Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mariana de Souza Cabezas.pdf: 1150017 bytes, checksum: 1b65dc9d20c52f075017a59c731fdcf3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-02 / The present master thesis deals with a new mechanism introduced by the new Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, called urgent interim relief , which stabilizes the effects of decisions that grant advance protection. Such interim relief is required in an anticipatory manner, prior to the defendant s response; in case the relief is granted and no appeal is filed against it aiming to invalidate, revoke or reform it, within two years, then the decision is stabilized. The matter was addressed under the perspective that this mechanism was included by the Brazilian legislator among other mechanisms of different jurisdictional reliefs, granted in summary proceedings, in which the adversary system is not only postponed, but also depends on the interested party s request for it to happen. The analysis carried out herein took the new approach given to the constitutional concept of jurisdictional relief as a starting point; thus, it encompasses the objective of enhancing several principles and rights protected by the due process of law guarantee, which included the principles of effectiveness, adversarial system, full defense and the right to trial within a reasonable time. Historically, the grant of jurisdictional reliefs has always been linked to an ordinary process that privileged a full examination of the facts involved in the controversy, thus worshiping the principles of certainty and legal safety. Such dogma was overruled, along with other ones, and the main reason for it derived from giving autonomy for these interim reliefs. However, controversies always arise from major changes; therefore, this thesis also analyzes the setbacks generally mentioned concerning the stabilization of this interim relief, as well as verifies its possible comparison with the effects caused by res judicata / A presente dissertação cuidou da análise da possibilidade, prevista no novo Código de Processo Civil, de estabilização dos efeitos da decisão concessiva da tutela antecipada de urgência, requerida em caráter antecedente, à míngua da competente impugnação pela parte contrária e do transcurso do prazo de dois anos previsto para o ajuizamento de ação tendente a invalidar, revogar ou reformá-la. Abordou-se a matéria sob a perspectiva de sua inserção no rol de mecanismos tendentes à conferência de tutela jurisdicional diferenciada, mediante provimento sumário autônomo, em que o contraditório é diferido e eventual, pois dependente do impulso processual da parte interessada e legitimada a fazê-lo. Para tanto, analisou-se o novo enfoque conferido ao conceito de tutela jurisdicional, com a promulgação da Constituição Federal de 1988, como forma de melhor concretizar os princípios constitucionais da efetividade da tutela jurisdicional, do contraditório, da ampla defesa e da razoável duração do processo, corolários do devido processo legal. Isso porque, historicamente, a prestação da tutela jurisdicional sempre esteve subordinada a um formato do processo que primava pela ordinariedade, mediante a cognição exauriente, em vista dos reclamos, igualmente relevantes, de paridade de armas entre os litigantes e dos imperativos de certeza e segurança jurídica. Verificou-se a superação desse dogma, e ainda, da instrumentalidade, acessoriedade e provisoriedade da tutela de urgência, mediante a autonomização daquela que for requerida em caráter antecedente. E, por fim, analisou-se as controvérsias em torno da estabilidade conferida ao provimento antecipatório e sua eventual equiparação aos efeitos da coisa julgada material

La rétroactivité étant un mode d’application d’une règle de droit dans le temps, il convient de se demander en premier lieu si le juge crée des règles de droit afin de savoir si la jurisprudence est rétroactive ou seulement déclarative. Pour répondre à cette interrogation, il a paru nécessaire de définir la règle de droit comme la règle ayant vocation à être utilisée par un juge pour trancher un litige. Puis, pour savoir si plus précisément le juge posait de telles règles de droit, il a été fait recours aux règles de reconnaissance de Hart, invitant à regarder l’attitude du législateur, du juge et du peuple pour voir si la jurisprudence était considérée comme source du droit. La réponse est affirmative en ce qui concerne celle de la Cour de cassation. Il devient alors nécessaire en deuxième lieu de s’interroger sur la cause de cette rétroactivité. La théorie naturaliste, soutenant que toute règle de droit est naturellement rétroactive, et la théorie mécaniste, expliquant la rétroactivité par la nécessité pour le juge d’appliquer la règle créée au litige qui lui est soumis, ont paru devoir être écartée. Le fondement de la rétroactivité serait la théorie de l’incorporation, dont l’application aux créations jurisprudentielles et aux changements d’interprétation serait justifiée par la prohibition des arrêts de règlement. Dès lors, et en troisième lieu, comment lutter contre l’insécurité juridique produite par la rétroactivité jurisprudentielle ? Deux solutions paraissent efficaces : soit permettre à la Cour de cassation de rendre des arrêts de règlement, soit introduire une sorte de référé législatif permettant à la Cour de cassation de demander au législateur de modifier la norme, plutôt que d’opérer un revirement rétroactif. Puisqu’il nous paraît opportun de conserver une complémentarité entre la loi et la jurisprudence, seule la création d’un référé-suggestion semble être une solution satisfaisante au problème de la rétroactivité de la jurisprudence. / As retroactivity constitutes an application process of the law in time, it is worth first asking whether a judge's rulings are considered as a rule of law whether such case law is retroactive or declarative. To answer this question, it seemed necessary to define the rule of law as the rule that is intended to be used by a judge to settle a dispute. Then, to check whether the judge do make such rules of law, the Hart recognition rules were applied, inviting us to look at the attitude of the legislator, the judge and of the people to see if case law was considered as a source of law. The answer is yes with respect to the French Supreme Court's case law (Cour de cassation). It then becomes necessary to question the cause of this retroactivity. The naturalistic theory, which provides that any rule of law is naturally retroactive; and the mechanistic theory which justifies retroactivity by the need for the judge to apply the rule created by its ruling to the dispute brought before him had to be excluded. The basis of retroactivity would be the incorporation theory, the application of which to case law as well as to changes in interpretation would be justified by the prohibition of regulatory judgements (arrêts de règlement). Therefore one may wonder how to avoid the legal uncertainty produced by the retroactivity of case law ? Two solutions seem to be effective: either to enable the French Supreme Court to make regulatory judgements, or to introduce a kind of legislative summary proceedings enabling the French Supreme Court to request from the legislator to amend the rule, instead of creating a retroactive overruling decision. As it seems appropriate to maintain the complementarity between statutory law and case law, the creation of a legislative summary proceeding appears to be the only satisfying solution to the case law retroactivity issue.