The focus of this discussion is whether there is still the need to enforce the restraint of trade agreements in their pre-Constitutional form. The dawn of the constitutional era has necessitated a re-examination of common law with a view to establishing whether the balance created by the latter (regarding this field) still exists. The Bill of Rights has obviously raised some doubts regarding the equilibrium desired between employer and employee interests. Section 22 of the Constitution is to the effect that everyone must be free to secure employment (as a fundamental right), whereas the common law restraint of trade agreements impose some bars to the operation of the said right. It is common course that the Constitution is more superior to common law, what remains a debateable issue is whether there are any reasonable limits that must be considered to justify the disregard of the Constitution. Serious arguments around the direct and indirect application of the Bill of Rights still persist and failure to resolve them would have the effect of excluding or weakening the application of the Bill to disputes arising in this field. In common law the enforcement of restraint agreements is sine qua non for the greater good of protecting the sanctity of contracts. Contractual obligations must be fulfilled unless it would be unreasonable to enforce same. The question of the onus to prove unreasonableness, which lies with the employee, turns to place an onerous burden on the employee. This coupled with the employee’s weaker bargaining power raises doubts as to whether the employee is in a better position to conclude a restraint of trade agreement. Common law does not consider or accommodate this concern in that its main object is the fulfilment of the agreement. It is believed that the Constitution has ushered in a new approach which focuses mainly on the fairness of the agreement itself. The enforcement of the agreement must pass the constitutional muster built in section 22 in order to ensure that there is equilibrium between the employer (the restrainor) and employee (the restrainee) interests. In the end this discussion explores whether it is justifiable to subject the Right to work (as provided by the Constitution) to the common law restraint which is opposed to the constitutional right. The circumstances under which the exclusion of section 22 is condonable are interrogated within the framework of conflicting case law. / LLM (Labour Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The focus of this discussion is whether there is still the need to enforce the restraint of trade agreements in their pre-Constitutional form. The dawn of the constitutional era has necessitated a re-examination of common law with a view to establishing whether the balance created by the latter (regarding this field) still exists. The Bill of Rights has obviously raised some doubts regarding the equilibrium desired between employer and employee interests. Section 22 of the Constitution is to the effect that everyone must be free to secure employment (as a fundamental right), whereas the common law restraint of trade agreements impose some bars to the operation of the said right. It is common course that the Constitution is more superior to common law, what remains a debateable issue is whether there are any reasonable limits that must be considered to justify the disregard of the Constitution. Serious arguments around the direct and indirect application of the Bill of Rights still persist and failure to resolve them would have the effect of excluding or weakening the application of the Bill to disputes arising in this field. In common law the enforcement of restraint agreements is sine qua non for the greater good of protecting the sanctity of contracts. Contractual obligations must be fulfilled unless it would be unreasonable to enforce same. The question of the onus to prove unreasonableness, which lies with the employee, turns to place an onerous burden on the employee. This coupled with the employee’s weaker bargaining power raises doubts as to whether the employee is in a better position to conclude a restraint of trade agreement. Common law does not consider or accommodate this concern in that its main object is the fulfilment of the agreement. It is believed that the Constitution has ushered in a new approach which focuses mainly on the fairness of the agreement itself. The enforcement of the agreement must pass the constitutional muster built in section 22 in order to ensure that there is equilibrium between the employer (the restrainor) and employee (the restrainee) interests. In the end this discussion explores whether it is justifiable to subject the Right to work (as provided by the Constitution) to the common law restraint which is opposed to the constitutional right. The circumstances under which the exclusion of section 22 is condonable are interrogated within the framework of conflicting case law. / LLM (Labour Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Primauté absolue du droit de l’UE ou suprématie des dispositions constitutionnelles ? Consacrée à l’analyse des conflits nés ou à naître entre normes constitutionnelle et celles du droit de l’UE, cette étude doctorale s’est focalisée sur l’analyse du lien entre les termes primauté et recours pour relever que dans ce genre de litiges contentieux un syllogisme juridique inédit est appliqué. Il s’agit de celui qui préserve cumulativement le critère hiérarchique caractérisant les ordres juridiques internes des États membres, à son sommet le principe de suprématie des dispositions constitutionnelles sur toutes les autres et l’application effective de la primauté matérielle du droit de l’Union ; les évolutions récentes du droit interne de l’UE convergent toutes dans ce sens : dans le cadre d’un litige contentieux, la primauté n’est plus une problématique de légalité constitutionnelle, le conflit est contourné. En la matière, les débats sur l’autorité et la force du droit international classique sur le droit constitutionnel ne se pose plus. Il a été séparé entre la force et l’effet des traités du droit international de l’Union. Pourtant sur le plan des principes, même au sein d’un État fédéral, le contenu définitionnel et surtout le maniement du texte constitutionnel n’ont pas été revisités ; la Constitution est le fondement sans être le contenu de validité de la primauté du droit de l’Union, le texte suprême opère en tant que technique de renvoi, il cadre deux types de champs en fonction du critère de l’objet du litige contentieux. Suprématie et primauté sont deux principes de nature juridique différente qui ne s’affrontent pas. La prévalence de la primauté matérielle du droit de l’Union n’affecte nullement la suprématie au sommet de la hiérarchie pyramidale des normes de chacun des États adhérents. / Absolute primacy of Community law or supremacy of constitutional provisions ? Devoted to the analysis of the conflicts born or to be born between EU law and constitutional standards, this doctoral study focused on analysis of the link between the terms of primacy or preemption rule and jurisdictional actions to raise that in this kind of litigation disputes a unreported legal syllogism is applied. It's one that cumulatively preserves the hierarchical criterion characterizing the domestic legal systems of the Member States, at its peak the principle of supremacy of the Constitution over all others and the effective application of the material primacy of Union law ; recent developments in internal law of the Union converge in this sense : in a dispute litigation, primacy is no longer a problem of constitutional legality, the conflict is circumvent. Concerning this matter, the debate on the authority and the force of traditional international law on constitutional law no longer arises. It has been separated between the force and the effect of the treaties of international law of the Union. Yet in terms of principles, even within a federal State, the definitional content and especially the handling of the constitutional text have not been revisited ; the Constitution is the legal basis without being the content validity of the primacy of Union law, the supreme text operates as a reference technique, it fits two types of fields based on the criterion of the contentious issue. Supremacy and rule are two different legal nature principles which do not compete. The prevalence of the material primacy of Union law sets no supremacy at the top of the pyramidal hierarchy of standards of each of the acceding States.