<p>After several scandals in the US, the focus on corporate governance has increased rapidly and led to implementations of “codes of best practice” in many countries. In 2002, the Swedish government appointed a committee with the purpose to develop a Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. The purpose with the code is to help the Swedish industry to regain its confidence in order to attract capital after the scandals that have occurred. The code shall be implemented by Swedish com-panies listed on the A-list on the Stockholm stock exchange and companies on the O-list with a market value above 3 billion SEK and shall be implemented by the 1:st of July 2005.</p><p>The code is based on the principle “comply or explain” which means that companies do not have to comply with the requirements of the code as long as they explain their reasons why they deviate. The purpose of this thesis is thereby to examine to what extent Swedish companies prepare to comply or are already complying with the requirements of the code and the reasons for possible deviations regarding the level of compliance between the companies. In order to answer the purpose stated, the authors have chosen to use both a quantitative and a qualitative method. The authors have sent surveys to all companies obliged to implement the code in order to find out to what extent the Swedish companies prepare to comply or are already complying with the code today. In order to answer the second research question, why companies prepare to comply, or are complying to different degrees, hypotheses were stated and interviews with five companies listed on the Stockholm stock exchange were made.</p><p>The authors found a high compliance rate among Swedish companies, with a mean of 88,49%. The companies on the A-list are complying to a larger extent than the ones on the O-list. Based on the hypotheses, the authors found that companies with higher turnovers are more likely to comply with the code to a larger extent than companies with lower turnovers. Additional reasons to a high degree of compliance rate with the code, are: the need for resources, the impact of media, the culture and personal values within the organization and the fact that the code does not imply any major changes for the organization. Reasons why companies do not prepare to comply or are already complying to a large extent are: the increased devotion of resources that the implementation requires, the high level of details and the complicated requirements of the code. These last-mentioned factors lead to difficulties to interpret the requirements of the code and increased bureaucracy, which thereby lead to a lower level of compliance.</p>

After several scandals in the US, the focus on corporate governance has increased rapidly and led to implementations of “codes of best practice” in many countries. In 2002, the Swedish government appointed a committee with the purpose to develop a Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. The purpose with the code is to help the Swedish industry to regain its confidence in order to attract capital after the scandals that have occurred. The code shall be implemented by Swedish com-panies listed on the A-list on the Stockholm stock exchange and companies on the O-list with a market value above 3 billion SEK and shall be implemented by the 1:st of July 2005. The code is based on the principle “comply or explain” which means that companies do not have to comply with the requirements of the code as long as they explain their reasons why they deviate. The purpose of this thesis is thereby to examine to what extent Swedish companies prepare to comply or are already complying with the requirements of the code and the reasons for possible deviations regarding the level of compliance between the companies. In order to answer the purpose stated, the authors have chosen to use both a quantitative and a qualitative method. The authors have sent surveys to all companies obliged to implement the code in order to find out to what extent the Swedish companies prepare to comply or are already complying with the code today. In order to answer the second research question, why companies prepare to comply, or are complying to different degrees, hypotheses were stated and interviews with five companies listed on the Stockholm stock exchange were made. The authors found a high compliance rate among Swedish companies, with a mean of 88,49%. The companies on the A-list are complying to a larger extent than the ones on the O-list. Based on the hypotheses, the authors found that companies with higher turnovers are more likely to comply with the code to a larger extent than companies with lower turnovers. Additional reasons to a high degree of compliance rate with the code, are: the need for resources, the impact of media, the culture and personal values within the organization and the fact that the code does not imply any major changes for the organization. Reasons why companies do not prepare to comply or are already complying to a large extent are: the increased devotion of resources that the implementation requires, the high level of details and the complicated requirements of the code. These last-mentioned factors lead to difficulties to interpret the requirements of the code and increased bureaucracy, which thereby lead to a lower level of compliance.

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to present an overview of the Swedish listed companies and their compliance with the Code and its normative rules for independent decision-making.  Methodology: The authors have read and delved into the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. The authors have chosen to study the enforcement of the code based on independent bracing guidelines. The study was conducted through a combined quantitative and qualitative approach. The study is based on primary data collected in the form of companies' corporate governance reports, which have been supplemented by structured interviews. Frame of reference: Swedish ownership structure and concentrated ownership, self regulation and normative guidelines, institutional theory and earlier research on this topic. Empirical foundations: A comparison of the selected companies has been based on the independence rules of the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. A specific company has been presented with the company's application of the code, interviews have also been done with this company to increase the understanding of the empirical basis further. Conclusions: There are several flaws with the code and how it is applied today. The Code is complied with in an inadequate manner, and in some cases not complied with at all. The authors of this paper believe that the code, through normative guidelines, will not have a self-regulating effect on an independent decision-making in companies in Sweden.

<p>Syfte:                                                                         </p><p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur organisation, intern kontroll och eventuella bolagsstyrningsrapporter förändrats i de tre undersökta bolagen i och med införandet av den reviderade koden den 1 juli 2008. Vidare är vårt syfte att undersöka om revisorernas arbete påverkats i och med införandet av den reviderade koden och hur Kollegiet upplever att implementering av densamma fungerat.</p><p>Metod:                                                     </p><p>Undersökningen bygger på en kvalitativ forskningsmetod där primärdata studerades i form av bolagsstyrningsrapporter från de granskade bolagens årsredovisningar samt intervjuer av semistrukturerad karaktär. Intervjuerna har gjorts med representanter för tre revisionsbyråer, tre börsnoterade bolag som följer koden sedan 1 juli 2008 samt Per Lekvall representant för Kollegiet för svensk bolagsstyrning.</p><p>Slutsats:                                                   </p><p>Författarna har kommit fram till att implementeringen av den reviderade koden inte har blivit så omfattande och krävt några större förändringar som många av de mindre/medelstora bolagen kanske oroat sig för. Anledningen till detta är att bolagen redan följer många delar av koden sedan tidigare samt att koden inte innehåller några revolutionerande förändringar för bolagen.</p> / <p>Purpose:                                                   </p><p>The purpose with this thesis is to study how the organization, intern control and possible corporate governance reports changed in three companies since they started to follow the modified code 1 july 2008. Further is the purpose to study if the work of the audits has been affected since the adoption of the modified code and how the Swedish Corporate Governance Board has experienced the implementation of the Swedish code of corporate governance.</p><p>Method:                                                   </p><p>The Research is built on a qualitative method where primary data was studied in form of corporate governance reports reports taken from the reviewed companies annual reports and from semi-structured interviews. The interviews has been done with representatives from three audit bureaus, three companies noted on the Swedish stock exchanged, who has followed the code since 1 july 2008 and Per Lekvall from the Swedish Corporate Governance Board.</p><p>Conclusion:                                             </p><p>The Authors has realised that the implementation of the modified code has not brought any big changes as many of the small/ medium-sized companies maybe worrying about. The reason is that many of these companies are already following a large part of the code and that the code does not contain any revolutionary changes.</p>

Syfte:                                                                          Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur organisation, intern kontroll och eventuella bolagsstyrningsrapporter förändrats i de tre undersökta bolagen i och med införandet av den reviderade koden den 1 juli 2008. Vidare är vårt syfte att undersöka om revisorernas arbete påverkats i och med införandet av den reviderade koden och hur Kollegiet upplever att implementering av densamma fungerat. Metod:                                                      Undersökningen bygger på en kvalitativ forskningsmetod där primärdata studerades i form av bolagsstyrningsrapporter från de granskade bolagens årsredovisningar samt intervjuer av semistrukturerad karaktär. Intervjuerna har gjorts med representanter för tre revisionsbyråer, tre börsnoterade bolag som följer koden sedan 1 juli 2008 samt Per Lekvall representant för Kollegiet för svensk bolagsstyrning. Slutsats:                                                    Författarna har kommit fram till att implementeringen av den reviderade koden inte har blivit så omfattande och krävt några större förändringar som många av de mindre/medelstora bolagen kanske oroat sig för. Anledningen till detta är att bolagen redan följer många delar av koden sedan tidigare samt att koden inte innehåller några revolutionerande förändringar för bolagen. / Purpose:                                                    The purpose with this thesis is to study how the organization, intern control and possible corporate governance reports changed in three companies since they started to follow the modified code 1 july 2008. Further is the purpose to study if the work of the audits has been affected since the adoption of the modified code and how the Swedish Corporate Governance Board has experienced the implementation of the Swedish code of corporate governance. Method:                                                    The Research is built on a qualitative method where primary data was studied in form of corporate governance reports reports taken from the reviewed companies annual reports and from semi-structured interviews. The interviews has been done with representatives from three audit bureaus, three companies noted on the Swedish stock exchanged, who has followed the code since 1 july 2008 and Per Lekvall from the Swedish Corporate Governance Board. Conclusion:                                              The Authors has realised that the implementation of the modified code has not brought any big changes as many of the small/ medium-sized companies maybe worrying about. The reason is that many of these companies are already following a large part of the code and that the code does not contain any revolutionary changes.

Författare:                   Marcus Davidsson, Camilla Johansson och Johanna Nilsson Handledare:                 Ola Nilsson Titel:                             Hur hanterar företagen kravet på revisionsutskott? – en studie av fem svenska börsföretag Bakgrund:                   Under sommaren 2008 blev Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning obligatorisk för samtliga svenska företag som är noterade på den svenska börsen. Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning stadgar bland annat att företagens styrelser skall inrätta ett revisionsutskott. Företagen kan dock välja att inte inrätta ett revisionsutskott och då förklara varför, enligt principen ”följ eller förklara”. Syfte:                            Syftet med studien är att öka kunskapen kring hur företag hanterar Svensk kod för bolagsstyrnings krav kring revisionsutskott samt vilken nytta revisionsutskottet upplevs tillföra i styrelsearbetet. Metod:                          En kvalitativ intervjustudie har genomförts. Studien omfattade fem styrelseledamöter från fem börsnoterade företag på OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm. Slutsats:                        Studien visar att fyra av de fem företagen som ingått i studien har valt att inrätta revisionsutskott. Majoriteten av dessa har inrättat revisionsutskotten som ett resultat av strävan att följa Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning. Vidare har studien visat att styrelserna har satt samman revisionsutskott på olika sätt, både vad gäller ekonomisk kompetens och oberoende. Merparten av företagen i studien ställer höga krav på vad revisionsutskotten skall utföra för uppgifter och upplever att utskotten tillför nytta i styrelsearbetet.

The aim of this essay is to examine why Swedish-English code-switching occurs, focusing on one person. The idiolect examined is Simon Davies, hosting the TV-show Design: Simon &amp; Tomas where Simon Davies and his colleague Tomas Cederlund travel around Sweden helping Swedes with interior design. Season three of the show was transcribed into written data and theories were later used when analyzing the data transcribed from the TV-show. The data was analyzed from a qualitative and a quantitative aspect as well as mixed and unmixed utterances. This was done in order to see if there is a pattern in the way Davies switches as well as further understand what kind of items are switched. As this is done, the essay analyses the possible reasons for why Davies switches using the theories displayed earlier. The results show that Davies’ idiolect does not fully follow any specific pattern, however most of the words switched are nouns and the least common word class is prepositions. However, theories applied show that Davies’ switching could be a way for him to create an identity and connect with Swedes. The use of Swedish could help him seem friendlier and less like a stranger.

<p><strong>Författare:                   </strong>Marcus Davidsson, Camilla Johansson och Johanna Nilsson</p><p><strong>Handledare:                 </strong>Ola Nilsson</p><p><strong>Titel:                             </strong>Hur hanterar företagen kravet på revisionsutskott? – <em>en studie av fem svenska börsföretag</em></p><p><strong>Bakgrund:                   </strong>Under sommaren 2008 blev Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning obligatorisk för samtliga svenska företag som är noterade på den svenska börsen. Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning stadgar bland annat att företagens styrelser skall inrätta ett revisionsutskott. Företagen kan dock välja att inte inrätta ett revisionsutskott och då förklara varför, enligt principen ”följ eller förklara”.</p><p><strong>Syfte:                            </strong>Syftet med studien är att öka kunskapen kring hur företag hanterar Svensk kod för bolagsstyrnings krav kring revisionsutskott samt vilken nytta revisionsutskottet upplevs tillföra i styrelsearbetet.</p><p><strong>Metod:                          </strong>En kvalitativ intervjustudie har genomförts. Studien omfattade fem styrelseledamöter från fem börsnoterade företag på OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm.</p><p><strong>Slutsats:                        </strong>Studien visar att fyra av de fem företagen som ingått i studien har valt att inrätta revisionsutskott. Majoriteten av dessa har inrättat revisionsutskotten som ett resultat av strävan att följa Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning. Vidare har studien visat att styrelserna har satt samman revisionsutskott på olika sätt, både vad gäller ekonomisk kompetens och oberoende. Merparten av företagen i studien ställer höga krav på vad revisionsutskotten skall utföra för uppgifter och upplever att utskotten tillför nytta i styrelsearbetet.</p>

<p>The aim of this essay is to examine why Swedish-English code-switching occurs, focusing on one person. The <em>idiolect</em> examined is Simon Davies, hosting the TV-show <em>Design: Simon & Tomas</em> where Simon Davies and his colleague Tomas Cederlund travel around Sweden helping Swedes with interior design. Season three of the show was transcribed into written data and theories were later used when analyzing the data transcribed from the TV-show. The data was analyzed from a <em>qualitative</em> and a <em>quantitative</em> aspect as well as <em>mixed</em> and <em>unmixed</em> utterances. This was done in order to see if there is a pattern in the way Davies switches as well as further understand what kind of items are switched. As this is done, the essay analyses the possible reasons for why Davies switches using the theories displayed earlier. The results show that Davies’ idiolect does not fully follow any specific pattern, however most of the words switched are nouns and the least common word class is prepositions. However, theories applied show that Davies’ switching could be a way for him to create an identity and connect with Swedes. The use of Swedish could help him seem friendlier and less like a stranger.</p>

<p>In society today large corporations are striving to regain the trust, which has been lost dur-ing the many accounting scandals that occurred lately. As a response to minimize the con-flicts countries have introduced codes of corporate governance. It is common knowledge that a company’s stakeholders and shareholders have different knowledge and interest in the company and the annual report is the agent’s main communication channel towards the principals. The Swedish code of corporate governance was implemented in July 2005 in an attempt to reduce the information gap between the managers of the company and the own-ers.</p><p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine if and how the Swedish code of corporate govern-ance has affected the content in annual reports in Sweden. We will evaluate and explain why listed companies have changed the information provided in their annual reports from the year 2001 prior to the codes existence, during the code’s implementation in year 2005, and after the implementation in 2006.</p><p>A deductive method created our research model, which was used as a tool to gather the empirical findings. Agency Theory, Institutional Theory and the Swedish code constitute the foundation for our evaluation of 65 companies’ annual reports from three individual years. Once our research model was created, an explorative and inductive method was used analyse and interpret the empirical findings.</p><p>Our conclusion is that corporate governance information in annual reports has increased, and the implementation of the Swedish code of corporate governance has affected the in-formation provided to the shareholders. Between 2001 and 2005 a rapid growth in infor-mation can be view, while only minor improvement can be found between 2005 and 2006. The Swedish code has been successful in its implementation as stakeholders and share-holders have received more information from the annual reports. However, we are ques-tioning the Swedish code for its extensive dimensions. Some areas of the Swedish code are provided with sufficient guidelines, while others would bring with it improved information to the shareholders by more detailed instructions. Many of the investigated companies have had their corporate governance information reviewed by an external auditor in 2005 and it is unexpected to see that this has been excluded in 2006. The examined companies provide information regarding many of the Swedish code’s rules, but we found the information re-lated to internal control, managing director and attendance at the general meeting insuffi-cient.</p>