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Reverse Auction Bidding: A statistical review of the first case studyGuhya, Dhaval C. 2010 May 1900 (has links)
It was in 2004 that the first case study was done by on the ongoing Reverse Auction Bidding at Texas A&M University. This long-term study has developed from a single case study, completed by van Vleet, to a series of case studies, now combined with personality testing of all participants. van Vleet developed a Microsoft Access database system and Active Server Pages web based user interface for the study. The first case study involved five participants with no prior experience in Reverse Auction Bidding. A study with five participants is considered competitive in accordance with the standard economic Herfindahl Index. van Vleet, concluded that the results showed a level of co-operation in the bidding game between the nominal competitors. In 2010 John Nichols coined the term "tacit collusion" to identify this apparent behavioural pattern observed in the bidding. A significant element of the studies from 2005 to 2009 has been to investigate the "tacit collusion" behaviour. Tacit collusion is not considered an illegal economic behaviour. In 2006 Seth Gregory encountered significant problems with a study involving ten participants using the Access database, as a result of Access' limitations on the number of connections. Gregory's study was migrated to a Microsoft SQL database that was developed by Wellington (2006) and which overcame the limitations. SQL database systems can generate a significant quantity of data which create a computer science problem, now commonly termed 'Data rich - analysis poor'. This study is the first in a series of studies to undertake a detailed statistical study of the early case studies to provide a set of algorithms for development of SQL queries for automated real-time data analysis of future Reverse Auction Bidding case studies. This study showed that a fifth order polynomial fit the contract time compared to the job number. Analysis of the number of bids per minute for the fifteen minutes of bid time showed a log-polynomial equation which provided a reasonable fit to the data. Two sub-games were postulated to describe the operational aspects of the auction. The first game, termed the - game, is between the players with the objective of maximizing average return and the second game, termed the - game, has the objective of average cost minimization for the purchasers and maximization of revenue for the seller group. In conclusion, Reverse Auction Bidding systems are not bid shopping, but the tenet that the purchaser will reduce costs in this type of system compared to the traditional closed bid system is not confirmed with van Vleet's data and any careful consideration of the results of canny players in the 'game suggests higher than average returns for some bidders. The results show a number of patterns in the data that warrant further study, particularly the characteristics of the canny players in the alpha game suggests higher than average returns for some bidders. The results show a number of patterns in the data that warrant further study, particularly the characteristics of the canny players.
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Owner's Interference in Reverse Auction Bidding to Skew a Free MarketChaudhari, Sushil V. 2009 December 1900 (has links)
Reverse auction bidding is an online auction system. A purchaser's primary objective in
using a reverse auction is to obtain the lowest possible bid for goods and services on a
construction project. With this type of bidding, it is normal that the purchaser will only
consider price, instead of a bidders' work history and experience. As a reverse auction is
an online service, the common misperception is that a purchaser can reach a broader
market to obtain the lowest possible price. It is a controversial bidding system. No
previous research has been undertaken by the Texas A&M University Reverse Auction
Bidding study group into potential owner interference with the bidding system for a
reverse auction.
Six bidders were asked to participate in the Reverse Auction Bidding process for a series
of construction projects in Houston. Each participant was also asked to complete a
Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test type I and II to determine each participant's
personality. After the tests, the six participants competed in an online reverse auction
bidding game. The primary objective of this research is to analyze the impact of an
owner's interference in a reverse auction bidding scenario. In this test, one of the six
bidders acted as the owner's surrogate to interfere with an ethical process and reduce the
owner's costs. The other five bidders were unaware of the surrogate's role in the
bidding. The primary directive given to the surrogate bidder was to drive down the cost
of the projects. The results for the research study show that the owner's surrogate can
affect the bidding process. Interference results in reduced returns for the bidders when
compared to an uncompromised bidding scenario. It is clear that the method used is
unethical.
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Statistical Analysis of the Fourth Case Study in Reverse Auction ResearchBhalerao, Aneesh Madhao 2011 August 1900 (has links)
Participating in an auction and winning items by placing bids has been in practice since at least 500 B.C. Auctions have evolved since then and anyone can now participate in one online and buy items ranging from clothes, electronics, automobiles and homes using online auction websites, such as eBay. A Reverse Auction varies from the traditional style of Auction where items or services are won by placing successive higher bids until the auction ends. The study of Reverse Auction was first introduced to Texas A & M University in 2004 and continues today, using a SQL based web system.
This current research provides a detailed statistical analysis of the fourth case study in this long running work. This fourth case study involved the participation of five bidders who had no prior experience in Reverse Auctions. A Microsoft Access database system and ASP web based user interface was developed and used to conduct these initial studies. However, due to the limited capability of the Access system to handle more than a limited number of connections or bidders, a Microsoft SQL database and web system was developed in 2006 and has been used in all subsequent studies. Case studies have involved up to ten participants. The results from the fourth case study show that a Reverse Auction can result in an increase in the average cost of the job to the owner. Also, there is evidence of game play amongst the bidders and against the purchaser that causes their profits to rise as they gain proficiency in the game. This behavior has been termed as 'tacit collision', but it is considered a byproduct of the system and not illegal behavior. This study analyzes the fourth study data to investigate if the behavior termed "tacit collusion" is evident in the bidding data. This analysis is completed by performing a detailed statistical analysis of the bidding data.
Analysis of the profit percentages illustrates the different stages of the game play amongst the bidders. This game play behavior is illustrated by plotting average number of bids to the profit made by each bidder. The data clearly suggests that the players became efficient in their bidding strategy, although some bidders are more efficient than others. This observation negates the common conception that Reverse Auctions will result in lowering average costs for the owners.
The individual data of bidders for bids and profit reveal why some players were able to obtain higher than average results and why the others were not. This study can be taken further by analyzing the patterns of the successful and unsuccessful players to determine what causes them to gain or lose profits.
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ESSAYS ON SPATIAL COMPETITION AND COLLUSION IN THE BANK DEPOSIT MARKETOh, Yoon Hae 25 September 2012 (has links)
No description available.
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Draudimas piktnaudžiauti kolektyvine dominuojančia padėtimi pagal EB Sutarties 82 straipsnį / Prohibition to abuse a collective dominant position under article 82 of EC TreatyRučinskaitė, Akvilė 11 January 2007 (has links)
This work deals with legal aspects of collective dominant position under Article 82 of the Treaty establishing European Community (hereinafter- EC). The purpose is to reveal a legal definition and main features of collective dominant position. The author examines features and criteria which are established in the jurisprudence of EC institutions. The author examines features and criteria which are established in the jurisprudence of EC institutions. The author also indicates that the criteria for establishing collective dominance are not fully scrutinized under EC competition law. Moreover, the practice of EC institutions is analyzed not only under Article 82, which prohibits abuse of a dominant position, but also under Merger regulation to that extent which is necessary to reveal the main topic. Further the work presents problems which are found under these two institutions of EC competition law.
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FIRM BIDDING BEHAVIOR IN HIGHWAY PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF SINGLE-BID CONTRACTS, TACIT COLLUSION, AND THE FINANCIAL IMPACT ON KENTUCKYBarrus, David R. 01 January 2011 (has links)
Recently, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) indicated lack of competition and single-bid contracts in asphalt paving as a major issue facing state transportation departments. Single-bid contracts indicate a lack of competition which increases costs to state and local governments. During the period from 2005-2007 in Kentucky, 42 percent of all bids were awarded with only one firm bidding on the project. Of the asphalt paving jobs, 63 percent of those jobs were awarded to a single bidder.
The analysis of this dissertation focuses on detecting tacit collusion in asphalt paving jobs in Kentucky. A focal point enables firms to coordinate bids and engage in a tit-for-tat strategy where they refuse to bid in each other’s counties. In this case the focal point is the county boundaries. Two factors contribute to the ability of firms to use county boundaries to coordinate bids. The first factor is that the political county boundaries form relatively small counties which allow a firm’s service area to cover multiple counties. The firms are able to claim counties and service the projects in those counties. The second factor is that a majority of asphalt projects which the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet puts up for bidding are exclusive to a specific county. This allows firms to know whether a project falls in a county within their bidding territory.
Each county and firm in each of the 12 Kentucky Transportation Cabinet geographic districts was analyzed to see if there was evidence of bid coordination. The result is that in 94 out of 120 counties there was evidence of bid coordination or tacit collusion with increases in bid levels. There is evidence that 25 of the 31 Kentucky asphalt paving firms refuse to bid against their rivals in their rival’s territories. This refusal by firms to bid against each other resulted in single-bid contracts that were $70,595,466.09 above the competitive level.
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Detecção de cartéis por marcadores de colusãoFetter, Seiji Kumon 05 March 2012 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2012-03-05 / Modelos teóricos de colusão tácita podem fornecer predições sobre preços ou outras variáveis estratégicas que permitam a detecção de conduta anticompetitiva. Esses marcadores de colusão geram hipóteses testáveis sobre o comportamento cíclico dos preços, sua dispersão entre concorrentes e sua variabilidade temporal. Utilizando dados municipais mensais para preços e custos da gasolina, regressões de painel dinâmico em forma reduzida são realizadas para averiguar a aderência empírica desses marcadores. Os efeitos são identificados comparando com 10 municípios que tiveram cartéis operando no varejo de combustíveis. Os resultados corroboraram as predições de preços anticíclicos e redução da dispersão dos preços, ainda que com ressalvas. Porém, não se encontrou evidências de aumento de volatilidade nos preços induzidos por choques adversos de demanda, que pretende capturar uma maior frequência de guerras de preços. A redução da volatilidade dos preços é parcialmente confirmada. / Theoretic models of tacit collusion may offer predictions over prices or other strategic variables that allow for the detection of anticompetitive conduct. These collusion markers generate testable implications on the cyclical movement of prices, its dispersion and its time series variability. Using municipal monthly data of gasoline prices and costs, reduced-form dynamic panel regressions are employed to assess the empirical adherence of these markers. The effects are identified through comparison against 10 municipalities, which exhibited episodes of cartelization. The results point to some evidence of countercyclical pricing and price dispersion reduction. However, no evidence if found for price wars, measured through increased price volatility due to adverse demand shocks. The prediction of price volatility reduction is partially sustained.
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Quantity choices and market power in electricity marketsLe Coq, Chloé January 2003 (has links)
Competitive power markets from different countries exhibit a common market design, especially because of the nature of electricity (lack of storage, inelastic load, and strong seasonal effects on multiple time scales). For example, a majority of countries have created a spot market where electricity is traded hourly. The design of the spot markets reflected an ambition of providing strong incentives for efficient and least-cost production. Subsequently, the spot market price has been considered as a reference price for other existing electricity markets such as the contract market or the real-time market. However, empirical studies on electricity markets find some evidence of abnormally high markups. The literature on the electricity spot market mainly focuses on the producers' pricing decisions. The present thesis argues that quantity choices, both in terms of available as well as contracted quantities, are crucial for understanding market power in electricity markets. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2003 [4], iii, [1] s., s. 1-6: sammanfattning, s. 7-119, [5] s.: 4 uppsatser
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Essays on managerial incentives and product-market competitionSpagnolo, Giancarlo January 1999 (has links)
This dissertation consists of four self-contained essays primarily concerned with incorporating the objectives of real world top managers, as revealed by the available empirical evidence, in supergame-theoretic analyses of long-term competition between oligopolistic firms. The first essay, "Ownership, Control, and Collusion", considers how the separation between ownership and control affects firms' competitive attitudes when top managers have the preference for smooth profit streams revealed by the evidence on "income smoothing" and when managerial compensation has the low pay-performance sensitivity found in many empirical studies. In a similar fashion, the second essay, "Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition", deals with the effects of the apparently more aggressive managerial incentives linked to stock price (e.g. stock options), which have become increasingly common in the U.S., on long-term oligopolistic competition. In the third paper, "Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device", shareholders’ commitments to reduce conflicts with debtholders by choosing a top manager with a highly valuable reputation or with "conservative" incentives are considered. These forms of commitment have been shown to reduce the (agency) cost of debt finance; this paper characterizes their effects on the relation between firms' capital structure and product market competition. The fourth paper, "Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion", addresses the relation between multimarket contact and firms’ ability to sustain collusive behavior in repeated oligopolies. It explores how this relation is affected by the strict concavity of firms’ objective function induced by managerial objectives and by other features of reality, discusses the effects of conglomeration and horizontal mergers, and extends the results to non-oligopolistic supergames. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1999</p>
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Detecting Collusion in Spatially Differentiated MarketsFirgo, Matthias, Kügler, Agnes 10 1900 (has links) (PDF)
The empirical literature on mergers, market power and collusion in differentiated markets has mainly focused on
methods relying on output and/or panel data. In contrast to this literature we suggest a novel approach that allows for
the detection of collusive behavior among a group of firms making use of information on the spatial structure of horizontally differentiated products. By estimating best response functions using a spatial econometrics approach, we focus on differences in the strategic interaction in pricing between different groups of firms as well as on differences in price levels. We apply our method to the market for ski lift tickets using a unique data set on ticket prices and detailed resort-specific characteristics covering all ski resorts in Austria. (authors' abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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