Sedan attacken på USA 11 september 2001 har åtskilliga rapporter skrivits om Talibanernaför att skapa underlag för styrkorna som bekämpar dem. Syftet med uppsatsen är att försökaåskådliggöra en struktur på styret av talibanernas organisation 2009 och förklara varför dehade denna struktur på styret med utgångspunkt i den religiösa utbildningen. Och i och meddetta bidra till forskningsläget om talibanerna. Frågeställningen som besvaras i uppsatsen är:Vilken struktur hade styret av talibanernas organisation 2009 och varför hade styret dennastruktur? Denna frågeställning löses ut av följande 2 frågor: Fråga 1 - Kan strukturen påstyret av talibanernas organisation 2009 beskrivas med hjälp av en strukturellorganisationsteori? Fråga 2 - Kan den religiösa utbildningen vara en förklaring till dennastruktur på styret?Med hjälp av en strukturell teori om organisationers form och två sociologiska teorier sombehandlar varför människor och grupper handlar som de gör utifrån deras bakgrund ska jagförsöka uppfylla uppsatsens syfte och beskriva hur strukturen på styret av talibanernasorganisation såg ut 2009 och förklara varför den såg ut så.Uppsatsen använder en kvalitativ metod där divisionaliserad organisation, habitus och dendolda läroplanen används som teorier. I den första analysen som svarar på den första frågangörs en fallstudie på ett dokument som beskriver regler och förhållningssätt för talibanernaunder Mullah Omar med hjälp av divisionaliserad organisation. Därefter för att svara påuppsatsens andra fråga analyseras talibanernas habitus utifrån den religiösa utbildningen föratt sedan analyseras med hjälp av Pierre Bourdieus habitusteori och Donald Broadys dendolda läroplanen.Resultatet av analyserna visar att strukturen på styret av talibanernas organisation 2009 tillstor del kan beskrivas med teorin om divisionaliserad organisation och att habitusteorin medstöd av den dolda läroplanen kan ge en förklaring till varför deras styre hade denna struktur2009 utifrån de enskilda individernas religiösa utbildning i södra Afghanistan och Pakistan. / Since the attack on The United States of America September 11 2001 numerous reports hasbeen written about the Taleban to provide information to the forces fighting them. Thepurpose of my thesis is to try to illustrate a structure on the rule of the Taliban organisation2009 and explain why they had this structure on their rule based on religious education. Andby this contribute to the current research about the Taliban. To fulfil this purpose I willanswers the following question in the thesis: What structure did the Taliban have on the ruleof their organisation in 2009 and why did the rule have this structure? This main questionwill be answered through two sub questions: Question 1 – Can the structure of the rule of theTaliban organisation 2009 be described by using a structural theory about organisations?Question 2 – Can the religious education be an explanation to this structure of their rule?With the help of one structural theory about organisations and two sociological theory’sthat concerns why people and groups act the way they do based of their background I will tryto fulfil the purpose of the thesis and describe the structure of the rule of the Talibanorganisation 2009 and explain why the rule had this structure.The thesis uses a qualitative method and divisionaliserad organisation, habitus and thehidden curriculum as theories. In the first analyse that answers to the first question I make acase study on a document that describes rules and regulations for the Taliban’s under MullahOmar using Henry Mintzbergs theory of divisionaliserad organisation. Thereafter to answerthe second question I first analyse the Taliban habitus based on their religious education.Then I continue the analysis using Pierre Bourdieus theory of habitus and Donald Broadysthe hidden curriculum.The result of the two analyses shows that the structure of the rule of the Talibanorganisation 2009 can be described fairly well using the theory of divisionaliseradorganisation. It also shows that the theory of habitus with the support of the hiddencurriculum can give an explanation to why their rule had this structure 2009 based on theindividual’s religious education in southern Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This thesis addresses an identified gap in the field of rebel governance and rebel funding, by theorizing and investigating how differences in rebel group funding sources affect a group’s engagement in rebel governance, distinguishing funding through natural resources from funding through non-natural resources. It is highlighted that these sources differ in three fundamental ways: their necessity for civilian labor and cooperation, the extent to which equipment, technology and infrastructure are required, and the expected time of pay-off. It is hypothesized that the degree to which a rebel group depends on natural resources determines the likelihood to which it engages in rebel governance - i.e. intervenes in all security, political, social, health and educational spheres of civilian life. This hypothesis is investigated through a comparative case study of two rebel groups from 2003 to 2018: the Taliban in Afghanistan, which generated its funding primarily through Afghanistan’s opium economy, and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, later known as Al-Qaeda in Maghreb, which generated its funding through ‘criminal activities’ such as kidnappings for ransom. The findings suggest some level of support for the hypothesis. Inconsistencies in the findings limiting generalizability and the need for further investigations are discussed.

<p>På hösten 1996 tog talibanerna makten i Afghanistan. Till en början hyllades de som hjältar av många eftersom de skapade ordning i landet och utrotade mer eller mindre all kriminalitet som under åren efter Sovjets ockupation ökat dramatiskt. Ganska snart började talibanerna införa regler och förordningar där de bland annat förbjöd musik, dans, drakflygning och andra nöjen. De beordrade männen att odla sitt skägg och kvinnorna att gömma sig bakom en burqa om de måste ut på gatorna, helst skulle de hålla sig hemma och inte visa sig bland folk. För de många afghaner som levt ett modernt liv med jeans, gympaskor, hitmusik och västerländska videofilmer blev talibanernas maktövertagande en chock. Latifa var 16 år när talibanerna intog Kabul. Tidigare levde hon som vilken 16-åring som helst. Hon brukade jogga på mornarna, gick i skolan och hade många vänner. För henne förändrades livet från frihet till fängelse. Männen beordrades klippa sitt hår och låta sitt skägg växa. Den som hade dålig skäggväxt eller för långt hår riskerade att bli straffad av sedlighetsministeriets poliser. Idrottsarrangemang byttes ut mot avrättningar och all form av kulturella yttringar bannlystes. Afghanistan skulle bli ett strikt muslimskt land med de strängaste och mest extrema sharialagar som världen skådat.</p><p>Den här uppsatsen belyser talibanernas tolkning av sharialagstiftningen kontra Koranen samt jämför med andra muslimska samhällens sätt att tolka sharia.</p>

På hösten 1996 tog talibanerna makten i Afghanistan. Till en början hyllades de som hjältar av många eftersom de skapade ordning i landet och utrotade mer eller mindre all kriminalitet som under åren efter Sovjets ockupation ökat dramatiskt. Ganska snart började talibanerna införa regler och förordningar där de bland annat förbjöd musik, dans, drakflygning och andra nöjen. De beordrade männen att odla sitt skägg och kvinnorna att gömma sig bakom en burqa om de måste ut på gatorna, helst skulle de hålla sig hemma och inte visa sig bland folk. För de många afghaner som levt ett modernt liv med jeans, gympaskor, hitmusik och västerländska videofilmer blev talibanernas maktövertagande en chock. Latifa var 16 år när talibanerna intog Kabul. Tidigare levde hon som vilken 16-åring som helst. Hon brukade jogga på mornarna, gick i skolan och hade många vänner. För henne förändrades livet från frihet till fängelse. Männen beordrades klippa sitt hår och låta sitt skägg växa. Den som hade dålig skäggväxt eller för långt hår riskerade att bli straffad av sedlighetsministeriets poliser. Idrottsarrangemang byttes ut mot avrättningar och all form av kulturella yttringar bannlystes. Afghanistan skulle bli ett strikt muslimskt land med de strängaste och mest extrema sharialagar som världen skådat. Den här uppsatsen belyser talibanernas tolkning av sharialagstiftningen kontra Koranen samt jämför med andra muslimska samhällens sätt att tolka sharia.

This paper deals with the post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan after the NATO-invasion at the end of 2001 and its success. To ensure the stability of the country, the NATO-led coalition had not only to overthrow the Taliban regime, but also to create basic government structures and help them perform. Reconstruction is of course very common and necessary after conflict, it is however usually operated by strictly civilian measures, e. g. government institutions and humanitarian organisations. In this case, however, such approach was not possible due to volatile security situation, which in some areas grew to such intensity, it essentially became a war-conflict again. This paper focuses on the Herat province and NATO units, especially under ISAF command. It seeks to define the process of post-conflict reconstruction and using the process-tracing method, it then ascertains the extent to which ISAF units dedicated themselves to post-conflict reconstruction and made a positive progress in this area. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

This research paper investigates the current turmoil in Pakistan and how much of it has been caused by the joint American-Pakistani War on Terror. The United States' portion of the War on Terror is in Afghanistan against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces that began after the September 11th attacks in 2001, as well as in Pakistan with unmanned drone attacks. Pakistan's portion of this war includes the support to the U.S. in Afghanistan and military campaigns within it's own borders against Taliban forces. Taliban forces have fought back against Pakistan with terrorist attacks and bombings that continue to ravage the nation. There have been a number of consequences from this war upon Pakistani society, one of particular importance to the U.S. is the increased anti-American sentiment. The war has also resulted in weak and widely unpopular leaders. The final major consequence this study examines is the increased conflict amongst the many ethnicities within Pakistan. The consequences of this war have had an effect on local, regional, American, and international politics.

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This dissertation explores the ways in which Americans constructed a public understanding about gender relations in Muslim countries from the Iranian Revolution through the post-9/11 period that cast Muslims as oppressors of women. It argues that such understandings significantly influenced U.S. foreign policy in recent decades. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the degree to which women had or lacked rights became one barometer by which Americans judged Muslim societies. Journalists, scholars, women's rights activists, novelists, filmmakers, politicians, and others in the U.S. contributed to public debates since 1979 that cast Muslims as particularly oppressive of women. The pervasiveness of such views and lobbying efforts by women's rights activists pushed policymakers to situate the attainment of rights for women within the constellation of legitimate areas of policy concern regarding the Muslim world. As a consequence, by the 1990s concern for Muslim women's rights sometimes drove U.S. policy, as when President Clinton chose not to recognize the Taliban regime in 1998; at other times, rhetoric about the oppression of Muslim women became a political tool which policymakers could use to provide legitimacy and moral force for their interventions in the Islamic world. This story is both national and transnational and involves both state and non-state actors. / History

The emergence and importance of human rights are rarely discussed without the discussion in some way also touching on the impact that various popular movements or social resistance have had on the manifestation of rights claims. This thesis focus in particular on the development in recent times in Afghanistan since the Taliban's takeover of power in August 2021. For the women and girls in Afghanistan the Taliban’s new power meant a return from 20 years of developed opportunities and recognized human rights, which can be directly derived to the rights and non-discrimination of women declared in the UN Women's Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This thesis will primarily deal with Amnesty International's report Death in Slow Motion: Women and girls under Taliban rule, which consists of a 100-page report, including testimonies, that describes the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan one year after the Taliban took gained power in August 2021. The analytical discussion of this thesis is based on a critical theoretical framework built on the concepts of performative practice, weapons of the weak, translation and ontological disturbance. The operationalization of the theoretical framework of this thesis is done with the help of a critical discourse analysis (CDA). The analytical discussion and conclusions of this thesis establish that Afghan women's and girls' current, every day or small-scale acts of resistance in order to assert their rights, demands for belonging, equality and freedom take varying forms and that these approaches move dynamically between the public and private spheres of society. In many ways, the resistance takes place beyond the Taliban's supervision and despite the risks that the acts of resistance entail, the actions of the Afghan women and girls contribute to manifesting and strengthening their rights claims and highlighting their capacity for agency and freedom of action. This thesis mainly highlights how these acts of resistance and agents can open up conditions for women and girls in Afghanistan to form communities and solidarity belonging within a social and political arena that has come to place them on the periphery.

This thesis investigates global fight against terrorism in North West Pakistan and Afghanistan from a 21st century perspective in 2018. It focuses on local attitudes towards the War on Terror and their interplay with geo-strategic, regional, international and Pakistan’s domestic landscapes. In doing so, it questions the efficacy of existing academic and policy approaches towards achieving sustainable peace in North West Pakistan in particular and South Asia in general. It also evaluates the impact of regional rivalries especially in between Pakistan and India on the achievement of US foreign policy interests. Part-1 reviews existing literature on terrorism especially in post 9/11 setting. It examines the international discord of agreeing on a single definition of terrorism and its ramifications. It sequentially focuses on character of security in North West Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan since colonial times. It also identifies various traditional, religious and societal angles of Pashtun tribes; which always inspired them to fight against external powers. Part-2 combines academic investigations with empirical evidence. The results are correlated with current discussions on modern terrorism, geopolitical pulls and regional rivalries to create a holistic picture. It identifies local attitudes and regional rivalries as major impediments towards achievement of sustainable peace. Research findings indicated that predominant Western academic debates on the conflict were foreign policy inspired with little local and veteran input. By adapting a pragmatic approach the terrorism challenge can be addressed and the region can contribute towards the continuation of ‘Rules Based Order’ within the current phase of Great Power Rivalry.