Double taxation treaties play a vital part in the international relations between states regarding taxation matters. Since double taxation can occur as soon as a person has income in more than one state, it is very important that there can be effective remedies to the problems that can occur in these situations. Double taxation treaties are necessary in most situations created by international trade and they are even more important in such a free flowing economic co-operation such as the EU, where the trade between the Member States is not only free but also very frequent. Most double taxation treaties are based on the Model Treaty created by the OECD. Even states not members of the organization use it as a model for their treaties. This means that treaties between Member States of the EC are often rather similar, but many times have been drafted without consideration taken to EC law. This can create problems since the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has stated in its case law that even though the Member States are solely competent when it comes to direct taxation, that competence must be used in accordance with EC law. Since double taxation treaties are directed at flows of income and capital between states, it is most probable that they can run afoul of EC law. After some judgments of the ECJ the situation is clearer now, but there are still some possible future problems. Examples of such problems are trailing taxes, limitations of benefits and the most favoured nation (MFN) principle. The latter has been before the Court, but there are many questions surrounding the MFN principle that has not been answered satisfactorily. Even if more cases are brought before the Court and it gives more guidance on how the Member States shall conclude treaties with each other, it is still preferable with proper EC legislation on the subject. It must also be mentioned that the ECJ has shown reluctance to disrupting the tax treaty networks in place and has been reluctant to dismiss rules based on the OECD Model Treaty. Several different solutions to these problems have been put forward, ranging from doing almost nothing and just letting the development in the case law have its way to a complete regulation of these issues through legislation by the EC. The two most interesting solutions presented are a Multilateral EU Tax Treaty or an EU Model Tax Treaty. Both of these two different methods would mean that the problems would have a proper solution in that it would implement common rules that would be applicable over the whole of the EU.

<p>Double taxation treaties play a vital part in the international relations between states</p><p>regarding taxation matters. Since double taxation can occur as soon as a person has</p><p>income in more than one state, it is very important that there can be effective remedies</p><p>to the problems that can occur in these situations. Double taxation treaties are</p><p>necessary in most situations created by international trade and they are even more</p><p>important in such a free flowing economic co-operation such as the EU, where the</p><p>trade between the Member States is not only free but also very frequent.</p><p>Most double taxation treaties are based on the Model Treaty created by the OECD.</p><p>Even states not members of the organization use it as a model for their treaties. This</p><p>means that treaties between Member States of the EC are often rather similar, but</p><p>many times have been drafted without consideration taken to EC law. This can create</p><p>problems since the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has stated in its case law that</p><p>even though the Member States are solely competent when it comes to direct taxation,</p><p>that competence must be used in accordance with EC law. Since double taxation</p><p>treaties are directed at flows of income and capital between states, it is most</p><p>probable that they can run afoul of EC law.</p><p>After some judgments of the ECJ the situation is clearer now, but there are still some</p><p>possible future problems. Examples of such problems are trailing taxes, limitations of</p><p>benefits and the most favoured nation (MFN) principle. The latter has been before</p><p>the Court, but there are many questions surrounding the MFN principle that has not</p><p>been answered satisfactorily. Even if more cases are brought before the Court and it</p><p>gives more guidance on how the Member States shall conclude treaties with each</p><p>other, it is still preferable with proper EC legislation on the subject. It must also be</p><p>mentioned that the ECJ has shown reluctance to disrupting the tax treaty networks in</p><p>place and has been reluctant to dismiss rules based on the OECD Model Treaty.</p><p>Several different solutions to these problems have been put forward, ranging from</p><p>doing almost nothing and just letting the development in the case law have its way to</p><p>a complete regulation of these issues through legislation by the EC. The two most interesting</p><p>solutions presented are a Multilateral EU Tax Treaty or an EU Model Tax</p><p>Treaty. Both of these two different methods would mean that the problems would</p><p>have a proper solution in that it would implement common rules that would be applicable</p><p>over the whole of the EU.</p>

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Commerce (Taxation). Johannesburg, 2015 / Tax treaties have a developed language of their own within the field of international law. They may include terms that are unknown in particular jurisdictions of domestic law or therein defined differently. Because the language of tax treaties and domestic law differ from each other, the definitions of certain terms and income type under a tax treaty and under different states’ domestic law are not necessary identical. Despite these differences, tax treaty definitions must be used for tax treaty classification purposes, and domestic law definitions must be used for domestic law classification purposes. The tax definition determines the type of the income for tax treaty purposes even though the income would qualify under another income category under the treaty states’ domestic law. Similarly, the domestic tax law definition determines the type of income for domestic law purposes (Helminen 2010). In most instances the treaty definitions of the various types of income refer back to domestic tax law, and where the domestic tax law definition deviates between the two treaty countries, this may lead to the application by these countries of different articles of the treaty. If this is caused by the application of the domestic law, this is referred to as a conflict of qualification in the Commentaries to the OECD Model Tax Convention. In general a conflict of qualification refers to a situation where identical facts are treated differently for tax purposes in different countries. Such a conflict may either concern the subject or the object of taxation. Key words: Tax treaties, OECD MTC, Double Tax Agreements, double taxation, conflicts of qualification, hybrid entities, partnerships, fiscally transparent, domestic law, Mutual Agreement Procedures, permanent establishment.

The investment treaty network and the tax treaty network comprise more than 3,000 treaties each. The provisions of these treaties generally are highly customized on the basis of the investment flows and economic interests of the contracting States. The number of treaties in force and their customization potentially turn the amendment of these treaty networks in their entirety into a cumbersome and long process. To modify the treaty networks in a swift and coordinated manner, the investment treaty makers and the tax treaty makers almost contemporaneously developed the idea of implementing treaty changes through a single multilateral convention. On 10 December 2014, the United Nations adopted the Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor' State Arbitration, also known as the Mauritius Convention. In addition, on 24 November 2016, the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), commonly referred to as the Multilateral Tax Instrument, was concluded under the aegis of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Mauritius Convention and the Multilateral Tax Instrument share the object and purpose of modifying an extensive number of treaties. However, due to their novelty, little research has been done until now on their common characteristics and differences. The article aims at filling this gap by comparing both multilateral conventions. It also aims at drawing lessons from the analysis of both multilateral conventions that might be of benefit for future modifications of an extensive number of treaties through a single instrument.

O presente estudo trata do procedimento amigável e da arbitragem como métodos de solução de controvérsias envolvendo a dupla tributação no âmbito das convenções internacionais celebradas por diversos países. Com efeito, em virtude do desenvolvimento das tratativas comerciais, são recorrentes as discussões relativas à soberania dos países e ao limite de sua competência tributária, sendo que as convenções internacionais para evitar a dupla tributação surgiram como mecanismos para conciliação dos interesses dos Estados Contratantes e de seus contribuintes. Ocorre, contudo, que os acordos internacionais nem sempre são suficientes para dirimir todos os conflitos envolvendo a dupla tributação, exigindo-se a adoção de outros mecanismos, i.e. procedimento amigável e arbitragem, conforme previstos no artigo 25, da Convenção Modelo da Organização para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico. O procedimento amigável permite a negociação entre dois ou mais países visando solucionar eventual conflito surgido no âmbito da aplicação da convenção internacional, bem assim a integração de seu conteúdo e a resolução de problemas interpretativos que podem desvirtuar seu fim. A arbitragem, por sua vez, possibilita a composição pacífica dos Estados Contratantes mediante a submissão da controvérsia à apreciação de um tribunal arbitral composto por sujeitos altamente capacitados e com expertise sobre a matéria. A despeito das inúmeras vantagens apresentadas por esses mecanismos, o Brasil não adota o procedimento amigável e ainda não incluiu a arbitragem em suas convenções internacionais, de modo que é imperativo o estudo de referido tema para o incremento e a harmonização das relações internacionais mantidas pelo país e seus contribuintes. / The present study deals with the mutual agreement procedure and arbitration as methods of resolving disputes involving double taxation in tax treaties signed by several countries. Indeed, due to the development of commercial trades are currently the discussions on the sovereignty of states and the limit of its tax competence, so the tax treaties for the avoidance of double taxation have emerged as mechanisms for reconciling the interests of the Contracting States and its taxpayers. However, these tax treaties are not always sufficient to resolve all conflicts of double taxation by requiring the adoption of other mechanisms, such as mutual agreement procedure and arbitration as provided for in Article 25 of the Model Convention of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Economic Development. The mutual agreement procedure allows the negotiation between two or more countries to resolve any conflicts arising in the scope of tax treaty, as well as the integration of content and the resolution of interpretive issues that can prejudice its finality. Arbitration, on the other side, enables the peaceful settlement of the Contracting States through the submission of the dispute before an arbitral tribunal composed of highly trained individuals and expertise on the matter. Despite the many advantages presented by these mechanisms, Brazil does not adopt the mutual agreement procedure and the arbitration is not yet included in their tax treaties, so it is imperative the study of theme for the improvement and harmonization of international relations retained by country and its taxpayers.

L’Étude porte sur un principe prétorien érigé par le Conseil d’État au travers de ses décisions et des conclusions rendues sous ses décisions par les Rapporteurs Publics. Depuis 1975 le Conseil d’État exerce le contrôle de la compatibilité d'un acte d'imposition vis-à-vis de conventions fiscales contre la double imposition et l'évasion fiscale qui est fait sous l'égide du principe de subsidiarité. En vertu de ce principe, au préalable du contrôle de «conventionnalité» de l'acte d'imposition, les juridictions doivent impérativement exercer un contrôle de la légalité de l'acte d'imposition, en prenant appui sur les seules dispositions du droit d'origine purement nationale, c'est-à-dire, du droit dit « domestique». Ce principe, tout juste nommé comme tel par le Conseil d’État dans une décision rendue en 2014, a longtemps fait l'unanimité au sein de la doctrine. Le principe de subsidiarité serait un principe conforme au bon sens et à la logique. Nous tentons au cours de ce travail de démontrer que le principe de subsidiarité des conventions fiscales pose problème à la fois d'un point de vue, strictement théorique, et à la fois d'un point de vue pratique. D'un point de vue théorique d'abord, il sera démontré que le principe de subsidiarité des conventions fiscales est particulier, il ne correspond à aucune autre application juridique de la subsidiarité, la similitude n'est que enveloppe terminologique. La version fiscale soulève un véritable problème théorique et pratique que la thèse tente de démontrer. / Our dissertation is about a praetorian principle erected by the French Administrative Supreme Court the Conseil d'Etat since 1975 and that became one of the major case law on international taxation under the French Law. From the given case law, it results that the checking of the conformity of a tax act issued by the French Tax authority with respect to a tax treaty, has to be made at a second stage, after of a domestic law based control by the judge. The principle implies the application of a method when controlling acts issued by the tax authority that tends to link the provisions of the tax treaty to be applied, of the prior qualifications provided by the domestic law. The principle has just been appointed as «the principle of subsidiarity of tax treaties, in a 2014 Decision, and differs from any other application of the subsidiarity theory in law.

Det har sedan lång tid tillbaka förekommit att svenska skattskyldiga försökt att undkomma beskattning i Sverige genom att gömma undan tillgångar utomlands i lågbeskattade länder, där sekretessen av information har varit stor. Lagstiftarna i Sverige har försökt att förhindra detta genom att tidigare infört den s.k. CFC-lagstiftningen. Syftet med lagstiftningen är att förhindra eller åtminstone försvåra att svenska skattskyldiga företar transaktioner med ut-ländska juridiska personer och genom det urholkar den svenska skattebasen. Lagstiftningen möjliggör att svenska skattskyldiga beskattas löpande för sin andel av det överskott som uppstår i utländska juridiska personer, oavsett om delägaren erhåller någon utdelning eller inte. De senaste åren har skatteavtal angående utbyte av information mellan Sverige och lågbe-skattade länder haft hög prioritet i regeringens arbete för att med denna metod säkerställa den svenska skattebasen. Sedan 2007 har över trettio avtal ingåtts med bl.a. länder som Schweiz, Luxemburg och Brittiska Jungfruöarna. Avtalen har till syfte att ge Skatteverket möjligheter att få tillgång till exempelvis bankinformation i utlandet och avtalen är även viktiga för att myndigheten ska kunna kontrollera svenskars inkomster och förmögenheter utomlands. Denna uppsats behandlar hur CFC-lagstiftningen bör komma att påverkas av de nya avta-len angående utbyte av information. I analysen fastställs att avtalen gällande informations-utbyte torde innebära att Sveriges CFC-lagstiftning blir effektivare till viss del, men att lag-stiftningens syfte skulle få ännu större inverkan med bättre avtal. Likväl fastställs att vid ett närmare samarbete mellan Sverige och de lågbeskattade länderna avseende flertalet förbätt-ringar torde CFC-lagstiftningen slutligen kunna bli överflödig. / There has since a long time occurred that Swedish taxpayers have tried to escape taxation in Sweden by concealing assets abroad in low tax countries, where the confidentiality of information has been large. Legislators in Sweden have tried to prevent this by earlier introduced the so-called CFC legislation. This legislation aims to prevent or at least make it more difficult for Swedish taxpayers to undertake transactions with foreign legal persons and by then eroding the Swedish tax base. The law allows the Swedish taxpayers to be taxed currently for their share of the surplus that arises in foreign legal persons, regardless of whether the shareholder receives dividend or not. In recent years tax treaties concerning exchange of information between Sweden and low tax countries have had high priority in the Government's work in order to secure the Swedish tax base by this method. Since 2007, over thirty agreements have been concluded with countries like Switzerland, Luxembourg and the British Virgin Islands. The agreements are intended to give The Swedish Tax Agency access to for example information from the bank abroad and the agreements are also important for the authority to monitor Swedes' incomes and assets abroad. This essay considers how the CFC legislation should be affected by the new agreements concerning exchange of information. The analysis determines that the agreements on exchange of information would probably mean that the Swedish CFC-legislation becomes more effective to some extent, but that the purpose of the legislation would have even greater impact with better agreements. Nevertheless it establishes that a closer cooperation between Sweden and the low taxed countries regarding improvements should mean that the CFC legislation would eventually become redundant.

O presente estudo trata do procedimento amigável e da arbitragem como métodos de solução de controvérsias envolvendo a dupla tributação no âmbito das convenções internacionais celebradas por diversos países. Com efeito, em virtude do desenvolvimento das tratativas comerciais, são recorrentes as discussões relativas à soberania dos países e ao limite de sua competência tributária, sendo que as convenções internacionais para evitar a dupla tributação surgiram como mecanismos para conciliação dos interesses dos Estados Contratantes e de seus contribuintes. Ocorre, contudo, que os acordos internacionais nem sempre são suficientes para dirimir todos os conflitos envolvendo a dupla tributação, exigindo-se a adoção de outros mecanismos, i.e. procedimento amigável e arbitragem, conforme previstos no artigo 25, da Convenção Modelo da Organização para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico. O procedimento amigável permite a negociação entre dois ou mais países visando solucionar eventual conflito surgido no âmbito da aplicação da convenção internacional, bem assim a integração de seu conteúdo e a resolução de problemas interpretativos que podem desvirtuar seu fim. A arbitragem, por sua vez, possibilita a composição pacífica dos Estados Contratantes mediante a submissão da controvérsia à apreciação de um tribunal arbitral composto por sujeitos altamente capacitados e com expertise sobre a matéria. A despeito das inúmeras vantagens apresentadas por esses mecanismos, o Brasil não adota o procedimento amigável e ainda não incluiu a arbitragem em suas convenções internacionais, de modo que é imperativo o estudo de referido tema para o incremento e a harmonização das relações internacionais mantidas pelo país e seus contribuintes. / The present study deals with the mutual agreement procedure and arbitration as methods of resolving disputes involving double taxation in tax treaties signed by several countries. Indeed, due to the development of commercial trades are currently the discussions on the sovereignty of states and the limit of its tax competence, so the tax treaties for the avoidance of double taxation have emerged as mechanisms for reconciling the interests of the Contracting States and its taxpayers. However, these tax treaties are not always sufficient to resolve all conflicts of double taxation by requiring the adoption of other mechanisms, such as mutual agreement procedure and arbitration as provided for in Article 25 of the Model Convention of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Economic Development. The mutual agreement procedure allows the negotiation between two or more countries to resolve any conflicts arising in the scope of tax treaty, as well as the integration of content and the resolution of interpretive issues that can prejudice its finality. Arbitration, on the other side, enables the peaceful settlement of the Contracting States through the submission of the dispute before an arbitral tribunal composed of highly trained individuals and expertise on the matter. Despite the many advantages presented by these mechanisms, Brazil does not adopt the mutual agreement procedure and the arbitration is not yet included in their tax treaties, so it is imperative the study of theme for the improvement and harmonization of international relations retained by country and its taxpayers.

The diploma thesis deals with the concept of International Taxation of Permanent Establishments. The treatment of permanent establishment is defined and compared from both czech and international perspective. Furthermore, there are identified issues that individual countries and the international organization OECD have to deal with under the Action Plan BEPS. Moreover, at the end of the thesis frequency of permanent establishments in the Czech Republic is displayed according to the residence of taxpayers.

Il n'existe pas à l'heure actuelle de définition « officielle » des juridictions fiscales non coopératives, l'appréhension de ces dernières étant particulièrement difficile à cerner. D'où la grande difficulté de les recenser avec exactitude et du même coup de leur donner une désignation géographique précise... Or, cette notion est d'autant plus importante qu'elle est le critère de détermination de territoires à régime fiscal dit « privilégié. » L'étude de la notion des juridictions fiscales non coopératives apparaît dès lors comme fondamentale pour aborder l'approche des législations fiscales internationales dans l'avenir. En effet, à partir de quand sommes-nous en présence d’une juridiction fiscale non coopérative ? Quels critères juridiques adopter pour les définir ? Bref, comment identifier de telles juridictions ? Quelles sont leurs caractéristiques premières ? Combien y'en a-t-il de par le monde et quel est leur poids exact dans l'économie mondiale ? Quelle a été l'évolution de l'approche internationale de ces juridictions dans le passé ? Comment cette approche peut-elle évoluer dans le futur pour tenir compte des contraintes économiques et financières avec la mondialisation ? En réalité, cette ambigüité accompagnant la notion de juridictions fiscales non coopératives, ne relève pas seulement de la simple négligence législative de la part des États qui a priori devraient être chargés de la définir. Bien plus, il s'agit là d'un véritable flou juridique plus ou moins organisé qui contribue grandement à entretenir l'opacité de ces territoires et à faciliter la tentation de l'évasion fiscale. / There is at the moment no "official" definition of the not cooperative fiscal jurisdictions, apprehension of these last ones being particularly difficult to identify. Hence the great difficulty of accurately identifying and thereby give them a specific geographic designation... Now, this notion is especially important as it is the criterion for determining territories Tax System "privileged." The study of the notion of the not cooperative fiscal jurisdictions therefore appears to be fundamental to discuss the approach of international tax laws in the future. Indeed, from when we are in the presence of a non cooperative fiscal jurisdiction? What legal criteria to adopt to define them? In brief, how identify such jurisdictions? What are their first characteristics? How much has it to it throughout the world and which is their exact weight in the world economy? What was the evolution of the international approach of these jurisdictions in past? How can this approach evolve in the future to take into account economic and financial constraints with the globalization? In reality, this ambiguity accompanying the notion of not cooperative fiscal jurisdictions, recover not only from the simple legislative negligence on behalf of the States which a priori should be in charge of defining it. Much more, it is about a real more or less organized vagueness of the law there which contributes largely to maintain the opacity of these territories and to facilitate the temptation of the tax evasion.