The present article demonstrates the historical bases previous to the success of alternative development in the region San Martín. It shows that anti-drug policy was unable to successfully function during the 1980s due to an absence of basic security conditions in the region. The ar- ticle’s main objective consists in presenting how the state managed to meet said security condi- tions. Thus, this article is divided into two periods of analysis. First, it focuses on the time period from 1980 to 1989 and shows how generalized state repression resulted counterproductive in the region because of strong subversive forces. Second, it presents the time period from 1989 to 1995 and demonstrates how the exercise of sequential period of focalized repression facilitated an environment to fight against drug trafficking. In this way, the focalized strategy and sequence permitted the state to resume security conditions that in a post-boom and post-conflict situation permitted the implementation of alternative development programs. / El presente artículo muestra las bases históricas previas al éxito del desarrollo alternativo en la región San Martín. Se muestra que la política antidrogas no pudo llevarse a cabo exito- samente durante la década de los ochenta debido a la ausencia de condiciones de seguridad mínimas en la región. De esta manera, el principal objetivo del artículo consiste en presentar cómo el Estado logró alcanzar dichas condiciones de seguridad. Para ello, la investigación se divide analíticamente en dos períodos. El primero se extiende de 1980 a 1989 y muestra cómo la ‘represión generalizada’ del Estado resultó contraproducente en la región debido a la presencia subversiva. El segundo parte de 1989 y se extiende hasta 1995 y muestra cómo, al ejercer una ‘represión focalizada’, de carácter secuencial primero en la subversión se facilitó el terreno para después luchar contra el narcotráfico. De esta manera, esta estrategia focalizada y secuencial permitió retomar las condiciones de seguridad que, en una situación post-boom y post-conflicto,facilitaron la implementación de los programas de desarrollo alternativo.

Criminal organizations have been commonly associated with violence and disorder. Despite there being truth in that, what is more concerning is their growing influence. Criminal violence has exceeded traditional forms of political violence in the world. In the wake of the signing of the Peace Accord on November 26, 2016, between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army, the disarmament and demobilization process created an institutional and security vacuum in rural regions of Colombia. These rural regions currently experience partial peace, with violence levels peaking under the competition of criminal organizations and other non-state armed groups to govern abandoned territories and communities over the pursuit of illicit markets and trade routes. This study focuses on a more profound understanding of the micro-dynamics between criminal organizations territorial control, governance, and its effects on violence against civilians in rural and post-conflict contexts. This thesis contributes to this research gap by asking why do criminal organizations territorial control affect violence against civilians? Through a qualitative study using the method of structured focused comparison and selecting a most similar research design, the period of study covers September 1, 2017, to June 30, 2022. The municipalities selected were Tarazá and Zaragoza, in the department of Antioquia. The findings seem to suggest that it is more likely that a criminal organization that has or in this case the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia that progressively achieved segmented territorial control would have the incentives to monopolize all functions of governance and to their capacity establish a public goods-based legitimacy governance system reducing the cost of social control and criminal violence against civilians in Tarazá and Zaragoza.

Grâce au Good Friday Agreement (GFA) signé en 1998, l’Irlande du Nord connait une période de pacification sans précédent depuis les Troubles (1969-1998). Dans cette situation de post conflit, la violence liée aux affrontements entre groupes paramilitaires et forces de sécurité britannique a très largement diminué. Cependant, de petits groupes paramilitaires républicains s’opposent toujours au traité de paix. Cette thèse a pour objectif comprendre pourquoi les paramilitaires républicains anti-GFA continuent d’utiliser la violence alors qu’ils reconnaissent que, dans le contexte actuel, la lutte armée a peu de chance de conduire à la réunification de l’Irlande. A Belfast, l’analyse spatiale des violences intracommunautaires (perpétuées dans le cadre d’un système de justice alternatif) et des attaques contre les forces de police montre que la stratégie des organisations paramilitaires anti-GFA repose sur la création d’un cycle d’agitation. Il s’agit d’une stratégie de développement locale qui vise à maintenir des territoires d’exception. Ce terme désigne ici des territoires où la normalisation voulue par le processus de paix est limitée par les actions des républicains anti-GFA et où le monopole de la violence légitime est disputé. Cependant, cette stratégie de contrôle du territoire communautaire se heurte à toute une série de problèmes. En effet, les organisations paramilitaires anti-GFA sont de petits groupes fragmentés qui tendent à se diviser dans le temps. Enfin, l’influence des paramilitaires anti-GFA est limitée par un contexte social extrêmement défavorable à la lutte armée, par les actions des forces de sécurité, et par la présence et la stratégie du Sinn Féin. / Thanks to the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) signed in 1998, Northern Ireland knows a period of pacification unknown since the Troubles (1969-1998). In this post-conflict situation, violence in the form of confrontation between paramilitary groups and British security forces has greatly decreased. Nevertheless, small republican paramilitary groups are still opposing the peace treaty. The goal of this dissertation is to understand why republican paramilitaries opposed to the GFA continue to rely on violence while recognizing that, in the current context, armed struggle has little chances of leading to the reunification of Ireland. In Belfast, spatial analysis of intracommunal violence (carried out within an alternative justice system) and attacks against the police indicate that the strategy of the paramilitary organizations opposed to the GFA relies on creating a cycle of unrest. This is a strategy of local development aiming at maintaining territories of exception. This concept here means territories where the normalization sought by the peace process is limited by anti-GFA republicans’ actions and where the monopole of legitimate violence is disputed. This strategy of communal territory control is however facing a series of problems. Anti-GFA paramilitary organisations are indeed small fragmented groups which often splinter overtime. Finally, anti-GFA paramilitary organizations’ influence is limited by a social context extremely unfavourable to armed struggle, by security forces, and by the presence and strategy of the Sinn Féin.

Limited systematic research has investigated how conflict events shape the spatial-temporal variation of insurgent violence against civilians. Although previous research has investigated how degrees of territorial control relate to general levels of violence against civilians, it remains largely an open question how the dynamics within territorial control determine violence against civilians by insurgents. This study aims to address this gap by hypothesizing that (1) insurgents become more likely to commit fatal violence against civilians, and (2) kill more civilians in contested areas when they lose territorial control. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) was used along with Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) GRID Dataset to create a novel data frame of all territorially contested area-weeks on the African continent between 1997 and 2017 (n = 3035). Contrary to theoretical expectations, logistic regressions indicate a lower risk of insurgent violence against civilians in contested areas following an insurgent territorial loss than following a break-even. Zero-inflated negative binomial regressions moreover tentatively indicate that insurgents kill more civilians following territorial wins in the short-term, and following territorial loss in the long-term. These results suggest that proactive counterinsurgency campaigns are in the interest of civilians in civil war.

Vår undersökning behandlar fenomenet POPS, Privately Owned Public Spaces.Offentliga platser har historiskt sett varit viktiga för en stad på grund av dessdemokratiska och sociala värden. Dessa värden riskerar att försvinna när stadensoffentliga platser privatiseras. Vi har gjort en fallstudie av Emporias takpark där viundersökt hur platsen används och kontrolleras. Analysen visar att privatägda offentligaplatser tenderar att kontrolleras med verktyg som övervakning och regler. Detta leder tillatt vissa grupper i samhället mer eller mindre exkluderas från dessa platser till förmånför en köpstark samhällsgrupp och i förlängningen stadens image. / Our study treats the phenomenon POPS, Privately Owned Public Spaces. Publicplaces have historically been important in cities because of their democratic andsocials values. There is a risk that these values disappear when public places of thecity are privatized. We have done a case study of Emporia rooftop park where weresearched how the space is used and controlled. Our analysis shows that privatelyowned public places tend to be controlled by tools such as surveillance and rules.This leads to certain groups in society getting more or less excluded from these placesin favor of a more well-funded social group and in extension the image of the city.

This dissertation focuses on the sub-national impact of foreign aid on civil conflicts by asking the question: How does foreign aid committed to contested areas affect the intensity of violence in those areas? The main theoretical contribution is to focus on how aid influences warring parties’ decisions to engage in contests over territorial control and how that in turn influences violence intensity. The study introduces two concepts: funding concentration and barriers to exploiting aid. A contested area has greater concentration of funding if warring parties expect a high value of aid to be distributed to only a few locations. Funding is instead diffused if the parties expect aid to be spread over many locations. A low barrier to exploiting aid is present if it is of a type that both state and non-state actors could potentially misuse. There is a high barrier if territorial control is required in order to exploit funding channels. The theory introduces three testable implications: First, greater funding concentration encourages conventional contests over territorial control, which increases military fatalities. The second proposal is that if there is a low barrier to exploiting aid (e.g. humanitarian and food aid) then there will be increased competition between warring parties and civilians, and hence more civilian fatalities. Third, high barrier funding (e.g. education aid) will motivate contests over territorial control and increase military fatalities. This dissertation uses geo-coded aid commitments data and introduces data of warring parties’ battleground control in sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2008. The research design relies on propensity score matching where pairs of observations are matched based on a range of covariates. The results concerning barriers to exploitation are partially supported. High barrier aid increases military fatalities whereas low barrier aid has little impact on violence. Greater funding concentration increases military fatalities substantially compared to if there is low or no funding concentration. In line with theory, greater funding concentration does not increase civilian fatalities.