My doctoral project investigates the impact of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative on transatlantic relations during the period 1983-86. The dissertation focuses on the three main European powers, namely Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, and examines their reaction to SDI both individually and comparatively. The study exploits SDI’s position at the intersection of nuclear strategy, political ideology, Cold War diplomacy, and industrial politics to offer a multifaceted, multi-national, and primary source-based analysis of US-European relations during the Reagan Presidency. The picture of the transatlantic relationship which emerges from the dissertation is a complex and nuanced one. On the one hand, the analysis argues that relations across the Atlantic during the Reagan era cannot be reduced to a scenario of accelerating ‘drift’ between the United States and Western Europe. Instead, on SDI as well as on other matters, moments of acute friction alternated with a constantly renewed search for dialogue, cooperation, and compromise on the part of the Europeans and also, if to a lesser degree, of the Americans. On the other hand, the ‘exceptionalist’ ideology and worldview underpinning SDI, the prevailing indifference in Washington to its implications for NATO, and most importantly the persistent anti-nuclear rhetoric and ambitions associated with the initiative revealed a distinct lack of sensitivity to European interest by the Reagan administration. As the dissertation shows, the anti-nuclear drive inherent in SDI, which both reflected and reinforced Reagan’s deep-seated interest in nuclear abolition, constituted the most disruptive aspect of the initiative from the viewpoint of European leaders. In these respects, the SDI controversy epitomises the unilateral tendencies and increasingly divergent priorities from those of the European allies which characterised much of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy – making the 1980s a decade of recurrent tensions in transatlantic relations.

Kiekviena politinės lyderystės apraiška 1990 – 1991 metais vykusio Irako – Kuveito konflikto kontekste buvo skirtinga priklausomai nuo JAV, Didžiosios Britanijos, Prancūzijos ir Irako politinių lyderių asmeninių savybių, lyderiavimo motyvų, nuo skirtingai suvokiamų atskiros visuomenės tikslų įgyvendinimo specifikos, nuo tarptautinės grupės ypatybių ir kitų socialinių, politinių, ekonominių bei kultūrinių sąlygų. Vieni politiniais lyderiais tapo dėl asmeninio patrauklumo, charizmos, kiti atsidūrė tam tikru momentu tam tikroje situacijoje, treti veikė vedini savo asmeninių ambicijų. Kaip tik todėl magistro darbo objektas yra politinių lyderių vaidmuo Irako – Kuveito konflikte. Darbo aktualumas. 1990 – 1991 metais Persijos įlankoje netrūko radikalių permainų: pagrindiniu tikslu buvo laikomas Irako prezidento Sadamo Huseino nuvertimas, o tai reiškė, jog sąjungininkai privalėjo užimti Irako sostinę Bagdadą ir kontroliuoti visus strateginius jame esančius objektus. Būtent šioje situacijoje politiniams lyderiams atsirado puiki terpė pasireikšti. Magistro darbe aiškinamasi apie galingiausių to meto valstybių verbalinį ir fizinį ryšį, jų vykdomus ar ketinamus vykdyti veiksmus. Kadangi nebuvo ir vis dar nėra jokios paprastos lyderystės formulės ar griežtos mokslinės disciplinos, kuria būtų galėję vadovautis nagrinėjami politiniai lyderiai, tai tapo akstinu pažvelgti į šią problemą iš naujo. Darbo chronologinės ribos. Pavadinime įvardintas 1990 – 1991 metų laikotarpis. Konfliktas... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Every political clash leaves a trace in World history. The conflict between Iraq and Kuwait in the end of XX century is not the exception. Amid growing tension between the two Persian Gulf neighbors, Saddam Hussein concluded that the United States and the rest of the outside world would not interfere to defend Kuwait. On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and quickly seized control of the small nation. Within days, the United States, along with the United Nations, demanded Iraq’s immediate withdrawal. U.S. and other UN member nations began deploying troops in Saudi Arabia within the week, and the worldwide coalition began to form under UN authority. On January 16, 1991, Allied forces began devastating bombing of Iraq and its forces in Kuwait. The Allied bombing sought to damage Iraq’s infrastructure so as to hinder its ability to make war while also hurting both civilian and military morale. Unfortunately, Allied air strikes and cruise missile attacks against Iraq proved more devastating than expected. When the Allied armies launched the ground war on February 23, the Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait were already beaten. On March 3, 1991, Iraq accepted the terms of the cease-fire and the fighting ended. So the object of master‘s work has been the evaluation of the role, substantiality and particularity of political leaders during the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait in 1990 – 1991. The goal has been to point out the connection between the expression of political... [to full text]

This essay examines two different female political leaders' ways to top positions. Even though it is over a century since women received voting rights in both the United Kingdom and Sweden, quite few women leaders have reached top positions. The purpose of this essay is to find explanation factors to why Margaret Thatcher succeeded to reach the top and why Anna Kinberg Batra did not. The method in this essay is a comparing case study between Great Britain's Margaret Thatcher and Sweden's Anna Kinberg Batra and it is analysed through Jane S Jensens theory that tries to give explanations behind the low representation of female political leadership. Yvonne Hirdmans gender theory is also a part of the analytical framework. The result of this study offers several factors as helpful for succeeding in reaching top positions such as growing up in a supportive family, having an attitude that gender would not be an obstacle and to be able to step outside one’s gender role seems essential to reach the political leadership as a female.

The aim of this Master thesis is to analyse the British civil service reforms both in theory and practice. The author picked three areas where the reforms would be scrutinized. By analysing four essential documents that contributed to the reforms of the civil service: The Northcote-Trevelyan report, The Fulton report, Next Steps and Modernising Government, we would be able to evaluate the impact of these changes in the following areas: 1) Human Resources (recruitment, training and the promotion of the civil servants) 2) Administration and Accountability (the aspects of ministerial responsibility, accountability, special advisers) 3) Decentralisation and Fragmentation (impact of the multi-level governance including deconcentration, devolution and EU membership). The first chapter is the necessary introductory part that deals with the basic principles of the British civil service, its history and the challenges it faces today. The second chapter provides analysis and historical background of the four documents that are used in the next section. Finally, the third chapter discusses the three above mentioned problematic areas. By analysing and comparing the documents, we seek to understand the reforms of the British civil service and their impact.

This thesis brings together for the first time, in an organised account, Saskatchewans search for a pulp industry. This thesis will show that, in a fundamental tension between goals of fiscal prudence and of economic growth, fiscal prudence won out again and again, to the point that the CCF governments could be characterised as risk-averse where pulp production was concerned. The cautious approach is in contradiction both to the activist reputation of the CCF governments and to their aggressive development of other resources, notably mining. Pulp offers an example of the contradictions that plagued the CCF governments and their policies for the north, contradictions that included disagreements between moderates and radicals over the roles of public and multinational enterprise, colonial attitudes towards the north, and risk aversion despite bold rhetoric and announcements.<p>The methodology used in this thesis has generally maintained an economic policy and political discourse, and incorporates mostly a top-down governmental approach. The personal papers of Tommy Douglas and Woodrow Lloyd provided CCF government correspondence and departmental memos that included premiers, ministers, deputy ministers, and departmental directors involved with the Department of Natural Resources, the Timber Board, the Industrial Development Office, and the Economic Advisory and Planning Board, and with pulp company officials. Furthermore, pulp reports, surveys, and studies helped contextualise all of the interrelated correspondences. To supplement government discourse I utilised the Prince Albert Daily Herald to gain an understanding of what issues the public was debating and found to be most important.

This thesis brings together for the first time, in an organised account, Saskatchewans search for a pulp industry. This thesis will show that, in a fundamental tension between goals of fiscal prudence and of economic growth, fiscal prudence won out again and again, to the point that the CCF governments could be characterised as risk-averse where pulp production was concerned. The cautious approach is in contradiction both to the activist reputation of the CCF governments and to their aggressive development of other resources, notably mining. Pulp offers an example of the contradictions that plagued the CCF governments and their policies for the north, contradictions that included disagreements between moderates and radicals over the roles of public and multinational enterprise, colonial attitudes towards the north, and risk aversion despite bold rhetoric and announcements.<p>The methodology used in this thesis has generally maintained an economic policy and political discourse, and incorporates mostly a top-down governmental approach. The personal papers of Tommy Douglas and Woodrow Lloyd provided CCF government correspondence and departmental memos that included premiers, ministers, deputy ministers, and departmental directors involved with the Department of Natural Resources, the Timber Board, the Industrial Development Office, and the Economic Advisory and Planning Board, and with pulp company officials. Furthermore, pulp reports, surveys, and studies helped contextualise all of the interrelated correspondences. To supplement government discourse I utilised the Prince Albert Daily Herald to gain an understanding of what issues the public was debating and found to be most important.

Nell’aprile 1982, l’Argentina – un Paese alleato degli Stati Uniti attraverso il Patto di Rio – invase le isole Falkland, un Territorio d’Oltremare del Regno Unito, rivendicato da Buenos Aires sin dal XIX secolo. Margaret Thatcher, l’allora Primo Ministro britannico, rispose con vigore. Alla fine la Gran Bretagna – alleato NATO degli USA – riuscì a riconquistare le isole e a ristabilire lo status quo ante. Il conflitto va inquadrato nel framework della ‘seconda Guerra Fredda’. Il confronto tra gli Stati Uniti e l’Unione Sovietica fu particolarmente aspro nei primi anni Ottanta e la logica bipolare influenzò le dinamiche diplomatiche della guerra del 1982. Da un lato, l’Emisfero occidentale era al centro della rinnovata strategia americana anti-comunista e l’Argentina era il principale pilastro nel Cono Sud. Dall’altro lato, il rafforzamento della ‘speciale relazione’ anglo-americana costituiva la pietra angolare della grand strategy statunitense nel teatro europeo. Con questo sfondo, è naturale domandarsi quale ruolo Washington scelse di giocare nella guerra delle Falkland tra due dei suoi alleati. A causa di interessi divergenti, la ‘relazione speciale’ non fu infatti del tutto speciale. / In April 1982, Argentina – a country allied with the United States through the Rio Pact – suddenly invaded the Falkland Islands, a long-time Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom, disputed by Buenos Aires since the XIXth century. Margaret Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister, vigorously responded and finally Britain – a US NATO ally – was able to regain the Islands and re-establish the status quo ante. The conflict needs to be contextualized in the ‘second Cold War’ framework. The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was particularly tough in the first years of the 1980s and the bipolar logic strongly influenced the diplomatic course of the 1982 war. On the one hand, the Western hemisphere was at the core of the renewed anti-communist US strategy and Argentina was the main pillar in the Southern Cone. On the other hand, the strengthening of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ was the European cornerstone of the US grand strategy. Against this background, what kind of role the US chose to play in the Falklands war between two of their allies instinctively arises as the main question. Affected by diverging interests, the ‘special relationship’ was not indeed entirely special.