Submitted by Nadir Basilio (nadirsb@uninove.br) on 2016-05-09T20:22:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabio Tenorio dos Santos.pdf: 988500 bytes, checksum: 7917caa9480754986f69fd90377c2132 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-05-09T20:22:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fabio Tenorio dos Santos.pdf: 988500 bytes, checksum: 7917caa9480754986f69fd90377c2132 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-02-23 / At the Military Justice have jurisdiction over military crimes in peacetime or in wartime defined in the Military Penal Code following the procedure provided for in the Criminal Procedure Code of Military. Both are part of the Military Penal Law and Procedural Law and Military are branches of criminal sciences, which are guided by the fundamental principles of law. There is no provision in the Military Penal Law and not to admit the so-called open type, much less criminal types blank. The Military Justice processes and judge the military of the Armed Forces and civilians in military crimes defined by law, condemning them or acquitting them, according to the evidence produced in the records, the Military Prosecutor's Office and the Defense Attorney. The Justice Union military is an integral body of the Judiciary and respects the fundamentals of the Federative Republic of Brazil, of which the citizenship, the dignity of the human person, but also observe faithfully the principle of prevalence of human rights, Since he, among others, rules in international relations, the Federative Republic of Brazil, as set forth in item II of art. 4 of the current Constitution. The Justice Union military has the jurisdictional military. In the military mission are inserted own legal activities, including the defense of the country against the enemy, the guarantee of the constitutional powers and at the initiative of any of these, of law and order, as prescribes the art. 142 of the Constitution to deal with the armed forces. In the exercise of its functions, the military may eventually commit excesses, entailing violations of human rights or humanitarian law, which would require the intervention of the military justice system to restore the right offended by the military. Fundamental human rights, which belong to citizens, are respected by the Military Justice, and made to respect, from its jurisdictional, which are the armed forces personnel. The armed forces are making every effort to ensure that his subordinates act within the principles protected by the human and humanitarian rights, and it performs from capacity building through training courses to perfecting them over the entire military career as well as have standards of action and legal conduct obeying the rules of law. The Union of Military Justice participates in the internal protection of human rights when does the processing and judgment of individuals with regard to the crimes defined in the law, while respecting due process, that is, the competence, the impartial judgment and natural and as the wide defense and the contradictory, according to the democratic adversarial system. The Military Penal Law [Internal] is an instrument of protection of human rights, by defining criminal offenses and sanctions. / À Justiça Militar da União compete julgar os crimes militares em tempo de paz ou em tempo de guerra definidos no Código Penal Militar observando o procedimento previsto no Código de Processo Penal Militar. Ambos integram o Direito Penal Militar e o Direito Processual Militar e são ramos das ciências penais, que se norteiam pelos princípios basilares do direito. Não há previsão no Direito Penal Militar e nem se admitem os denominados tipos abertos e muito menos os tipos penais em branco. A Justiça Militar da União processa e julga os militares das Forças Armadas e civis nos crimes militares definidos em lei, condenando-os ou absolvendo-os, conforme as provas produzidas nos autos, pelo Ministério Público Militar e pelo Advogado de Defesa. A Justiça Militar da União é órgão integrante do Poder Judiciário e respeita os fundamentos da República Federativa do Brasil, dentre os quais o da cidadania, o da dignidade da pessoa humana, como também observa, fielmente, o princípio da prevalência dos direitos humanos, uma vez que ele, dentre outros, rege, nas relações internacionais, a República Federativa do Brasil, como previsto no inciso II do art. 4º da vigente Magna Carta. A Justiça Militar da União tem como jurisdicionados os militares. Na missão dos militares estão inseridas atividades jurídicas próprias, entre elas a defesa da pátria contra o inimigo, a garantia dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem, como preceitua o art. 142 da Constituição Federal ao tratar das Forças Armadas. No exercício de suas funções, os militares podem eventualmente cometer desmandos, ensejando violações dos direitos humanos ou do direito humanitário, o que torna necessária a intervenção da Justiça Militar para restabelecer o direito ofendido pelo militar. Os direitos humanos fundamentais, inerentes aos cidadãos, são respeitados pela Justiça Militar da União, e feitos por respeitar, por parte dos seus jurisdicionados, que são os militares das Forças Armadas. As Forças Armadas estão envidando todos os esforços para que seus comandados ajam dentro dos princípios tutelados pelos direitos humanos e humanitários, e para isso realiza desde a capacitação através de cursos de formação até os de aperfeiçoamento ao longo de toda carreira militar, bem como têm normas de atuação e conduta legal obedecendo às regras de direito. A Justiça Militar da União participa da proteção interna dos direitos humanos quando faz o processamento e o julgamento de pessoas físicas, quanto aos crimes definidos na lei, sempre respeitando o devido processo legal, ou seja, a competência, o juízo imparcial e natural, bem como a ampla defesa e o contraditório, de acordo com o sistema acusatório democrático. O Direito Penal Militar [interno] é instrumento de proteção dos direitos humanos, através da definição de crimes e sanções.

No abstract available. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / gm2014 / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

How do technologies that remove warfighters from the front lines affect the frequency and intensity of military confrontations between states? Many scholars and policymakers fear that weapons that reduce the risks and costs of war – in blood and treasure – will lead states to resort to force more frequently during crises, destabilizing the international security environment. These concerns have featured prominently in debates surrounding the proliferation and use of remote warfighting technologies, such as drones. This project sets out to evaluate whether and how drones affect crisis escalation. Specifically, do drones allow decisionmakers to deploy military forces more frequently during interstate crises? Once deployed, how do these systems affect escalation dynamics? I argue that drones can help control escalation, raising questions about scholarly theories that suggest the world is more dangerous and less stable when technology makes conflict cheaper and less risky. At the core of this project is a theory of technology-enabled escalation control. The central argument is that technologies like drones that remove friendly forces from the battlefield may lead states to use force more frequently, but decrease the likelihood of escalation when used in lieu of inhabited platforms. More specifically, these technologies lower the political barriers to initiating military operations during crises, primarily by eliminating the risk of friendly force casualties and the associated domestic political consequences for launching military operations. At the same time, removing personnel from harm’s way may reduce demand for escalatory reprisals after remotely operated systems are lost to hostile action. Drones can also help to mitigate escalatory spirals by collecting intelligence that overcomes information asymmetries that often contribute to armed conflict, helping facilitate more measured decision-making and tailored targeting of enemy forces. By more fully considering how technology affects escalatory dynamics after the initial use of force, technology-enabled escalation control theory advances our understanding of the link between technology and conflict. I test the theory using a multi-method approach that combines case studies with original experiments embedded in surveys fielded on public and military samples. The dissertation also introduces a new research method for international relations research: experimental manipulations embedded in wargames with military participants. In Chapter 1 and 2, I define the concept of crisis escalation and review the literature that examines the effect of technology on escalation and conflict dynamics. I then introduce the theory of technology-enabled escalation control and outline four mechanisms that undergird the theory – increased initiation, tempered/tailored targeting, restrained retaliation, and amplified aggression. Each of these hypothesized mechanisms describes ways in which emerging technologies can prevent crises from escalating into broader or more intense conflicts. Chapter 3 describes each component of the multi-method research design that I use to test the theory in Chapters 4 through 7. Chapter 4 uses experiments embedded in surveys and wargames to assess whether and how drones allow states to more frequently initiate military operations. Chapter 5 tests whether drones enable decisionmakers to control escalation by restraining retaliation after attacks on a state’s drones. Chapter 6 and 7 test the theory in the context of U.S drone use during the Cold War and Israeli drone use from the 1960s through late-2010s. The findings of these empirical tests provide strong support for technology-enabled escalation control. In Chapter 8, I conclude with a summary of the analysis and test the generalizability of the theory beyond the state use of drones. I find that tenets of technology-enabled escalation control explain escalation dynamics associated with U.S. cyber operations against North Korea and Hezbollah’s use of drones against Israel and during the Syrian Civil War. The chapter also maps out pathways for future research and identifies policy implications. My findings suggest the growing proliferation of drones will increase the frequency of military confrontations during crises, yet these confrontations are unlikely to escalate. Even though drones may help control escalation, clearer doctrine, rules of engagement, and international agreements to govern their use will help to further avoid crisis escalation and conflict.

The debate on gender equality and diversity has shaped our time. More and more companies and organizations are looking into how to raise their workforce diversity. To recruit a more diverse workforce you could either raise the public opinion or get more effective in your recruitment. The Swedish armed forces are today an organization where women are highly underrepresented, only 18 percent of the personnel is female. By using a theory on diversity management, to look into if the Swedish armed forces way to handle diversity appeal to what the theory that’s used are saying. The study concludes that the Swedish armed forces partly handle the diversity focus at women in same way the theory claims to do. But one level of the theory is not proceeded. And on that part the Swedish armed forces can be better. The study concludes that there is a difference between the armed forces and the recruiting center inobjectives in diversity, this is what can make the Swedish armed forces goal hard to reach.

Orientador: Héctor Luis Saint-Pierre / Banca: Samuel Alves Soares / Banca: Marcelo Fabián Sain / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas" / Resumo: O objeto da pesquisa é o emprego das forças armadas - instrumento de política externa - em atividades de segurança pública na Argentina e no Brasil, entre os anos de 2005 e 2015. O objetivo do estudo é compreender a construção de padrões divergentes de utilização dos instrumentos castrenses nos dois países estudados. Enquanto os militares argentinos são treinados e empregados predominantemente para o combate de ameaças externas de natureza estatal, as Forças Armadas brasileiras estão direcionadas essencialmente ao enfrentamento de problemas internos e atores não-estatais. Defendemos a hipótese de que os processos de rompimento e continuidade do papel das forças armadas argentinas e brasileiras - entendido como o conjunto de ações com as quais as mesmas identificam-se e são identificadas -, desencadeados com a transição das ditaduras militares para a democracia nos países estudados, geraram as condições de possibilidade para a conformação da situação em tela. Em relação à bibliografia especializada, a hipótese defendida opõe-se à lógica explicativa positivista, segundo a qual a definição das missões militares é uma resposta pragmática a uma realidade objetiva e à concepção de que o controle político das instituições castrenses resulta na diminuição da atuação militar no interior das fronteiras nacionais. / Abstract: The research subject is the deployment of armed forces - foreign policy instrument - in public security operations in Argentina and Brazil, between 2005 and 2015. It aims to comprehend the construction of diverging patterns of military deployment in the studied countries. While argentinians militaries are primarily trained and employed to confront external threats, brazilian Armed Forces are essentially directed to deal with internal problems and confront non-state actors. The hypothesis sustained is that the processes of rupture and continuity in the argentinian and brazilian armed forces role - understood as the set of actions in which military are recognized and recognize themselves -, triggered by the transition from dictatorship to democracy, created the conditions possibility for the setting of the analyzed scenery. With regard to the specialized literature, this hypothesis opposes the positivist approach that understands the definition of military missions as a pragmatic reply to an objective reality and the argument that political control of military institutions decreases the deployment of it inside national boundaries. / Mestre

This thesis addresses accountability for mass atrocities. It presents a case study of Uganda that has undergone a two-decade conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgent group and the national army, the Uganda People’s Defence Armed Forces (UPDF). The government of Uganda has initiated various accountability measures that include international and domestic prosecutions, truth telling, reparations and traditional justice to address international crimes and other human rights violations committed during the conflict. The thesis in particular investigates how all these mechanisms could be used in a way that ensures that Uganda fulfils its international obligations and that the different measures complement each other. The thesis traces the background to the conflict that began in 1986 and explores the consequences of the conflict on the civilian population in Uganda. It alludes to its spread from Uganda to South Sudan and since 2008, to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic. It argues that the significant and continuous involvement of the government of Sudan from 1994 to 2005 internationalised the LRA conflict. It further finds that both the LRA and the UPDF perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity during the conflict. The thesis further discusses the international obligation of Uganda to prosecute, punish and extradite persons responsible for the commission of international crimes and to ensure remedies to victims of such crimes and other human rights violations. It finds that the lapse of Part II of the Amnesty Act that allowed for a ‘blanket amnesty’ leaves room for Uganda to fulfil its international obligations. The thesis further investigates the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and its Annexure reached between the government of Uganda and the LRA in Juba that ushers in the various accountability pursuits in Uganda. It argues that the implementation and successes of the Agreement depends on the consultations, legislations, policies and the establishment and workings of the institutions envisaged that could lead to justice, truth and reparations in Uganda. The thesis finds that the different accountability measures that Uganda is pursuing correspond to the political, social and historical conditions in Uganda, in particular, decades of armed conflict and human rights violations with impunity of perpetrators. It concludes that the success of the accountability undertakings will largely depend on the high calibre of officials and staff of the different institutions and their ability to deal wisely with challenges that will inevitably arise. It further finds that a political will and commitment is essential to ensure adequate investment in technical, material and financial resources and that non-interference of the government in the work of the institutions will ensure success. It concludes that such a political will and commitment, a robust consultation with stakeholders including victim groups and the creation of alliances locally, nationally, regionally and internationally, Uganda’s accountability pursuits will lead to the desired justice, truth and reparations. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

In the years following 9/11, research has shown that United Nations peacekeeping has grown increasingly militarized. Meanwhile, there have long been calls for women’s increased participation in peacekeeping, for a myriad of reasons mainly founded on instrumental and essentialist arguments. According to feminist theories, however, militarization would limit the agency of women as they are often placed in marginalized, protected roles when such a militarization occurs. Against this background, this thesis has utilized a visual and textual discourse analysis to investigate memory books published by the Swedish Armed Forces, which detail the presence of the Swedish contingency in MINUSMA in the period 2014-2019, to understand the connection between female peacekeeper’s agency and the increasing militarization of the UN’s most deadly peacekeeping mission. The findings suggest that militarization does not seem to limit the agency of Swedish female peacekeepers, who have seen their roles become more varied and seemingly possess more agency later than earlier on in the mission, despite an increased militarization of the peacekeeping mission. The thesis thus contributes to an underexamined connection between agency and militarization in the context of peacekeepers, while exploring a heretofore unexamined material. In doing so, the thesis opens for further research in both the material itself as well as further comparative studies.

The main purposes of this study are to elaborate on the concept of ethnic military mobilization and to identify the factors that contribute to its occurrence.

Peacekeeping is a means by which international or regional organizations control conflict situations that are likely to endanger international peace and security. Most scholars have viewed the contributions of peacekeeping forces only in terms of failures, and they have not investigated fully the political-military circumstances" under which conflict control measures succeed. This dissertation is an attempt to bridge this gap and to show how the OAU compares with the UN in carrying out peacekeeping missions. The method of research was the case study method in which primary and secondary data was used to describe the situations in which six peacekeeping forces operated. The content of resolutions, official reports and secondary data were examined for non-trivial evidences of impediments to implementation of mandates. Findings from the research indicate that peacekeeping missions not properly backed by political efforts at settlement of disputes, cooperation of the superpowers, and financial and logistic support were ineffective and usually unsuccessful. Lack of consensus and pursuit of national interests have resulted in ambiguous or unrealistic mandates and have reduced the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Moreover, parties to a conflict were interested only in solutions that favored their interests and were often skeptical about the role and credibility of peacekeeping forces. But the continued violations of ceasefire agreements in defiance of the presence of peacekeeping forces were due partly to the force's inability to use force except in self-defense , Most of the forces operated under serious operational and logistical difficulties and they were inadequately funded. But none of the three factors has been responsible alone for the failure of peacekeeping missions. The coordination of UN operations has been better than that of the OAU. In civil war situations, national governments have requested peacekeeping forces because they could not, unaided, put down their opponents. The UN has deployed its forces only as a means of relaxing tensions while member-states have pursued other interests.

No description available.