The crucial purposes of this thesis have two folds. Firstly, I will reconstruct Adam Smith¡¦s (5 June 1723-17 July 1790) thought through re-conceptualising the doctrine of the human nature in his theory. In doing this, I will give you reasons that the so-called ¡¥Das Adam Smith Problem¡¦ is founding on the wrong problematic concern in interpreting Smith¡¦s doctrine. The bulk of ¡¥the problem¡¦, having raised from the incessant controversy about whether Smith¡¦s theory is a coherent system built upon either sympathetic-based or interested-based foundation, but, as my kernel problematic concern in this thesis, I will argue that, neither side alone captures comprehensively about Smith¡¦s own understanding of human nature. Through presenting Smith¡¦s conception of the development of our moral judgement and his construction of operational principal of our market bahaviour, his doctrine of man should be orientated towards our intellectual capacity, especially on how do human cultivate their own moral judgement and the proper way of mutual understanding in everyday life. To accentuate the development of our capacity of judgement or reflection is the way I argue to understand Smith¡¦s conception of man correctly. Secondly, another controversy about Smith¡¦s doctrine lies on the contradiction among the concepts of ¡¥propriety¡¦ and ¡¥virtue¡¦ in his moral philosophy, while the former is the general standard attainable by the majority, and the latter with the stricter normative standard only a few men can achieve. My argument is, if man¡¦s intellectual capacity, such as judgement and reflection, having been regarded as essential concepts that Smith used to supersede the deficiency of one-sided understanding of human, then, his conception of impartial spectator and spectatorship¡¦s approach also gives the priority to cultivate our moral judgement and our capacity of reflection. Smith¡¦s primary concern, if I conceive it rightly, is to inspire our moral potential through disclosing the general principle lies behind our moral learning which terminated in the judgement made by impartial spectator, further, the concept of impartial spectator is also a linkage of different normative standards prescribed by propriety or virtue. Finally, In the conclusion part, I will connect my argument about moral potential with Smith¡¦s conception of human nature which tries to prove that, as the practical moralist, who considered man as intellectual animals that who deserves this privileged claim when who urges himself in enlarging and improving his own mentality.

本論文研究伊恩．麥克尤恩的《贖罪》、《愛無可忍》及《星期六》這三部小說中的同情與想像力。第一章仔細爬梳亞當．史密斯的哲學文本《道德情感論》，並闡述幾個重要概念如同情與想像力、公正觀察者的角色、同情與戲劇性質、及同情與敘事。第二章運用史密斯的同情與想像力的概念來檢視《贖罪》這部小說，並指出布萊妮最初反映了史密斯式的同情概念，但在她贖罪的過程中，她實踐了自我反省及自我批判的另一層次的同情。第三章從演化、利他主義及同情的觀點來閱讀《愛無可忍》這部小說。敘述者喬．羅斯所面臨的拯救小孩及保存自己性命的道德兩難彰顯出利他行動與利己行為間的衝突。本章以史密斯的同情概念來解釋小說中約翰．羅根的利他主義，並呈現出同情與利他行為的關連性。本章指出同情並非完全是利他的情感展現，同情實際上包含了利己與利他的動機。第四章檢視《星期六》中同情與敘事的關係，並闡述貝羅安對其病人泰勒伯的同情與泰勒伯透過口述去敘述其在伊拉克所遭遇的苦難具有關連性。本章並分析貝羅安在聆聽黛絲朗誦馬修．阿諾的多佛海灘詩集時所展現的同情與想像力。本章最後聚焦在貝羅安對巴克斯特的同情，並指出貝羅安對巴克斯特的仁慈實際上強化了同情者與被同情者之間微妙的權力關係。 / The dissertation aims to study the concept of sympathy and imagination in Ian McEwan’s three novels Atonement, Enduring Love and Saturday. In the first chapter, Adam Smith’s philosophical text, Theory of Moral Sentiments, is carefully scrutinized. The chapter includes several key ideas such as sympathy and imagination, the role of the impartial spectator, sympathy and its theatrical quality, and sympathy and narratives. In the second chapter, I use Smith’s concept of sympathy and imagination to examine McEwan’s Atonement and propose that Briony’s sympathy at first reflect Smith’s model of sympathy, but in the process of her atoning for her crime, Briony achieves a new level of sympathy which is more self-reflected and self-critical. Chapter Three reads Enduring Love from the perspective of evolution, altruism and sympathy. The narrator Joe Rose’s moral dilemma between saving the child and preserving his own life dramatizes the conflict between altruistic actions and self-interested behaviors. Smith’s idea of sympathy is employed to account for John Logan’s altruism and the connection between sympathy and altruistic acts is then presented. The chapter shows that sympathy is not an other-oriented emotion but a sentiment that contains both self-interested and other-interested motives. Chapter Four looks at the relation between sympathy and narratives, and demonstrates how Perowne’s sympathy to his patient Taleb is related to Taleb’s oral report of suffering in Iraq. It then analyzes Perowne’s sympathy and imagination during Daisy’s recitation of Matthew Arnold’s Dover Beach. The final section focuses on Perowne’s sympathetic sentiments to Baxter, arguing that Perowne’s benevolence to Baxter only highlights the subtle power relationship between the sympathizer and the sympathized.