Magister Legum - LLM / South Africa

Magister Legum - LLM / This study examines the legal and policy objectives of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) with specific reference to international standards and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). The study sets out the history and development of the TBT Agreement and the relationship between the TBT Agreement and selected WTO Agreements. The study also explores the application and interpretation of the TBT Agreement under the WTO dispute settlement system. More importantly, the study addresses the legal, policy and practical implications of the TBT Agreement for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa. A central argument put forward in this study is that, albeit international standards have been recognised as an important tool for LDCs in Africa to gain access to foreign markets, there is no significant ‘political will’ and commitment from the key players in standardisation work, that is, the national governments, the private sector and the ISO. At the same time, some developed and developing countries tend to use their influence and involvement in the activities of the ISO as a means of promoting the use and adoption of their homegrown standards. The study proposes, among others, that a more participatory approach which encompasses representatives from consumer groups, the private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from these LDCs in Africa, should be adopted

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / Post-apartheid foreign policy has witnessed a fundamental shift in South African foreign policy objectives and strategies as the country has aimed to move from a pariah to a participant in the international community. Since 1994, South Africa has become an active player in the international system and has assumed an increasingly active role in international organisations. One distinct strand of South African foreign policy which has emerged is a commitment to the use and support of multilateralism. Yet, as the country has become increasingly active in multilateral fora, so too, it is argued, has it been torn between the promotion of its own interests and those of its African peers. At times South Africa is seen to vociferously champion African interests, and at others to sideline the interests of its African partners and the notion of the African Renaissance, in favour of its own interests. Yet, whilst inconsistencies in South African multilateral foreign policy exist, this study argues that overall, South Africa has actively and consciously attempted to establish itself as an African middle power within the international system, and to create a distinct niche for itself as “the voice of Africa” in multilateral fora. Employing a Middle Power approach and utilising the concept of niche-building diplomacy this study investigates first, South Africa’s middle power niche in the international system at large, before, secondly, investigating South Africa’s role at the World Trade Organisation. The study concludes that, while South Africa has continually attempted to establish itself as “the voice of Africa” in a range of multilateral fora and has acted in a manner consistent with this stated objective, it has acted contrary to its established niche at the World Trade Organisation since joining this organisation in 1994. Indeed, this study finds that whereas in other multilateral fora South Africa has acted as the standard-bearer of African interests, in the World Trade Organisation it has acted contrary to African interests time and again. The findings indicate that the Middle Power concept in international relations itself needs to be revisited, that South Africa’s role as a middle power in the international system requires greater investigation, and that further research is required on the roles played by other middle powers at the World Trade Organisation.

<p>This research paper pays particular attention to the EAC because of its unique composition of four LDCs46 and 1 DC47 and the fact that three of these countries are landlocked least developed countries (LLDCs).48 The EAC was notified as a RTA to the WTO under the Enabling Clause on 9 October 2000 and registered as a Custom Union49 under WT/COMTD/N/14.50 The notification of the EAC under the Enabling Clause is due to the nature of composition of members therein and to the fact that the Enabling Clause does not require regional trading arrangements to cover substantially all trade, or to achieve free trade in the bloc within ten years after notification. Additionally, it provides an avenue for giving special consideration to the LDCs through making concessions and contributions,51 allows automatic exemptions from MFN (non-discrimination) treatment in favour of DCs,52 and thus allows other WTO members to accord more favourable treatment to DCs in many cases without according the same treatment to other WTO members.53.</p>

<p>The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) seeks to provide a standard uniform law for international sales contracts. This research paper analyses the rationale behind South Africa&rsquo / s delay in deciding whether to ratify the CISG, and its possible effect on trade with other nations. The CISG drafters hoped that uniformity would&nbsp / remove barriers to international sales thereby facilitating international trade. Ratification of the convention is only the beginning of uniformity / uniformity must then be extended to its application&nbsp / and interpretation. Not all countries have ratified the Convention yet they engage in international trade in goods: this state of affairs presents challenges since traders have to choose a national&nbsp / law that applies to their contract where CISG does not apply. This takes traders back to the undesirable pre-CISG era. On the other hand, those States that have ratified the convention face&nbsp / different challenges, the biggest one being a lack of uniformity in its interpretation. The problem of differing interpretations arises because some CISG Articles are vague leading to varied&nbsp / interpretations by national courts. Further, the CISG is still largely misunderstood and some traders from States that have ratified CISG exclude it from application. South Africa can only ratify an&nbsp / international instrument such as the CISG, after it has been tabled before Parliament, and debated upon in accordance with the Constitution. CISG&rsquo / s shortcomings, particularly regarding&nbsp / interpretation, make it far from certain that CISG would pass the rigorous&nbsp / legislative process. Nonetheless, the Constitution of South Africa requires the South African courts and legislature to promote principles of international law. The paper, therefore, examines, whether the Legislature has a constitutional obligation to ratify CISG. South Africa&rsquo / s membership of the WTO requires&nbsp / that it promote international trade by removing trade barriers. It is, therefore, vital for South Africa to be seen to be actively facilitating international trade. Even though the trade benefits which&nbsp / flow from ratification are not always visible in States that have ratified the CISG, there is some doubt whether South Africa can sustain its trade relations without ratifying the CISG. The paper shows that the formation&nbsp / of contracts under the South African common law is very similar to formation as set out under Part II of the CISG and if the CISG were to be adopted in South Africa, no major changes would be&nbsp / needed in this regard. International commercial&nbsp / principles as an alternative to the CISG still require a domestic law to govern the contract and would, therefore, leave South African traders in the&nbsp / same position they are in currently, where their trading relations are often governed by foreign laws. Ratifying CISG would certainly simplify contract negotiations particularly with regard to&nbsp / governing law provisions. Overall the advantages of ratification for South Africa far outweigh the shortcomings of the CISG, and ratification will assist in ensuring that South African traders get an&nbsp / opportunity to enter the international trade arena on an equal platform with traders from other nations. </p>

No description available.

<p>This research paper pays particular attention to the EAC because of its unique composition of four LDCs46 and 1 DC47 and the fact that three of these countries are landlocked least developed countries (LLDCs).48 The EAC was notified as a RTA to the WTO under the Enabling Clause on 9 October 2000 and registered as a Custom Union49 under WT/COMTD/N/14.50 The notification of the EAC under the Enabling Clause is due to the nature of composition of members therein and to the fact that the Enabling Clause does not require regional trading arrangements to cover substantially all trade, or to achieve free trade in the bloc within ten years after notification. Additionally, it provides an avenue for giving special consideration to the LDCs through making concessions and contributions,51 allows automatic exemptions from MFN (non-discrimination) treatment in favour of DCs,52 and thus allows other WTO members to accord more favourable treatment to DCs in many cases without according the same treatment to other WTO members.53.</p>

No description available.

<p>The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) seeks to provide a standard uniform law for international sales contracts. This research paper analyses the rationale behind South Africa&rsquo / s delay in deciding whether to ratify the CISG, and its possible effect on trade with other nations. The CISG drafters hoped that uniformity would&nbsp / remove barriers to international sales thereby facilitating international trade. Ratification of the convention is only the beginning of uniformity / uniformity must then be extended to its application&nbsp / and interpretation. Not all countries have ratified the Convention yet they engage in international trade in goods: this state of affairs presents challenges since traders have to choose a national&nbsp / law that applies to their contract where CISG does not apply. This takes traders back to the undesirable pre-CISG era. On the other hand, those States that have ratified the convention face&nbsp / different challenges, the biggest one being a lack of uniformity in its interpretation. The problem of differing interpretations arises because some CISG Articles are vague leading to varied&nbsp / interpretations by national courts. Further, the CISG is still largely misunderstood and some traders from States that have ratified CISG exclude it from application. South Africa can only ratify an&nbsp / international instrument such as the CISG, after it has been tabled before Parliament, and debated upon in accordance with the Constitution. CISG&rsquo / s shortcomings, particularly regarding&nbsp / interpretation, make it far from certain that CISG would pass the rigorous&nbsp / legislative process. Nonetheless, the Constitution of South Africa requires the South African courts and legislature to promote principles of international law. The paper, therefore, examines, whether the Legislature has a constitutional obligation to ratify CISG. South Africa&rsquo / s membership of the WTO requires&nbsp / that it promote international trade by removing trade barriers. It is, therefore, vital for South Africa to be seen to be actively facilitating international trade. Even though the trade benefits which&nbsp / flow from ratification are not always visible in States that have ratified the CISG, there is some doubt whether South Africa can sustain its trade relations without ratifying the CISG. The paper shows that the formation&nbsp / of contracts under the South African common law is very similar to formation as set out under Part II of the CISG and if the CISG were to be adopted in South Africa, no major changes would be&nbsp / needed in this regard. International commercial&nbsp / principles as an alternative to the CISG still require a domestic law to govern the contract and would, therefore, leave South African traders in the&nbsp / same position they are in currently, where their trading relations are often governed by foreign laws. Ratifying CISG would certainly simplify contract negotiations particularly with regard to&nbsp / governing law provisions. Overall the advantages of ratification for South Africa far outweigh the shortcomings of the CISG, and ratification will assist in ensuring that South African traders get an&nbsp / opportunity to enter the international trade arena on an equal platform with traders from other nations. </p>

No description available.