Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Globally as well as nationally, AIDS is politically contested. Since AIDS was first identified in 1981 there have been several responses to the pandemic, reflecting AIDS’ biomedical, political and social nature and implications. Although there are many ways to frame and approach AIDS, no single approach appears to be universally superior to any other, especially as these various approaches are essential for a comprehensive global response to the pandemic. However, these several responses can also represent contested constructs of how AIDS is inter-subjectively problematised based on different ontological understandings and epistemological preferences. The existence of such contested constructs suggests that multilateral AIDS governance is shaped by binaries and zero-sum games where the overall approach ought to be holistic. As such, some scholars claim that HIV is increasingly treated as something medical, and outside the context of overall development issues, sexual and reproductive health, human rights and structural violence. Recently, Vanwesenbeeck (2011) offered a simplified model of ‘high-road’ and ‘low-road’ solutions to the pandemic, problematising specifically the global policy/political response. Vanwesenbeeck’s model suggests that biomedical, vertically distributed and asexual high-road approaches are prioritised at the expense of the more community oriented, sexual and rights-based low-road approaches. This, Vanwesenbeeck argues, is because current ideas and norms of the market, moralism and medicalisation are more aligned with the de-contextual, de-sexual and quantifiable characteristics of high-road approaches. This study tests the analytical utility of Vanwesenbeeck’s model with a case study of the policy and political narratives emerging from the International AIDS Society’s nine International AIDS Conferences from 1996 until 2012. The research question this study investigates is thus: Can Vanwesenbeeck’s (2011) model of high-road and low-road solutions be identified in and illuminate the policy ideas, problem definitions and political binaries that play out in the discourse surrounding the biennial International AIDS Conferences between 1996 and 2012? This main research question is complemented by three sub-questions concerning 1) the strengths and limitations of Vanwesenbeeck’s model, 2) the general trends and developments in global AIDS policy/political responses during, before and after the biennial International AIDS Conferences and 3) the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the global AIDS response. Applying a qualitative methodology, the study finds that Vanwesenbeeck’s model can both be identified in and elucidate the political discourses, policy implementations and binaries surrounding the International AIDS Conferences between 1996 and 2012, albeit not all. The analytical utility of Vanwesenbeeck’s model is limited by oversimplification of the highroad/ low-road binary and the exclusion of alternative ideas for high-road prioritisation, such as humanitarianism, securitisation/sensationalism and the neoliberal ideological link between medicalisation and the market, as well as negligence of the impact of the Global Financial Crisis. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Vigs is internasionaal sowel as nasionaal polities omstrede. Sedert Vigs die eerste keer in 1981 geïdentifiseer is, was daar al verskeie reaksies op die pandemie wat die biomediese, politieke en maatskaplike aard en implikasies van die siekte weerspieël. Hoewel daar verskillende maniere is om Vigs te beskou en te benader, blyk geen enkele benadering universeel superieur te wees nie, veral aangesien al hierdie verskillende benaderinge noodsaaklik is vir ’n omvattende globale reaksie op die pandemie. Tog kan hierdie verskillende reaksies ook as betwiste konstrukte beskou word van hoe Vigs intersubjektief op grond van verskillende ontologiese begrippe en epistemologiese voorkeure geproblematiseer word. Die bestaan van sulke betwiste konstrukte gee te kenne dat multilaterale Vigsbestuur deur binêre en nulsombenaderinge gekenmerk word, terwyl die algehele benadering veronderstel is om holisties te wees. Sommige vakkundiges beweer dan ook dat MIV al hoe meer as ’n mediese probleem hanteer word, buite die konteks van oorkoepelende ontwikkelingskwessies, seksuele en voortplantingsgesondheid, menseregte en strukturele geweld. Vanwesenbeeck (2011) het onlangs ’n vereenvoudigde model van sogenaamde ‘grootpad-’ en ‘smalpadoplossings’ vir die pandemie aan die hand gedoen wat spesifiek die algehele beleids-/politieke reaksie problematiseer. Vanwesenbeeck se model voer aan dat biomediese, vertikaal verspreide en aseksuele grootpadbenaderinge dikwels ten koste van die meer gemeenskapsgerigte, seksuele en regtegebaseerde smalpadbenaderinge gekies word. Dít, reken Vanwesenbeeck, is omdat huidige denke en norme met betrekking tot die mark, moraliteit en medikalisasie eerder met die kontekslose, geslaglose en kwantifiseerbare kenmerke van grootpadbenaderinge strook. Hierdie studie het die analitiese nut van Vanwesenbeeck se model getoets met behulp van ’n gevallestudie van die beleids- en politieke narratiewe uit die Internasionale Vigsvereniging se nege internasionale vigskonferensies vanaf 1996 tot 2012. Die navorsingsvraag van hierdie studie was dus: Kan Vanwesenbeeck (2011) se model van grootpaden smalpadoplossings geïdentifiseer word in, en lig werp op, die beleidsidees, probleemomskrywings en politieke teenpole wat uit die diskoers by die tweejaarlikse internasionale vigskonferensies vanaf 1996 tot 2012 gespruit het? Hierdie hoofnavorsingsvraag is aangevul deur drie verdere vrae oor (i) die sterkpunte en beperkinge van Vanwesenbeeck se model, (ii) die algemene tendense en ontwikkelings in wêreldwye beleids-/politieke reaksies op Vigs gedurende, voor en na die tweejaarlikse internasionale Vigskonferensies, en (iii) die impak van die wêreldwye finansiële krisis op die wêreldwye Vigsreaksie. Met behulp van ’n kwalitatiewe metodologie het hierdie studie bevind dat Vanwesenbeeck se model wél geïdentifiseer kan word in, en lig werp op, sommige van die politieke diskoerse, beleidsinwerkingstelling en teenpole waartoe die internasionale vigskonferensies tussen 1996 en 2012 gelei het. Die analitiese nut van Vanwesenbeeck se model word egter beperk deur die oorvereenvoudiging van die grootpad-/smalpad-teenpole en die uitsluiting van alternatiewe idees oor die prioritisering van grootpadoplossings, soos filantropie, sekuritasie/sensasionalisme en die neoliberale ideologiese verband tussen medikalisasie en die mark, sowel as die verontagsaming van die impak van die wêreldwye finansiële krisis.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The horrific terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, in America, and the bombing of a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, have forced may people to seriously consider the impact of religion on political conflict. This literature review readdresses the serious neglect of religion in political studies by examining the three theoretical approaches to religion and political conflict, on the domestic and international level, that can be identified. Primordialists argue that differences in religious traditions should be viewed as one of the most important factors in explaining violent interactions in and between nations. They stress how differences in cultural identity and cosmologies can lead to violent conflict in and between nations. They illustrate how the deep malaise of modem secular society is leading to a backlash of alternative worldviews. This approach is culturally too simplistic in not providing a complex enough framework for understanding the dynamic social forces that constitute cultural identity. Instrumentalists admit that conflicts might be aggravated by diverging religious creeds but are rarel y if ever caused by them; instead most conflicts are about power and wealth. They emphasize the role played by political entrepreneurs, who use religion as an instrument to further their own goals. This approach is guilty of the other extreme - downplaying the role of religion and culture. Constructivists regard social conflicts as being embedded in cognitive structures like ideology, religion, nationalism and ethnicity. Constructivists can theorize about cultural identity, social structures, actors and forces together with the material world of power and wealth and are therefore best suited to give an adequate description of religion and political conflict. Despite its great promise constructivism still needs to step up to the board and deliver theories about religion and political conflict. The serious neglect of religion in political studies needs to be addressed and the most likely framework within which to do so seems to be constructivism. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die skokkende terroriste aanvalle op die World Trade Center en die Pentagon in Amerika en die bom in 'n nagklub in Bali, Indonesië, het baie mense gedwing om die impak van godsdiens op politieke konflik ernstig te oorweeg. Die literatuuroorsig herondersoek die ernstige verwaarloosing van godsdiens in politieke wetenskap weer eens, deur te kyk na die drie benaderings wat ten opsigte van godsdiens en politieke konflik, op plaaslike en internasionale vlak geïdentifiseer kan word. Primordialiste glo dat verskille tussen gosdienstradisies gesien moet word as een van die vernaamste faktore vir politieke konflik binne en tussen nasies. Hulle beklemtoon die wyse waarop verskille in kulturele identiteit en kosmologie kan bydra tot gewelddadige konflik binne en tussen nasies. Hulle illustreer verder hoe die diep malaise van die moderne sekulêre samelewing besig is om te lei tot 'n teenreaksie van alternatiewe wêreldbeskouings. Die benadering is egter kultureel gesproke te simplisties deurdat dit nie 'n raamwerk kan skep wat kompleks genoeg is ten einde die dinamies sosiale kragte wat kulturele identiteit vorm, te verstaan nie. Instrumentaliste gee toe dat politieke konflik dalk deur uiteenloopende godsdienstige tradisies vererger kan word, maar dat dit selde indien ooit daardeur veroorsaak word. Inteendeel, die meeste konflik handel steeds oor mag en rykdom. Hulle beklemtoon die rol wat gespeel word deur politieke entrepreneurs, wat geloof as 'n instrument gebruik in die bevordering van hulle eie doelwitte. Die benadering is skuldig aan die ander uiterste - die rol van kultuur en godsdiens word as minder belangrik beskou. Konstruktiviste beskou sosiale konflik as gewortel in kognitiewe strukture soos ideologie, godsdiens, nasionalisme en etnisiteit. Konstruktiviste kan teoretiseer oor kulturele identiteit, sosiale strukture, akteurs en kragte saam met die materiële wêreld wat bestaan uit mag en rykdom, en is daarom die beste geskik om 'n voldoende beskrywing te gee van godsdiens en politieke konflik. Ten spyte van die belowende potensiaal van konstruktivisme moet die perspektief nog begin om teorieë oor godsdiens en politieke konflik te verskaf. Die ernstige verwaarloosing van godsdiens in politieke wetenskap moet ondersoek word en die beste benadering hiervoor blyk konstruktivisme te wees.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The global city discourse posits a new role for cities in light of increased economic integration and the rise of a global economy. Firms are increasingly investing capital in locations where profits are anticipated to be highest, creating a geographic dispersal of economic activity. As a result, the central command functions of firms – management, coordination, servicing, and financing of vast networks of operations – have become more complex and strategic. Firms thus outsource a portion of their central command functions to specialised service firms. Specialised service firms tend towards high levels of agglomeration and concentrate in a small number of locations, giving rise to command and control centres of the global economy or global cities. Cities of the South are increasingly fulfilling global city functions, yet are generally approached through a developmentalist framework. The global city discourse places salience on specialised services and exhibits a Western bias. This study develops an alternative analytical framework that recognises an array of activities and processes, across three spheres of globalisation – markets, mafias, and movements – that contribute to the global connectivity of cities. In this way the role of cities of the South in the global economy is better understood. This study focuses on Mexico City and Johannesburg as global cities of the South. What the research uncovers is that these cities fulfil many global city functions and are amongst the best connected cities in their respective regions in terms of their ability to service global capital through growing specialised service sectors. In this way Mexico City and Johannesburg emerge as global cities of the South that integrate large geographical areas, populations, and sub-global economies with the global economy. This study also illustrates that the way in which global cities are conceptualised limits the extent to which the concept can be applied in Southern context. Global cities of the South service far less global capital because of the nature of core/semi-periphery/periphery relations and underdevelopment, the role they fulfil in the global economy is, however, no less critical than that of global cities of the core. This study therefore proposes thinking of global cities as constituent units of a global urban network, garnering certain power by occupying a particular niche constitutive of the whole network.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--Stellenbosch University, 2009. / In recent years it has become increasingly evident that the idea of the state as a universal (Western) type of governance structure, i.e. a set of bureaucratic institutions headed by a central government with the capacity and interest to govern all of its territory, is incongruent with realities on the ground, particularly within the African continent. The 1990s has been a critical period in the evolution of African statehood, during which old strategies of state control have broken down. While this has given rise to a debate on the ‘failure’ of African statehood, it has also led to attempts to revise and expand theories and concepts of statehood and set off a search for more indigenous and empirically viable alternatives to the state as it was devised by the European colonizers. This thesis aims at contributing to the debate on the challenges and potentials of contemporary African statehood by investigating the case of de facto statehood in Somaliland emerging on the backdrop of state failure in Somalia. The collapse of the de jure state of the Republic of Somalia in 1991 provided an opportunity for Somaliland to fundamentally redefine the pillars of statehood and governance. This entailed the combining of modern institution building with traditional practices of governance, to in this way bolster the capacity and legitimacy of the new de facto state in the north of what is formally recognized as Somalia. Drawing on the analytical framework of ‘mediated state’ provided by Ken Menkhaus, this thesis explores Somaliland’s self-reliant path to state formation as well as the governance structures which underpin its contemporary statehood. Particular attention is given to the role of traditional authorities as driving forces behind state formation and as a means of complementing the under-capacitated state institutions. The study thus relates to the debate on the resurgence of traditional leadership in Africa. The resurgence of traditional leadership within governance is a tendency which is part of a broader development of the reconfiguration of the state in Africa since the early 1990s – a tendency which introduces new possibilities, as well as new risks, in terms of reconstituting new viable governance structures. The study concludes that Somaliland’s approach to state formation demonstrates an impressive indigenous alternative to externally driven top-down attempts to revive centralized statehood, and that the case also challenges the perception that the breakdown of old strategies of state control necessarily leads to generalized anarchy. The study, however, also points out some risks involved in the exercise of the state and the traditional authorities ‘converting’ different forms of power between different realms of governance, and concludes that collaboration between the state and traditional authorities does not per se counteract undemocratic governance practices. On this basis the study suggests that the new ambiguous roles of traditional authorities within governance in Africa merit more academic attention.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / This thesis aims to assess what perceptions a sample population of Dutch students in Amsterdam have of South Africa from a broad range of social, political and cultural indicators. Until now, research into the existent perceptions regarding South Africa in the international community has been limited, which has implications for the formulation of its branding strategies and the possibility of their successful implementation at a crucial stage in the development of the country’s international reputation. Based on a theoretical framework which assumes the potential of nation branding for developing states, this thesis aims to provide an assessment of several historical and contemporary challenges faced by Brand South Africa, the most salient of which are linked to the fundamental need for consistency in the promotion of the nation’s identity. This analysis introduces the empirical research upon which the study is based and thereby explains the ambiguous nature of South Africa’s post-Apartheid brand identity.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The central research question of this study concerns the level of political risk that the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia poses for companies operating in, or intending to operating in the oil and gas industry of that region. The aim is to answer that question as well as two further subquestions. The first sub-question concerns issues pertaining to the factors and indicators that would be included in a political risk model specifically envisaged for the oil and gas industry, and the second concerns the practical application of political risk as a decision-making and management tool for investors. It is practically impossible to gather all the relevant information when undertaking a political risk analysis, to know all the unknowns. It would take an immense amount of time to attempt such an analysis and the costs would be exorbitant. In creating a political risk model specific to the oil and gas industry, a methodological approach is adopted to streamline this process. It is the aim of this research study to engage in this streamlining process; selecting the most salient variables that can then be incorporated into an industry specific model, which will yield realistic and practical results. In terms of the political risk indication, the political risk analysis of the Ogden returned a score putting the region in the high risk indication bracket. In terms of investment indication, the score indicates a moderate to high risk for investments the oil and gas industry. This does not mean that investors should stay away from the region. A high degree of risk, if sufficiently managed, can result in increased opportunities for higher returns for the investor. Beyond the traditional approaches to risk management there are other avenues that the investor may choose to follow, such as a commitment to engage with local stakeholders. These initiatives should extend beyond mere financial incentives to a more genuine form of community interaction, with extensive local consultation. Strategies, policies, and procedures should be developed that ensure that companies engage productively with NGOs and the media at local levels in order create a suitable environment for all involved. Political risk is more than simply providing a report with a risk rating tagged to the end of it. It should be a fully integrated part of the investor’s strategy, essential to the continued success and profitability of the investment. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die sentrale navorsingsvraag van hierdie studie handel oor die vlak van politieke risiko wat maatskappye wat besigheidsbelange in die Ogaden streek van oos Ethiopië het, of wat beplan om besigheidsbelange in die olie- en gasbedryf te begin, in die gesig staar. Die doel is om die vlak van politieke risiko te identifiseer en om verder twee sub-vrae te beantwoord. Die eerste sub-vraag is om die faktore en indikatore te identifiseer wat deel sal vorm van ‘n politieke risikomodel, spesifiek vir die olie- en gasbedryf en die tweede handel oor die praktiese aanwending van politieke risiko as ’n besluitnemings- en risikobestuur-instrument vir beleggers. Dit is prakties onmoontlik om alle relevante informasie in te samel wanneer ’n politieke risiko-analise gedoen word, of om bewus te wees van al die onbekende aspekte. Dit sal ‘n ongelooflike lang tydperk neem asook die kostes sal uiters hoog wees. Wanneer ‘n politieke risikomodel spesifiek vir die olie- en gasindustrie gebou word, word ’n metodologiese benadering om die proses te vergemaklik gevolg. Dit is die doel van hierdie studie om by te dra tot die vereenvoudiging van hierdie metodologiese proses deur die mees prominente aspekte te selekteer wat gevolglik geïnkorporeer kan word in ‘n industrie spesifieke model. Die model sal beide realistiese en praktiese resultate bied. Ten opsigte van die skaal vir belegging en politieke risiko indikasie, het politieke risiko analise van die Ogaden gedui op ’n hoë risiko indikasievlak. Vir belegging dui die risikovlak op ’n medium tot hoë risikovlak vir die olie- en gasindustrie. Dit beteken nie dat beleggers die area noodwendig moet vermy nie. Indien ’n hoë risikovlak aanwesig is, kan suksesvolle bestuur steeds verhoogde winsgeleenthede vir die belegger verseker. Behalwe vir die tradisionele benaderings tot risikobestuur en risikomitigasie is daar ook ander moontlikhede wat die belegger kan volg om die vlak van risiko te verlaag, soos ’n ooreenkoms om saam met plaaslike belanghebbendes te werk. Sulke meganismes moet verby finansiële belonings strek en ‘n opregte vorm van gemeenskapsinteraksie aanneem wat net kan gebeur deur middel van uitgebreide plaaslike konsultasie. Strategie, beleid en prosedure moet ontwikkel word, wat sal verseker dat maatskappye optimaal saamwerk met nie-regerings-organisasies en die media op plaaslike vlak. Dit sal verseker dat ’n geskikte omgewing vir alle partye geskep word. Poltieke risiko is veel meer as net risiko-evaluasie waar ’n vlak van risiko verskaf word. Dit behoort ten volle deel te wees van die belegging en is essensieël tot die sukses en winsvlak vir die belegger.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The small Middle Eastern country of Lebanon was once recognised as the exemplar of power-sharing democracy, upholding a system that promoted peace and coexistence between Christians and Muslims. Power was divided proportionally amongst confessional groups, granting each sect power according to their demographic proportion. This division of power was aimed at promoting national unity, but changes in the Lebanese demography made the division undemocratic, and the constitution no longer accurately represented Lebanese society. The 1926 constitution, supplemented by the National Pact in 1943, which had upheld this division of power, baulked under the pressure of a 15-year civil war, to the surprise of many scholars who had praised the Lebanese system. While many place the blame on the outside influences, it has been determined that the problem lay within the system. The static characteristic of the system did not sufficiently provide for changing demographics, or a change in interest groups. The problem lay in the fixed nature of the proportionality of the consociational system. The prolonged civil war, sometimes referred to as a proxy war between Israel and Syria, came to an end with the signing of the Taif Accord in 1990. Though none were satisfied with its provision, the Accord brought an end to the escalating violence. The Accord paved the way for the rebuilding of state institutions, enabling parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1996; general municipal elections in 1998; the peaceful transfer of power between presidents; as well as the reconstruction of the Lebanese economy. The main objective of this study of Lebanon is to determine whether the amended Lebanese constitution of 1990 adheres to the principles provided in the theoretical framework regarding constitutional endurance. This study is in the form of a qualitative case study. It aims to describe, at length, and to form an in-depth understanding of the actors and events leading up to the Taif Accord, as well as the formation and implementation thereof. The research questions include: What factors relating to flexibility, specificity and inclusion contributed to the breakdown of the 1943 National Pact?; What steps were taken leading to the Taif Accord?; and Have the changes made in the Lebanese constitution by means of the 1990 Taif Accord facilitated the endurance of the constitution? The study aims to contribute through its application of the theoretical framework to a particular case study, namely that of Lebanon. By 'testing' this theoretical framework, this study also provides an in-depth analysis of the happenings in Lebanon over the past 80 years. It remains in question whether the Taif Accord‟s amendments to the constitution have sufficiently provided for the resilience of thereof. Twenty years of relative peace have not convinced Lebanese citizens of the legitimacy and efficacy of the Accord. While the over-centralisation of power within the system was curbed by shifting power away from the president to a cabinet equally divided between Christian and Muslims, the Accord failed to effectively deal with the preset nature of the proportionality within the system. 20 years of relative peace may be enough to ensure the endurance of the constitution, but regional factors as well as the presence of radicalised groups play an important role in destabilising the fragile balance within the country. Should the Lebanese state continue to be inclusive and flexible in the wake of a constantly changing environment, it may endure. However, the tumultuous nature of the region in which Lebanon finds itself may eventually provide external shocks that the Lebanese system fails to weather. The hope is that the system builds on sound, systemic foundations in order to be able to endure regional conflict. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die klein Midde-Oosterse land Lebanon, was vroeër 'n voorbeeld van 'n magsdelende demokrasie wat 'n stelsel gehandhaaf het wat vrede en naasbestaan tussen Christene en Moslems bevorder het. Mag is proporsioneel onder geloofsgroepe verdeel volgens hul demografiese verhouding tot die ander groepe. Hierdie verdeling van mag was gemik op die bevordering van nasionale eenheid, maar veranderinge in die Lebanese demografie het veroorsaak dat die grondwet nie meer verteenwoordigend was van die Lebanese samelewing nie. Die Lebanese Grondwet van 1926, tesame met die Nasionale Verdrag van 1943, wat hierdie verdeling gehandhaaf het, het onder die druk van 'n 15-jare Burgeroorlog inmekaar gestort, ten spyte van die vertroue wat in die stelsel was. Alhoewel die skuld soms op eksterne invloede geplaas is, is dit egter bepaal dat die probleem in die Lebanese stelsel self lê. Die statiese kenmerk van die stelsel het nie voldoende voorsiening gemaak vir 'n verandering in die demografie of belangegroepe nie. Die probleem lê in die statiese en onwrikbare aard van die konsosiatiewe stelsel. Die uitgerekte Burgeroorlog, soms gesien as 'n oorlog tussen Israel en Sirië op Lebanese grond, is tot 'n einde gebring met die ondertekening van die Taif Verdrag in 1990. Alhoewel geen betrokke party ten volle tevrede was met die bepalinge van die Verdrag nie, het dit 'n einde gebring aan die toenemende geweld. Die Verdrag het die weg gebaan vir die heropbou van staatsinstellings; parlementêre verkiesings in 1992 en 1996; algemene munisipale verkiesings in 1998; die vreedsame oordrag van mag tussen presidente; sowel as die heropbou van die Lebanese ekonomie. Die hoof doel van hierdie studie van Lebanon is om te bepaal of die gewysigde grondwet van 1990 voldoen aan die beginsels van die teoretiese raamwerk rakende grondwetlike uithouvermoë. Die studie is in die vorm van 'n kwalitatiewe gevallestudie. Dit het ten doel om te beskryf en 'n in-diepte begrip van die akteurs en die gebeure wat gelei het tot die Taif Accord, asook die vorming en implementering daarvan te vorm. Die navorsing vrae sluit in: Watter faktore met betrekking tot buigsaamheid, spesifisiteit en insluiting het bygedra tot die verval van die 1943 National Pact?; Watter stappe is geneem wat gelei tot die Taif Verdrag?; en Het die veranderinge in die Lebanese grondwet deur middel van die 1990 Taif Verdrag die langdurigheid van die grandwet gefasiliteer? studie het ten doel om by te dra deur middel van sy toepassing van die teoretiese raamwerk om 'n bepaalde gevallestudie, naamlik dat van die Lebanon. Hierdie studie verskaf ook 'n in-diepte analise van die gebeure in Lebanon oor die afgelope 80 jaar. Die vraag bly staan of die Taif Verdrag se wysigings aan die grondwet voldoende voorsiening gemaak het vir die oorlewing van die grondwet. Twintig jaar van relatiewe vrede het nog nie Lebanese burgers oortuig van die legitimiteit en doeltreffendheid van die Verdrag nie. Alhoewel die oor-sentralisering van mag binne die stelsel ingeperk is deur die verskuiwing van mag weg van die President, na 'n kabinet wat gelykop tussen Christene en Moslems verdeel is, het die Verdrag versuim om effektief met die proporsionele aard van die grondwet te handel. Dit is egter belangrik om op die uniekheid van die Lebanese geval te let, ten spyte van die vele faktore rondom die saak. Hoewel 20 jaar van vrede genoegsaam kan wees om die langdurigheid van 'n grondwet te verseker, speel streeksfaktore, sowel as die teenwoordigheid van radikale groepe 'n belangrike rol in die destabilisering van die fyn balans wat in die land voorkom. Indien die Lebanese staat voortgaan om inklusief en buigsaam te wees in die nasleep van 'n voortdurende, veranderende omgewing, sal dit kan voortleef. Maar die onstuimige aard van die streek waarin Lebanon homself bevind mag eksterne negatiewe faktore na vore bring wat die Lebanese stelsel nie kan hanteer nie. Die hoop is dat hierdie stelsel sal voortbou op sterk, sistemiese fondasies om in staat te wees om eksterne, sowel as interne, konflik te hanteer.

Since its independence on July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan, with the assistance of various internal and external stakeholders, has been working towards viable and constructive political and socio-economic change in the new state. These processes of change are aimed at the effective development of South Sudan as a sovereign, peaceful and stable nation-state that is capable of serving the short- and long-term needs and expectations of its citizens and the environment at large. However, the successful realisation of this transformation is facing serious challenges. These challenges are partly attributable to the unresolved issues and consequences of South Sudan’s protracted years of civil war with Sudan, and the difficulties that often confront post-conflict societies, especially a post-independence state like South Sudan, which came into existence after two prolonged civil wars. Given the complexity of South Sudan’s post-independence environment, this study aims to gain a clearer understanding of South Sudan’s complex transformational and peace-building challenges as an independent state; and to propose recommendations on how they can be managed. This will be achieved through the use of historical and qualitative research methods, which locate the study within a framework that provides the basis for the analyses of the data collected on South Sudan and on the subjects of conflict transformation and peace-building. As South Sudan celebrated its one-year anniversary on July 9, 2012, it was recalled that the country’s official independence was regarded as a historic event for the African continent at large. While there were high expectations among the South Sudanese population and the international community that this signalled an end to Africa’s longest conflict, it was soon clouded by a myriad of political, economic, socio-cultural, peace, security and development challenges. These include building an entirely new state out of the ruins of war, confronting the unresolved resource and border demarcation conflicts with Sudan, and tackling South Sudan’s own internal ethnic confrontations, among many other human resources and capacity challenges. Given South Sudan’s challenging post-conflict and post-independence environment, this study contends that contrary to the notion that the resolution and transformation of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict and the birth of the new Republic of South Sudan ended the conflict between the two entities, the secession did not create a cohesive and robust new state that is free from serious internal and external challenges. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and external and internal stakeholders, including the African Union (AU); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the United Nations (UN); civil society organisations (CSOs) and various individual countries (among many other initiatives) have been and are actively engaged in joint efforts to address and manage the challenges that confront South Sudan as an independent state. However, such endeavours have mainly concentrated on state-building issues, resources and border demarcation conflicts, and have focused less on the problems of nation-building. As such, internal complexities such as social and national identity, the decentralisation of power/broader representation in government and state affairs and growing ethnic conflicts have continued to receive less attention. Bearing this in mind, this study argues that unless these internal matters are given serious consideration, sustainable peace and development in South Sudan will remain elusive. While negotiations to resolve the cross-border South Sudan-Sudan conflicts continue, a solution that is acceptable to all parties is only possible if all the conflicting parties are invited to the negotiation table to engage in peaceful dialogue and find the means to reconcile their differences and build trustworthy and mutually beneficial relationships. The study also identifies a need for the promotion and coordination of a constructive relationship between the South Sudanese state and civil society. It further recognises the importance of building inclusive political processes to facilitate a state-society cooperative environment, and the development of state capacity to perform its duties in a manner that satisfies the expectations of the population that they will enjoy the fruits of their long-drawn out struggle for independence. In terms of how these processes can be achieved, the study recommends an indigenous intervention mechanism that encourages the active engagement of the entire post-conflict society in its own peace-building and development initiatives. This mechanism is encapsulated in John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model of conflict transformation, which emphasises the importance of coordinating peace-building activities between and among the various leadership levels – the top, middle and grassroots leaders of the post-conflict society. This model also advocates that the local community be encouraged to develop and drive its own peace-building and development activities, which is a major step forward in reconciling differences, building a sense of belonging, trust, mutual respect and ultimately societal cohesion. These are very important considerations for any society or state with the long-term goal of sustainable peace and development. The research study thus recommends this model for managing South Sudan’s challenges. It urges all stakeholders to promote the involvement of the local community in peace-building and development activities and to facilitate peaceful dialogue and reconciliation within South Sudan and with Sudan in order to achieve viable peace and development in the longer term. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

Africa is at the cross roads as it redefines itself within a new framework of political and economic linkages. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States illustrate both the dangers of reckless foreign policy choices as well as the need for cooperation with regard to transnational threats. From the exclusive policies of ‘total onslaught’ to the inclusive policies of the African Renaissance, South Africa has tried almost everything but remains unable to find an acceptable niche for herself in Southern Africa. Deep suspicions about South African intentions and commitment persist despite the reality of shared fears of further marginalisation, and aspirations of more propitious integration, within a rapidly globalising international environment. In understanding these dynamics, this study traces the evolution of South Africa’s contemporary relationship with the Southern African region and rationalizes this relationship within a broader theoretical framework based on development, discourse and hegemonic stability theories as well as the middle-power and pivot-state paradigms. In addition, the study assesses South Africa’s foreign policy options in light of both domestic constraints and the perceptions of other countries within the region. In essence, South Africa’s regional foreign policy dilemma is a product of the country’s inability to adjust timeously its strategic compass in the mercurial world of foreign policy where a country seeking to advance an ambitious foreign policy agenda will always be confronted with powers arrayed against it, forces that it cannot manage and battles that it cannot win. As this thesis argues, South Africa’s inability to convince other states that her vision is complimentary to their needs has inhibited her ability to engineer a process of transformation and development in the region. The challenge for the South African government is to shift the power dynamic against which projections of South African dominance trigger fierce rejection or reluctant cooperation by regional governments. This foreign policy drive has to be underpinned by a clearly defined developmental strategy that is able to compromise between high ideals and stark realities, between a preference for paternalistically reshaping regional relations and realising that given internal challenges and international expectations, South Africa needs the region perhaps even more than the region needs South Africa. In order to restore some balance to this trend, regional relations grounded in transformative development must be seen as a critical component of South Africa’s national interests. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2010.

This thesis examines the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) in light of the continental challenges of peace and security. It explores the prospects for the success of the PSC in its endeavours. The study’s central argument is that the PSC’s ability to successfully tackle peace and security challenges depends greatly on the cooperation of the fifteen members of the PSC as well as between the fifty-three African Union members and the international community at large, including the United Nations. This hypothesis is backed by the argument that although the PSC may be a practical translation of the theoretical statement that ‘African problems need African solutions’, the reality is that the PSC cannot achieve such an ambitious objective alone. The PSC’s enthusiasm should be bolstered by the requisite assistance from the international arena. The international community, especially the major players or countries in the international political spectrum, are challenged to work together with the PSC in its quest for African peace and security. The members of the international community are called upon to discontinue their parallel peace and security initiatives in Africa in favour of supporting and strengthening the PSC’s ongoing initiatives. Another critical point raised in the study is that the UN’s brief to cultivate world peace and security obliges it to buttress the PSC’s initiatives, the home-grown regional solutions to Africa’s inherent peace and security challenges. This support should include the UN’s engagement at all levels with the newly created African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Indeed, the moral challenge for the international community is to support Africa’s already demonstrated political will with the necessary assistance. This study advocates political and economic cooperation, resource mobilisation and provision of the relevant expertise. The validity of the study’s hypothesis has been tested and confirmed by means of a deeper inquiry into the PSC’s normal business conduct, and a comparative analysis of the case studies relating to the PSC’s interventions in Burundi and in Sudan’s Darfur region. This study of those interventions has illuminated the PSC’s opportunities and challenges: on the one hand, it has revealed that the PSC’s authority and legitimacy are not challenged, at least in Africa. On the other hand, however, it has lent support to the thesis that the PSC cannot go it alone - a conclusion that has encouraged the entire AU to find ways of challenging the UN to own up to its obligations. The PSC has made noteworthy strides in assisting to streamline and coordinate the support and engagement it receives from the international community. The major limitation of the study is that it was conducted before other PSC support structures (the African Standby Force and the Continental Early Warning System) were fully operational. The study thus could not assess the full potential of the PSC. Nonetheless, the study has sought to identify potential or latent challenges which could hamper the PSC’s success, whether its support structures are fully operational or not. In the end, the study recommends greater coordination and cooperation between the PSC and major international actors including the UN. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2010.