Spelling suggestions: "subject:"fthings (baw) - south africa"" "subject:"fthings (baw) - south affrica""
1 |
Accessio en die onderskeid tussen by- en hulpsakeVan Zyl, David 13 August 2015 (has links)
LL.M. / Please refer to full text to view abstract
|
2 |
Onstoflike sake in die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakeregCloete, R. 06 1900 (has links)
Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are
examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also
incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of
property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing".
Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the
position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a
setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South
African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be
attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives
preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related
to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to.
Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of
things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal
practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal
things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised
to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der
Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced
in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights.
Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required
in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The
fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest
possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be
introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform
were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so,
further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept.
Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started
a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between
private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide
interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the
constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that
constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new
constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and
intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the
private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as
an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the
wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation
should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the
literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that
incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law
thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain
cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider
thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse
sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar
ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse
eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg.
Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die
posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n
terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in
die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf
word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger
omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde
interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as
uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word
egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse
regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit.
Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake,
is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die
privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die
privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte.
In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van
eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te
oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die
wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten
aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning
van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas.
Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n
nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan
die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die
Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip
te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as
die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word
tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos
new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil.
Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien
word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande
privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword
ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde
die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat
hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat
onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige
gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van
die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese
druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale
nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.
|
3 |
Onstoflike sake in die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakeregCloete, R. 06 1900 (has links)
Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are
examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also
incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of
property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing".
Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the
position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a
setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South
African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be
attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives
preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related
to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to.
Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of
things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal
practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal
things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised
to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der
Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced
in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights.
Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required
in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The
fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest
possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be
introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform
were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so,
further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept.
Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started
a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between
private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide
interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the
constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that
constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new
constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and
intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the
private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as
an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the
wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation
should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the
literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that
incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law
thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain
cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider
thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse
sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar
ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse
eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg.
Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die
posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n
terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in
die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf
word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger
omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde
interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as
uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word
egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse
regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit.
Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake,
is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die
privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die
privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte.
In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van
eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te
oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die
wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten
aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning
van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas.
Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n
nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan
die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die
Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip
te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as
die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word
tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos
new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil.
Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien
word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande
privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword
ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde
die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat
hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat
onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige
gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van
die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese
druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale
nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.
|
4 |
Die strafbaarheid van furtum possessionis in die Suid-Afrikaanse regRoos, Cornelius Johannes 09 1900 (has links)
Text in Afrikaans / Theft in South African law is one of the most well-known
common law crimes. It is also one of the crimes in respect of
which opinions vary considerably.
Furtum possessionis is one of the manifestations of the crime
of theft at common law. The general requirements of furtum
possessionis were already established in Roman law. Emphasis
was not placed on the taker of the thing but on the particular
position of the person who was deprived of the property. This
approach was also followed in Roman-Dutch law.
Fur tum possessionis in South African law can be defined as
follows: It is the unlawful and intentional appropriation by
the owner or someone else of a movable corporeal thing in
commercio, in circumstances in which the possessor of the
thing has a valid right of retention of the thing, with the
intention of depriving the possessor permanently of control of
the thing.
Theft in the form of furtum possessionis differs in an
important respect from theft in the form of the removal of a
thing. In the case of removal the complainant can also be a
person acting as a holder, that is someone exercising control
of the thing on behalf of the owner. In the case of furtum
possessionis the complainant is the person with the right of
retention and from whose possession the thing is taken away.
The accused either possesses the thing as an owner or as a
holder before possession of the thing was transferred to the
complainant. Mere possession is not enough. The possession of
the complainant has to be accompanied by a right to retention.
Furthermore the possession of the thing has to be lawful / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)
|
5 |
Die strafbaarheid van furtum possessionis in die Suid-Afrikaanse regRoos, Cornelius Johannes 09 1900 (has links)
Text in Afrikaans / Theft in South African law is one of the most well-known
common law crimes. It is also one of the crimes in respect of
which opinions vary considerably.
Furtum possessionis is one of the manifestations of the crime
of theft at common law. The general requirements of furtum
possessionis were already established in Roman law. Emphasis
was not placed on the taker of the thing but on the particular
position of the person who was deprived of the property. This
approach was also followed in Roman-Dutch law.
Fur tum possessionis in South African law can be defined as
follows: It is the unlawful and intentional appropriation by
the owner or someone else of a movable corporeal thing in
commercio, in circumstances in which the possessor of the
thing has a valid right of retention of the thing, with the
intention of depriving the possessor permanently of control of
the thing.
Theft in the form of furtum possessionis differs in an
important respect from theft in the form of the removal of a
thing. In the case of removal the complainant can also be a
person acting as a holder, that is someone exercising control
of the thing on behalf of the owner. In the case of furtum
possessionis the complainant is the person with the right of
retention and from whose possession the thing is taken away.
The accused either possesses the thing as an owner or as a
holder before possession of the thing was transferred to the
complainant. Mere possession is not enough. The possession of
the complainant has to be accompanied by a right to retention.
Furthermore the possession of the thing has to be lawful / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)
|
Page generated in 0.1039 seconds