The intention of this study was to understand more fully the process of creating musical composition. As a means to to this I created a compositional model, "Maya's Words", a conscious experiment which utilised the techniques I discovered and codified from children's compositions. By utilising rhe model as a working tool and the information extracted from the children's works I was able to draw together my own theories and observations concerning the process of musical composition and how it works. Within this study I have also examined my own process of musical composition and drawn, in a limited way, upon my work on the methodology behind the compositional procedures of composer Elisabeth Lutyens. The way in which the children used their own musical ideas in a flexible and original manner illustrated a mental state that seemed to be able to grasp thoughts from anywhere, without reference, for example, to tradition or style. This dexterity brought to my attention the notion that the children were using fragments of ideas/music/sound and integrating them into their own compositions. In the compositional model for this study I chose to compose in a way that utilised information from this study in many manifestations but it also had to be an organic growth as a means to be real and for me to have a true input into it a sa composer. It also had to incorporate many of the study elements into it otherwise it would not be a conscious experiment. The two forces here, for me haave worked in tandem as the flexibility of approach used by the children has allowed me to work in a flexible way in this compositional model and yet the uncomplicated way in which the children evaluated their own progressions has had a profound influence on me too and provided me with a method of self-evaluation which does not create self-inflicted damage to my own feelings about my composition. I hope in the same way that this study will allow composers a freedon of perspective that will open for them a new understanding of musical composition.

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Many well-known arguments in the philosophy of mind use thought experiments to elicit intuitions about consciousness. Often, these thought experiments include mechanistic explanations of a systems’ behavior. I argue that when we understand a system as a mechanism, we are not likely to understand it as an agent. According to Arico, Fiala, Goldberg, and Nichols’ (2011) AGENCY Model, understanding a system as an agent is necessary for generating the intuition that it is conscious. Thus, if we are presented with a mechanistic description of a system, we will be very unlikely to understand that system as conscious. Many of the thought experiments in the philosophy of mind describe systems mechanistically. I argue that my account of consciousness attributions is preferable to the “Simplicity Intuition” account proposed by David Barnett (2008) because it is more explanatory and more consistent with our intuitions. Still, the same conclusion follows from Barnett’s “Simplicity” account and from my own account: we should reassess the conclusions that have been drawn from many famous thought experiments.

This thesis will concern itself with the development of the religious thought of Eliot as it is expressed in his poetry and plays.

This thesis argues against the Humean theory of practical reasons, criticising its foundations in philosophical and moral psychology. It develops a realist account of value-based reasons, underpinned by a distinctive cognitivist moral psychology, and a non-causalist account of the rational explanation of action. Contemporary Humeans reject Hume's own theory of thought, but this leaves the Humean theory of practical reasons without justification for a conception of desire as non-cognitive and not open to fundamental rational evaluation. Two possible strategies for filling this justificatory gap are (i) an appeal to grammatical considerations about the attribution of desires and their content, or (ii) an appeal to distinctions in respect of direction of fit. I argue that neither is successful. Kant's moral psychology provides the key to an alternative account, but is unsatisfactory due to its acceptance of a theory of thought which is relevantly similar to Hume's, and of non-compulsory rationalist presuppositions. Separated from these aspects, Kant's insights open a path to developing a conception of desire as essentially rationally evaluable. I argue that, in addition to such a conception, we should accept an account of rational attitudes as constitutively normative. On the basis of these two views, I argue that desire is a kind of evaluative belief. An independently plausible account of reasons takes them to be evaluative facts, and this neatly connects to the normative philosophical psychology. I consider the implications of such a view for the rational explanation of action, arguing that while causal theories of action and action-explanation are unacceptable, the normative philosophical psychology allows the development of non-causal alternatives to them. The non-causal account of action and action-explanation leaves space for an explanatory role for reasons themselves, beyond that provided by merely psychological explanation, as well as an explanatory role for an agent's character and emotions.

Kwong Yuk Yee, Jessica. / "June 2002." / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 88-97). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Antioch University, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed April 10, 2007). Advisor: Jon F. Wergin . Keywords: leadership, concept mapping, educational administration, teachers' thinking, cognitive map. Includes bibliographical references (p. 148-159).