The desire is infinite, but the resources are limited. The relationship between fiscal decentralization and long-run economic growth is ambiguous. Several economists have made the case for fiscal decentralization as a means of promoting long-run economic growth based on the view that it leads to better resource allocation and a more productive, and possibly smaller, public sector. Countries have pursued decentralization policies both for political and developmental reasons. Fiscal decentralization, the allocation of tax and spending powers to lower levels of government, currently in vogue is based on notions of economic efficiency criteria. Although it is theoretically expected that decentralization leads to efficient provision of local public services and stimulates economic development, the theoretical underpinnings for this relationship remain largely undeveloped. The absence of an adequate theoretical framework has undermined the validity of the empirical work on this subject. Advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that among other benefits, it can increase the efficiency of delivery of government services. We use data from 23 counties (cities) of the Taiwan province. The empirical findings can be stated as follows. The primary finding is that the estimated coefficient on fiscal decentralization variable is positive and statistically significant . This finding provides evidence that fiscal decentralization contributes to economic growth. This paper is also one of the first to evaluate this claim empirically by looking at the association between expenditure decentralization and the efficiency of local government .We also provide evidence that expenditure (revenue) decentralization is a negative (positive) relation with the efficiency of local government. Further Tobit panel regression of 23 counties (cities) provide robust evidence that more decentralization is not associated with higher efficiency of local governments. Therefore that fiscal decentralization contributes to the efficiency of local governments is ambiguous in the previous period.

人類慾望無窮而資源有限，所以如何將資源做最有效的使用一直是經濟學所追求的課題。有關效率的規範分析中，巴瑞圖最適（Pareto optimality）為接受度最高的準則。基於巴瑞圖效率的觀點，不論是營利組織或非營利組織其經營之基本理念皆是希望以最少的投入獲得最大的產出，因此衡量投入與產出間之相對表現即為效率的評估。非營利組織及公共部門因為有許多產出、投入不易量化，故其效率不易評定。此一情況一直到DEA（Data Envelopment Analysis；資料包絡分析法）發展才逐漸改善。另外，有關DEA的運用幾乎都集中在個別決策單位的效率衡量，將之應用在衡量總體經濟的表現上非常少見。所以論文第肆章是按傳統方式以DEA衡量我國地方政府的效率並分析造成效率差異的原因，第參章則將DEA的概念應用於經濟成長上，探討使經濟成長達到極大化之租稅負擔及租稅結構。又效率的追求為經濟學的主軸，但中央政府的效率目標與地方政府並不相同，由於目標不同，因此彼此所訂的租稅政策亦不相同。本文第伍章試圖提出一理論模型說明中央政府在面對異質地區的垂直外部性下如何有效率的訂定其租稅政策。 / The human desires are infinite but resources are scarce. Using resources effectively is the topic of the economics. In efficient analyses, the Pareto optimality is the highest criterion to accept. Based on Pareto efficiency, the basic idea is to obtain the most outputs by the least inputs. Therefore the efficiency measurement is to calculate the relative performance of inputs and outputs. The nonprofit organization and the public agencies have many outputs and inputs not easy to be quantified; hence, their efficiency is not easy to evaluate. This phenomenon doesn’t improve until DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) was developed. However, the application of DEA concentrates nearly on the efficiency measurement of individual policy-making unit; the application is be rarely used in measuring the performance of the macro-economy. Chapter 4 of this dissertation measures and explains the variation in cost efficiency of the local governments in Taiwan area. Chapter 3 deals with the application the DEA to economic growth, estimating a combination of the tax burden(the ratio of tax revenue to GDP）and the tax structure(the ratio of indirect taxes to direct taxes)which would maximize the rate of growth of GDP of Taiwan. Efficiency is the core of economics, but the national government’s efficient goal is not as same as the local government’s. Because their goals are not consistent, thus the tax policies are different. Chapter 5 attempts to propose a theoretical model to explain how a national or federal government decides its tax policy in the vertical externalities happening in heterogeneous states.