Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The enlisted personnel assignment process is a major part in the United States Navy's Personnel Distribution system. It ensures warfighters and supporting activities receive the right sailor with the right training to the right billet at the right time (R4) and is a critical element in meeting the challenges of Seapower 21 and Global CONOPS. In order to attain these optimal goals the ways-to-do-it need to be customer-centered and should optimize both, the Navy's needs and the sailor's interests. Recent studies and a detailing pilot in 2002 used a web-based marketplace with two-sided matching mechanisms to accomplish this vision. This research examines the introduction of an Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) as part of the U.S. Navy's enlisted personnel assignment process in a simulation environment. It uses a previously developed simulation tool, including the Deferred Acceptance (DA) and the Linear Programming (LP) matching algorithm to simulate the assignment process. The results of the sensitivity analysis suggested that the Navy should mainly emphasize sailor quality rather than saving AIP funds in order to maximize utility and the possible matches. When adopting such an introduction policy also the percentage of unstable matches under the LP as the matching algorithm was reduced. / Commander, German Navy

I analyze the effects of bank mergers and competitive market structure after the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. The first chapter studies the incentives to decide mergers and the effects of market competition. Nationwide branching from deregulation and the resulting bank consolidation have brought more a competitive market environment. In particular, branch networks play an important role in bank merger analysis. Using commercial banks' branch-level location data in Texas from 1994 to 2005, I estimate a two-sided matching model of merging and target banks with transferable utility. To study post-match values, I apply the maximum score estimator developed by Fox (2010). I find the positive assortative matching of bank sizes and I confirm that a bank prefers matching with target banks that have geographically overlapping markets. Moreover, I extend the standard matching model to incorporate externalities of market competition and the merger activities of rivals. Competitive rivals lessen the effects of mergers but mergers that increase market power have positive externalities on unmatched banks. The second chapter develops a structural model of demand and supply for retail banking to predict post-merger price. Ownership consolidation can affect not only price but also product characteristics. Once demand parameters and price elasticities are estimated, the adjustments in banking characteristics following mergers are considered in order to estimate marginal costs. I apply Peters’ (2006) simulation methods to account for the discrepancy between simulated merger changes and actual changes. The third chapter builds on an entry model of Berry and Waldfogel (1999) to quantify market competition. Significant consolidation waves after the Riegle-Neal Act brought a decrease in the number of banking institutions, while the relaxation of branching regulations almost doubled the number of bank branches and fortified market competition. When a new branch with high quality enters, I analyze the effects of market deposit expansion, business stealing from rival incumbent banks and cannibalization from other branches operated by the same bank. I find evidence that business stealing effects dominate cannibalization effects as market size increases. However, the impact of competition is localized and cannibalization effects are rather reversed at remote distances.

Apresentamos a teoria sobre mercados de dois lados, centralizados e descentralizados, para analisar o mercado de admissão de estudantes aos Centros de Pós-graduação em Economia no Brasil ao longo dos últimos 15 anos. Iniciamos descrevendo a história da organização deste mercado até a época atual. As falhas do sistema descentralizado e as hipóteses sobre o insucesso do procedimento centralizado de 1997 são discutidas. Observações empíricas são utilizadas para propor um modelo teórico que represente aproximadamente o atual mecanismo descentralizado e explique a aparente duradoura aplicação desse mecanismo. Por fim, tecemos considerações a respeito das possibilidades de aprimoramento deste mercado com modificações do mecanismo existente. / We present the theory of two-sided matching markets, with centralized and decentralized mechanisms, in order to analyze a Brazilian market in which graduated students seek positions in postgraduate programs in economics. We first describe the institutional history of this market. The failures of the decentralized procedure and the hypothesis about the failure of the 1997 centralized mechanism are discussed. Empirical observations are used to propose a theoretical model that represents the actual decentralized matching procedure of the market. Based in this model we explain the apparent long-lasting use of this decentralized mechanism. Finally, we make considerations about the possibilities of developments in this market by modifying the mechanism used today.

Submitted by Christiane Szerman (chriszerman@gmail.com) on 2015-07-28T14:26:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis_SISU.pdf: 1175179 bytes, checksum: 326f32ec921524e51e6c86a8c5224711 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2015-07-30T14:52:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis_SISU.pdf: 1175179 bytes, checksum: 326f32ec921524e51e6c86a8c5224711 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Almeida (maria.socorro@fgv.br) on 2015-07-30T19:46:12Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis_SISU.pdf: 1175179 bytes, checksum: 326f32ec921524e51e6c86a8c5224711 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-30T19:46:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Thesis_SISU.pdf: 1175179 bytes, checksum: 326f32ec921524e51e6c86a8c5224711 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-29 / No Brasil, a recente reformulação do Exame Nacional de Ensino Médio (ENEM) e a criação do Sistema de Seleção Unificada (SISU), um mecanismo de admissão centralizado que aloca os alunos às instituições, promoveram mudanças relevantes no Ensino Superior. Neste artigo, investigamos os efeitos da introdução do SISU na migração e evasão dos alunos ingressantes a partir dos dados do Censo de Educação Superior. Para tal, exploramos a variação temporal na adesão das instituições ao SISU e encontramos que a adoção do SISU está associada a um aumento da mobilidade entre municípios e entre estados dos alunos ingressantes em 3.8 pontos percentuais (p.p) e 1.6 p.p., respectivamente. Além disso, encontramos um aumento da evasão em 4.5 p.p. Nossos resultados indicam que custos associados à migração e comportamento estratégico são importantes determinantes da evasão dos alunos. / Although decentralized assignment mechanisms have been increasingly replaced by centralized systems as part of education reforms, empirical evidences of such transitions are limited. In this paper, we investigate the effects of introducing a centralized admission system that allocates students to Higher Education Institutions on migration and college enrollment. We use rich data from Brazilian Higher Education to construct measures of migration and dropout. Exploiting time variation in adoption of a centralized mechanism across institutions, we find that the adoption of a centralized mechanism increases inter-municipality and interstate mobility of first-year students by 3.8 percentage points (p.p.) and 1.6 p.p., respectively. The system is also associated with an increase by 4.5 p.p. in dropout rate of first-year students. Overall, our findings suggest that migration and strategic behaviors during the application process play a crucial role for an increase in dropout.

Apresentamos a teoria sobre mercados de dois lados, centralizados e descentralizados, para analisar o mercado de admissão de estudantes aos Centros de Pós-graduação em Economia no Brasil ao longo dos últimos 15 anos. Iniciamos descrevendo a história da organização deste mercado até a época atual. As falhas do sistema descentralizado e as hipóteses sobre o insucesso do procedimento centralizado de 1997 são discutidas. Observações empíricas são utilizadas para propor um modelo teórico que represente aproximadamente o atual mecanismo descentralizado e explique a aparente duradoura aplicação desse mecanismo. Por fim, tecemos considerações a respeito das possibilidades de aprimoramento deste mercado com modificações do mecanismo existente. / We present the theory of two-sided matching markets, with centralized and decentralized mechanisms, in order to analyze a Brazilian market in which graduated students seek positions in postgraduate programs in economics. We first describe the institutional history of this market. The failures of the decentralized procedure and the hypothesis about the failure of the 1997 centralized mechanism are discussed. Empirical observations are used to propose a theoretical model that represents the actual decentralized matching procedure of the market. Based in this model we explain the apparent long-lasting use of this decentralized mechanism. Finally, we make considerations about the possibilities of developments in this market by modifying the mechanism used today.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The purpose of this thesis is threefold. Firstly, to attempt to provide validity for the two-sided matching process; secondly, analyze FITREP attributes to determine their suitability for a weighted criteria evaluation system and; thirdly, compare the USMC promotion and assignment process with contemporary human resource management practices. Using data from the USMC Officer Accession Career file (MCCOAC), a logit model is used to estimate the effects of TBS preference and other officer characteristics on retention to the seven year mark. Findings indicate that there was little difference in the probability of retention throughout most preference levels except for the bottom sixth. Using USMC FITREP data, an ordinary least squares model is used to estimate the effects of rank and MOS on FITREP scores across all attributes. Multiple comparison tests demonstrated that there are statistical differences at the 0.05 level between the means of the MOSs. Additionally, reporting creep is continuing across all attributes. Surveys were also conducted. The first survey indicated that USMC officers believe the FITREP attributes were not all equally important within, and across each MOS - although the USMC assesses them as such. The second survey indicated that the USMC promotion and assignment process can be strengthened through a clearly defined HRM plan that extends beyond 'faces' and 'places', and provides very clear links to the organizational strategy. Based on the findings it is recommended that the USMC review its HRM processes and conduct further analyses on the FITREP data for: (1) correlation, (2) longitudinal analysis as a predictor for success and, (3) relevance and relationship to MOS characteristics, position descriptions, and organizational strategy. / Major, Royal Australian Infantry Corps / Major, United States Marine Corps