The "law versus politics" debate is central in the study of the Supreme Court's institutional role in US democracy and law making. Research has sought to determine if the Supreme Court is an unconstrained political actor or if it is constrained by precedent. This dissertation contributes to this debate by theorizing that there is not a direct tradeoff; instead, even a politically motivated Court can be constrained by precedent. Given precedent is an internally imposed norm, what incentive does a politically motivated Supreme Court have to adhere to precedent when it results in outcomes that deviate from the Court's most preferred ideological outcome? There has been a lack of theoretical development and empirical testing that would explain the Court's incentive to adhere to precedent. I argue that even a politically motivated Supreme Court has an interest in adhering to precedent as a means of control over the lower courts. The Court has a role as a principal with the Courts of Appeals acting as an agent. The Supreme Court uses precedent as a standard that guides lower court decision-making in thousands of cases that the Court will never hear. The Supreme Court is willing to sacrifice the dispositional outcome (who wins and who loses) in a given case to issue or adhere to a precedent that will better guide lower court decision-making in a given area. To test this theory, this project will construct an original data set using a new measure of precedent. Specifically, "the law" and "precedent" for a case will be coded in terms of the standard of review. The standard of review can be understood as a precise legal statement of which party has the burden of proof or justification in a given case and the nature of that burden. This is an ordinal measure (coded 0-4) based on the Court's finite legal rules in a given area of law (rational basis, heightened rational basis, intermediate, heightened intermediate and strict). This novel understanding better captures the legal content of court opinions.

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The topic of this thesis is nomination of justices of the Supreme Court, the highest federal court in the United States. The Constitution gives the power to appoint new federal justices to the president, with "advice and consent" of the Senate. This clause is based on one of the primary constitutional principles used in the United States - the system of checks and balances. The first part describes the general aspects of all nominations, from court vacancies to the final vote on Senate floor. The primary roles of the president and the Senate are defined. Focus is also set on the evolution of the nomination process throughout the history, as well as the criteria for selecting new justices, who shape the constitutional development of one of the oldest functioning democracies. The structure of the first part is then applied for a description of the nomination of Brett M. Kavanaugh, who was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Donald Trump in 2018. The course of this nomination was strongly affected by sexual assault accusations against the nominee and fierce partisan battles that resulted in the closest confirmation vote in history. The final part applies quantitative research methods to discover the influence of partisan difference between the president and the Senate majority on the...

This thesis examines how American and German constitutionalism, as shaped by the U.S. Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), have mediated the tension between threats to stability and the imperative of renewal through occasional or constant interventions in their democratic processes. To do this, it primarily assesses the 1960s U.S. reapportionment cases and the European Parliament electoral threshold cases of 2011 and 2014. It also considers the ideas of four thinkers, theorists and jurists who have wrestled with the dilemma of how to maintain the bond between citizen and state: Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Hannah Arendt, Thomas Jefferson and Alexis de Tocqueville. Stability and renewal represent the twin orientation points for constitutionalism and the courts against which they must adjust to possible democratic threats, or new political and social forces in need of recognition. Threats to the state can emerge either from a surfeit of illiberal views in politics and society aimed at destroying an existing constitutional order, or when democratic channels become starved of new opinions through the constitutional or unconstitutional exclusion of voters and parties. A distinctive feature of the approach taken is the conceptual division between the ‘legal/institutional' space in which the Supreme Court and Bundesverfassungsgericht interpret constitutional meaning, and the ‘civic space' in which citizens accept or reject constitutional meaning. One central question is how American and German constitutionalism, and the U.S. Supreme Court and Bundesverfassungsgericht shape and influence the vital civic space that is integral to the democratic relationship between citizen and state, and the survival of the state itself. Ultimately it is concluded that without acceptance of the importance of law and constitutionalism by citizens in the civic space, the influence of the Supreme Court and the Bundesverfassungsgericht becomes purely institutional and effectively consigned to the courtroom.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-18T12:54:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAO_JORGE FERRAZ DE OLIVEIRA JUNIOR.pdf: 775239 bytes, checksum: 807e822b6702aee8818a57787af9b4be (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-12-12 / This dissertation, based on the investigation of the "emergence" of judicial activism expression s arrising, on pendulous phases between judicial activism and self-restraint of American Supreme Court s jurisprudence, on dialogue s theories and on the contribution of many authors who advocate the adoption of a Constitution s constructive and moral interpretation, aims to demonstrate two theses about the judicial activism s limits and who should have the last word at Constitution s interpretation. The first one, refered to the idea of, in not being in a case of fundamental rights guarantee, protection of minorities and the unblocking of access channels to political power, the Supreme Court should adopt a selfrestraint posture, preferring decisions that encourage the Legislature to exercise its prerrogatives provided by the Constitution. Cases in which the democratic process will be strengthened, through a greater accountability of elected representatives before the true holder of sovereignty: the people. The second one, that there is no definitive last word (but only temporary) at Constitution s interpretation and that the legislative activism, when exercised to confirm or even to contest a Supreme Court s decision, far from meaning a crisis between the powers, may serve to strengthen the democratic process, increasing the possibility of providing more correct answers to especific constitutional problem. / A dissertação, partindo da investigação da emergência da expressão ativismo judicial , das fases pendulares entre ativismo judicial e autocontenção na jurisprudência da Suprema Corte Norte-Americana, das teorias do diálogo e do contributo de diversos autores que preconizam a adoção de uma interpretação construtiva e moral da Constituição, pretende demonstrar duas teses concernentes aos limites do ativismo judicial e quanto a quem deve dar a última palavra na interpretação da Constituição. A primeira, a de que se não se está em um caso de garantia de direitos fundamentais, proteção de minorias e de desobstrução dos canais de acesso ao poder político, a Suprema Corte deve adotar uma postura autorrestritiva, preferindo decisões que instiguem o Poder Legislativo a exercer as prerrogativas previstas na Constituição. Casos em que o processo democrático resultará fortalecido, mediante a maior responsabilização dos representantes eleitos perante o verdadeiro titular da soberania: o povo. A segunda, a de que não há última palavra definitiva (mas apenas provisória) na interpretação da Constituição e que o ativismo legislativo, quando exercido para corroborar ou até mesmo para contestar uma decisão da Corte Suprema, longe de significar uma crise entre os poderes, pode servir para fortalecer o processo democrático, aumentando a possibilidade de fornecimento de respostas mais corretas a dado problema constitucional.

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