South Korea should join the US BMD in Northeast Asia. Application of Offensive Realism clearly shows that China is a potential threat to South Korea, and Seoul requires an alliance partner in order to counter the threat from the west. The immense latent power and offensive military capabilities of China, coupled with its nuclear strategic weapons render China as a potential threat to South Korean national security. No independent action from South Korea would be sufficient to balance against China, hence the need for an ally. The United States is already engaged in relative power maximization against China. In addition, its role as an offshore balancer and status as a regional hegemon in the western hemisphere makes the US the most ideal alliance partner for South Korea. The alliance with the US to balance against China cannot be built upon the existing ROK-US alliance, because the current status of the alliance has deteriorated. One of the key causes of alliance deterioration could be attributed to the unilateral American security assistance to South Korea. Seoul’s participation in the US BMD would solve the non-reciprocating role of South Korea found in the existing ROK-US alliance. Because the benefits from South Korea’s participation in the US BMD are great for Washington, Seoul would be able to secure the US as an alliance partner to balance against China. Keywords: US, South Korea, China, Ballistic Missile Defense, ROK-US Alliance, Offensive Realism.

This thesis analyzes the historical decision made by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on March 1, 2003. On this date Turkey made the decision not to accept the United States&rsquo / offer of monetary compensation in exchange for the use of Turkish Air Force bases and the right to move troops through South Eastern Turkey into Northern Iraq. The aim of this work is to give the reader historical background of the strategic alliance these two countries have shared since World War II, and in the events leading up to the Iraq War. The main focus of the paper is to understand, through historical context, the reasons why Turkey said &ldquo / no.&rdquo / This thesis posits three main reasons for the failure of this motion.

This thesis argues that the Australian military intervention in East Timor in 1999 was motivated primarily by the need to defend Australia’s own strategic interests. It was an act of Australian imperialism understood from a Marxist perspective, and was consistent with longstanding strategic policy in the region.¶ Australian policy makers have long been concerned about the security threat posed by a small and weak neighbouring state in the territory of East Timor. This led to the deployment of Australian troops to the territory in World War Two. In 1974 Australia supported Indonesia’s invasion of the territory in order to prevent it from becoming a strategic liability in the context of Cold War geopolitics. But, as an indirect result of the Asian financial crisis, by September 1999 the Indonesian government’s control over the territory had become untenable. Indonesia’s political upheaval also raised the spectre of the ‘Balkanisation’ of the Indonesian archipelago, and East Timor thus became the focal point for Australian fears about an ‘arc of instability’ that arose in this period.¶ Australia’s insertion of military forces into East Timor in 1999 served its own strategic priorities by ensuring an orderly transfer of sovereignty took place, avoiding a destabilising power vacuum as the country transitioned to independence. It also guaranteed that Australia’s economic and strategic interests in the new nation could not be ignored by the United Nations or the East Timorese themselves. There are therefore underlying consistencies in Australia’s policy on East Timor stretching back several decades. Despite changing contexts, and hence radically different policy responses, Australia acted throughout this time to prevent political and strategic instability in East Timor.¶ In addition, the intervention reinforced Australia’s standing as a major power in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. The 1999 deployment therefore helped facilitate a string of subsequent Australian interventions in Pacific island nations, both by providing a model for action and by building a public consensus in favour of the use of military intervention as a policy tool.¶ This interpretation of events challenges the consensus among existing academic accounts. Australia’s support of Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of East Timor from 1974 was frequently criticised as favouring realpolitik over ethical considerations. But the 1999 intervention, which ostensibly ended severe violence and secured national independence for the territory, drew widespread support, both from the public and academic commentators. It has generally been seen as a break with previous Australian policy, and as driven by political forces outside the normal foreign policy process. Moreover, it has been almost universally regarded as a triumph for moral conduct in international affairs, and even as a redemptive moment for the Australian national conscience. Viewing the intervention as part of the longstanding strategy of Australian imperialism casts doubt on such positive evaluations.