The purpose of this study was to examine the Indigenous Navigator partnership through its Bésiro project in Bolivia to find out whether the partnership approach can enhance Indigenous participation in global education. In the short term, enhancing the participation of Indigenous peoples in global education may help them maintain their unique identity and culture. In the long term, it may enable Indigenous peoples to actively decide on policy that concerns them. The objective of the research was to help policymakers and those working in the field of international and comparative education to secure Indigenous peoples’ right to determine their own education development. In the 19th and 20th centuries, after the creation of nation-states in Latin America, national education efforts sought to unify populations through assimilationist policies. Those policies used the dominant language as the language of instruction, and the content of curricula responded to the national vision of those in power. Indigenous peoples held on to their culture and language despite the external pressure to assimilate and the lack of recognition and support. In the second half of the 20th century, a global Indigenous movement took place that claimed Indigenous peoples’ collective rights within the nation-state, including the right to self-determine their education. This movement succeeded in garnering international attention, which led to the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This declaration served as a framework upon which states were expected to model their laws. While this helped put the plight of Indigenous peoples in the international spotlight, some countries have implemented the Declaration to a greater extent than others. As a result, many Indigenous peoples remain stripped of the power and legal authority to ultimately decide on the education (and other) issues that concern them. The power asymmetries that have been affecting them in international education politics persist. A global education system that does not count on the continuous participation of Indigenous peoples as collective actors fails to meet the goals of inclusion and equality that it intends to achieve. Against this background, the following questions remained unanswered: Who is entitled to participate in global education and in what capacity? How are Indigenous peoples currently participating in global education? Why and how should the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which is the international agency tasked with promoting peace through international cooperation in education, science, culture, communication, and information, enhance Indigenous participation in its education politics? Driven by the questions above, I carried out a qualitative case study involving a multistakeholder partnership–the Indigenous Navigator. The Indigenous Navigator partnership includes Indigenous and non-Indigenous nongovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, and other international and national stakeholders. This partnership developed a framework and a set of tools to produce Indigenous data and track progress toward the fulfillment of Indigenous human rights. When applied to education, the Indigenous Navigator partnership translates the data collected into projects designed by Indigenous peoples for their own purposes. The Indigenous Navigator partnership offers an alternative approach for global education to enhance Indigenous participation in education policy. The Indigenous Navigator partnership’s project that became the case study was called Revitalization and Vitalization of the Bésiro Language of the Monkox Nation. This project was designed by the Monkox, a people indigenous to Bolivia. The Monkox utilized the Indigenous Navigator’s framework and set of tools, and focused on revitalizing their Bésiro language. This Bésiro project was implemented between 2019 and 2020 in Lomerío, in Bolivia’s lowlands. The case of the Monkox within Bolivia stands out because even though the Monkox are small in number, they have a long history of defending their language and their education. Bolivia, in turn, has drawn regional and international attention because it adopted Indigenous human rights into its political constitution and has come forth with a unique education model based on intraculturality, interculturality and plurilingualism, and in which Indigenous peoples are seen not only as individuals with a right to education, but also as peoples with collective education rights. To analyze the effectiveness of the Indigenous Navigator partnership and the Bésiro project, I spent 7 months observing the functioning of the Indigenous Navigator partnership prior to fieldwork, then spent another year interviewing 42 key stakeholders, out of whom at least 17 were Indigenous. I also analyzed relevant documents related to Indigenous education in Bolivia, global education, and enhanced participation. The results of the study offer a glimpse into present-day Indigenous education in Bolivia; an analysis of the Indigenous Navigator partnership and the Bésiro project; and a comparison between local, national, and international power dynamics that interacted throughout the project and can further impact education politics in Bolivia and beyond. The results show that the Indigenous Navigator partnership operated through what I call multisphere Indigenous ownership (i.e., the capacity of each partner to contribute from their own area of expertise while reducing the stratification of power) to ensure the Monkox’s self-determination in the Bésiro project. The analysis also shows that interculturality is difficult to reach if intraculturality, or the reaffirmation of a people’s identity, culture, and politics, has not been strengthened. To reaffirm intraculturality, the active participation of Indigenous peoples in their own education policy processes is vital. Only then will Indigenous peoples be able to achieve sustainable education along with national efforts. Lastly, the case study revealed that the Indigenous Navigator partnership worked through tacit interculturality between the European Union and Latin America, that is, the implicit reciprocity of two Indigenous systems in both parts of the world. As an outcome of this analysis of the Indigenous Navigator partnership and the Bésiro project, it is suggested that the global education community, guided by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, implement multistakeholder Indigenous ownership to allow Indigenous peoples, as collective stakeholders, to participate in education policy processes that concern them. This study closes with a policy and research agenda that contributes to achieving sustainable, quality education for Indigenous peoples.

本論文以中央研究院近代史研究所所典藏的「外交部檔案」為主，輔以聯合國年鑑與相關聯合國專門機構的資料，首先整理出中華民國喪失各專門機構席位的時序與過程，接著探討中華民國政府是否有何事前的應對策略，並嘗試探究中華民國政府在喪失聯合國中國代表權以後，面對專門機構席位問題的態度是否具彈性思維。 聯合國專門機構僅是一個代表性的名詞，本質上就是一個由各國政府代表組成的國際組織，一個國際組織與聯合國經濟暨社會理事會簽署合作協定後，就成為聯合國專門機構。兩者之間互不隸屬，是屬於合作的關係，意即一個國家若喪失聯合國的席位，並不代表同時喪失專門機構的席位，需再由專門機構討論之。現今聯合國共有19個專門機構，1971年時則是擁有13個專門機構。 中華民國在1971年喪失聯合國中國代表權之前，在13個聯合國專門機構中，除了聯合國糧食及農業組織(FAO)為觀察員外，其餘12個專門機構皆擁有會員國資格。而擁有會員國資格的專門機構中，除了4個金融性專門機構於1980年時才喪失席位，其餘8個專門機構則先後於1971年10月下旬至1972年5月下旬間陸續喪失席位，本研究探討的就是這一段時間。而由於資料與篇幅的限制，選擇世界衛生組織(WHO)、世界氣象組織(WMO)與國際電信聯盟(ITU)三個專門機構，深入探討中華民國喪失聯合國專門機構席位以及中華民國政府如何因應的過程。 由本文的討論可知道，聯合國大會396號決議案與2758號決議案與此議題息息相關，396號決議案決定了當一國政府的代表權發生爭議時，聯合國體系各組織應顧及聯合國大會的態度，而2758號則決定了聯合國中國代表權的歸屬。兩個決議案是專門機構處理中國席位問題的關鍵。而中華民國面對聯合國專門機構席位問題時，其態度是認為中華人民共和國的加入，並不能以排除中華民國為前提，但席位問題的屬性卻是聯合國中國代表權問題的延伸，也就是說，聯合國專門機構要處理的是機構內「誰來代表中國」的問題。事實上，在那段時間，立場較親近中華民國的國家曾推動類似於「兩個中國」或「一中一台」的提案，希望中華民國與中華人民共和國同時存在於聯合國專門機構之中，只是中華民國政府卻未主動與這些國家合作，使得相關議案未獲通過。 本論文另外發掘當時介於行政院與外交部之間的決策單位，此單位是由當時的行政院政務委員葉公超主持，邀請行政院各部會首長成立的跨部會小組，名為光華小組，運作時間起於1971年11月下旬，至1972年5月底結束，旨在因應中華民國喪失聯合國中國代表權後，所引發的後續外交鉅變效應，處理議題的內容亦包含專門機構的席位問題。 聯合國專門機構的席位議題，如同聯合國大會2758號決議案，只處理了「誰來代表中國」的問題，實際上台灣地位的議題並沒有被提及，留有彈性空間。而現今台灣的困局在於，要成為聯合國專門機構正式會員的條件必須是個國家，所以目前首要處理的，仍是國家定位的問題。從本研究中可知道，中華民國在聯合國專門機構的會籍問題，本質就是中國代表權問題，如果使用中華民國名義申請加入聯合國專門機構，無疑是抵觸1971年至1972年間各個專門機構的決議，這些決議已闡明「China」席位的歸屬，如此一來，其阻力只有更大而已。

The thesis examines the international law pertaining to the use of force by states, in general, and to the use of force in self-defence, in particular. The main question addressed is whether the use of force, which was purported to be in self-defence, by the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies against al Qaeda, the Taliban and Afghanistan, beginning on 7 October 2001, was lawful. The thesis focuses not only on this specific use of force, but also on the changing nature of conflict, the definition of terrorism and on the historical evolution of limitations on the use of force, from antiquity until 2006. In the six chapters which trace the epochs of international law, the progression of five inter-related concepts is followed: limitations on the resort to force generally, the use of force in self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, the use of forcible measures short of war, and the use of force in response to non-state actors. This historical analysis includes a particular emphasis on understanding the meaning of the 'inherent right of self-defence', which was preserved by Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter. This analysis is then applied to the use of force against Afghanistan which occurred in 2001. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the US and the UK notified the United Nations Security Council of their resort to force in self-defence under Article 51. Each element of Article 51 is analysed and the thesis concludes that there are significant doubts as to the lawfulness of that decision to employ force. In addition to the self-defence justification, other possible grounds for intervention are also examined, such as humanitarian intervention, Security Council authorisation and intervention by invitation. This thesis challenges the common assumption that the use of force against Afghanistan was an example of states exercising their inherent right to self-defence. It argues that if this particular use of force is not challenged, it will lead to an expansion of the right of self-defence which will hinder rather than enhance international peace and security. Finally, this thesis draws on recent examples to illustrate the point that the use of force against Afghanistan could become a dangerous precedent for the use of force in self-defence.