No description available.

No description available.

<p>This study focuses on the impact on service provision arising from uncertainties in the UC Act. There are serious problems with the delivery of basic services in urban areas: including frequent interruptions in water supply, persistent power cuts, uncollected refuse, poor health services and dilapidated infrastructure. The purpose of this study is to highlight specific weaknesses in the UC Act and examine how these contribute to poor service delivery. The specific weaknesses to be examined are the unfettered powers of the minister, lack of legal certainty on powers and functions of UCs, limited revenue generating powers and lack of autonomy in recruiting senior council administration. First, UCs exercise delegated powers from central government. The minister has powers to give directions on matters of policy, suspend, reverse, or rescind council resolutions. There is no legal authority to check and balance the unfettered powers of the minister. Poor service delivery may be attributed in part to the unfettered powers of the minister. Secondly, UCs do not have devolved fiscal powers. As agents of central government, UCs can only levy those taxes and borrow money as authorised by the minister. The limited capacities of UCs to generate own revenue impacts negatively on the capacity of UCs to respond to the needs of the communities they serve.</p>

<p>This study focuses on the impact on service provision arising from uncertainties in the UC Act. There are serious problems with the delivery of basic services in urban areas: including frequent interruptions in water supply, persistent power cuts, uncollected refuse, poor health services and dilapidated infrastructure. The purpose of this study is to highlight specific weaknesses in the UC Act and examine how these contribute to poor service delivery. The specific weaknesses to be examined are the unfettered powers of the minister, lack of legal certainty on powers and functions of UCs, limited revenue generating powers and lack of autonomy in recruiting senior council administration. First, UCs exercise delegated powers from central government. The minister has powers to give directions on matters of policy, suspend, reverse, or rescind council resolutions. There is no legal authority to check and balance the unfettered powers of the minister. Poor service delivery may be attributed in part to the unfettered powers of the minister. Secondly, UCs do not have devolved fiscal powers. As agents of central government, UCs can only levy those taxes and borrow money as authorised by the minister. The limited capacities of UCs to generate own revenue impacts negatively on the capacity of UCs to respond to the needs of the communities they serve.</p>

Magister Legum - LLM

Magister Legum - LLM / This study focuses on the impact on service provision arising from uncertainties in the UC Act. There are serious problems with the delivery of basic services in urban areas: including frequent interruptions in water supply, persistent power cuts, uncollected refuse, poor health services and dilapidated infrastructure. The purpose of this study is to highlight specific weaknesses in the UC Act and examine how these contribute to poor service delivery. The specific weaknesses to be examined are the unfettered powers of the minister, lack of legal certainty on powers and functions of UCs, limited revenue generating powers and lack of autonomy in recruiting senior council administration. First, UCs exercise delegated powers from central government. The minister has powers to give directions on matters of policy, suspend, reverse, or rescind council resolutions. There is no legal authority to check and balance the unfettered powers of the minister. Poor service delivery may be attributed in part to the unfettered powers of the minister. Secondly, UCs do not have devolved fiscal powers. As agents of central government, UCs can only levy those taxes and borrow money as authorised by the minister. The limited capacities of UCs to generate own revenue impacts negatively on the capacity of UCs to respond to the needs of the communities they serve. / South Africa

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / Introduction: The appointment of special interest councillors in terms of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act has encountered much opposition from residents in many urban areas.8 The appointment has also attracted public attention, especially through the media which has highlighted the plight of urban councils most of which have failed to contend with additional unelected personnel on their payrolls. There has also been a claim that the process of appointing special interest councillors may be or that it is being abused.9 What has further exacerbated this situation is the fact that there is no legal provision to check the powers of the Minister, leaving room for the anipulation of the powers to appoint.10 Since the enactment of section 4A of the Urban Councils Act (UCA) in April 2008, numerous elected councillors and mayors belonging to the MDC have been dismissed, or summarily suspended pending dismissal to justify the appointment of special interest councillors over and above elected councillors. At the same time the Minister seeks to discredit the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) councillors as incompetent to gain political mileage for the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF).11 The rampant dismissal and suspension of MDC-T (the MDC faction led by Mr Morgan Tsvangirai) councillors and mayors and dissolving urban councils has led to allegations that the Minister seeks to weaken MDC in urban local councils and to justify the existence of special interest councillors in urban councils. By highlighting and examining the implications of these appointments on urban governance and the general functioning of urban local councils, the researcher will be able to assess the practice of appointing special interest councillors against internationally accepted norms. / South Africa

Magister Legum - LLM / This is a desktop based study which will analyse relevant books and chapters in books relating to supervision of local governments by national and other higher level governments. It will also examine legislation, journal articles, newspaper articles and press statements in the field of multi-level government. The study will examine three Ministerial directives in chapter four. Due to challenges in accessing government policies the study will assess two directives that the author has on file. The study will rely on secondary sources such as newspaper articles for the third directive.

<p>The monitoring and supervision of local government is usually done by central governments. However in some countries like South Africa where there three spheres of government the provincial executive is charged with the supervision of the local sphere of government. In Zimbabwe the monitoring and supervision of local government is done by the central government through the relevant Minister. This study will look at the appointment of a caretaker to act as council in terms of section 80 of the UCA. Although a similar provision exists in section 158 of the RDCA, it is section 80 that has been vigorously applied by the Minister in recent times and which has caused an outcry from urban local authorities.</p>

<p>The monitoring and supervision of local government is usually done by central governments. However in some countries like South Africa where there three spheres of government the provincial executive is charged with the supervision of the local sphere of government. In Zimbabwe the monitoring and supervision of local government is done by the central government through the relevant Minister. This study will look at the appointment of a caretaker to act as council in terms of section 80 of the UCA. Although a similar provision exists in section 158 of the RDCA, it is section 80 that has been vigorously applied by the Minister in recent times and which has caused an outcry from urban local authorities.</p>