In 2010, our definition of democracy in America was drastically changed by the Supreme Court case Citizens United v. FEC. The Court ruled that under the First Amendment, corporations have the right to free speech. The decision removed the final ban on corporations, which prohibited corporate money used for direct advocacy. The consequences of this have been tremendous. The decision has allowed for the creation and rise of Super PACs and political active nonprofits. As a result, Super PACs and nonprofits now act as “shadow campaigns”. Outside groups have the ability to engage in voter suppression tactics without politically hurting the candidate. Unlike political candidates, there are no direct ramifications for an outside organization to get caught engaging in voter suppression. They are not held accountable by anyone. The ability to take political action that is independent from the government or campaigns allows for a new form of corruption. Corruption is no longer a coordinated act between corporate money and a candidate, but rather political actions that take place outside the public sphere. Political actions that take place in the private sphere are outside the realm of political accountability. The people stand powerless against private outside organizations.

This research attempts to examine whether economic, social, political and institutional factors affected local public expenditures (per capita) in Taiwan. The panel data regression analysis, covering the period from 1989 to 2007, used statistics from the 21 prefectures (5 cities and 16 counties) of Taiwan by applying the median voter model and political business cycle (PBC) model. The findings from the empirical data suggest that the explanatory variable of the median income is significant and has a positive sign as predicted by the priori expectation, with the exception of economic development expenditure. The gap between the median income and average income variables has positive signs in the total, social welfare, police and economic development expenditures. The tax share variable and grant variable on all categories of spending are significant, but the positive sign of the tax share variable contrasts a priori expectations. The population variable and population density variable have negative signs in different expenditures, while the social welfare and the education, science, and culture expenditures have positive signs. Comparing the difference before and after the downsizing of the Taiwan Provincial Government, the significance of the latter is higher than the former, and the effects of various variables differ. The results of this research also indicated that the variables of the pre-election year, election year and post-election year demonstrated statistical significance with varying directional tendencies, and that the results are inconsistent with the traditional hypothesis of the election cycle. The incumbent magistrates or mayors, regardless of whether they do or do not intend on re-election, exhibit no significant influence on most expenditures, and thus this does not agree with a priori expectations. The administrative satisfactions of incumbent magistrates or mayors have statistically significant influence on the expenditures and deficits. Generally, the Pan-KMT incumbent magistrates or mayors have more motives to increase the total and capital expenditures and deficits than the Pan-DPP. Interestingly, the KMT party, which held the majority of seats in the county council, has a positive sign and statistically significant influence on the expenditure of grants to townships. The evidence has demonstrated that a unified government or divided government (horizontal type or vertical type) has no significant influence on most of the expenditure forms, although a negative sign on social welfare expenditure is evident in 21 counties and cities. The lagged deficit is significant with a positive sign, which implies that the insufficiency of local accountability and deficits are becoming a long-term problem. When comparing the power of the median voter model and political business cycle model in explaining the local public expenditure, a non-nested test was implemented. No model was found to hold an advantage over another model. In brief, the current research indicates that the factors of the majority voters' demands, elections and parties indeed have different influences on various expenditure forms in Taiwan.

The politics of Blacks are stereotypically assumed to be the same and share the same race-based root, be it disenfranchisement or solidarity. Given the recent jump in Black political participation and the seemingly race-based and partisan nature "the Black vote" holds, it is essential to investigate what factors drive Black voter turnout as well as what factors contribute to the partisan nature of Black voters. Most other studies of political opinion, turnout, and party preference only consider comparable demographic groups such as men versus women or Blacks versus Whites. This study examines partisan preference and participation only among Black Americans. The data used here come from the American National Election Survey (ANES) 1984, 1996, and 2008 Pre- and Post-Election Survey, election years that coincided with peaks and lows of Black voter turnout since the Civil Rights Movement. Findings indicate that Black Democrats report higher voter turnout than Black non-Democrats, and younger Blacks and those who opposed abortion were less likely to vote. Also, results suggest that although Black partisanship can be predicted by gender, abortion stance, and age, partisanship is largely not a product of demographics or political stances based on how little variance these models account; rather, Black partisanship may be explained by aspects that go beyond these usual determinants, measures, and proxies. Implications of this study show that non-Democratic Blacks were political available to other parties, and it warrants a further investigation into Black partisanship.

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My dissertation focuses on the effect of several variables on two key forms of political participation -- voting and candidacy. First, I examine how voter turnout is impacted by differences in the intensity of political beliefs across the electorate and the resulting impact on candidate issue choice. Next, I examine the role of term limits and political party recruitment policies in determining the quality of the political class. Finally, I examine the impact of term limits at the lower rungs of the political ladder on the quality of individuals seeking higher office. In Chapter 2, I present a modified version of Downs’ spatial model to analyze the effect on candidates’ policy choices when there is a positive relationship between political extremism and conviction. I assume that alienation and lack of conviction affect voter turnout negatively. I find that the positive relationship between political extremism and conviction leads candidates away from the center and describe the conditions under which segments of the electorate will abstain in equilibrium. Incorporating candidate asymmetry through differences in valence and campaign finances resulted in the strategy of the disadvantaged candidate being unrestricted. Meanwhile, the advantaged candidate can afford to be more centrist or extremist than his opponent in order to win the election. In Chapter 3, I present a multi-period model analyzing the impact of political party recruitment and retention policies and the implementation of term limits on the quality of individuals seeking a career in politics. Candidates differ in political skill and their political skill directly affects the provision of a public good. Term limits lead to a restructuring of the timing of rewards for political careers. I find that term limits increase the probability of entry of those of lesser quality. Under certain conditions, term limits reduce the expected ability of those entering the political arena, as those of higher ability are more adversely affected by the restructuring of rewards. In Chapter 4, I explore the extent to which term limits alter the average quality of office-seekers for higher-level political positions. In addition, I determine whether improvement in quality in upper level political positions comes at the expense of lower level positions. The results suggest that term limits on lower level elected offices reduce the expected political skill of officeholders at this level. Under limited circumstances, term limits will also reduce the expected political skill of those seeking upper level political positions. Under most conditions, term limitation at lower level offices lead to an improvement in the quality of elected officials in upper level offices. / text

Introduction: Domestic research studies focused on the interrelationships between political ideology characteristics inherent in policy decisions and the contributions these political determinants exert over health indicators and outcomes are limited. Given the paucity of research that focuses on political and policy support of health at the county-level, this study sets out to utilize the University of Wisconsin Population Health Institute’s (UWPHI) annual County Health Rankings data and examine them within the context of county-based majority political partisanship and economic measures. Methods: This exploratory ecological study examined differences between independent variables: partisan voting behavior (trichotomized as conservative, moderate, and liberal) and median per capita household income in U.S. dollars (by quartile) on dependent variables related to mortality (years of productive life lost) and morbidity (number of poor mental and physical health days) at the county-level to compare differences in political and ideological underpinnings that may act as influencers on health outcomes. Multiple data sources were combined and matched to all 3,140 counties located in the U.S. Two-way between-subjects ANOVA statistical tests were conducted to determine if there is an effect of partisan voter index category on the three aforementioned dependent variables related to health outcomes, and median per capita income by quartile. Results: There was a statistically significant main interaction between median per capita household income by quartile and partisan voter index category on years of productive life lost, F(6,2789) = 19.3, p < .000, partial η2 = .040. While there were also statistically significant interactions between the independent and dependent variables of poor mental and physical health days, results of those analyses should be interpreted with caution. Pertaining to years of productive life lost, post hoc analyses of significant interactions revealed significant differences at the lower income quartile, but not in the expected direction. The conservative category had statistically significant lower years of productive life lost in comparison to the liberal category (M = -8.21, SE = 1.47, p = .000). Also, there were significant differences detected in the upper quartile suggesting that the liberal category has lower years of productive life lost in comparison to the conservative category (M = 7.06, SE = 1.06, p = .000). Conclusion: Results should be interpreted with caution and suggest more research and methodological refinements are needed, particularly related to categorizing county-level political dynamics.

All levels of governments in Canada are seeing a continued decrease in voting during elections. The lowest voter turnout rates are at the municipal level--the 2011 Vancouver municipal election saw only 34 percent of eligible voters participate. This research examines why citizen participation is decreasing in Vancouver municipal elections and focuses that research through three theories (rational voter theory, social capital and political efficacy). The research relied on existing academic literature, and combined that with primary data yielded from focus groups made up of self-declared non-voters from the 2011 Vancouver municipal election, with the addition of several subject experts (academic and those involved in running municipal campaigns). The research revealed that many non-voters are disengaged in their communities, distrust politics, do not understand the role of municipal government, and are mistrustful that voting will make a difference or that the government will represent them. They perceive that voting is too complicated in municipal elections because of factors such as having to vote for multiple positions which is a stark contrast to federal or provincial elections where they only vote for one. The thesis also identifies solutions to increase citizen participation in future municipal elections.

This thesis examines political efficacy and youth non-voting in New Zealand. Drawing from a focus group discussion and depth interviews with 20 young people, I compare and contrast the attitudes and experiences of 18-24 year-old voters and non-voters. I assess whether the theory of political efficacy is a useful conceptual tool for distinguishing between their attitudes, and evaluate the ability of efficacy theory to explain youth non-voting in New Zealand. The thesis draws attention to the oft-overlooked benefits of using qualitative methods to conduct political science research. Based on my research, I find that the standard (quantitative) operationalisation of efficacy obscures the complex and nuanced nature of young people's thoughts about politics. Depth interviews and focus groups are found to be valuable means to gain insight into the political attitudes of young people, as - unlike quantitative methods - they allow participants to elucidate themselves using language and ideas of their own. A purposive sampling strategy using snowball referrals also proved to be a useful way to recruit young non-voters, indicating to future researchers that such an approach may be a good way to access disengaged populations. Contrary to the predictions of efficacy theory and to the findings of research in the quantitative tradition, I find fewer differences between young voters and non-voters than expected: the interviews and focus group in fact reveal surprising similarities in the political efficacy of young voters and non-voters. Through my research I identify three types of young non-voters: 'disinterested', 'inconvenienced' and 'principled' non-voters, each of whom give different and diverse explanations for their non-participation. These findings suggest that the usefulness of efficacy theory as an explanation for youth non-voting may have been overstated, and my research highlights the need to remain open to other explanations for youth electoral disengagement - such as rational choice and post-materialist theories.

Il primo capitolo sviluppa un modello di gioco strategico di voto costoso per due candidati dove il processo elettorale può essere illecitamente influenzato da uno dei due. Si assume che vi sono due tipi di meccanismi di frodi elettorali: incidenza diretta sui costi di voto o probabilita’ di pivotality. Si dimostra che la frode può effettivamente aumentare l’affluenza. Per assicurare la vittoria al margine, l’affluenza degli elettori che sostengono entrambe le alternative sono aumentate rispetto ai casi senza frodi. Nel secondo capitolo si stima l'effetto delle frodi elettorali sull'affluenza analizzando un panel di elezioni a livello nazionale in più di 130 paesi dalla fine del 1970. Controllando per una serie di importanti variabili di sistema politico e socioeconomico otteniamo che le frodi a livello intermedio , ceteris paribus , deprimono l'affluenza di circa 3-4 punti percentuali , mentre interventi a livello elevato non hanno alcun effetto significativo. Il terzo capitolo riguarda dinamiche di protezione dei diritti di proprietà nelle economie in transizione che possono influenzati da parte del governo non benevolente. Possiamo osservare dinamiche positive dei diritti di proprietà se un governo e’ relativamente più efficiente ad estrarre rendite dalla redistribuzione del PIL piuttosto che dai pagamenti diretti degli agenti che se ne appropriano, anche con una moderata pressione politica. / In the first chapter a costly strategic voting game over two candidates is modeled and electoral process can be illicitly influenced by one of two candidates. Fraud mechanisms are assumed to be of two types: affecting directly voting costs or pivot probabilities. It is demonstrated that fraud may actually increase turnout. In particular, if it is of a magnitude to ensure a victory at the margin, then participation rates of voters sustaining both alternatives are increased compared to no fraud situation. In the second chapter we estimate the effect of electoral fraud on turnout by analyzing a panel of national level elections in more than 130 countries since the end of 1970s. Controlling for a set of important institutional, political system and socio-economic variables we obtain that medium fraud, ceteris paribus, depresses turnout by around 3-4% points, whereas high fraud has no significant effect. The third chapter deals with dynamics of property rights protection in transition economies, which can be influence by non-benevolent government. Whenever a government is relatively more efficient in extracting private rents from GDP redistribution rather than from direct payments of appropriating agents, positive dynamics in property rights protection can be observed, even with moderate political pressure.

We have developed a game-theory based prediction tool, named Preana, based on a promising model developed by Professor Bruce Beuno de Mesquita. The first part of this work is dedicated to exploration of the specifics of Mesquita's algorithm and reproduction of the factors and features that have not been revealed in literature. In addition, we have developed a learning mechanism to model the players' reasoning ability when it comes to taking risks. Preana can predict the outcome of any issue with multiple stake-holders who have conflicting interests in economic, business, and political sciences. We have utilized game theory, expected utility theory, Median voter theory, probability distribution and reinforcement learning. We were able to reproduce Mesquita's reported results and have included two case studies from his publications and compared his results to that of Preana. We have also applied Preana on Iran's 2013 presidential election to verify the accuracy of the prediction made by Preana.