No description available.

Universiẗat, Magisterarbeit., 2001--Lüneburg.

Zugl.: Chemnitz, Techn. Universiẗat, Diss., 2008.

Diss. Wirtschaftswiss. Zürich, 2004 (kein Austausch). / Im Buchh.: Bern etc. : Haupt. Literaturverz.

Univ., Diss.--Kassel, 2001.

Tendo em vista uma contribuição para a discussão epistemológica sobre as ciências humanas e para o problema da objetividade do conhecimento científico que orientava os primeiros modelos filosóficos dirigidos à sustentação das Geistwissenschaften, esta dissertação procura reconstruir um modelo filosófico que teve papel ativo no debate, mas que ainda é pouco explorado em seu caráter epistemológico: o pensamento de Georg Simmel. Simmel fez parte de um grupo de filósofos alemães críticos ao nascimento naturalista das ciências humanas. Para eles, enquanto as naturais procuram explicar (erklären) a realidade por experimentação e análise causal, as ciências do espírito procuram compreender (verstehen) o fenômeno social através da interpretação das motivações dos indivíduos. Sua estratégia de penetração no fenômeno social recebeu o nome de Verstehen, ou compreensão. Devido à penetração no fenômeno social e aos diferentes pontos de vista abarcados, uma das críticas centrais enfrentada pelo grupo foi o perspectivismo, levantado como problema pelos positivistas. Simmel explorou o conceito de Verstehen partindo de uma crítica à visão mecanicista, circunscrita pelo realismo histórico e influenciada pelos pressupostos naturalistas e positivistas. Ademais, sua Verstehen sofreu modificações conceituais, as quais podem ser comparadas ao dividir o conjunto da obra simmeliana em dois grandes momentos epistêmicos: Idealista e Vitalista. Dada esta divisão, e tendo em mente o problema da objetividade e perspectivismo, a presente investigação é delineada a partir de três hipóteses iniciais. A primeira é, justamente, a existência de diferentes quadros conceituais em Simmel, os quais demonstram uma progressão intelectual madura e cada vez mais preocupada em explicar a natureza da Verstehen e como ela funciona. Esta hipótese contribui tanto para a discussão epistemológica das ciências, como para o melhor uso do autor, seja de seus escritos filosóficos ou sociológicos. A segunda hipótese refere-se especificamente ao conceito de Verstehen, admitindo-se a existência de duas noções de Verstehen, cada qual ligada a um dos períodos. Na fase Idealista, Simmel parece ter uma preocupação mais metodológica concernente à Verstehen. Na fase Vitalista, a Verstehen simmeliana surge como a relação fundamental entre indivíduos, ou seja, algo além de um conceito metodológico. De modo geral, a noção de compreensão perde o vínculo direto com a representação projetada e passa a vincular-se diretamente à noção de vida, como uma relação fundamental entre seres humanos. A terceira hipótese, por fim, vincula-se ao período Vitalista e tem como premissa um perspectivismo necessário para o conhecimento científico. Com o desenvolvimento intelectual da obra simmeliana, o perspectivismo deixa de ser um problema e passa a ser uma condição da investigação humana, uma condição que deve ser aceita com vistas a maior conhecimento científico da realidade social. Por fim, registram-se encaminhamentos para futuras investigações. / In order to contribute to the epistemological discussion about the human sciences and to the problem of the objectivity of scientific knowledge that guided the first philosophical models aimed at sustaining the Geistwissenschaften, this dissertation seeks to reconstruct a philosophical model that played an active part in the debate, but rather it is still little explored in its epistemological character: the thought of Georg Simmel. Simmel was part of a group of German philosophers critical of the naturalistic birth of the humanities. For them, while the natural sciences seek to explain (erklären) reality by experimentation and causal analysis, the human sciences seek to understand (verstehen) the social phenomenon through the interpretation of the inner motivations of individuals. Their strategy of penetrating into the social phenomenon was called Verstehen. Due to the penetration of the social phenomenon and the different points of view, one of the central criticisms faced by the group was the perspectivism, raised as a problem by the positivists. Simmel explored the concept of Verstehen from a critique of the mechanistic view, circumscribed by historical realism and influenced by naturalist and positivist assumptions. In addition, his Verstehen underwent conceptual modifications, which can be compared by dividing the whole of the Simmelian work into two great epistemic moments: Idealist and Vitalist. Given this division, and bearing in mind the problem of objectivity and perspectivism, the present investigation is delineated from three initial hypotheses. The first is precisely the existence of different conceptual frameworks in Simmel, which demonstrate a mature and increasingly preoccupied intellectual progression in explaining the nature of Verstehen and how it functions. This hypothesis contributes as much to the epistemological discussion of the sciences, as to the best use of the author, or of his philosophical or sociological writings. The second hypothesis refers specifically to the concept of Verstehen, admitting the existence of two notions of Verstehen, each connected to one of the periods. In the Idealist phase, Simmel seems to have a more methodological concern about Verstehen. In the Vitalist phase, the Simmelian Verstehen emerges as the fundamental relationship between individuals, that is, something beyond a methodological concept. In general, the notion of Verstehen loses the direct link with projected representation, and becomes directly linked to the notion of life as a fundamental relation between human beings. Finally, the third hypothesis is linked to the Vitalist period and is premised on the perspectivism as necessary for scientific knowledge. With the intellectual development of the Simmelian work, perspectivism ceases to be a problem and becomes a condition of human inquiry, a condition that should be accepted resulting in greater scientific knowledge of social reality. Finally, there are guidelines for future investigations.

Die vorliegende Arbeit versammelt zwei einleitende Kapitel und zehn Essays, die sich als kritisch-konstruktive Beiträge zu einem "erlebenden Verstehen" (Buck) von Physik lesen lassen. Die traditionelle Anlage von Schulphysik zielt auf eine systematische Darstellung naturwissenschaftlichen Wissens, das dann an ausgewählten Beispielen angewendet wird: Schulexperimente beweisen die Aussagen der Systematik (oder machen sie wenigstens plausibel), ausgewählte Phänomene werden erklärt. In einem solchen Rahmen besteht jedoch leicht die Gefahr, den Bezug zur Lebenswirklichkeit oder den Interessen der Schüler zu verlieren. Diese Problematik ist seit mindestens 90 Jahren bekannt, didaktische Antworten - untersuchendes Lernen, Kontextualisierung, Schülerexperimente etc. - adressieren allerdings eher Symptome als Ursachen. Naturwissenschaft wird dadurch spannend, dass sie ein spezifisch investigatives Weltverhältnis stiftet: man müsste gleichsam nicht Wissen, sondern "Fragen lernen" (und natürlich auch, wie Antworten gefunden werden...). Doch wie kann dergleichen auf dem Niveau von Schulphysik aussehen, was für einen theoretischen Rahmen kann es hier geben? In den gesammelten Arbeiten wird einigen dieser Spuren nachgegangen: Der Absage an das zu modellhafte Denken in der phänomenologischen Optik, der Abgrenzung formal-mathematischen Denkens gegen wirklichkeitsnähere Formen naturwissenschaftlicher Denkbewegungen und Evidenz, dem Potential alternativer Interpretationen von "Physikunterricht", der Frage nach dem "Verstehen" u.a. Dabei werden nicht nur Bezüge zum modernen bildungstheoretischen Paradigma der Kompetenz sichtbar, sondern es wird auch versucht, eine ganze Reihe konkrete (schul-)physikalische Beispiele dafür zu geben, was passiert, wenn nicht schon gewusste Antworten Thema werden, sondern Expeditionen, die sich der physischen Welt widmen: Die Schlüsselbegriffe des Fachs, die Methoden der Datenerhebung und Interpretation, die Such- und Denkbewegungen kommen dabei auf eine Weise zur Sprache, die sich nicht auf die Fachsystematik abstützen möchte, sondern diese motivieren, konturieren und verständlich machen will. / This book is a collection of two introductory chapters and ten essays that address questions concerning "experiential learning" in physics. Traditionally, physics education has been trying to convey a systematic picture of salient scientific knowledge, which would then be applied to selected experiments and phenomena. However, within such a framework, students' real life experiences and interests can hardly be related to. This problem is well known, but typical solutions within science education address merely the methods and conditions of learning, thereby treating symptoms and missing the underlying problem. For our discussion we have chosen a different point of departure: The fascination of science arises from its investigative nature, which allows us to relate to our world in novel ways. Accordingly, we should teach how to inquire nature, rather than giving canonical answers. What would be the practical consequences of such an approach, and what would the theoretical framework look like? These collected essays investigate a number of approaches toward this issue: phenomenological optics and its rejection of kinematic pictures, the distinction between mathematical reasoning and scientific evidence, the potential of non-conventional interpretations of science teaching, the meaning of "understanding" etc. This discussion merges into the current discourse about competence, while illustrating a kind of physics teaching that encourages "expeditions" into the realm of physics. Here, the key concepts, methods of investigation, and ways of reasoning are not simply based on the established edifice of physics, but rather serve to motivate, clarify, and elucidate its structures and practices.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Jena, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 140-151).

Thesis (doctoral)--University of St. Gallen, 2007.

Univ., Diss.--Frankfurt (Main), 2004. / Literaturverz. S. 157 - 168.