This thesis aims to provide a new definition for philosophy rooted in MacIntyre’s account of a “practice”. In the first chapter, I explain MacIntyre’s concept of a practice as it appears in After Virtue—including its critical components, namely, internal goods, standards of excellence, and the historical dimension of practices—through a consideration of the practice of guitar lutherie. I then use this account to build up an initial definition of philosophy as a practice, and briefly clarify two minor confusions that could easily arise regarding such an account. In my second chapter, I take up MacIntyre’s view that practices are always spatiotemporally situated in order to question whether or not my definition from Chapter One could include non-Western philosophy within it. I argue that this is possible within the peculiar epistemic conditions of modernity, based on a reading of MacIntyre’s paper “Relativism, Power and Philosophy”. In Chapter Three, I consider another key component of MacIntyre’s account—namely, that of institutions—and arrive at some extra qualifications regarding the concepts of both “external goods” and “corruption” to deepen the account, and then introduce my own concept of “institutional hegemony” to account for academia’s present status with regards to the practice of philosophy, which I use to explain a discordance between the present reality of philosophy as a discipline and the conclusions I draw in Chapter Two. I then extend this line of thought in the fourth chapter to look at some objections that could be made against a MacIntyrean view of philosophy-as-a-practice from a feminist and postcolonial lens. These objections are then addressed in the fifth chapter, where I show that the MacIntyrean ought to be in agreement with the feminist and postcolonial projects, and that the MacIntyrean framework can indeed accommodate them.

Thesis advisor: James Keenan / This dissertation argues that humility is a cardinal virtue that governs our ecological relationality. I define humility as the virtue of knowing and valuing the truth of our place in the world as interdependent beings. Humility is acquired via the practice of other-centeredness and other-acceptance and enabled by the “graces" of self-doubt and self-affirmation. A global survey of recent Christian scholarship on environmental issues and magisterial Roman Catholic teaching supports three conclusions: 1) interconnectedness characterizes human relationships with creation; 2) current ecological crises indicate the presence of sin and 3) we need to understand our place within creation and appreciate other-centered ways of knowing. Utilizing these three themes, I expand upon James Keenan's framework of rethinking cardinal virtues in terms of human relationality in order to account for an underdeveloped aspect of human relationality, that is, ecological relationality. I propose a more robust account of humility as a mean between two equally problematic extremes: pride and self-deprecation. Furthermore, humility helps us better identify sin both by recognizing how pride and self-deprecation can lead to indifference, understood as a failure to bother to love, that stems from our strength, and by rejecting the isolation that enables the sin of indifference so understood. The final chapter addresses how humility can be understood and cultivated in the United States today. In particular, I argue that the adoption of a plant-based diet generally fosters humility in individuals living in wealthy nations with high rates of meat consumption. In conclusion, I suggest that Catholics reinvigorate the Lenten penitential practice of Friday abstinence from meat by seeing it also as an opportunity to foster the virtue of humility. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Aristotelian eudaimonism – as Daniel Russell puts it – is understood as two things at once: it is the final end for practical reasoning, and it is a good human life for the one living it. This understanding of Aristotelian eudaimonism, on which one’s ultimate reason for doing all that one does is one’s own eudaimonia, has given rise to what I call the “self-absorption objection.” Roughly, proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an attempt to adequately address this objection, I break with those contemporary neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation that insist that the virtuous agent ought to be understood as performing virtuous actions ultimately for the sake of her own eudaimonia (enlarged, no doubt, to include the eudaimonia of others). On the alternative neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation I go on to defend – what I call the altruistic account of motivation – the virtuous agent’s ultimate reason for acting virtuously is based on a desire to act in accordance with her particular conception of the good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that it is good for her, but rather good, qua human goodness. More specifically, on the altruistic account of motivation I advance, the virtuous agent may be understood as being motivated by human goodness, valuing objects and persons only insofar as they participate in human goodness, and where all of the virtuous agent’s reasons, values, motivations, and justifications are cashed out in terms of human goodness – as they say – “all the way down.” / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In this dissertation, I advance a neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation that is immune from what I call the “self-absorption objection.” Roughly, proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they wrongly prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an attempt to sidestep this objection, I offer what I call the altruistic account of motivation. On this account, the virtuous agent’s main reason for acting virtuously is based on her desire to act in accordance with a particular conception of the good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that it is good for her, but rather good, qua human goodness.

This thesis attempts to demarcate the use of the term “racism” by looking at two of main accounts of what the word means. The first, individualism, defines racism as normally meaning an individual act or attitude of antipathy or apathy towards a person on the basis of their perceived race. The second, structuralism, defines racism as normally meaning the various beliefs, ideologies, laws, and actions that a cultural group participates in as caused by the structures of society which negatively affect a racialized group. I believe that neither of these accounts can adequately define nor address racism. As is shown in chapter III, many of the critiques made against individualism do not adequately answer the major structuralist concerns, but, as is shown in chapter IV, the same can be said for individualist critiques of structuralism. As I show in chapter V, each of them address an important aspect of racism, but fail when they attempt to entirely address it. Both act as a useful evaluative lens, but I will argue that we should be able to use both, rather than have to explain one by using the other / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA) / This Thesis discusses individualist and structuralist accounts of racism in an attempt to bridge the two. Many people have discussed this topic in the past 20 years, but nearly all do it from one of these two camps. I propose that we allow for both account to be used in tandom, rather than using one account to explain situations and aspects of situations better explained by the other account.

Thesis advisor: John F. Baldovin / This dissertation argues that the eucharistic theology found in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae is not a Christocentric, static, hierarchical economy of grace production. Rather, it is a deeply Trinitarian, dynamic, communal drama of graced participation. Based on Aquinas's insistence that grace is a participation in the Divine Nature that is signified by the sacraments, I turn to the Secunda Pars in order to explicate the relationship between grace and human action that is presupposed in the sacramentology of the Tertia Pars. Insofar as the res tantum of the Eucharist is the unity of the mystical body of Christ, special attention is given to the relationship between grace, theological virtue, and moral virtue. Through close examination of the process through which charity is said to increase in the subject, the unity of the mystical body is seen, not as a mystical state, but as a graced action that is simultaneously God's action (insofar as grace formally moves us through charity) and the Church's action (insofar as the moral virtues dispose us to receive the presence of God as the extrinsic principle of our actions). The unity of the mystical body of Christ is, then, rightly called the grace of the Eucharist because the spiritual life affected by the Eucharist is the active presence of charity in the Church. The result of the Eucharist is the Church's participation in the Divine Nature. This project aims at providing a grammar that allows for fruitful dialogue in modern sacramental theology. Within Catholic Eucharistic theology, the scholastic language of metaphysics is regularly given place of privilege to such an extent as to view other grammars of the Eucharist with suspicion. This dissertation provides a Thomistic grammar of the Eucharist that largely avoids the traditional scholastic grammars. It is the hope that such retrieval is a catalyst for constructive dialogue between modern grammars (of all denominations) and traditional scholastic grammars. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / For a variety of reasons, in the field of biblical ethics, Scripture scholars do not use much ethical theory, while theological ethicists do little actual exegesis. Even those recent attempts to bridge better Scripture with Christian ethics have either stressed the importance of the scriptural text or the importance of ethical hermeneutics. Throughout this entire work I advocate for a more integrated approach for a Scripture-based Christian theological ethics. In so doing I first propose using Allen Verhey's distinction of Scripture as 'scripted' and 'script': The former refers to exegesis and the latter to admonitions for ethical living. A more integrated approach will therefore treat Scripture as both 'scripted' and 'script', taking exegesis seriously and interpreting the text by using a sound hermeneutical framework. Subsequently, we can both acquire a more accurate understanding of the original meaning of the text and obtain a more complete and consistent interpretation of the text for today. From the perspective of Christian ethics, I further suggest virtue ethics as a worthy hermeneutical tool in treating Scripture as 'script'. Virtue ethics complements principle-based ethical theories by emphasizing practices and the importance of exemplary models. It also attends to the character formation and identity of both individuals and the moral community. Moreover, as I argue, there exists an explicit link between Scripture and virtue. Both the biblical link and the uniqueness of virtue ethics make it suitable as the hermeneutical tool for doing Scripture-based Christian ethics. In order to demonstrate concretely how the methodological shift into a more integrated scriptural ethics as such leads to actual benefits and improvements, I offer a three-step illustration. I begin with treating the Beatitudes in Matthew 5:3-12 as first `scripted'; that is, I exegete the text. Then I look at the text as 'script' through the hermeneutics of virtue ethics. I identify a new set of core virtues (and corresponding practices) not just for personal formation but also for the formation of the community and the larger society. Third, I then bring the fruits of this treatment forward by exploring the possible reception of the Beatitudes and its core virtues by the Confucian tradition. Methodologically speaking, Confucianism goes to its own texts in its search of ethical teachings; and Confucian ethics is primarily the fruit of careful interpretation of their 'sacred' texts. In other words, it is both text-based and interpretative, and shares a common methodological approach with the Scripture-based Christian ethics proposed here. Subsequently, we find significant parallel virtues in Confucian texts although dissimilarities (such as worldview) exist between the two traditions. As a whole, the proposed methodological shift into a Scripture-based Christian ethics produces a more accurate, complete and consistent interpretation of the biblical text for our contemporary audience and makes Christian ethics more explicable to Confucian society and more supportive of cross-cultural dialogue with Confucian ethics. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: Daniel J. Harrington / Holy Scripture throughout history has been a source of inspiration for human beings. One important theme that emerges from Scripture is the notion of mercy, which is a capital virtue in the gospel of Luke. The Gospel according to St. Luke has traditionally merited the title “The Gospel of Mercy” and contains parables such as “The Parable of the Good Samaritan” and “The Parable of the Prodigal Son,” which are unique to Luke’s gospel. These parables highlight the divine merciful actions of a Samaritan and of a father respectively; they show us a path of divine mercy through concrete actions. This thesis will focus on the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10:25-37). / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

Surely, moral education is not merely intended to result in theoretical knowledge, but instead attempts to change people's behavior. However, when examining and evaluating current trends in moral education, it appears that hitherto moral education has fallen short of its goal to make people better. In this paper, I try to determine what has caused this perceived failure of moral education and conclude that approaches that focus on teaching moral reasoning skills rather than on teaching actual moral content, i.e., values and virtues, are generally ineffective for moral improvement. However, a more traditional form of moral education, namely character education, appears to be a viable alternative to the moral reasoning methods. Since character education can be regarded as the practical application of virtue ethics, I first describe and evaluate virtue ethics and defend it against potential criticisms. I then examine what methods are effective for teaching virtues, and how such methods can potentially be incorporated into the curriculum. Since virtues cannot be taught through theoretical instruction, the acquisition of good habits constitutes the necessary foundation for the establishment of good moral character. Some methods that have been suggested for laying the foundation for virtue are the use of stories, role play, as well as the inclusion of physical and outdoor activities, etc. Furthermore, habituation constitutes the basis for the acquisition of good habits, and as such it requires the application of rewards and punishment by a caring tutor, who at the same time can serve as a role model for virtuous behavior. Finally, I extrapolate if and how character education can be employed to make people more environmentally conscious citizens. I conclude that environmental virtue or character education is the most effective method of environmental education, since it affects how an individual understands, views, and subsequently interacts with the natural environment.

Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the key philosophers in contemporary revival of virtue ethics, and often labeled as a representative of communitarianism in liberal-communitarian debate. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a narrative of the development of MacIntyre's philosophy, from his early Marxist thought to the later virtue ethics, and to examine the continuities and discrepancies between different stages of his philosophy. This thesis argues that the central theme of MacIntyre's philosophy is a diagnosis of the crisis of modernity and the ways through which we can overcome the predicament of alienation. In other words, MacIntyre's critique of capitalism and liberalist individualism shows the sophistication of his political thought and therefore cannot simply be described as "communitarian." To demonstrate MacIntyre's analysis of the crisis of modernity, this thesis focuses on four sets of binary concepts that constitute the foundations of his critiques, that is, "is-ought", "theory-practice", "individualism-holism", and "philosophy-history". The key to his theory of overcoming alienation, in this interpretation, is to understand the dialectic relations within each set of binary concepts respectively. This thesis illustrates how young MacIntyre tried to combine Marxism and Christian theology to answer these problematics, as well as how the later MacIntyre turned to Aristotle and Aquinas for theoretical inspirations. Aside from re-articulating the role of virtues in ethics, other MacIntyre's important theoretical innovations include transcending modern instrumental rationality by elevating the significance of teleological rationality and reconstructing the dynamic relations between rationality and traditions.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle introduces his Doctrine of the Mean, where he argues that virtue is the mean between two extremes, the mean between excess and deficiency. However, Aristotle mentions actions whose wrongness does not seem to be explained in terms of excess and deficiency; rather, it seems that these actions are always wrong, regardless of whether they are excessive, deficient, or neither. Among such actions Aristotle mentions moicheia, androphonia, and klopê (usually translated "adultery," "theft," and "murder"). Thus, with such actions the main questions become, first, what, according to Aristotle, explains the wrongness of these actions, and second, what makes it the case that they are always wrong. With these questions in mind, I will take moicheia as a test case to come up with an account that can answer these questions. In order to build this account, I make use of an objection leveled by Rosalind Hursthouse against the Doctrine of the Mean and of Howard Curzer's response to this objection. Though I claim Curzer's account fails, I make use of Curzer's work in another context in order to respond to Hursthouse's objection. Ultimately, I will claim that the wrongness of actions like moicheia can be satisfactorily explained as failures of the virtue of justice in which the agent goes beyond what properly belongs to her, beyond her proper share. However, in order for this account to succeed, I must get clearer about what resources Aristotle might have to specify what properly belongs to an agent, or what makes for one's "proper share." This can be done by looking deeper at Aristotle's theory of justice. Making use of the work of Richard Kraut, I claim that the concept of proper share involves Aristotle's ideas of nomoi (laws), and the common good. Ultimately though, what will allow us to make sense of prohibitions against acts like moicheia being absolute will be Aristotle's claim that certain laws are based on phusis ("nature"). In the last analysis, it is Aristotle's concept of phusis as it relates to human beings that will be central to his account of absolute moral prohibitions.