Under the leadership of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the military is undergoing transformation to more effectively counter the asymmetric threat of non-state terrorists and extremists in the "long war." After five years, however, one component of national security strategy is visibly unfulfilled: military pursuit of terrorists and extremists outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. The lack of offensive military efforts outside of areas designated as combat zones creates the impression that the long war has stalled. Overt offensive military operations targeting non-state actors may advance the counterterrorism mission and serve as a deterrent. This thesis identifies and analyzes four major constraints on the conduct of such operations: legal concerns about the use of force, use of the CIA for covert paramilitary activities, limits on USSOCOM and Special Operations Forces, and civilian and military leaders' aversion to risk. It describes the historical, bureaucratic and cultural causes of the constraints, concluding with recommendations to allow the US government and the US military to pursue non-state terrorists and extremists with overt offensive military operations.

Throughout American history, there has been a tension between conventional and unconventional forces on the field as well as between the commanders; we even see this at the strategic level. Force misperceptions created a gap between U.S. conventional and unconventional forces that reached a peak at the conclusion of the Vietnam War. This gap has slowly been reduced with the creation and efforts of SOCOM; however, inefficiencies in the conduct of major combat campaigns still remain as a result of poor integration. The Burma Campaign and the Liberation of the Philippines 1942-1945 provide two unique case studies in which unconventional forces worked under the overall guidance and command of a conventional leader. Throughout the Burma Campaign and the struggle for the Liberation of the Philippines, conventional forces relied heavily on the ability of unconventional forces to support and contribute to the overall campaign strategy. Direct and indirect communication, coordination, and autonomy of operations between these forces resulted in strategic successes enroute to victory in World War II. The coordination and roles of these forces throughout the campaigns provide valuable insights and lessons learned that can be applied to today's forces, who find themselves working together - and needing to work together - in conflicts abroad. / US Navy (USN) author.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis provides insight into how terrorist organizations exploit the information environment to achieve their objectives. The study establishes an analytical IO framework, by integrating US military doctrine with a fundamental approach to IO theory. The framework proves useful in examining the IO tools terrorists have assembled and how they implement them to influence their target audiences. The thesis shows that terrorists are, indeed, naturally linked to the information environment by their nature and strategy. Generally speaking, all terrorists employ IO tactically to enhance their operations. However, many organizations have a profound understanding of the information environment and also have the ability to manipulate information to achieve their objectives. Since, terrorist organizations are militarily weaker than the states they face and cannot rely on physical attacks to accomplish their goals, they must adopt an information strategy to achieve their objectives. This thesis emphasizes three primary conclusions: first terrorist conduct violent attacks in the physical environment to enable operations in the information environment. Second, terrorist integrate offensive and defensive IO to survive and appear legitimate to potential supporters and to the state. Finally, terrorists intentionally target four different audiences: opposing, uncommitted, sympathetic, and active to influence their perceptions. / Major, United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis done in cooperation with the MOVES Institute / The Information Age empowers individuals, and affords small groups an opportunity to attack states' interests with an increasing variety of tactics and great anonymity. Current strategies to prevail against these emerging threats are inherently defensive, relying on potential adversaries to commit mistakes and engage in detectable behavior. While defensive strategies are a critical component of a complete solution set, they cede initiative to the adversary. Moreover, reactive measures are not suited to quickly suppress adversary networks through force. To address this shortfall in strategic planning, the science of networks is rapidly making clear that natural systems built over time with preferential attachment form scale-free networks. These networks are naturally resilient to failure and random attack, but carry inherent vulnerabilities in their highly connected hubs. Taking the offensive against networks is therefore an exercise in discovering and attacking such hubs. To find these hub vulnerabilities in network adversaries, this thesis proposes a strategy called Stimulus Based Discovery, which leads to rapid network mapping and then systematically improves the accuracy and validity of this map while simultaneously degrading an adversary's network cohesion. Additionally, this thesis provides a model for experimenting with Stimulus Based Discovery in a Multi-Agent System. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / The military changes that have transformed global politics in recent years - especially since the end of the Cold War - have brought about a new revolution in military affairs (RMA) by the United States. The PLA has begun to study the RMA by focusing on asymmetric warfare capabilities under high technological conditions. China believes that asymmetric operations have the advantages of enabling a swift and precise attack and avoiding mass destruction on Taiwan's infrastructure and hightech industry. They also have the benefits of low intensity, low collateral damage, high efficiency, fast attack, and fast victory. In summary, asymmetric operations are regarded by the PLA as a kind of warfare that conforms both with the dictum of China's ancient war theorist Sun Tzu to "defeat the enemy without bloodshed and fighting" and the demands of a modern economy. In the face of China's development of asymmetric capabilities, Taiwan should think about how best to confront and counter China's threats and to gain a military edge over China.

Russia’s recent increase in acts of aggression against bordering nations is concerning. After Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, many wondered if the world should anticipate a Baltic intervention. This paper seeks to analyze this question through a comparative study of Russia’s recent interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, an analysis of the Estonian and Latvian Russian-speaking population, and an analysis of the NATO alliance’s strengths and weaknesses in deterring a possible Russian threat. From my analysis, I conclude that a conventional Baltic intervention is unlikely. However, I also conclude that the NATO alliance is not prepared to counter non-conventional acts of aggression and that these tactics could become more common in international conflicts. Therefore, I also conclude that a non-conventional Baltic intervention from Russia is possible and, consequently, the alliance should re-examine its framework.

Optimization of electronic warfare (EW) receiver scan strategies is critical to improving the probability of surviving military missions in hostile environments. The problem is that the limited understanding of how dynamic variations in radar and EW receiver characteristics has influenced the response time to detect enemy threats. The dependent variable was the EW receiver response time and the 4 independent variables were EW receiver revisit interval, EW receiver dwell time, radar scan time, and radar illumination time. Previous researchers have not explained how dynamic variations of independent variables affected response time. The purpose of this experimental study was to develop a model to understand how dynamic variations of the independent variables influenced response time. Queuing theory provided the theoretical foundation for the study using Little's formula to determine the ideal EW receiver revisit interval as it states the mathematical relationship among the variables. Findings from a simulation that produced 17,000 data points indicated that Little's formula was valid for use in EW receivers. Findings also demonstrated that variation of the independent variables had a small but statistically significant effect on the average response time. The most significant finding was the sensitivity in the variance of response time given minor differences of the test conditions, which can lead to unexpectedly long response times. Military users and designers of EW systems benefit most from this study by optimizing system response time, thus improving survivability. Additionally, this research demonstrated a method that may improve EW product development times and reduce the cost to taxpayers through more efficient test and evaluation techniques.

The emergence of social media technology and the rise in unorthodox warfighting strategies has fundamentally changed and altered traditional methods of conflict. With the ability to use social media network features for military effects, citizens, state, and non-state actors have set precedents for modern warfare in the age of the Internet. Through exploring three case studies on Egypt, ISIS, and Russia, this paper will address how modern conflict has advanced to become a fight over public perception and behavior. Each case employs various techniques of mobilization, recruitment, and propaganda to weaponize the online social media user. The Egyptian Revolution of 2011, the growth of ISIS, and the 2016 United States Presidential Election have all been impacted by social media for the advancement of hybrid warfare. This paper will seek to answer how has social media changed the nature of contemporary conflict, and how has social media allowed warfighting strategies that differ from traditional warfare?

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