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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ana Carolina de Angelo Camargo.pdf: 389840 bytes, checksum: 7154d19337424760c6159069e39a7aba (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-11-27 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The end of the Cold War led to questions about the international order and the position of the United States in particular. At the end of the conflict, the United States had political and military superiority as no other state throughout History. During this period, there was renewed the longstanding desire of America to remodel the order according to its image, ie. the promotion of its values around the world. Thus, the first two presidents elected after the end of the Cold War, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, retook the wilsonian approach to U.S. foreign policy. At the same time global and regional tensions and the lack of bipolarity influence enable the emergence of problems all around the globe. Not all were directly related to system stability, but still offered challenges for United States foreign policy. This paper seeks, based on the reading of various texts written about the period, to make an analysis on the use of wilsonianism over these governments, emphasizing two distinct periods: the strategy of engagement and expansion in the Clinton administration and the Bush doctrine. The analysis required in the research seeks to show that despite their differences, both used the approach for the same purpose: to justify their actions in foreign policy. The research also presents discussions around the concept of wilsonianism, based on its most fundamental characteristics. Finally, we tried to present the challenges to wilsonian approach in a world still in transformation / O fim da Guerra Fria provocou questionamentos sobre a ordem internacional e a posição dos Estados Unidos, em particular. Ao fim do conflito, os EUA possuíam uma superioridade militar e política como nenhum outro Estado tivera ao longo da história. Assim, durante esse período, ressurgiu o antigo desejo norte-americano de remodelamento da ordem à sua imagem e semelhança, ou seja, a promoção de seus valores pelo mundo. Nesse sentido, os dois primeiros presidentes eleitos após o fim da Guerra Fria, Bill Clinton e George W. Bush, retomaram a abordagem wilsoniana para a política externa dos Estados Unidos. Ao mesmo tempo, o descongelamento das tensões políticas globais e regionais e a ausência da influência bipolar possibilitaram o surgimento de inúmeros problemas nos mais diversos cantos do globo. Nem todos estavam diretamente relacionados à estabilidade do sistema, mas que mesmo assim ofereceram desafios na abordagem de política externa dos Estados Unidos. Assim, o presente trabalho procura, a partir da leitura de diversos textos escritos sobre o período, fazer uma analise sobre a utilização do wilsonismo ao longo desses governos, enfatizando dois momentos distintos: a estratégia do engajamento e expansão no governo Clinton e a doutrina Bush. A analise pretendida na pesquisa procura demonstrar que apesar das diferenças, os dois presidentes utilizaram a abordagem para o mesmo fim: justificar sua atuação em política externa. A pesquisa também apresenta as discussões em torno do conceito de wilsonismo, tendo como base suas características mais fundamentais. Por fim, procurou-se apresentar os desafios à abordagem wilsoniana em um mundo ainda em transformação

This thesis examines the role of democracy in British, French and American visions of global order in the 1940s. It argues that 'democracy' in a global context did not reflect 'Wilsonian' or 'Cosmopolitan' dreams, nor did it refer to the questions of state representation and institutional accountability that dominate contemporary debates. Instead, it shows that building a 'democratic' global order in the 1940s meant, above all, an attempt to address the challenge of democratic modernity, summarised by Karl Polanyi in 1944 as the search for 'freedom in a complex society', in the new global environment of the mid-century. This challenge was composed of five core concerns, ranging from the protection of the individual from the modern state and the transformation of democratic participation, to the use of expert planning and modern technology to secure economic justice. Achieving a balance between these competing and at times contradictory imperatives was seen as the key to securing a new democratic order that could resist the temptations of nationalism and totalitarianism and secure peace. Crucially, it was only through the structures of a new global order that, internationalists argued, there could be any chance of success. The task was not an easy one, and the historical investigation shows how the choices and trade-offs internationalists made in relation to these imperatives entailed costs in terms of inclusivity, participation and even rights within visions of democratic global order. The thesis has both historical and conceptual goals. First, it recovers important ideas about global order that have been largely written out of the history of this period by taking the language of democracy in world order debates seriously and understanding these visions in context. Conceptually, its aim is to contest and transform how we think about global order and democracy in the history of international thought and in the present day. Instead of Cosmopolitan, Wilsonian, liberal or other normative blueprints for a democratic world order, the conclusion argues that we should, following the example of the 1940s, reconceptualise the relationship between global order and democracy today in relation to the persistent dilemmas of democratic modernity. In a global context, these continue to have interlocking domestic and international dimensions and, more importantly, continue to require choices that entail normatively contestable costs in the construction of a democratic global order. Only then, it argues, will it be possible to think about how these shortcomings can be mitigated and whether and what kind of democratic order we want to pursue at all.

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While few would deny America is the most powerful nation on earth, there is considerable debate, and controversy, over how America uses its foreign policy power. This is even truer since the “unipolar moment,” when America gained sole superpower status with the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. In the Cold War Reinhold Niebuhr was the main theological voice speaking to American power. In the Unipolar world, the Religious right emerged as the main theological voice, but instead of seeking to curb American power the Religious right embraced Neoconservatism in what I will call “Totemic Conservatism” to support use of America's power in the world and to triumph Manifest destiny in American foreign policy, which is the notion that America is a chosen nation, and this legitimizes its use of power and underpins its moral claims. I critique the Niebuhrian and Religious right legacies, and offer a classical realist strategy for theology to speak to America power and foreign policy, which avoids the neoconservative and religious conservative error of totemism, while avoiding the jettisoning of Niebuhr's theology by political liberals, and, the political ghettoizing of theology by his chief critics. This strategy is based on embracing the understanding of classical realism, but not taking the next step, which both Niebuhr and neoconservativism ultimately do, of moving from a prescriptive to a predictive strategy for American foreign policy. In this thesis, I argue that in the wake of the unipolar moment the embrace of the Religious right of Neoconservatism to triumph Manifest destiny in American foreign policy is a problematic commingling of faith and politics, and what is needed instead is a strategy of speaking to power rooted in classical realism but one which refines Niebuhrian realism to avoid the risk of progressing a Constantinian theology.