Zürich, Univ., Diss., 2005.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 1999. Graduate Programme in Philosophy. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 266-269). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR51734

Thesis (Honors)--College of William and Mary, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-97). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T18:01:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo2246_1.pdf: 1031641 bytes, checksum: bc138941276e0b4b68fe2a2dddfcc5bb (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Esta dissertação analisa a abordagem que Wittgenstein faz ao problema do solipsismo na obra Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Toda a investigação aqui envolvida tem como objetivo principal entender o aparente paradoxo expresso na frase inicial do aforismo tractatiano 5.64: "o solipsismo, levado às últimas conseqüências, coincide com o puro realismo". Para cumprir essa tarefa, apresenta-se, inicialmente, uma caracterização geral do Tractatus com vistas a situar o grupo de aforismos que compõem a seção do solipsismo na estrutura argumentativa dessa obra. Num segundo momento, trata-se dos limites da linguagem e do mundo e do que, para Wittgenstein, é a verdade do solipsismo. Nessa ocasião, a ênfase é dada à teoria pictórica da proposição e à doutrina da distinção entre o dizer e o mostrar, que está no cerne da análise wittgensteiniana da questão do solipsismo. Em seguida, examina-se a noção tractatiana de sujeito. Destacam-se aqui: (1) os argumentos utilizados por Wittgenstein para negar a existência de sujeitos empíricos capazes de fazer representações do mundo; e (2) a existência de um sujeito metafísico como limite do mundo e, portanto, como condição de possibilidade para que as proposições da linguagem adquiram seu sentido na projeção lingüística do mundo. Por fim, mostra-se como foi possível a Wittgenstein afirmar o aparente paradoxo que conduziu toda essa pesquisa. Ressalta-se que essa afirmação nada mais é do que uma conseqüência necessária de toda a proposta filosófica do Tractatus

<p>The distinction between that which can be said with a language and that which must be shown by a language is central to Ludwig Wittgenstein/s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The theme of "saying and showing" has at least three distinct but related connotations in that work. First, the theme constitutes the core of the Tractarian view of the logic of language and, with this, the core of its view of metaphysics. The logical form of a proposition must show itself thereby allowing the proposition to picture a possible state of affairs in the world and, consequently, allowing a language-user to claim that that state of affairs is actually the case in the world. Second, the theme of saying and showing is apparent in Wittgenstein/s view of the elucidating activity that is philosophy, as the philosopher brings one to see that which shows itself and thereby brings one to see the world aright. Third, the theme of saying and showing accounts for Wittgenstein's remarks on the ineffability of the mystical/ethical: why one must remain silent concerning that which is "higher" and what this silence means. The implications of the third connotation of the theme of saying and showIng, however, make possible a critique of and a development within the first connotation of that theme. This third sense of the theme, therefore, makes possible a changed view of language, logic and the world. Exactly such a view is developed in the Philosophical Investigations and other later writings of Wittgenstein. The theme of saying and showing can thus be traced into Wittgenstein's later writings. Further, having found the theme in the later writings as well as in the earlier work and having linked the theme with Wittgenstein's views on the mystical/ethical, it becomes reasonable to postulate a unified ethical project of showing the limitations of language as underlying the entire corpus of Wittgenstein's work.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Teilw. zugl.: Augsburg, Universiẗat, Habil.-Schr., 2003.

Zugl.: St. Gallen, Hochsch. für Wirtschafts-, Rechts- und Sozialwiss., Diss., 1995. / Literaturverz. S. 309 - 321.

Zugl.: Berlin, Freie Univ., Diss.

This work starts from three complementary and interdependent questions: 1) How should we interpret Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategy as presented in On Certainty, and especially the elusive and yet central concept of ‘hinges’? 2) Can Wittgenstein’s strategy, when properly understood and developed, provide a satisfactory response to Cartesian skepticism? 3) Does a Wittgensteinian epistemology license epistemic relativism, and if so to what extent? In Chapter 1, I present Cartesian-style skepticism and its epistemological implications along with the Dretske-Nozick’s ‘relevant alternatives’ theory, based on the rejection of the Closure principle for Knowledge which underlies the skeptical challenge. After a brief discussion of the main concerns raised against this proposal, I argue that this line is untenable and that a successful anti-skeptical proposal has to retain Closure. Having shown the shortcomings of the Dretske-Nozick proposal, I then focus my attention on G. E. Moore’s famous anti-skeptical works, namely “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925, henceforth DCS) and “Proof of an External World”, (1939, henceforth PEW). In these seminal papers, Moore famously argued that it is possible to know several ‘obvious truisms of commonsense’ such as ‘There are external objects’, I have a body’ and so on and that this knowledge can offer a direct response to skeptical worries; the aim of this strategy is then to retain both Closure and our confidence in our everyday knowledge claims. After a detailed presentation of DCS and PEW I will discuss the problems of Moore’s direct response against the skeptic, drawing on the works of distinguished commentators such as Malcolm, Clarke, Stroud and Wright. Roughly, I argue that Moore’s strategy is both unnecessary and unconvincing: unconvincing because Moore’s knowledge-claims cannot refute Cartesian skeptical arguments; unnecessary for they can ‘work’ only within our everyday ‘non-philosophical’ context, thus when no skeptical hypothesis can be sensibly raised. Even if Moore’s anti-skeptical attempts have unanimously been considered unsatisfying, for several reasons his works have nonetheless been extremely influential, to the extent that quite a few contemporary anti-skeptical proposals can be fairly described as ‘Moorean’. In Chapter 2, I present and discuss the dominant ‘Moore-Inspired’ positions, namely Pryor’s Dogmatist Reading of PEW, Neta’s interpretation of the Proof, Greco’s reliabilist account, Fara’s ‘Second Proof’, DeRose’s ‘Moorean contextualism’ and Sosa ‘Neo-Mooreanism’. I criticise these accounts in turn, in order to show that all these strategies inherit the main problems of Moore’s treatment of skepticism and also have unpalatable consequences with regard to the so-called ‘value problem for knowledge’. After having extensively criticised both Moore’s and ‘Neo-Moorean’ epistemologies, in Chapter 3 I focus my attention on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty; given the obscurity and ambiguity of this work, in this chapter I present some of the less contentious aspects of Wittgenstein’s treatment of skepticism and I emphasise the role played by ‘hinges ’ in his anti-skeptical strategy. This will give me the background to assess the different ‘Wittgensteininspired’ anti-skeptical strategies I consider in Chapter 4, namely Conant’s ‘therapeutic’ reading, Wright’s ‘rational entitlement’ account, Williams’ ‘Wittgensteinian contextualism’, McGinn’s ‘framework’ reading and Pritchard’s ‘hinge commitment’ strategy. I argue that these proposals are wanting, both as plausible interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought and more importantly as viable anti-skeptical strategies. Moreover, I show that McGinn and Williams’ proposals can lead to a form of epistemic relativism, according to which our epistemic practices are the result of pre-rational, social commitments not subject to rational evaluation of any sort; a conclusion which is not more palatable than skepticism itself. Chapter 5 is devoted to presenting Moyal-Sharrock’s ‘non-epistemic’ reading of OC, for which ‘hinges’ such as ‘There are external objects’ or ‘I have a body’ are the expression of a pre-theoretical, animal certainty which she sees as constitutively different from knowledge. While I defend Moyal-Sharrock’s exegesis and her analogy between ‘hinges’ and 'rules of grammar’ as the most plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought, in this chapter I also criticise her ‘non-epistemic’ account; roughly, I argue that following this strategy we will be forced either to reject the Closure principle, thus inheriting the problems of the Dretske-Nozick’s line, or else to endorse skepticism. Moreover, I also consider some of the relativistic implications of Moyal-Sharrock’s account, which make her proposal vulnerable to the same objections I have raised against McGinn’s framework reading and Williams’ Wittgensteinian contextualism. In Chapter 6, I develop my own anti-skeptical proposal, which is informed by the analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’ and their peculiar status. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s reflections on grammatical rules, developed in the socalled second phase of his thought, and especially in his Philosophical Investigations, I argue that ‘hinges’ cannot be object of knowledge but are subject to an altogether different epistemic standing, namely understanding or ‘mastery of techniques’. A promising anti-skeptical implication of this account is that it will help us to dismiss Cartesian-style skepticism as the result of a logical error, based on a misleading way of representing the structure of our epistemic practices, which are not based on propositional beliefs but rather on non-propositional, normative rules. In the rest of Chapter 6, I consider a final problem that a Wittgensteinian epistemology so construed has to face in order to be considered a fully viable antiskeptical position; that is, whether Wittgenstein’s account of ‘hinges’ would lead to epistemic relativism of a kind that is generated by the proposals put forward by Williams, McGinn and Moyal-Sharrock. Chapter 7 is devoted to addressing this question in detail. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s views on mathematics, metrology and religious beliefs, I aim to show that his remarks on ‘hinges’ will help us to dissolve epistemic relativism rather than licensing it. This is so because following Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of reason the disagreement between epistemic communities committed to different ‘hinges’ (for instance a community which believes in oracles rather than in science) is either solvable, as different epistemic practices can be compared and assessed if they have similar aims, or is a pseudo-disagreement which stems from a misguided comparison between different practices.

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