Certain aspects of sculptural assemblage remain largely unexamined in an academic context. I contend that this mode of practice is not in need of theorisation, but that it can fruitfully be brought into dialogue with philosophy. Doing so may shed light upon assemblage and the contextual thinking which frames it. I undertake the re-evaluation of this medium by means of a reflexive engagement with the processes and concerns of my own assemblage practice. By detailing the shifts and movements of my own making, I explore the tensions and connections inherent in the historical development of this media. I discuss a connection (or family resemblance) between aspects of my sculptural practice and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s methods of grammatical disruption and displacement. I argue that thinking about sculptural assemblage grammatically provides a way of re-framing the relationship between my artworks and their contexts. This in turn facilitates an examination of the practical and philosophical implications of the ‘fittingtogether-ness’ of assemblage. It also brings into view a possible re-thinking of relations in a way that emphasises connective potential rather than difference or similarity.

No description available.

No description available.

Quine and late Wittgenstein have often found themselves being compared for similarities and dissimilarities, we can attribute the allure of this subject to both philosophers being similar advocates of holism and epistemological relativity despite taking on different subject matters. Pieranna Garavaso attempted an inquiry of this type, where she compares Quine’s view on holism, relying mainly on “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, with Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Garavaso shows in her essay that there is a high level of correspondence between On Certainty and “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” but ultimately concludes that despite any actual agreement between Quine and Wittgenstein, their views end up ultimately incompatible. I will argue that this is wrong; Quine’s conception of holism, and Wittgenstein’s conception of holism found in On Certainty are compatible, and even complementary. I will begin my text by giving a short presentation of Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. I will then raise the similarities, and dissimilarities between the two texts before giving my final argument against the supposed conflict between them.

The aim of this thesis is to look freshly at one of the oldest objections to the Tractatus - that no examples are given of Tractarian objects and it is not clear what they are. The thesis will argue that although there is a serious point to the objection - despite the official response which is made to it, but in line with Wittgenstein's later views - it does not undermine the value of the work as a whole, but can instead be seen as helping the work's fundamental purpose. Chapter One: The aim of this Chapter is to lay out the theoretical role of objects in the Tractatus. It will argue that this depends on the Bild theory of language, and the demands which that places on the world. Objects are (i) what names refer to; (ii) the constituents of atomic facts; (iii) the substance of the world; (iv) however they are required to be for atomic facts to be logically independent of each other. Chapter Two: The aim of this Chapter is to spell out the crucial ways in which the nature of objects is left undetermined by their theoretical role as specified in Chapter One. In particular it will be argued that it is indeterminate whether the objects include universals - qualities and relations (against both realist and nominalist interpreters, but in line with Ramsey's view of the text) - and what the relation is between the objects of the Tractatus and the objects which we might think we experience. Chapter Three: The aim of this Chapter is to show that the indeterminacies identified in Chapter Two create serious problems for the Tractatus. In particular, it becomes impossible even in principle either (i) to identify the objects after further analysis, or (ii) to verify or falsify the theory of the Tractatus. It also looks as if it is impossible either (iii) for words ever to be correlated with objects (since we can never know, or have known, which the objects are) or (iv) for sentences to be compared with reality to see whether they are true or false. Chapter Four: The aim of this Chapter is to argue that despite these problems, the indeterminacies in the notion of ‘objects' does not undermine the project of the Tractatus as a whole, but in fact furthers it. This depends on interpreting the central purpose of the Tractatus as being mystical. This Chapter will present the interpretation of the central purpose of the book, and will explain how maintaining these indeterminacies, precisely by making the Tractatus empty or problematic as a theory, furthers the work's mystical purpose.

This thesis considers the implications of Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy for the issue of religious belief, as well as the relation of religion to Wittgenstein’s thought. In the first chapter I provide an overview of the Tractatus and discuss the place of religion within the Tractarian framework. I then provide an overview of Philosophical Investigations. In the second chapter I consider interpretations by Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in relation to religion, as well as Kai Nielsen’s famous critique of ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism.’ The third and final chapter takes up the issue of construing religious belief as a distinctive language-game. I consider arguments from D. Z. Phillips and criticisms of Phillips from Mark Addis and Gareth Moore.

Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Philosophie--Paris 1, 2000. Titre de soutenance : Wittgenstein, le réalisme et la nature de la signification. / Bibliogr. p. 293-307. Index.

Texte remanié de: Dissertation--Munich, Allemagne--Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität. / Courts extraits de textes allemands avec leur traduction anglaise. Notres bibliogr. Index.

No description available.

Zugl.: Berlin, Freie Univ., Diss., 2005