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<p>No Abstract Provided.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine certain key aspects of Wittgenstein's later teaching regarding philosophy in both its traditional form and its proper, Wittgensteinian form. The primary reason for choosing the later teaching is Wittgenstein's clear indication that this is his best, most mature and, hence, most authoritative account of the matter. The thesis draws, so far as his own works are concerned, exclusively on his later writings, especially the Philosophical Investigations. The discussion proceeds as follows. In the first chapter, an attempt is made to expound systematically the substance of the later Wittgenstein's critique of traditional philosophy, particularly the 'skeptical' side of traditional philosophy as well as the conceptions of 'language' and 'meaning' on which it is founded. The second chapter consists in an attempt to illuminate, in the light of this critique, Wittgenstein's later understanding of proper philosophical inquiry. In the third and final chapter, some of the problems or questions pertaining to Wittgenstein's later teaching concerning philosophy are examined. Special attention is given to the question of whether or not Wittgenstein's later thought is historicist in essence (and therefore contains an essentially historicist teaching about philosophy).</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

[pt] A proposta inicial de análise da linguagem afirmada pela filosofia analítica partia do pressuposto da existência de uma linguagem logicamente perfeita, que espelharia a forma lógica dos fatos. Essa linguagem ideal revelaria de maneira clara e correta a estrutura essencial do mundo, evitando as armadilhas da linguagem cotidiana. A filosofia desenvolvida na segunda fase da obra de Wittgenstein fragmenta essa noção de linguagem unitária em uma multiplicidade de jogos de linguagem, firmados sobre formas de vida particulares. A gramática, ou o conjunto de regras que regem uma linguagem, torna-se autônoma, posto que não leva em consideração uma pretensa essência ou forma da realidade, mas adquire seu sentido no uso das expressões que regula. Essa autonomia da gramática abre espaço para a existência de diferentes sistemas dotados de sentido e, portanto, nos permite falar de uma alteridade de formas de representação. A presente dissertação pretende apontar tal abertura provocada por Wittgenstein, em parte prefigurada na sua crítica à obra do antropólogo J. G. Frazer, bem como apresentar algumas discussões que ela suscitou dentro e fora da filosofia analítica. Por fim, o objetivo é esboçar um método de análise conceitual, derivado do encontro entre antropologia e filosofia, como uma alternativa de abordagem para a corrente analítica. / [en] The original proposition of language analysis set forth by analytical philosophy stemmed from the assumption of the existence of a logically perfect language, which would mirror the logical form of the facts. This ideal language would clearly and correctly reveal the logical structure of the world, avoiding the 'traps' of daily language. The philosophy developed on the second phase of Wittgenstein's work breaks apart this notion of a unitary language in a multiplicity of language games, based upon particular forms of life. Grammar, or the set of rules that govern a language, becomes autonomous, since it does not account for an assumed essence or form of reality, but acquires its meaning in the use of the expressions it regulates. This autonomy of grammar makes room for the existence of different systems endowed with meaning and, therefore, allows us to speak of an otherness of forms of representation. This dissertation intends to point out this 'opening' introduced by Wittgenstein, which was partly foreshadowed on his critique of the works of the anthropologist J. G. Frazer. It also presents some discussions that it raised inside and outside of analytical philosophy. Finally, the objective is to sketch a method of conceptual analysis, derived from the encounter between anthropology and philosophy, as an alternative approach to the analytical train.

Trata-se de mostrar alguns argumentos, desenvolvidos por Ludwig Wittgenstein nos seus últimos escritos, contra uma espécie de investida cética que pretende colocar em suspensão a certeza que temos a respeito da existência do mundo. Para tanto, procuramos, primeiramente, a partir da exegese do parágrafo 308 de Da Certeza, explorar a relação estabelecida entre os conceitos de dúvida, saber e certeza a fim de esclarecer a concepção de que a dúvida apenas pode ser aplicada sobre proposições empíricas e jamais sobre proposições gramaticais. Em segundo lugar, mostramos que, ao entender que a dúvida ( o ato de duvidar) sobre qualquer coisa faz sentido apenas quando aceitamos um sistema de proposições, Wittgenstein a (o) coloca como dependente da estabilidade da gramática de nossa linguagem. Nesse sentido, buscamos elucidar a maneira como o filósofo caracteriza a lógica demonstrando-a, de um lado, como algo constante um quadro de referência que possibilita o curso das proposições relacionadas à experiência e, de outro, como algo inconstante que comporta fissuras, quebras e até desmoronamento. Por fim, desenvolvemos a ideia de que essa precária condição de nossa gramática não impede que confiemos nela e que, unicamente por conta disso, possamos dizer que algumas proposições fundamentam nossos jogos de linguagem. É nesse sentido que o cético, ao tentar colocar uma proposição fundante em nossos jogos tal qual o mundo existe em dúvida, suspende sem perceber a fluência do jogo assertivo que pretende estabelecer e, por que não dizer, sua lógica. / This work aims to show some arguments, developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later writings, against a kind of skeptical assault that wants to put in suspension our assurance about the existence of the world. First, we should clarify the conception that a doubt can only be applied on empirical propositions and never on grammatical ones, from the relationship established between the concepts of doubt, know and certainty. Secondly, we aim to show that by identifying that raising a question makes sense only when we accept a system of propositions, Wittgenstein puts it as dependent on the stability of our grammar. Accordingly, we seek to elucidate how the philosopher characterizes grammar as something stable, on one hand as a reference framework which enables the course of the propositions that refer to the experience and, on the other, as something unstable that can crack, break and even collapse. Finally, we developed the idea that this precarious condition of our grammar does not prevent us to trust her and solely because of that we can say that some propositions underlie our language games. In this sense, the skeptic, when trying to put a founding proposition for our language games like \"the world exists\" in doubt, suspend without notice the fluency of the assertive game he intended to stablish, its consistency and, for that matter, its logic.

Procurando investigar as razões que justificam a ausência de uma epistemologia no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Wittgenstein, o trabalho encontra na filosofia de Schopenhauer a raiz da metafísica que ele vincula à lógica. Descobre-se que esse vínculo constitui a verdadeira estratégia de dissolução do terreno no qual classicamente se constroem as epistemologias. A partir daí, duas direções são tomadas: de um lado, exploram-se certas teses centrais do Tractatus no sentido de saber se há, afinal, uma epistemologia compatível com a sua lógica; e, de outro, confrontam-se essas mesmas teses com os fundamentos de dois modelos epistemológicos clássicos: o de Russell e o de Kant. Com isso, o trabalho procura mostrar que, tanto no sentido de “telos", quanto no sentido de “termo", o “fim" da epistemologia no Tractatus marca a singularidade da obra no cenário geral da filosofia contemporânea / This work investigates the reasons which justify the absence of an epistemology in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and encounters in Schopenhauer’s philosophy the root of the metaphysics which Wittgenstein connects to logic. This connection is found to constitute the true strategy of dissolution of the grounds in which epistemologies are classically built. Two directions are then taken: on the one hand, certain central theses of the Tractatus are explored, in order to see whether, after all, there is an epistemology that is compatible with its logic; on the other hand, these same theses are compared with the foundations of two classical epistemological models: Russell’s and Kant’s. In this way, the work attempts to show that the “end" of epistemology in the Tractatus, both in the sense of “telos" as in the sense of “finishing", marks the singularity of the book in the overall background of contemporary philosophy.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:02:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 21 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente dissertação analisa em que sentido Wittgenstein nos convida ao silêncio a partir de seu último aforismo no Tractatus logico-philosophicus 1921, que foi norteador deste trabalho: “Sobre o que não se pode falar, sobre isso deve-se calar.” . Observa-se que o silêncio ocupa um lugar de identidade, ou seja, será necessário guardá-lo, protegê-lo, pois é a partir do silêncio, para Wittgenstein, que será possível encontrar a “clareza” que se busca sobre o mau uso que se faz da linguagem. O silêncio é, portanto, o hiato entre o dito e o não-dito; nele estão contidas as condições de possibilidade para compreensão daquilo que está para ser dito, mas que só pode ser mostrado. Paradoxalmente, para Wittgenstein mais uma vez o silêncio representa a atitude, porque para ele o significado da vida não poderia ser suficiente ou logicamente explicado através de sistemas lógicos. Segundo tese de Wittgenstein, há um limite para a linguagem, ou seja, nossa linguagem é insuficiente e, portanto, seria necessário apelar a i / The current presentation analyzes the sense in which Wittgenstein invites us to the silence from his last aphorism in Tractactus logico-philophicus 1921, which has oriented this work: " Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. " Observe oneselt that the silence occupies a place of identity, that is, It will be necessary to keep itselt, protect itselt, because it is from silence to Wittgenstein, that it will be possible to find the “clarity” that is sought over the bad use of the language. The silence is, therefore, the hiatus between what is said and what is unsaid, in it are the conditions of the possibility to a comprehension from that is still to be said, but it can only be shown. Paradoxically, to Wittgenstein once more the silence represents the attitude, because to him, the meaning of life could not be enough or logically explained through the logic systems. According to Wittgenstein is thesis, there is a limit for the language that is, our language is insuffcient and therefore, it would be

In this work the concept of 'context' is considered in five main points. First, context is seen as always necessary for an adequate explication of the concepts of meaning and understanding. Context always plays a role and is not merely brought into consideration when handling a special class of statements or terms, or when there is doubt and clarification is necessary. Second, context cannot be completely reduced to some system of representation. The reason for this is the presence of humans, which is always an important component of a context. Humans experience situations in ways that are not always reducible to symbolic representation. Third, contexts are in principle open. In normal cases they cannot be determined or described in advance. A context is not to be equated with a set of information. Fourth, we understand the parameters of a context pragmatically, which is why we are not led into doubt or even to meaning skepticism by the open nature of a context. This pragmatic knowledge belongs to the category of an ability. Fifth, contexts are, in principle, accessible. This denies the idea that some contexts are incommensurable. There are a number of pragmatic ways of accessing unfamiliar contexts. Some of these are here examined in light of the so-called 'culture wars' in the U.S.A. / Der Kontextbegriff wird so betrachtet, dass es in fünf Hauptpunkte untergliedert wird. Erstens: der Kontextbegriff ist für eine Explikation der Begriff die Bedeutung und des Verstehens immer notwendig. Der Kontext spielt immer eine Rolle und ist nicht nur für Fälle gut, in denen eine besondere Klasse von Wörtern behandelt wird, oder in denen Zweifel bestehen und eine Klarstellung benötigt wird. Zweitens: der Kontextbegriff lässt sich nicht vollständig auf eine Art von Repräsentation reduzieren. Grund dafür ist das Vorhandensein von Menschen, was immer ein wichtiger Bestandteil des Kontextes ist. Drittens: Kontexte sind grundsätzlich offen. Sie können nicht im Normalfall in vorbestimmter Art und Weise eingegrenzt oder beschrieben werden. Viertens: wir verstehen die Parameter eines Kontextes nach pragmatischer Art und Weise, daher führt uns die offene Natur eines Kontextes nicht zur epistemischen Zweifeln oder sogar Bedeutungsskeptizismus. Dieses pragmatische Wissen gehört in eine völlig andere Kategorie; die eine Fähigkeit ist. Fünftens: Kontexte sind prinzipiell zugänglich. Dies lehnt eine These der Inkommensurabilität zwischen Kontexte ab. Es gibt verschiedene pragmatishce Wege, um Zugang zu fremden Kontexte zu erreichen. Die sogenannte 'culure wars' in den U.S.A. werden hier als Beispiel bennant.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1997. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 391-403). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1997. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 391-403). Also available on the Internet.