At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate. Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.

At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate. Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.

There is a divergence of views in German First World War literature concerning the presentation of medical aspects and nursing experiences. Although all accounts of the war claim implicitly to present the truth about a section of, or even the whole of, the war, be they diaries, letters or war fiction, variations arise due to the individual attitude, perspective and intention of each author. This thesis examines a range of different types of fictional and non-fictional war literature: diaries, letters, reports, narratives and novels written by or about participants during or after the war, taking due account of the precise relationship to the experience, the intent of the writers and the context of their accounts. Some of these are based on personal experience and provide an imnediate impression of the war. Some use personal experience, but not specific historical details, to look at the war in retrospect, conditioned by the (additional) medical knowledge of the late 1920s. Others blend fictional and historical characters and events. Although the standpoint of the individual ordinary soldier and sailor, or officer, predominates in writings of this kind, writings both by and about women and other non-combatants involved in the war have been included. German material is compared with American, British and French accounts wherever possible and practicable. A preliminary section (chapters 2+3) provides the reader with a detailed and necessary historical overview of the organization of the German lieeressanialtswesen. between 1914 and 1918, followed by an examination of the discrepancy between the historical experience and perception of the Lazarett in the German literary context. The second part of the work (chapters 4-6) examines descriptions and perceptions of specific medical aspects of the war from the point of view of those immediately involved in the Yermuncletenliirgarge: surgeons and medical practitioners, paramedical orderlies and stretcher-bearers as well as nurses. The largest part (chapters 7-12) examines the medical effects of the war as perceived in different literary and non-literary contexts, ranging from straightforward wounds, shell-shock and other psychological phenomena, to the effects of poison gas and chemical warfare, venereal diseases, self-inflicted wounds and the medical implications of trench warfare, followed by an analysis of the motif of 'war as disease'.

The First World War is remembered by many as a series of gigantic battles along a system of tranches in France. However, a number of other engagements, equally important, took place. One of the most prominent and fascinating of these engagements was the Dardanelles Campaign. Beginning in February 1915, the campaign lasted until the evacuation of the Cape Halles positions in January 1916. It originated as an attempt by the political leadership in London to seek a victory which would ease the Imperial situation, strengthen allied diplomacy with the neutrals, boost morale and achieve a victory without the expansive methods being advocated by the 'Westerners' in northern France. [...]

Univ., Diss.--Mainz, 2004. / Literaturverz. S. 185 - 206.

No description available.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This thesis examines a group of German intellectuals and politicians who, during World War I, formulated and proposed a democratic ideology based on their interpretation of the German Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant and integrated his ideas with those of Karl Marx, the father of modern socialism. Their theory was an attempt to legitimize democracy in Germany at a time when democratic reforms came to the forefront of German politics. These thinkers advocated a non-revolutionary foundation for social democracy by emphasizing the role of human reason and agency in the process of democratization. Because they had abandoned the need for revolution, which most early nineteenth-century socialists believed was socialism’s ‘final goal,’ these thinkers were known as revisionists. The revisionists’ primary medium through which they espoused their views of social democracy was the journal Sozialistische Monatshefte, which ran from 1893 until 1933. The timeframe on which this argument focuses is the last two years of World War I, when Germany’s failure achieve a victor’s peace opened new avenues for the center-left of the political spectrum to achieve democratic reform. The revisionists sought to carry forward the process of democratization, and by doing so, reconnected with the ideas of the Enlightenment.

This thesis explores academic propaganda in the first two years of the First World War, examining the activity of the university men in Britain and Germany who were left behind when their students went to the Front. Using pamphlets and manifestoes, it seeks to highlight the way the War split the international academic community and the creation of a debate which examined not only the causes of the War, but the reasons for which the nations were fighting. By exploring the propaganda organisations of both countries, as well as the academic milieu in which the subjects of this thesis worked, it hopes to provide the context within which this propaganda was created, before turning to an examination of the content of the propaganda - an aspect which has often been overlooked in propaganda studies. The investigation of the content looks first at the outbreak of war and the reaction of the academic community to a shock which shook their community. It then turns to the arguments expounded on culpability for the War, and the ideals for which each side felt they were fighting, illustrating the shift in emphasis from a political war to an ideological conflict between two opposing world views. Finally, the thesis considers perceptions of the War in the early years of the conflict, and the way in which it was seen both as a panacea to overcome social divisions and a catharsis which would lead the way to a new world - ideas which would provide the foundation for later war aims. In taking this comparative approach, the aim is to provide new insights into a fascinating and relatively little-known aspect of the history of the First World War.

No description available.