Economic theory and empirical research suggests product market competition can result in both positive and negative capital market effects. Specifically, research suggests competition reduces agency costs, but also reduces profitability. I examine the relation between product market competition and firm value in an international setting, focusing on how the relation varies with firm- and country-specific characteristics. I document lower values for firms in more competitive industries. However, the negative relation between competition and firm value is less pronounced for firms with higher firm-level liquidation risk, stronger country-level investor protection mechanisms, and higher firm-level transparency. These findings are consistent with an agency cost benefit resulting from product market competition. / Ph. D.

Background: Sweden has a tradition of a concentrated ownership structure where many owners use dual asset classes to maintain corporate control by possessing small portions of the dividend rights. Financial literature has shown that these controlling owners find more incentives to divert corporate resources for private use, at the expense of shareholders. Recent studies also show that involvement in extraction of private benefits leads to long maturity debt as controlling owners avoid frequent monitoring by lenders. As this causes a conflict over corporate debt maturity between controlling and minority shareholders, we investigate if the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) mitigates this conflict through control contests. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to examine and analyze how different ownership structures affect the informative environment within a firm. In addition, the thesis investigates how ownership structure affect debt maturity structure and what this mean for large and minority shareholders. Method: The study uses a quantitative approach with panel data of 74 publicly traded non – financial Swedish firms over the period of 2006 – 2014. A deductive approach has been applied in order to explain empirical results from theory and previous literature. Results: We find evidence that controlling owners with a separation in control and cash flow rights tend to insulate themselves through long term debt, creating a bad informative environment with information asymmetry and agency costs. Furthermore, our results show robust evidence that MLS mitigates these problems since control contest between large shareholders leads to a shorter debt maturity, yielding a better informative environment. In addition, our results imply that MLS may be an important factor in facilitating financing as investors associate these firms with less risk of extraction of private benefits.

Dado o recente cenário econômico brasileiro, caracterizado por incertezas políticas e instabilidades econômicas, é essencial que as empresas engajem uma política de hedge, como parte de sua política financeira, com o objetivo de evitar que seus resultados sejam afetados por fricções de mercado. Neste contexto, o presente trabalho teve como objetivo verificar o impacto da política de hedge sobre os custos de agência das empresas brasileiras. Os resultados obtidos foram de encontro com a literatura sobre hedge e custos de agência, foi encontrado que quanto maior a utilização do hedge, menor são os custos de agência enfrentados pelos acionistas. Essa relação demonstra que ao engajar a utilização do hedge na política financeira da empresa, o gestor passa a minimizar os impactos das fricções de mercado, e reduz as perdas residuais que os acionistas sofreriam em suas riquezas, caso o gestor não engajasse a política. Ainda, conforme sugerido por Dadalt, Gay e Nam (2002), outro benefício encontrado nesse resultado, é que ao reduzir os impactos das fricções de mercado nos lucros da empresa, o gestor informa aos stakeholders, um lucro que demonstra melhor a performance da companhia, assim credores e investidores podem tomar melhores decisões referentes aos contratos com a empresa, com base em um lucro que contém menor informação assimétrica. Dessa forma, a utilização da política de hedge pode aliviar problemas relacionadas a seleção adversa entre a empresa e seus stakeholders / Given the recent Brazilian economic scenario, characterized by political uncertainties and economic instabilities, it is essential that companies engage in a hedge policy as part of their financial policy, in order to prevent their results from being affected by market frictions. In this context, the present study aimed to verify the impact of the hedge policy on the agency costs of Brazilian companies. The results obtained were in agreement with the literature on hedge and agency costs, it was found that the greater the use of hedge, the lower the agency costs faced by the shareholders. This relationship demonstrates that by engaging the use of hedge in the company\'s financial policy, the manager starts to minimize the impacts of market frictions and reduces the residual losses that shareholders would suffer in their wealth if the manager did not engage the policy. As suggested by Dadalt, Gay and Nam (2002), another benefit found in this result is that by reducing the impacts of market frictions on company profits, the manager informs stakeholders of a profit that best demonstrates the performance of the company, so creditors and investors can make better decisions regarding contracts with the company, based on a profit that contains less asymmetric information. In this way, the use of the hedge policy can alleviate problems related to adverse selection between the company and its stakeholders.

Dado o recente cenário econômico brasileiro, caracterizado por incertezas políticas e instabilidades econômicas, é essencial que as empresas engajem uma política de hedge, como parte de sua política financeira, com o objetivo de evitar que seus resultados sejam afetados por fricções de mercado. Neste contexto, o presente trabalho teve como objetivo verificar o impacto da política de hedge sobre os custos de agência das empresas brasileiras. Os resultados obtidos foram de encontro com a literatura sobre hedge e custos de agência, foi encontrado que quanto maior a utilização do hedge, menor são os custos de agência enfrentados pelos acionistas. Essa relação demonstra que ao engajar a utilização do hedge na política financeira da empresa, o gestor passa a minimizar os impactos das fricções de mercado, e reduz as perdas residuais que os acionistas sofreriam em suas riquezas, caso o gestor não engajasse a política. Ainda, conforme sugerido por Dadalt, Gay e Nam (2002), outro benefício encontrado nesse resultado, é que ao reduzir os impactos das fricções de mercado nos lucros da empresa, o gestor informa aos stakeholders, um lucro que demonstra melhor a performance da companhia, assim credores e investidores podem tomar melhores decisões referentes aos contratos com a empresa, com base em um lucro que contém menor informação assimétrica. Dessa forma, a utilização da política de hedge pode aliviar problemas relacionadas a seleção adversa entre a empresa e seus stakeholders / Given the recent Brazilian economic scenario, characterized by political uncertainties and economic instabilities, it is essential that companies engage in a hedge policy as part of their financial policy, in order to prevent their results from being affected by market frictions. In this context, the present study aimed to verify the impact of the hedge policy on the agency costs of Brazilian companies. The results obtained were in agreement with the literature on hedge and agency costs, it was found that the greater the use of hedge, the lower the agency costs faced by the shareholders. This relationship demonstrates that by engaging the use of hedge in the company\'s financial policy, the manager starts to minimize the impacts of market frictions and reduces the residual losses that shareholders would suffer in their wealth if the manager did not engage the policy. As suggested by Dadalt, Gay and Nam (2002), another benefit found in this result is that by reducing the impacts of market frictions on company profits, the manager informs stakeholders of a profit that best demonstrates the performance of the company, so creditors and investors can make better decisions regarding contracts with the company, based on a profit that contains less asymmetric information. In this way, the use of the hedge policy can alleviate problems related to adverse selection between the company and its stakeholders.

A organização cooperativa é uma, dentre várias, forma de se coordenar a atividade econômica. No setor agropecuário, particularmente, desempenha um papel relevante na economia de vários países, atuando como importantes players em diversos segmentos do agronegócio. A cooperativa difere de outros tipos organizacionais em grande parte devido à sua peculiar estrutura de propriedade e natureza econômica complexa, delineados por princípios históricos que fazem dela uma forma organizacional ímpar, uma simbiose entre propósitos social e o econômico. A motivação do presente trabalho é trazer ao conhecimento do leitor, ao menos em parte, as diferentes abordagens nas quais as teorias sobre o modelo de empreendimento cooperativista têm se baseado para responder questões fundamentais acerca das organizações cooperativas agropecuárias no decorrer da história, tais como: o que são cooperativas? Por que elas se formam? O que as fazem organizações únicas? Quais são as vantagens e desvantagens deste modelo organizacional frente aos demais? Enfim, no presente trabalho busca-se mostrar como a organização cooperativa, deixando questões ideológicas de lado, vem sendo estudada e debatida à luz da teoria convencional da firma e sua análise marginal e, mais recentemente, da moderna teoria das organizações formulada no âmbito da Nova Economia Institucional. / The cooperative organization is one of several means of coordinating economic activity. In the agricultural sector, notably, it plays an important role in the economy of several countries, acting as important players in a number of segments of agribusiness. The cooperative differs from other organizational types largely because of its peculiar structure of ownership and complex economic nature, outlined by historical principles that make it a unique organizational form, a symbiosis between social and economic purposes. The aim of the present work it is to bring to the reader's knowledge, at least in part, the different approaches on which theories of the cooperative model of enterprise have been based to answer fundamental questions about cooperative organizations throughout history, such as: what are cooperatives? Why do they form? What makes them unique organizations? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this organizational model with regard to others? Finally, the present paper seeks to show how the cooperative organization, ideological issues aside, has been studied and debated in the light of the conventional theory of the firm and its marginal analysis, and more recently, those covered by the modern theory of organizations formulated within the scope of the New Institutional Economics.

In a 2004 study, Harvey, Lin and Roper argue that debt makers with a commitment to monitoring can create value for outside shareholders whenever information asymmetry and agency costs are pronounced. I investigate Harvey, Lin and Roper's claim for bank loans by empirically testing the effect of information asymmetry and direct agency costs on the abnormal returns of the borrowers' stock around the announcement of bank loans. I divide my study into two main sections. The first section tests whether three proxies of the direct agency costs of equity are equally significant in measuring the direct costs associated with outside equity agency problems. I find that the asset utilization ratio proxy is the most statistically significant proxy of the direct agency costs of equity using a Chow F-test statistic. The second main section of my dissertation includes and event study and a cross-sectional analysis. The event study results document significant and positive average abnormal returns of 1.01% for the borrowers' stock on the announcement day of bank loans. In the cross sectional analysis of the borrowers' average abnormal stock returns, I find that higher quality and more reputable banks/lenders provide a reliable certification to the capital market about the low level of the borrowers' direct agency costs of equity and information asymmetry. This certification hypothesis holds only for renewed bank loans. In other words, in renewing the borrowers' line of credit, the bank/lender is actually confirming that the borrower has a low level of information asymmetry and direct costs of equity. Given such a certificate from the banks/lenders, shareholders reward the company/borrower by bidding the share price up in the capital market.

This study is an empirical examination of a new theory that links dividends to institutional ownership in a framework of both information signaling and agency costs. Under this theory put forth by Allen, Bernardo and Welch in 2000, dividends are paid out to attract tax-favored institutional investors, thereby signaling good firm quality and/or more efficient monitoring. This is based on the premise that institutions are considered sophisticated investors with superior ability and stronger incentive to be informed about the firm quality compared to retail investors. On the agency level, institutional investors display monitoring capabilities, and can detect and correct managerial pitfalls, thus their presence serves as an assurance that the firm will remain well run. The study provides a comprehensive analysis of the implications of the theory by testing various aspects of the relationship between dividends and institutional holdings. Unlike the prevalent literature on this topic, I give specific attention to the different types of institutional investors and their incentives to invest in dividend paying stocks. Moreover, I analyze the signaling and the agency effects on the market reaction to dividend initiations within the framework proposed by the theory. Finally, I test the smoothing effect institutions have on dividends by examining the firm's propensity to increase dividends given the level of institutional ownership. I find institutional holders to respond positively to dividend initiation announcements as they adjust their portfolios by buying or increasing their holdings of the dividend paying stock following the announcement. I also find that this response is displayed more strongly among tax-favored institutions. My test results also reveal that positive abnormal returns to dividend initiation announcements are a decreasing function of institutional holdings in the dividend initiating firm, and that this mitigating effect of institutional ownership on the market reaction to dividend initiations is stronger for firms with higher information asymmetry and more potential for agency problems. This evidence lends some degree of support to the tested theory. Additional support to lies in the test results of its smoothing hypothesis which reveal that as institutional ownership increases, the propensity of firms to increase dividends decreases.

We investigate whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) play an internal corporate governance role in mitigating agency problems between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in a cross-country sample of public firms. We draw our conclusion by examining the market reaction (in terms of bidder announcement period abnormal returns) to acquisition announcements made by firms with and without MLS in their ownership structure. Using an international sample of acquisition announcements made by firms with at least one large shareholder from 10 Western European and 5 East Asian countries between 1996 and 2000, we find the presence of MLS, their voting rights, relative voting power, the number of blockholders and the relative voting power of these blockholders have a positive and significant impact on bidder announcement period abnormal returns. We also find that the legal institutions such as disclosure requirement, investor protection, common-law legal origin and anti-self-dealing have positive effects on bidder announcement period abnormal returns.

We investigate whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) play an internal corporate governance role in mitigating agency problems between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in a cross-country sample of public firms. We draw our conclusion by examining the market reaction (in terms of bidder announcement period abnormal returns) to acquisition announcements made by firms with and without MLS in their ownership structure. Using an international sample of acquisition announcements made by firms with at least one large shareholder from 10 Western European and 5 East Asian countries between 1996 and 2000, we find the presence of MLS, their voting rights, relative voting power, the number of blockholders and the relative voting power of these blockholders have a positive and significant impact on bidder announcement period abnormal returns. We also find that the legal institutions such as disclosure requirement, investor protection, common-law legal origin and anti-self-dealing have positive effects on bidder announcement period abnormal returns.

I examine the informational efficiency of stock markets by testing the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and equity mispricing. I find that the level of mispricing declines with idiosyncratic volatility consistent with the notion that greater levels of firm-specific risk reflect greater participation of informed traders in the market for the stock. However, I also find that mispricing increases with idiosyncratic volatility for highly volatile stocks, and this is attributed to both noise trading and arbitrage risk. In addition, I investigate the link between agency costs and equity mispricing, and whether it exists due to information asymmetry or the degree of conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. I provide evidence that the level of agency costs is positively related with mispricing. In contrast to previous studies' claim that the information asymmetry level is a key determinant in the equity mispricing, I find that the conflict of interests is more important than information asymmetry in explaining equity mispricing. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that stock option grants, originally intended to resolve conflicts of interests, actually exaggerate this problem.