Submitted by Nara Lays Domingues Viana Oliveira (naradv) on 2015-07-16T18:32:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TADEU.pdf: 1920392 bytes, checksum: 2d3a9be6b8a3c34155d4ce8ce06acb5a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-16T18:32:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TADEU.pdf: 1920392 bytes, checksum: 2d3a9be6b8a3c34155d4ce8ce06acb5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-28 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente estudo investigou se as companhias abertas familiares, entre 2005 e 2012, possuem criação de valor, desempenho operacional, nível de alavancagem e despesas administrativas diferenciados em relação às empresas não familiares. Também, investigou-se diferenças de performance dentre as empresas familiares sob diferentes modelos de gestão. Os resultados para as variáveis de valor e desempenho demonstraram sensibilidade dependendo do conceito de empresa familiar utilizado. Para as empresas familiares sob o conceito amplo (CF1), os resultados obtidos para criação de valor e desempenho operacional são inferiores as empresas não familiares privadas. Para os demais conceitos de empresa familiar (CF2 e CF3) não há indicativos estatísticos de diferença entre os resultados. Através destes achados, pode-se supor que o controle acionário familiar não majoritário, a divisão do controle da empresa em várias famílias e a ausência do laço da família fundadora com a companhia, prejudique o desempenho das empresas familiares. Na análise dos níveis de alavancagem, os resultados indicam que apenas as empresas familiares em que a família fundadora ainda possua grande influência (CF3) são mais alavancadas. Para a métrica de despesas administrativas, as empresas familiares sob o conceito amplo (CF1) apresentaram maiores gastos em relação as não familiares, evidenciando maior conflito de agência entre os acionistas controladores e minoritários nestas empresas. O modelo de gestão mais eficiente em termos de valor de mercado, para as empresas familiares, é a Gestão Familiar do Fundador. Todos os resultados descritos são confirmados nas análises de Robustez. / The present research investigated if traded family firms, from the period of 2005 to 2012, have creating value, operating performance, leverage and administrative costs differentiated in comparison to non-family firms. Besides it was investigated differences in performance among the family firms in different management models. The results for the variables of value and performance demonstrated sensitivity depending on the concept of family firms used. For family firms under the wider concept (CF1), the results for creating value and operating performance are lower than private non-family companies. For other concepts of family firms (CF2 and CF3) there is no statistical difference between the results. Through these findings it is assumed that the family non majority equity control, the division of the company control in several families and the absence of the founding family in the company, lower the performance of family firms. In the analysis of leverage levels the results indicate that only the family firms where the founding family (CF3) still has great influence are more leveraged. Regarding for the metric of administrative expenses the family firms under the wider concept (CF1) reported higher expenses in relation to the non-family, showing greater agency conflicts between controllers and minority shareholders in these companies. The more efficient model of management in terms of market value for family firms is the Family Management Founder. All results are confirmed in the Robustness analyzes.

This paper describes and develops a trade off model of optimal capital structure by Bradley et al. (1984). The model is then tested to examine how changes in corporate tax rates affect the optimal capital structure of firms. Based on theoretical implications of the model, four hypotheses are derived stating that firms’ optimal debt-to-value ratio is (1) negatively related to financial distress costs, (2) negatively related to non-debt tax shields, (3) negatively related to firm volatility and (4) positively related to the corporate tax rate. Based on the results of two regression models applied on 753 Scandinavian and German firms, we find empirical support for hypothesis 1 and 3 while we find no empirical support for hypothesis 2 and 4. These results can be explained by problematic empirical proxies and in the light of the pecking-order theory.

本研究之主要目的在於探討公司自由現金流量與其過度投資之關聯性，並設法瞭解內外部機制是否有助於減緩公司過度投資之代理問題。此外，本研究亦探究公司自由現金流量與債務控制之關聯性，以及債務控制與公司之其他監督機制間之關聯性。本研究發現，公司自由現金流量愈大時，愈可能有過度投資之現象，且此種現象較集中於自由現金流量為正之公司。此外，相較於高成長公司，低成長公司自由現金流量之代理問題較為嚴重，更傾向於過度投資。而在減緩代理問題之機制上，管理階層及機構投資人之持股並無法有效減緩代理成本，或抑制公司過度投資之現象，但或許可藉由債務控制減緩過度投資之問題。再者，本研究推論過度投資之公司可能會傾向於提前適用資產減損之會計處理，以認列其投資損失。最後，公司代理問題愈嚴重時，並不一定會藉由債務控制方式減緩過度投資。而在降低代理成本的作用上，管理者持股、機構投資人持股與債務控制之間具有明顯的互補關係。 / The main purpose of this study is to examine the association between a firm’s free cash flows and its overinvestment. In addition, I also examine the interrelationships between free cash flow, managerial ownership, institutional investors, and debt .The empirical results suggest that overinvestment is concentrated in firms with higher levels of free cash flows and lower opportunities for growth. Further tests find that a firm’s managerial ownership, institutional investors’ ownership may not effectively mitigate its overinvestment. However, debt appears to control overinvestment. Besides, I infer that firms with overinvestment may choose to adopt the accounting standards for asset impairment earlier to recognize their investment losses. Finally, I find evidence that firms may not be using debt control to mitigate their overinvestment, and a firm’s managerial ownership, institutional investors’ ownership and debt may serve as substitutes in controlling its agency costs.

For decades, business press and researchers have observed and investigated the premiums/discounts on closed end investment companies. Proposed explanations for the phenomenon have been poor performance, high expenses (due to agency relationships), inefficient internal capital markets and excess volatility in the returns of the shares of the closed-end investment companies. Some, but not conclusive, empirical evidence support these theories. Most empirical evidence is based on American data. This study uses British and Swedish data on closed end investment companies. Some, but not conclusive, empirical evidence support these theories. Most empirical evidence is based on American data. This study uses British and Swedish data on closed end investment companies from 1972 – 2004 to investigate the premiums/discounts. Three areas of explanations are examined: performance, agency costs and diversification. In contrast to previous studies this study uses detailed data on quoted and unquoted securities respectively to investigate the relationship between performance and premiums/discounts. Evidence is found for a relationship between the performance on unquoted securities and premiums/discounts, but not for quoted securities. Indications that measurement biases in unquoted securities are properly priced are also found. The agency problem is analyzed in two ways, formal and controlling power, to investigate if actions taken by the company substantiating agency behavior have additional effects on prices. Such actions are measured as large investments in other portfolio companies (controlling power).  The empirical evidence suggests that the existence of formal power creates additional discounts. The marginal effect on discounts is even deeper when proposed agency actions are identified. Diversification is argued to decrease the value of a portfolio of securities when heterogeneous beliefs are present. This study provides evidence that portfolio diversification deepens discounts. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2007

Le résumé en français n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur. / Administrative registers maintained by statistical offices on vastly heterogeneous firms have much untapped potential to reveal details on sources of productivity of firms and economies alike. It has been proposed that firm-level shocks can go a long way in explaining aggregate fluctuations. Based on novel monthly frequency data, idiosyncratic shocks are able to explain a sizable share of the Finnish economic fluctuations, providing support to the granular hypothesis. The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 has challenged the field of economic forecasting, and nowcasting has become an active field. This thesis shows that the information content of firm-level sales and truck traffic can be used for nowcasting GDP figures, by using a specific mixture of machine learning algorithms. The agency problem lies at the heart of much of economic theory. Based on a unique dataset linking owners, CEOs and firms, and exploiting plausibly exogenous variations in the separation of ownership and control, agency costs seem to be an important determinant of firm productivity. Furthermore, the effect appear strongest in medium-sized firms. Enterprise group structures might have important implications on the voluminous literature on firm size, as large share of SME employment can be attributed to affiliates of large business groups. Within firm variation suggests that enterprise group affiliation has heterogeneous impacts depending on size, having strong positive impact on productivity of small firms, and negative impact on their growth. In terms of aggregate job creation, it is found that the independent small firms have contributed the most. The results in this thesis underline the benefits of paying attention to samples encompassing the total population of firms. Researchers should continue to explore the potential of rich administrative data sources at statistical offices and strive to strengthen the ties with data producers.

This cumulative dissertation covers four papers on the management and governance of family firms. The first paper provides a systematic review of the literature on family-related determinants of the board of directors’ tasks, composition and processes in family firms. The review clusters and synthesizes the literature into six major determinants, details the methods used, and provides recommendations for future research in the field. The second paper develops a contingency approach to board task needs of family firms. The paper identifies five contingency factors and demonstrates how board task needs typically evolve over the ownership stages of family businesses. The third paper constitutes a qualitative empirical study on the role of board control in controlling owner family businesses. Based on a multiple case study approach, the study shows that controlling owners frequently use board control as a self-governing mechanism to mitigate self-control problems. Additionally, the study provides insights on favorable board processes and board composition in the controlling owner setting. Overall, the dissertation underlines the importance of factoring in the influence of family firm heterogeneity on the board of directors. The fourth paper concludes the dissertation with a teaching case study on a small family firm that is exposed to the threat of a disruptive innovation in its industry.:1 Introduction 1.1 Research Objective 1.2 Summary of the Research Papers 1.3 References 2 Determinants of Boards in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review 2.1 Abstract 2.2 Introduction 2.3 Boards of Directors in Family Firms 2.4 Research Method 2.5 Findings on Family-Related Determinants 2.6 Synthesis of Results 2.7 Future Research 2.8 Conclusion 2.9 Appendix 2.10 References 3 The Board of Directors in Family Firms: One Size Fits Forever? 3.1 Abstract 3.2 Introduction 3.3 Board Tasks in Family Firms 3.4 Development of a Conceptual Model 3.5 Limitations of the Model 3.6 Conclusion 3.7 References 4 Self-Control Through Board Control: Formalized Governance in Controlling Owner Family Businesses 4.1 Abstract 4.2 Introduction 4.3 Theoretical Foundations 4.4 Research Method 4.5 Findings 4.6 Discussion 4.7 Conclusion 4.8 References 5 Teaching Case Study ATB: Digital Disruption in the Manufacturing Industry 5.1 Abstract 5.2 Case Manuscript 5.3 Teaching Note 5.4 References 6 Conclusion 6.1 Contribution of the Dissertation 6.2 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 6.3 References

Yes / This study examines stock market reaction to the announcement of various forms of seasoned issues in China. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that market reactions differ in ways that suggest a difference between management's internal assessment and the market's assessment of the stock price. The market responds unfavourably to the announcement, notably in the case of rights issues and also with regard to open offers. Private placements experience an unfavourable pre‐announcement reaction, which contrasts with the favourable reaction after the event. Convertible bond issues generate positive excess returns consistent with the market's confidence that they can help to align management and shareholders’ interests. Further investigation shows that market reaction is related to factors specific to the issuer and issue by reference to the period immediately surrounding the issue. Specifically, ownership concentration, agency matters connected with equity offerings, investor protection connected with fund allocation and security pricing, and the influence of powerful moneyed interests together provide an instructive insight into market reaction. Institutional inefficiency pertaining to underwriting, auditing, analysts’ forecasts and credit ratings are found to have a weak association with market price, consistent with due public scepticism concerning management and their gatekeepers.

Recent research has suggested that interest alignment, i.e., the degree to which members of an organization are motivated to behave in line with organizational goals, is a source of competitive advantage that can generate rents for the firm (Gottschlag and Zollo, 2007). Drawing on agency theory, this dissertation tests whether the interest alignment premise manifests itself differently in the strategic behavior of family-controlled firms when compared to their nonfamily peers. In particular, for firms in the S&P 500, I evaluate the results of two important strategic policies; mergers and acquisitions, as well as CEO compensation practices. In studying acquisitions made by family and nonfamily firms in the S&P 500 index from 1992-2006, I find that family firms are more careful when embarking on actions leading to mergers than non-family firms, as evidenced by their selection of smaller targets and targets who are in related businesses. I also find that there is a preponderance of cash purchases by family firms that does not vary with market movements and that completion times for merger transactions are shorter than for non family firms. The care and concern with which family-controlled firms choose their "mates" translates into higher stock returns when compared with non-family firms. Overall, I believe that family-controlled firms derive value from their merger and acquisition strategy. With regard to CEO compensation practices, I find that family firms provide strong incentives to the CEO for superior performance but pay significantly lower than nonfamily firms in terms of both salary and stock-based pay. The pay-for-performance sensitivity between annual stock returns and total compensation is significantly greater for family firms in general, and for family CEOs when compared with compensation of CEOs in nonfamily firms. The pay-for-performance sensitivity is in turn positively related to firm performance, suggesting that firms with greater pay-for-performance sensitivity (family controlled firms) also perform better. The analyses in my thesis thus illustrate that family-controlled firms and non-family firms in the S&P 500 differ in their strategic decision-making. It would be fair to say that family firms have longer investment horizons and give deliberate thought to expending resources whether for acquisitions or for CEO pay, and may suffer lower agency costs than nonfamily firms due to family governance (and public monitoring) which may lead to their relative superior performance. This dissertation finds that each acquisition made by a family controlled firm generates an extra return of 0.50% when compared with a nonfamily firm, and family controlled firms earn 0.50% every year directly attributable to pay-for-performance sensitivity. The study thus underlines and reiterates the importance of instilling the long-term view in the management of all firms, lowering agency costs, and aligning the interests of managers with those of stockholders for superior financial performance / Ph. D.

Die studie ondersoek die inligtingswaarde van dividende as 'n moontlike verldaring van die waargenome aandeleprysreaksie op dividendaankondigings. Twee algemene hipoteses is getoets, naamlik dat 'n betekenisvolle verandering in 'n maatskappy se dividendbeleid inligting oor daardie maatskappy se toekomstige verdienste per aandeel bevat, en tweedens dat hierdie inligting in die reaksie van aandelepryse na die aankondiging van die verandering gereflekteer word. Die belangrikste bevindinge is soos volg: • Die inligting vervat in huidige dividendaankondigings kan nie deur beleggers gebruik word om die volgende jaar se verdienste per aandeel van 'n maatskappy te voorspel nie. Die aandeleprysreaksie op positiewe, negatiewe en neutrale nuus is statisties beduidend, maar vind hoofsaaklik in dieselfde rigting plaas. Beleggers sou dus nie die inligting vervat in dividendaankondigings kan gebruik om bogemiddelde opbrengskoerse te genereer nie. • Die inligtingswaarde van dividende is dus 'n onwaarskynlike verldaring van die invloed van 'n maatskappy se dividendbeleid op die waarde van sy gewone aandele. / This research investigates the information content of dividends as a possible explanation for the observed share price reaction to dividend announcements. Two hypotheses were tested, namely that a significant change in a company's dividend policy contains information on that company's future earnings per share, and secondly, that this information is reflected in the share price reaction after the announcement of the change. The most important findings are as follows: • Investors cannot use the information contained in current dividend announcements to predict a company's earnings per share for the next year. • Share price reactions to positive, negative and neutral news are statistically significant, but will be in the same direction. Hence investors cannot use this information to generate above-normal returns. The information content of dividends is therefore an unlikely explanation of the influence a company's dividend policy has on the value of its ordinary shares. / Business Management / MCom (Sakebestuur)

La privatisation des entreprises industrielles en Algérie a été initiée en 1995 par le PAS (Programme d’Ajustement Structurel) appliqué à une économie qui était en cessation de paiement. La privatisation des entreprises sous l’égide du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale avait donc pour principal objectif d’alléger les dépenses de l’Etat pour rétablir l’équilibre budgétaire et l’équilibre des comptes extérieurs dans le contexte d’une économie en voie de libéralisation progressive. Les mesures du PAS dont la privatisation ne sont pas intégrées dans une politique industrielle. En 2001, une ordonnance stipule que toutes les entreprises sont privatisables. Un tournant a cependant été observé dés 2007 puisque la privatisation des entreprises est intégrée dans une politique industrielle. Elle doit désormais contribuer à freiner la désindustrialisation amorcée durant la décennie 1980 et aggravée par le PAS et à améliorer la compétitivité de l’économie algérienne. Après un échec, le bilan de la privatisation des entreprises s’améliore d’un point de vue quantitatif (dés 2005) et qualitatif (IDE hors-hydrocarbures) particulièrement en 2007, comme le montre notre bilan qui est global et qui traite aussi dans le détail de cas d’entreprises privatisées. Cependant, depuis 2008, le « climat des affaires » marqué par une instabilité juridique, l’interventionnisme, la crise économique mondiale semble peu propice à une privatisation qui pourrait permettre à l’industrie algérienne de sortir de sa dépendance vis-à-vis des hydrocarbures. Nous concluons que malgré quelques rares succès, la privatisation des entreprises en Algérie a échoué parce que ces dernières n’ont pas bénéficié, au préalable de restructuration stratégique. De plus, la privatisation n’a pas été encadrée par des institutions et une politique industrielle efficaces. / The privatization of industrial enterprises in Algeria was initiated in 1995 by the SAP (Structural Adjustment Program) applied to an economy that was insolvent. The privatization of companies under the aegis of the IMF and the World Bank had therefore the main objective to reduce government expenditure in order to restore the balance of both state budget and external accounts in the context of an economy in the process of gradual liberalization. The SAP measures including privatization are not integrated into an industrial policy. In 2001 an ordinance stipulates that all companies can be privatized. A turning point was however observed in 2007 because privatization is integrated into an industrial policy. Privatization must now help to stop the deindustrialization that began during the 1980s and exacerbated by the SAP and to improve the competitiveness of the Algerian economy. After a failure, the privatization results improves by a quantitative point of view (from 2005) and qualitative (non-hydrocarbon FDI), especially in 2007, as shown in our assessment that is global, and dealing also in details of cases of privatized enterprises. However, since 2008, the "business climate" marked by legal instability, interventionism, the global economic crisis does not seem conducive to a privatization that could help the Algerian industry to go out of its dependence on hydrocarbons. We conclude that despite a few successes, the privatization of enterprises in Algeria failed because these last ones have not benefited from prior strategic restructuring. In addition, privatization has not been supervised by effective institutions and industrial policy.