The purpose of this study was to advance the discussion of collaboration between Canadian sport organizations beyond current levels of critical rhetoric and to (a) recommend improvements to the collaborative sport management processes specifically related to this particular case and (b) provide an analytical framework that will facilitate the application of this knowledge to others in similar interorganizational relationships. The purpose was achieved by collecting empirical evidence on the collaborative process through a theoretically guided case study of the relationship between Sport Canada and Canadian Interuniversity Sport (CIS), which were selected for the study due to their prominence in the Canadian sport system. Agency theory was chosen to provide the primary guiding framework for development of the research questions, and data collection and analysis. Data collection included three sources: my personal narrative, a selection of relevant documents, and personal interviews with thirteen key informants familiar with the two sport organizations. Data analysis was guided by the key concepts of agency theory to provide structure for the process. Consistent with the assumptions of agency theory, my findings indicated that the primary goals of Sport Canada and CIS are incongruent and that a managed contract is in place that includes financial incentives for CIS to collaborate with Sport Canada, but the incentives do not appear to work. Reporting and monitoring occur on an annual basis, but the relationship is essentially one of funding and accountability and not collaboration. The results of this research suggest that the current paradigmatic approach to understanding the Canadian sport system, based on the assumption that the federal government controls funding and national policy and thereby controls the sport system, is inappropriate and works directly against the espoused need for interorganizational collaboration. The opportunity for enhanced collaboration does exist, but intentional efforts to collaborate must be increased. The control paradigm should be rejected in favor of shared goal setting and decision-making and a negotiated contract between the organizations that identifies a measurable collaborative advantage. This research confirmed and explained the contribution that can be made by agency theory to the study and management of collaboration in sport organizations.

Agency theories suggest that governance matters more when agency conflicts are potentially more severe. However, empirical studies often do not control for the potential severity of agency conflicts. I show that the marginal benefit of governance varies with the free cash flow level, a proxy for the potential severity of agency conflicts. As the free cash flow level increases, higher governance quality becomes incrementally more value-enhancing, and lower governance quality becomes incrementally more value-destroying. This is consistent with the hypothesis that better governance helps resolve the agency conflicts in investment decisions when a firm has more free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). This study highlights the importance of controlling for the potential severity of agency conflicts in governance studies and provides an improved method to estimate the marginal benefit of a governance mechanism.

The Enron collapse in 2001 has resulted in an increasing attention to corporate governance. Even in Sweden, some scandals have occurred, for example Skandia, ABB, Trustor; a parallel could be drawn, implying that these scandals have resulted in increased attention to corporate governance. Corporate governance concerns the relationship between a corporation’s management, board of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The problems with the relationship between managers and share-holders are referred to as the principle-agent problem. The increase in corporate governance disclosure can be seen as a way by the corporations to regain the trust from the shareholders. Can agency theory be used to explain why some corporation disclose more corporate governance information than others? The purpose with this master thesis is, with starting point in agency theory, to contribute to the understanding of which factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information in the annual reports. For this thesis, a quantitative research has been performed. Annual reports from corporations listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange have been examined, to be able to develop a corporate governance disclosure index and to measure 15 characteristics, derived from the agency theory and two control variables. The data was analysed in SPSS , using both linear and multiple regressions. The analysis showed that role duality actually measured if a corporation had a foreign parent company and corporations listed on the O-list other on Stockholm Stock Exchange served as proxies for smaller corporations. Therefore, it was possible to con-clude that corporations were influenced by the origin of the parent company and the size of the corporation to disclose corporate governance information. Another conclusion was that corporate governance characteristics derived from agency theory is not appropriate when trying to find factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is inappropriate to take the starting point in the agency theory.

<p>This literature study aims to identify international best practice concerning the role of the board and more particularly that of the independent director in ensuring good corporate governance. The study is based on sources which include a large contingent of up to date sources on the subject ranging from newspaper articles, journal articles, various corporate governance codes, company reports and reports on governance such as Cadbury and Higgs.</p>

The research work addresses the changes that occurred in the valley and the Yungas of Cochabamba during the Inka Horizon (1400-1538 AC) while introducing in an exploratory way, the Late Intermediate (1100-1400 AC) and the Middle Horizon (400-1100 AC) periods. In theoretical terms, we emphasize the local human agency (individual and social) as important elements in order to understand the processes of social change. We assume that the complex relational webs generated by the Inka presence in the valleys and the Yungas appear as "traces" in the space (as constructed landscapes: social, agro-hydrological, sacral, administrative, war landscapes etc.) that can be seized from two sources, archaeological and historical, that are seen as complementing each other. We carried out two case studies in the Yungas of Tablas Monte and Inkachaca /Paracti. In both areas, previously unknown to Bolivian archaeology, we examined the impact of the Inka. Based upon material evidence, such as the sophisticated agro-hydrological system sustained by an intensive use of the stone as well as documentary data, we discuss the presence of warrior groups, i.e. that the arrival of the Inka had a relative impact in this area.

The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the theoretical and empirical relationship between entrepreneurship and bureaucracy, and to examine the cause and effect of entrepreneurship. From this overall aim, four specific questions are investigated. The first question deals with the issue of combining agency and structural explanations of entrepreneurship. Traditional one-sided explanations are discussed, and a two-sided explanatory model of the entrepreneurial choice is presented and tested empirically. In relation to this, the issue of causal heterogeneity is discussed and tested. The empirical results indicate that several country-level variables, including bureaucracy, influence the entrepreneurial choice at the individual level, and that the effect of some individual variables on the entrepreneurial choice varies according to structural context. The following two questions deal with the relationship between the entrepreneur and bureaucracy. The first one describes how the entrepreneurial process is regulated by bureaucracy, and how entrepreneurs solve regulatory problems. From this study it is clear that the smaller entrepreneurs comply with 'good' law in order to enjoy the benefits of formality, and avoid 'bad' law to reduce the costs of formality. The larger entrepreneurs comply with all regulations and are very frustrated over delays and inefficiency. The smaller entrepreneurs have a more understanding attitude towards bureaucratic inefficiency and have less trouble solving regulative problems. Both groups have strategies for solving regulative problems; most frequently this involves social ties with public officials and bribes. The second of the relationship questions investigates the extent to which entrepreneurs are obstructed by or dissatisfied with the regulatory authorities, and whether this varies over different types of entrepreneurs. Based on Schumpeter’s distinction between entrepreneurs and other, less creative, business owners, the overall results indicate that creative companies have larger problems with regulatory authorities. The conclusion is that bureaucracy tends to be a problem with regard to new ideas, but not for new companies. The fourth question raised deals with the economic effects of entrepreneurship and bureaucracy. Can entrepreneurship and bureaucracy explain variation in economic development across countries? The results indicate that entrepreneurship combined with bureaucracy offer high explanatory values and that a large part of the variance in economic development, left unexplained by agency behaviour, is explained by the regulation of that behaviour. In terms of policy implications the results indicate that the removal of bureaucratic barriers to entrepreneurs could have large potential payoffs in terms of economic growth.

This thesis asks who is able to answer the call to action that the problems of global injustice pose. It focuses on the concept of institutions such as states, intergovernmental organisations, corporations and non-governmental organisations as moral agents and whether such institutions can be said to be morally responsible for creating or responding to global injustice. It examines three theories of institutional moral agency as presented by Peter French, Toni Erskine and Onora O’Neill and the way in which their conceptions of moral agency are based on the idea of attributing moral responsibility. It argues that the nature of organisational decision-making structures provides an unstable basis on which to establish the moral responsibility of institutions. It presents an alternative account of moral agency that includes institutions but separates the concept of moral responsibility from that of moral agency. The thesis contends that it is only individual agents who are able to bear moral responsibility, in the sense of blame or duty, for moral problems but that a coherent account of institutional moral agency is important for understanding the moral responsibilities of individuals in terms of the power of their collective actions. It argues that while institutions are capable of responding to the call to action that global injustice poses,  it is individuals who bear a moral responsibility to do so.

The purpose of this essay is to critically review Pierre Bourdieus contribution to agency – structure debate. I will do this with help from the thinking of George Herbert Mead. My aim is to show that Mead can provide valuable knowledge to Bourdieus theory. Pierre Bourdieus notion of habitus is his solution to the dilemma between agency and structure. It is in the habitus that the objective structures meet the inner, subjective structures and this results in various actions. Bourdieu claims that the relation between the habitus and the outer structures causes dispositions to ‘ways of reacting’. His aim with the notion of habitus is to show why the society follows an often strict regularity. Bourdieus is however often accused of being a determinist. I do not totally agree with this criticism but I claim that Bourdieus hasn’t done enough to stipulate his middle way between freedom and constraint and agency and structure. The habitus seems to be more or less immune to mayor upset. Bourdieu is often unclear of how the individual uses his dispositions in various situations. Bourdieus is letting the habitus to too much work. He sometimes seems to forget that it is an individual beyond the habitus. He underestimates the power of humans to make choices of their own. There seems to be more to the notion of agency then the habitus can fully capture. Thus we turn to the thinking of George Herbert Mead. I claim that Mead offers a way out of Bourdieus dilemma between agency and structure. He does this by focusing on what happens in the particular situation. Mead believes that the society reproduces itself in two different ways. There is the ‘unreflexive’ way which has certain similarities with Bourdieus way of thinking. The main difference between Mead and Bourdieu is that Mead claims that there is another way that the society reproduces itself. This is what he calls the reflexive reproduction. If the individual encounters resistance he/she becomes aware of the habitual expectations he/she brought in to the situation. The resistance causes a break in the world the individual takes for granted. The individual then reflexively adapt there actions to the situation. The break makes the individual aware of the world, and this is what lacks in Bourdieus theory. The individual can think and also act in opposite to their habits or habitus. This is what can cause the habitus to change.

Purpose: The purpose of this research is to explore the reasons behind the abolish-ment of statutory audit in small limited firms in Sweden and to discuss whether it would be beneficial for these firms to still maintain an audit of their business after the abolishment. Method: As a major part of this research study, qualitative interviews with auditors have been conducted to obtain professional opinion in the subject of inter-est. Previous research are presented to provide a broader perspective of the debate. Frame of Reference: The authors present an extensive background to auditing and accounting. Stakeholder model and agency theory have been applied to aid an under-standing of the relationship between a firm and its stakeholders. Experi-ences from other European Union countries are presented to provide a ba-sis of comparison and discussion. Moreover, advantages and disadvantages of auditing are presented to facilitate a discussion of whether it is beneficial to maintain an audit of small limited firms. Conclusion: After extensive research the authors have identified and determined the most probable reasons behind the abolishment of statutory audit. The au-thors can after a broad research conclude that the central reasons behind the abolishment are the costs of auditing. Populism and politics, as well as harmonisation motives of the European Union, are also prominent reasons for the abolishment of statutory audit in small limited firms in Sweden. Highlighting the benefits of auditing illustrates that accomplishing an assur-ance of quality is one of the most essential motives of an audit review. Au-diting may facilitate granting of loans, longer credit periods and loyalty, a credible image of the firm, as a result of business owners providing trust-worthy information to their stakeholders. It can be concluded that it is beneficial for small limited firms to maintain an audit of their business, de-spite the abolishment of statutory audit. / Syfte: Syftet med denna uppsats är att utforska de bakomliggande orsakerna till revisionspliktens avskaffande i små aktiebolag i Sverige och att diskutera hu-ruvida det är fördelaktigt att behålla revision i bolagen efter slopandet. Metod: För att erhålla en professionell åsikt kring ämnet i fråga, har denna studie till största del bestått av kvalitativa intervjuer med respondenter från revisions-byråer. Tidigare studier är även presenterade för att tillföra debatten ett bre-dare perspektiv. Referensram: Författarna ger en omfattande beskrivning av redovisning och revision. Intressentmodellen och agentteorin har tillämpats i syfte att underlätta för-ståelsen av relationen mellan företag och dess intressenter. Erfarenheter från andra EU-länder är presenterade för att möjliggöra jämförelse och dis-kussion, dessutom beskrivs för- och nackdelar av revision för att underlätta diskussionen om huruvida det är fördelaktigt att behålla revision i små ak-tiebolag. Slutsats: Författarna har efter omfattande forskning fastställt de troligaste orsakerna till slopandet av revisionsplikten i små aktiebolag. Sammanfattningsvis kan författarna hävda att huvudorsakerna till avskaffandet är kostnaden av att upprätthålla revision. Populism, politik och EU:s harmoniserande strävan är ytterligare framträdande anledningar till slopandet av revisionsplikt i små ak-tiebolag i Sverige. Att erhålla en kvalitetsstämpel är den främsta fördelen med revision. Dessutom kan revisionen underlätta beviljande av lån, längre kredittider, bi-dra till ökad pålitlighet och trovärdighet av bolaget. Dessa fördelar resulterar från ägarnas pålitliga information som de förser sina intressenter med. Av-slutningsvis kan man påstå att det är gynnsamt för små aktiebolag att behål-la revision även efter slopandet.

Introduction: Over half of the Swedish IT-projects get delayed and more expensive than budgeted. Large corporations and governmental institutions stand before the process of investigating in new IT-systems in intervals of three to five years. In order to decrease the cost, an external consultant with large experience in IT-purchases could be used by the customers. These consultants does today work solely for the customers, helping them to find the best solution. We want to see if an external consultant instead could act as an inde-pendent moderator between the supplier and customer in the IT-systems lifecycle. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze problems and possible solutions related to the involvement of third party consultants in larger IT-projects. In particular, we will investigate when and where in the project cycle it could be beneficial to use an independent moderator. Method: We have conducted semi-structured interviews with six organizations to get an understanding about consultants in IT-projects. Four of the interviewed were IT-managers at organizations were large IT-systems are bought and implemented. Then, two of the in-terviewed represented the supplier companies that sell large IT-systems. Frame of reference: Transaction cost theory and agency theory has been used. Transac-tion cost theory is a theory on whether you should conduct the service internally or purchase it from external firms. Agency theory describes problems in the relationship between a principal and an agent. The agent has a diversified interest towards the principal. In our case, the agent is a consultant. Conclusion: The implementation phase benefits from using an external moderator who monitors what the customer needs, and then in a continuous interval measures if the project is aligning towards the stated goal. This can lower the failure of information and identify problem areas early and thereby prevent costly adjustments later in the project. An in-dependent moderator with a high degree of routine and specific knowledge could enhance communication, create a better fit of the implemented system and foresee opportunistic advices from suppliers. In the pre-study phase there are benefits for the customer with evaluating the need, stating specific demands and define a clear goal.