No description available.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att kritisera David Copps collective moral autonomy thesis. Denna tes säger att det är möjligt för kollektiv att ha moraliska förpliktelser och vara moraliskt ansvariga trots att ingen av dess medlemmar har motsvarande egenskaper. Copp har fört fram två argument och tre exempel till stöd för sin tes. Jag kommer att diskutera dessa utifrån den kritik som förts fram mot tesen. Min slutsats är att Copps tes, om ändå konceptuellt möjlig, inte stöds av de argument och exempel som Copp presenterar. Jag kommer huvudsakligen argumentera för att dessa är fall där ingen agent – varken ett kollektiv eller en individ – kan hållas moraliskt ansvarig.

Traditionally, it has been argued that companies are only responsible towards their shareholders, to maximize the profits. But lately it has changed into another way of responsibilty. It has become of great importance to demonstrate sustainable long-term values for stakeholders to identify with. This thesis aims to clarify the banks’ definition of responsible investment and what criteria they assume when talking about such kind of investments. Furthermore, the thesis intends to examine how the banks in their role as an agent can contribute so their customers can achieve responsible investments. The issues dealt with are: What criterias must a responsible investment meet according to the Swedish banks? and How can the Swedish banks contribute so their clients' investments falls under what is defined as responsible investment?The conclusions of this study show that to conduct a dialogue with companies that violate norms and principles is considered more responsible, than to exclude companies and divest holding. A responsible investment is thus an investment on which banks are active owners and influence companies through dialogues. / Traditionellt sett har det hävdats att företag endast har ett ansvar gentemot aktieägarna. I takt med globaliseringen och en ökad medvetenhet om hur företag påverkar omvärlden, blir trycket allt större på att organisationer och företag ska ta ett ansvar bortom årets resultat. Påtryckningarna kommer främst från företagens intressenter och utgörs av deras krav på företagets verksamhet. För att ett företag ska kunna överleva i en föränderlig omvärld är det av stor vikt att företaget kan uppvisa hållbara värderingar som intressenterna långsiktigt kan identifiera sig med. Företagsledningen måste därför acceptera att det finns andra mål än vinstmaximering och vara redo att arbeta med flera parallella målsättningar av olika slag. Det är genom detta arbete som företaget måste hitta vägar att möta dessa krav och på så vis axla sitt ansvar gentemot omvärlden. SRI, Socially Responsible Investment, går i linje med att företagen ska förmå att ta sitt ansvar. SRI medför att aktieägarna genom sina investeringar ges en möjlighet att utöva påtryckningar på företagen, att integrera CSR-arbetet i sin verksamhet, samtidigt som de får ekonomisk avkastning. På en internationell nivå är FN:s principer för ansvarsfulla investeringar, UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), kanske det mest betydelsefulla initiativet för att kombinera ett ansvarsfullt agerande med ekonomisk avkastning. Principerna förser investerare med ett ramverk för att ställa krav på företagen att implementera ett arbete avseende miljö- och socialt ansvar, samt frågor som rör bolagsstyrning i företagens verksamheter. Denna uppsats syftar till att bringa klarhet i vad som, enligt de ledande bankerna i Sverige, avses med ansvarsfulla investeringar och vilka kriterier bankerna utgår från när de talar om den här typen av investering. Vidare studeras hur bankerna i sin roll som agenter kan verka för att kundernas placeringar blir ansvarsfulla investeringar. Frågeställningarna som uppsatsen behandlar lyder: Vilka kriterier utgår Sveriges ledande banker från när de definierar en ansvarsfull investering? samt Hur kan Sveriges ledande banker verka för att deras kunders placeringar faller inom ramen för ansvarsfulla investeringar? Studien visar att de ledande bankerna i Sverige följer Principles for Responsible Investments när de talas om ansvarsfulla investeringar. Respondenterna och bankerna har genomgående definierat en ansvarsfull investering som en investering där ägaren är aktiv i sin roll och påverkar bolagen att leva upp till ESG-kriterierna. Bankerna är i sin roll som agenter av stor betydelse för dialogen med bolagen för att kundernas placeringar faller inom ramen för ansvarsfulla investeringar. Att föra en dialog med bolag som bryter mot normer och principer anses mer ansvarsfullt än att exkludera bolagen och avyttra innehavet.

The aim of this master thesis is to examine research perspectives and a selection ofmanagers’ views on the concept of work motivation. With an exploratory approach,based on a literature review and interviews these views are examined and compared inrelation to a theoretical framework. This theoretical framework consists of three keyconcepts, the individual, the context and the regulation of work motivation. Theliterature review reveals two research perspectives, a classic economic perspectivebased on Principal–Agent Theory and a more up to date social psychologicalperspective based on Self-Determination Theory. Interviews with selected managersas informants reveal that both of these research perspectives are represented amongthe managers, but foremost the social psychological perspective. The comparisonbetween the research perspectives and the managers’ views also show that thesimilarities between the social psychological perspective and the managers’ views arestrongest in relation to the key concept of the individual, compared to the keyconcepts of context and regulation. A discrepancy between how managers view workmotivation and how managers deal with work motivation in practice can also be seenand related to the managers’ views on the key concepts named.

In this dissertation, I examine relationships between gender and agency in the works of Victorian author Elizabeth Gaskell. Gaskells position within discussions of nineteenth-century feminisms has long been a subject of debate, and her celebration of and focus on femininity, womens lives, and the domestic sphere of nineteenth-century womanhood is inevitably crucial in critical analyses of her work. I argue that Gaskells take on gender is a more sophisticated one than has been recognised. In her fictional depictions of the agency and power of women and men, as well as in commentary from her correspondence and her biography of her friend and contemporary woman author Charlotte Brontë, Gaskell conceives of the traditionally feminine sphere of influence as more conducive to action than the masculine realm, where notions of authority and responsibility paradoxically place limits on individual ability and agency. These ideas are further complicated in Gaskells work by an awareness of the constructed or unfixed nature of gender, a conscious recognition of gender roles as not essentially tied to sex difference but rather as fluid, mutable, and primarily utilitarian.<p> My argument situates Gaskells position contextually, with reference to contemporary nineteenth-century discussions of the roles and expectations of men and women. It is organised in terms of the thematic focus of her novels, with chapters on industry and class relations, fallen women, religion and marriage, and home and family. Within this framework I suggest a progression in the complexity of Gaskells thinking both chronologically and in the shift of focus from topics that are centered in masculine spheres of power, such as the economic, political, and religious, to those that are firmly ensconced in the feminine domestic realm of the personal home and local community. I end with a discussion of The Life of Charlotte Brontë and Gaskells thoughts on female authorship, concluding that Gaskells locating of agency in the feminine is a means by which she can promote alternative ways of being and recognize that diverse ways of seeing the world and ones own identity or position within it are essential in order to create and maintain effective societies.

Many previous studies suggest that agency costs and information asymmetry are signifi-cant factors that affect the relationship between the investment expenditures of firms and the availability of cash from internal operations. Some other studies show that dividing firms in terms of the degree of ownership concentration further explains the relationship. However, the findings of previous studies are not consistent suggesting that other firm characteristics may be affecting the results. We propose that additional attention to the nature of ownership control of firms may explain the inconsistency. In this study, we examine the investment behaviour of family-controlled firms, institu-tion-controlled firms and widely-held firms. We distinguish between these three kinds of firms as they represent different levels of market imperfection. Therefore, we expect diverse investment behaviours among the three groups. Compared with family-controlled and institution-controlled firms, widely held firms have dispersed ownership structures. The greatest weakness of a widely-held ownership structure is the lack of shareholder monitoring due to the unmatched benefit and cost of control for small shareholders. The existence of at least one large shareholder will reduce the agency costs and asymmetric information. On one hand, enhanced monitoring will decrease the waste of free cash flows by managers. On the other hand, large shareholders are willing to spend time and effort to collect more information on management performance or to estimate the firms investment projects and thus reduce the information asymmetry. Both family-controlled firms and institution-controlled firms have large shareholders. However, whether or not the shareholders are playing an active monitoring role is still an important issue. From the point of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, the family-controlled group is superior to the institution-controlled group as family-controlled firms generally assign influential positions to family members whose focus is in line with that of the family group. Even though a non family member may be appointed as the manager, the level of monitoring is significant given the high ownership concentration by the family. On the other hand, significant family ownership may lead to agency costs of its own. The main disadvantage of owner-managers is that they may lack the expertise to manage their firms although their position in the family may make it natural for them to be the manager. Another advantage of the family-controlled firm is that the family may divert company resources for its own benefit despite the presence of a manager who may or may not be a family member. Essentially, the family and the manager can all collude to spend on perks and personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Therefore, as we move from widely-held to institution-controlled the level of agency costs may decrease but as we move further into higher control, as may be suggested by family ownership, the level of agency costs may increase again. Although previous studies have noticed the influence of ownership structure, no analysis has been carried out to explore the investment behaviour of firms controlled by the three differ-ent kinds of shareholders. Our first motivation is to fill this gap. Splitting our sample into three representative groups enables us to study the financing constraints and investment behaviour of firms that are family-controlled, institution-controlled, and widely held. The focus of this study is on Canadian firms. The Canadian evidence is worth particular attention because the Canadian business environment is similar to the US business environment in terms of legal, regulatory, and market institutions but it is similar to European or Asian firms in terms of ownership structure. Therefore, a study of Canadian firms can provide a useful and rational assessment of the investment behaviour of firms that follow the ownership structures of Europe and Asia but operate in a business environment and institutional setting similar to those of the US. Further, a large number of Canadian firms have controlling shareholders and a large proportion, approximately 60%, of Canadian firms can be categorized as having concentrated ownership structure. Among the firms with concentrated ownership, over 1/3 of them can be dis-tinguished as family-controlled. This dataset provides an ideal setting to study the investment behaviours of firms according to the nature of their controllers. Our results illustrate that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is higher than the intensity of investments of concentrated ownership firms and that the intensity of investments of widely-held firms is positively and significantly affected by the availability of funds from internal sources. In contrast, for concentrated ownership firms the intensity is positively and significantly affected by the availability of growth opportunities. These observations suggest that in comparison with the concentrated ownership firms, the widely-held firms face higher levels of financing constraints and exhibit less value maximizing behaviour. However, once we separate the family-controlled firms from the institution-controlled firms, we find that the investment expenditures of the family-controlled firms and the institution-controlled firms are not significantly different in terms of their dependence on internal cash flows or on the market-to-book ratios. We also find that widely-held firms tend to invest in projects that payoff quickly. This preference may be the result of these firms desires to ease their external funding constraints by generating funds internally.

Drawing on participatory knowledge creation, this thesis examines the diverse ways in which social capital of poor, rural women in Bangladesh serve as a “capacity of individuals to command scarce resources, by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures” (Portes 1995:120). It addresses how women’s capacity to command resources, needed for their livelihood and for a dignified life, is influenced by cultural practice, power and gender relations, which interplay within and around their networks. Women are represented as active participants who are shown to celebrate, adapt, sustain, negotiate and resist the circumstances of their lives. Women find space to manoeuvre in the situations they face, strategize in their dealings with various actors, and manipulate resources and constraints. The author argues that the social capital of women and the portfolio of bonding, bridging and linking relations that women have, or do not have, are keys to an understanding of the bargaining processes in their households and communities. Among the research participants, women’s ability to eventually change cultural practice, power- and gender relations depends upon whether women, individually or collectively, have a variety of bonding, bridging and linking relations to strengthen their bargaining power.

Several recent corporate governance scandals relate to non-disclosure or high amounts of pension benefits given to executive directors. The lack of disclosure and transparency has gained pensions benefits greater attention as a significant part of the total remuneration received by executive directors. Due to the associated problems there is a greater need for better disclosure and in turn heightened transparency towards shareholders.   This qualitative case study focuses on general retailers in Sweden and the United Kingdom. Due to the lack of research five general retailers from respective country were chosen to be examined and compared during 2006-2010. The aim is to examine the disclosure of individual pension benefits of executive directors and the development in levels of pension benefits in the following general retailers Bilia, Clas Ohlson, Debenhams, Dunelm Mill, Fenix Outdoor, Halfords, JD Sports Fashion,  Kappahl, Mekonomen and N Brown Group. The findings show that the majority of general retailers have complied with their respective corporate governance code during 2006-2010. The level of disclosure has differentiated, where UK general retailers have a higher level of individual disclosure. The development in levels of pension benefits has shown that there are higher amounts of pension benefits in Swedish general retailers. A negative trend in the development of the Chief Executive Officers amounts of pension benefits has mainly been present in 2007-2009. Reversal of the negative trend came in the last year of the case study. No distinctive trends were found in the development of pension benefits for all other executive directors.

Family-owned governance is a typical governance structure in Taiwan¡¦s companies, including those ones engaged in high-tech industry. For those family-owned companies in high-tech industry, they need to assign professional managers in key decision-making roles in order to compete in this industry characterize by fast-moving, rapidly changing, and highly competitive. Thus, the mechanism to solve the possible agency problem caused from separation of ownership and management is a rather tough issue for those high-tech family-owned companies. Utilizing the over-five-year data, this study examines the possible relationships between the assignment of professional managers in key decision-making roles, the family sharing, and the performance in Taiwan¡¦s family-owned companies in personal computer industry. The results indicate that assigning professional managers in key decision-making roles will negatively moderate the negative relationship between family indirect sharing and performance. However, the assignment of professional managers in key decision-making roles will not significantly influence the relationship between family direct sharing and performance in high-tech family-owned companies. The finding highlights the importance of giving professional managers decision-making positions to solve the agency problem besides the typical compensation mechanism in family-owned company context. Furthermore, it also provides referable values in agency issues in family businesses.

Abstract In the era of globalization,trades and professions stress competitiveness; Government institution in Taiwan have also begun to emphasize on improving it. Self-efficacy results are often influenced by accountability and job satisfaction as well as the self-efficacy. This study conducted and survey on Government institution in Taiwan to investigate relationship among those variables. This study proposes a concept of self-efficiency of government institution staff. accountability and job satisfaction are thevariables in this study. Subjects were sampled from National Immigration Agency in Taiwan. There were 300 sample government institution staff in total.Additionally, there were 300 questionnaires received and 250 are effective. Conclusion: General accountability and job satisfaction have different effect on self-efficacy.