I Försvarsdepartementets utredning kring Försvarsmaktens långsiktiga materielbehov 2018:7 urskiljs det ökade behovet av förmåga till vilseledning och genom vilseledningen försvåra valet av mål för en eventuell motståndare. En metod för vilseledning är nyttjande av skenmål. Skenmål beskrivs i Amfibiebataljonens styrande dokument som en del i de vilseledande åtgärderna men nyttjas i mycket liten utbredning praktiskt. Arbetet skrevs ur ett militärtekniskt perspektiv och har en utforskande ansats gällande nyttjandet av skenmål i en amfibiekontext. Uppsatsens frågeställning besvarades genom att det inledningsvis genomfördes en datainsamling som sedan möjliggjorde en modellering av scenarier. Utifrån scenarierna genomfördes en analys genom nyttjande av bekämpningskedjan där slutsatserna sedan ledde till att uppsatsens frågeställning besvarades. Slutsatsen av analysen var att skenmål, med rätt egenskaper för vilseledning av moderna sensorer, skapar osäkerhet och störningar hos motståndaren som leder till minskad sannolikhet för upptäckt och påverkan av egna enheter. Osäkerheten och störningarna kan bland annat uppkomma vid vetskapen om att skenmål nyttjas och därmed osäkerhet kring klassificering av den upptäckta enheten. Skenmål kan också nyttjas i syfte att skapa en normalbild för de egna enheterna och den egna verksamheten att dölja sig i. / In the Ministry of Defenses inquiry about the Armed Forces long-term material needs 2018:7, an increased need for an ability of deception was identified, as well as through deception make the identification of real units more difficult for a potential threat/opponent. One method used for deception is the utilization of decoys. Decoys are described in the Swedish Marine Corps governing documents as a part of the means of deception but are practically used to very small extent. The essay was written from a military technical perspective and has an exploratory approach regarding the usage of decoy units in a marine context. The question of research was answered by initially collecting data that enabled modeling of scenarios. Based on the scenarios, an analysis was performed using the Kill chain, where the conclusions then led to the question being answered. The results of the analysis showed that a decoy, with the right characteristics for deceiving modern sensors, can contribute to hesitation and distraction for the opponent that leads to reduced likelihood of discovery and influence of own units. The hesitation and distraction can arise, among other things, in the knowledge that decoys are used and therefore hesitation about the classification of a detected unit. Decoys can also be used in order to create an image that the real units and activities can hide in.

There are several studies showing the importance of having a well-functioning learning organization and history is full of examples demonstrating what failures or successes can lead to. Therefore, the emphasis of this thesis is to implement Visser´s theory regarding capability and battlefield performance and apply this and measure to which extension the Swedish 2nd Amphibious Battalion utilized organizational learning. The method used in this thesis is a case study consisting of interviews with officers, ranging from platoon to battalion. Results show that the 2nd Amphibious Battalion had an overall productive learning cycle in higher echelons but with deviation regarding lower echelons. Deviation was most prominent concerning learning capability in lower echelons regarding a systematic procedure towards systems to capture and share learning from as well as communications between individuals and higher echelons concerning development orientation and collaboration. 2nd Amphibious Battalion exhibits a decentralized leadership which enables participative decision making. Furthermore, the battalion shows a comprehensive change towards a higher degree of error openness, but with deviation regarding lower echelons.