Cette thèse de doctorat est consacrée à la pensée du philosophe américain Nelson Goodman (1906-1998). Nous y défendons, à l’encontre de la plus grande partie de la critique, une lecture métaphysicienne de son œuvre. Il est démontré que Goodman, dans tous ses travaux, développe une métaphysique technique et méconnue, dont les piliers sont le nominalisme, le pluralisme, le perdurantisme, l’actualisme, et l’universalisme méréologique. Cette lecture permet de réévaluer l’ensemble de la pensée goodmanienne. Elle établit aussi ses liens insoupçonnés avec la métaphysique analytique contemporaine.

In his opus magnum Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, the prominent (post)analytic Richard Rorty calls for such a philosophical inquiry, thath would rather fit under the term hermeneutics, than epistemology. Hermeneutics being the trademark term of an important movement of continental philosophy, this comes as a suprise. By examining Richard Rorty's criticism of epistemology and Hans- Georg Gadamer's concept of hermeneutics, this paper tries to find out, how much do they have in common. Source texts for this research are the topic-relatively relevant texts from the books Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and Truth and Method. In conclusion, the main difference appears to lie in their answers to the hardly solveable question of importance of the very concept of truth. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

Ordinary material objects, such as guitars and houses, do not seem to pose any serious philosophical problems. However, the nature of the material objects and their part-whole relation raises serious questions about fundamental ontologies. Furthermore, part-whole relations are not necessarily spatial; they can be temporal as well. My dissertation investigates the problems posed by ordinary material objects, and the different ontological views that attempt to provide answers to these problems. I then present a new and radical view, which I call Nihilist Perdurantism (NP). NP claims that objects have temporal parts, but not spatial parts. I arrive at this view by first exploring and arguing against different views on composition, with a focus on arguments against common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. I then discuss the nature of mereological simples and argue against several views that claim that qualitatively heterogeneous simples are possible (Markosian and McDaniel). Next, I present my arguments against perdurantist, endurantist, and presentist view of persistence. I especially focus on endurantism, and use the aforementioned argument against the possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous simples to construct a similar argument against endurantism. Finally, I argue in favor of my view, NP. This view combines a mereological nihilist view (defended at various times by Unger, Van Inwagen, Merricks, and Sider) about spatial parts with a perdurantist view (defended at various times by Lewis, Hawley, Heller, and Sider) of temporal parts. Therefore, according to NP, there are no guitars, trees, or houses. The only objects that exist are NP objects; these are line-shaped objects that extend through spacetime. With respect to the three spatial dimensions, these objects have no parts. However, with respect to the temporal dimension, NP objects do have parts in the form of points and line segments. My work shows that NP has better solutions to many of the puzzles and problems posed by material objects, such as the puzzle of change, over the three standard views. Hinchliff argues that change is puzzling because in order for there to be real change, then the following four intuitions must be true: (1) The candle persists through the change. It existed when it was straight, and it exists now when it is bent…(2) Shapes are properties not relations. They are one-placed, not many-placed…(3) The candle itself has the shapes. Not just a part but the candle itself was straight, and not just a part but the candle itself is bent…(4) The shapes are incompatible. If the shapes were compatible, there need not have been a change. The puzzle of change is the mutual inconsistency of these four intuitions. I argue that perdurantists must deny intuition (3), endurantists must deny intuition (2), and presentists must deny intuition (1). I then argue that only NP can accommodate all four intuitions about both macroscopic and microscopic change while resolving the inconsistency of the four intuitions. My dissertation presents a new view that provides a fresh perspective on the debate about the nature of material objects. My development of NP touches on a number of other philosophical problems. In Chapter One, I discuss the role of intuitions in metaphysics, and argue that many supposedly “common sense” intuitions are already philosophical positions. In Chapter 2, I argue against Korman’s and Markosian’s common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. In Chapter 3, I argue that the endurantist view of persistence is inconsistent and should be rejected. In addition to making the case for NP and its solution to the puzzle of change in Chapter 4, I also argue that NP can solve the problem of motion in a homogenous substance. Finally, in Chapter Five, I argue against the possibility of both gunky and junky material objects.

In recent decades, a debate has arisen within analytic philosophy concerning the nature, validity and possible uses of Kantian transcendental arguments. This thesis examines two of the main questions within this debate: (i) what is a transcendental argument, and (ii) could there be a successful transcendental argument. The first chapter surveys some recent attempts at definition. A general lack of consistency in the literature makes it impossible to reach any precise conclusion about what a transcendental argument is, but a two-fold working definition is proposed on the basis of two identifiable general approaches to this question. The second chapter looks at two forms of scepticism about our knowledge of the external world in order to set up in a Kantian way the two epistemological problems to which transcendental arguments have been proposed as solutions. One problem concerns how it can be known that the external world exists; the other concerns conceptual relativism and the possibility of transcendental justification of a particular conceptual scheme. The third chapter examines and expands upon Stephan Korner's forceful argument to show that transcendental arguments are impossible. This argument counts decisively against the possibility of a transcendental solution to the problem of conceptual relativism, but does not touch arguments to demonstrate that we have knowledge of the existence of the external world. The fourth chapter examines several transcendental arguments which attempt the latter demonstration, beginning with Kant's Refutation of Idealism and then turning to some recent variations on this argument. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Thesis (MMus (Music))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study concerns the widespread phenomenon that music is perceived as meaningful to the listener in some sense. The study adopts a style of conceptual clarification and investigation that is current in the analytic philosophy of language, and is further informed by recent research into the fundamental biology of human musicality, which suggests that musicality and language are neurologically related. The problem of musical meaning is approached as a problem of communicative behaviour, and is hence conceptually related to the concept of meaningfulness in the various modalities of linguistic communication. ‘Communication’ is defined in terms of the intended consequences of communicative acts – that is, a communicative act is an attempt on the behalf of the utterer to cause some sort of change in the listener’s mental states. From this premise, meaning in both musical and linguistic acts is defined in terms the mental states elicited in the mind of the listener. Two classes of mental state are identified: cognitive states, which are propositional in nature; and affective states, which are essentially nonpropositional. It is proposed that meaning in both music and language (as well as in other communicative acts) can be explained in terms of the elicitation of these classes of mental states in the minds of competent listeners, and that in any linguistic or musical act, a competent listener will entertain a composite of these mental states that will be perceived as meaning. The mechanisms responsible for the elicitation of these states are discussed, and it is concluded that the causal powers of the communicative act, as it is represented in the mind, are responsible for the elicitation of these mental states. Directly causal means are responsible for affective states: there is a relationship of direct causation between relevant features of the communicative act, as represented in the mind, and affective states. Affective states are nonpropositional, in that they cannot be subjected to deductive or propositional operations in the mind. By virtue of their being non-propositional, such states are also considered to be beyond verbal explication (‘ineffable’). Cognitive states, on the other hand, are propositional in nature. The mechanisms by which they are realised are complex in terms of propositional computation: the relevant propositional features of the communicative act, as represented in the mind of the listener, undergo manipulation by mental processes (for instance, the computational system for linguistic syntax). Cognitive states are expressible in propositional terms, and are hence expressible in language. Whereas linguistic communication is efficacious for the elicitation of cognitive states, musical utterances tend to elicit affective states to a far greater degree. Furthermore, whereas the syntax of language aids communication in the facilitation of semantics, the syntactic dimension of music is principally a means of implementing affective states in the listener. Therefore, any explanation of musical meaning must take the syntactical dimension of music into account. It is also argued that there are features of performance common to both language (in its spoken modality) and musical utterances that serve to elicit affective states. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie ondersoek die verskynsel dat musiek deur die meeste luisteraars as betekenisvol ervaar word. ’n Styl van konseptuele verduideliking en ondersoek word gebruik wat eie is aan die analitiese filosofie van taal. Terselfdertyd word die jongste navorsing op die gebied van die fundamentele biologie van menslike musikaliteit in aanmerking geneem, wat suggereer dat taal en musikale vermoë neurologies met mekaar verwant is. Die probleem van betekenis in musiek word as ʼn probleem van kommunikatiewe gedrag benader, en is dus konseptueel verbind aan die konsep van betekenisvolheid in die verskeie modaliteite van kommunikasie deur middel van taal. ‘Kommunikasie’ word in terme van die geïntendeerde uitkomste van kommunikatiewe aksies/dade gedefinieer. Met ander woorde, ʼn kommunikatiewe aksie/daad is ʼn poging deur die spreker om uiteindelik ʼn verandering in die geestesgesteldheid (‘mental state’) van die luisteraar teweeg te bring. Op hierdie basis word twee tipes geestesgesteldheid onderskei: ʼn kognitiewe gesteldheid, wat proposisioneel van aard is, en ʼn affektiewe gesteldheid, wat nie-proposisioneel is. Daar word voorgestel dat betekenis in beide musiek en taal, soos ook in ander vorme van kommunikasie, verduidelik kan word as die belewenis van sodanige geestesgesteldhede aan die kant van die bedrewe luisteraar. Dit impliseer dat die betekenis van enige uiting in taal of musiek as ʼn bepaalde kombinasie van hierdie twee geestesgesteldhede deur die bedrewe luisteraar ervaar word. Die meganismes wat hierdie geestesgesteldhede ontlok word bespreek, en die gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat dit die kousale mag van die kommunikatiewe daad is, soos dit in die bewussyn (‘mind’) neerslag vind, wat hierdie twee tipes geestesgesteldheid ontlok. Daar word beweer dat ʼn proses van direkte kousaliteit verantwoordelik is vir ʼn affektiewe gesteldheid: daar is ’n oorsaaklike verhouding tussen die onderskeie kenmerke van die kommunikatiewe daad, soos dit in die bewussyn voorgestel word, en die uiteindelike affektiewe geestesgesteldheid. ʼn Affektiewe geestesgesteldheid is nie-proposisioneel omdat dit nie in terme van deduktiewe of proposisionele prosesse in die bewussyn verstaan kan word nie. Omdat dit nie-proposisioneel is word die kenmerke van hierdie affektiewe geestesgesteldheid as onsegbaar (‘ineffable’) deur die luisteraar beleef. Daarteenoor is ʼn kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid proposisioneel van aard. Die meganismes wat veroorsaak dat hierdie geestesgesteldheid gerealiseer word is kompleks: die onderskeie kenmerke van die kommunikatiewe daad, soos dit in die bewussyn van die luisteraar voorgestel word, ondergaan manipulasie deur denkprosesse wat proposisioneel van aard is (bv., die denkproses wat die sintaktiese dimensie van taal moet verwerk). ʼn Kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid kan in proposisionele terme weergegee en gevolglik in taal verwoord word. Terwyl kommunikasie deur middel van taal effektief is om ʼn kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid te ontlok, is musikale uitdrukking veel eerder geskik om ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid te ontlok. Verder, terwyl die sintaksis van taal bydra tot verwesenliking van semantiese betekenis, dra die sintaktiese dimensie van musiek eerder daartoe by om ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid by die luisteraar te vestig. Dus moet elke verduideliking van musikale betekenis die sintaktiese dimensie van musiek in aanmerking neem. Verder word beweer dat daar algemene kenmerke in sowel taal (in die gesproke modaliteit) as musiek voorkom wat spesifiek ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid tot stand bring.

To evaluate specific architectural theories, an analytic methodology was used. The specific architectural theories evaluated all have in common the fact that their formative models can explain how their original ideas manifest in the practice of architectural works. Although these architectural theories researched are thousands or in some cases hundreds of years apart, a way to compare and contrast them was to use philosophies of art common to all. This contemporary approach to analysis was done with the use of ?analytic philosophy? for its effectiveness to clarify concepts. Central aspects of architectural theories will be analyzed in detail through the lenses of four contemporary theories of the philosophy of art. They are: formalism (including neo-formalism and theories that emphasize the connection between form and function), expression theories, representation theories (including neo-representational and mimetic accounts), and theories based on aesthetic experience. Looking at architecture from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy of art provides new insights into the nature of architecture and illuminates the field in significant ways. A recommendation for further study is enclosed.

Although Wilfrid Sellars's work holds a prominent place in recent analytic philosophy, little work has been done to situate his early approaches to normativity and the philosophy of language in their proper context. What little work has been done tends to emphasize Sellars's connection to a then dominant logical empiricism at the expense of marginalizing other American philosophical schools. On top of this historical issue, most scholars attempting to explain Sellars's systematic philosophy tend to ignore a developmental picture of Sellars's positions and focus on explicating the systematic character of his thought. My dissertation attempts to correct both of these tendencies by offering a historically situated account of Sellars's early papers that presents his views in relation to logical empiricism, the "Iowa School" of philosophy as embodied in Gustav Bergmann's and Everett Hall's writings, and some aspects of traditional American philosophy. By fleshing out the context of Sellars's early papers, it becomes clear that the "strong" normativist project present in his later essays developed out of his shift from his attempt to fit "traditional" philosophical problems into a formalist approach to language. My thesis acts as a "correction" to the previous interpretive points by presenting a more complex characterization of the contextual influences on Sellars's early papers and creating a foundation for a developmental account of Sellars's later views. I do this by examining evidence from Sellars's unpublished correspondence and works from a myriad of archival sources in conjunction with an analysis of his early publications.

La présente thèse de doctorat propose une interprétation du Tractatus logico-philosophicus qui prend pour fil directeur l'analyse de la distinction opérée par Ludwig Wittgenstein entre « ce qui peut être dit » et « ce qui se montre ». Il s'agit, à partir d'une étude de la relation entre les développements logiques du Traité et son aspect « mystique » (c'est-à-dire ses considérations concernant la notion de valeur absolue), de poser le problème de son unité structurelle. L'unité du premier ouvrage de Wittgenstein s'avère étroitement liée à la distinction entre dire et montrer en laquelle résident selon l'auteur l'« argument principal » de son livre et le « problème cardinal de la philosophie ». Afin d'expliquer l'unité du Tractatus, ce travail de recherche s'efforce d'élucider la nature de la distinction dire/montrer, d'abord par une analyse de ses applications dans les remarques dont le Traité est composé, puis par une enquête sur ses origines dans les œuvres de Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Arthur Schopenhauer, Otto Weininger, William James et Léon Tolstoï. Selon la lecture du texte ici présentée, tous les emplois de cette distinction participent d'une forme commune qui est liée à la notion de réflexivité (ou d'autoréférence). / This PhD thesis deals with Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and intends to construct an interpretation of the book by using the distinction between ‘what can be said' and ‘what shows itself' as a central thread. Starting from a study of the relationship between the logical developments of the treatise and its ‘mystical' aspect (i.e. its remarks on the idea of an absolute value), the thesis raises the problem of the structural unity of Wittgenstein's early work. It appears that this unity is intimately related to the distinction between saying and showing, which is, according to Wittgenstein, the ‘main point' of his book and ‘the cardinal problem of philosophy'. To explain the unity of the Tractatus, the present work tries to elucidate the nature of the say/show distinction—first, through an analysis of its use in the book, and second, through an investigation into its origins in the works of Frege, Russell, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Weininger, James, and Tolstoy. According to the reading presented here, all the uses of this distinction pertain to a common form, which is linked to the concept of reflexiveness (or self-reference).

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 667392 bytes, checksum: 81855201a60f4021feba0aa9f9697356 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-10-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation research aims to discuss about the role of proper names in the contemporary philosophy of language. The bias that we will adopt is an internalist. To perform our research will begin by contextualizing what was the meaning that the pragmatic-linguistic turn had the philosophical field. It will try to expose some of the most important elements which characterize the importance of discussions of proper names within the philosophy of language. Given our internalist bias, seek to demonstrate two basic functions of proper names, the informational function and operational function. Possession that present two distinct streams of theories of appointment, the descritivimo and causation theory. With this route we intend to show the reader get the meaning and the role that proper names take within contemporary discussions of analytic philosophy of language imprint. / A presente pesquisa de dissertação tem como objetivo discorrer acerca do papel dos nomes próprios dentro da filosofia da linguagem contemporânea. O viés que adotaremos é o de um internalista. Para realizar nossa pesquisa iniciaremos por contextualizar qual foi o significado que a virada pragmático-linguística teve no campo filosófico. Disso tentaremos expor alguns dos elementos mais importantes que caracterizam a importância das discussões dos nomes próprios dentro da filosofia da linguagem. Tendo em vista nosso viés internalista, buscaremos demonstrar duas funções básicas dos nomes próprios, a função informacional e a função operacional. De posse disso apresentaremos duas correntes distintas das teorias da nomeação, o descritivimo e a teoria da causalidade. Com esse percurso pretendemos conseguir mostrar ao leitor o significado e o papel que os nomes próprios assumem dentro das discussões contemporâneas da filosofia da linguagem de cunho analítica.

Frege wanted to show that arithmetical truths are logical by proving them from purely logical basic laws. But how do we know that these basic laws are logical? Frege uses generality and undeniability to make a prima facie case for logicality—if a truth is general and undeniable, then it's likely logical. I argue that Frege could, did, and had to make a deeper case for why we're right in recognizing his basic laws as logical. Implicit in his work is a view of logical laws as epistemically analytic—his arguments for his basic laws serve to elicit a reflective awareness of the fact that understanding them is sufficient for recognizing them to be true. This view both fits with Frege's comments concerning the connection between logic, truth, and normativity, and serves to explain why and in what sense he took logic to be general and conceptually undeniable. In my view, semantics must play a distinctive role in any rational reconstruction of Frege's case for logicality—the aforementioned “reflective awareness” must be an explicit appreciation of how the truth of formulas expressing Frege's laws follows quickly from his stipulations governing terms which figure in those formulas. Opposing this view is the elucidatory interpretation of Thomas Ricketts, Warren Goldfarb, and Joan Weiner, which holds that Frege's arguments for his basic laws can't be taken at face value, and must serve the merely elucidatory purpose of easing us into the language. Another reading is the correctness interpretation of Richard Heck and Jason Stanley, which holds that Frege's primary purpose in his arguments is justifying the claim that Frege's axioms, qua formulas, are true. I argue against both of these interpretations, and in doing so clarify the role and limits of semantics in Frege's enterprise.