Esta dissertação tem dois objetivos principais: (i) apresentar um estudo introdutório e (ii) uma tradução integral do Eutífron de Platão. O Eutífron é um diálogo de definição. Nesta obra, Sócrates quer saber o que é o piedoso. Enquanto pergunta, examina e refuta as respostas de seu interlocutor, o filósofo também fornece um conjunto de instruções sobre como entender e responder a sua pergunta. Essas instruções podem ser entendidas como exigências ou requerimentos socráticos. O nosso estudo tentará identificar, prioritariamente, (i) o conjunto de exigências que acompanham a pergunta o que é o piedoso? e (ii) algum procedimento socrático específico que visa definir o piedoso. Quanto à tradução, utilizaremos a edição recente de E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson e J. C. G. Strachan (Oxford Classical Texts, 1995), que substitui a edição canônica de John Burnet na mesma coleção (Oxford Classical Texts, 1903). / This dissertation has two main objectives: (i) present an introductory study and (ii) an integral translation of Platos Eutífron. The Eutífron is a dialogue of definition. In this work, Socrates wants to know what the pious is. While asks, examines and refutes the answers of his interlocutor, the philosopher also provides a set of instructions about how to understand and to answer his question. These instructions may be understood as socratic exigencies or requirements. Our study aims to try to identify, prioritarily, (i) the set of exigencies that follows the question what is the pious? and (ii) any specific socratic procedure that intends to define the pious. Concerning the translation, we will use the recent edition of E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson e J. C. G. Strachan (Oxford Classical Texts, 1995), that replaces the canonic edition of John Burnet of the same collection (Oxford Classical Texts, 1903).

A pesquisa pretendeu encontrar na experiência jurídica grega dos séc. VI a IV a.C. um novo modal normativo, para além dos clássicos permitido, proibido, facultado, cujo conteúdo se emoldurasse num caráter constitutivo. A partir dos estudos do direito grego desenvolvidos desde o final do séc. XIX, especialmente daqueles trabalhados pelos atuais scholars europeus e norte-americanos, buscou-se resgatar nesta experiência uma forna de pensar o conteúdo normativo de modo diverso do presente, tentando escavar na leitura da norma e no relacionamento dos homens com o fenômeno jurídico uma maneira de ver o direito enquanto direito constitutivo de virtudes e de subjetividades austeras. Para tanto, foram fundadas algumas premilinares essenciais, capazes de justificar o porquê dos estudos sobre o direito grego sobretudo no Brasil ; a necessidade de olhar a experiência clássica como algo radicalmente diverso e novo experiência exterior e não recobro histórico; bem como o método arqueogenealógico condutor da aproximação com os antigos. Em seguida, foram levantadas as principais contribuições da experiência jurídica grega, do seguinte modo: a análise da juridicidade (norma e jusracionalidade), da estrutura deste jurídico (instituições, materialidade e processualidade), e do modo de agir/ser normativo (educação jurídica, jurista e essência do direito). Ao final, aspirou-se definir os traços desta forma de ver a experiência jurídica grega enquanto direito constitutivo: uma maneira peculiar de ler a filosofia do direito enquanto saber constitutivo, os contornos deste direito bem como os seus vetores epistemológicos e seu fim / The research has intended to find in Greek juridical experience between the VI and IV centuries b.C a new normative modal as an exclusive moral issue normative modal beyond the classical allowed, forbiden and granted. Drawing heavily on the current North-American and European scholars and also since by those started at the bottom of XIX century, the research has tried to dig up in the norm and the relationship between citizents and that one, a particular manner of think law as constitutive law of virtues and austere subjectives. After has founded some essential questions: the reason of study greek law namely in Brazil and the construction of the thesis greek approach like the archeogenealogical method and the outside philosophical experience, the research has defined the substance of ancient greek law: starting from the singular structure of law and its applications, passing by the rationality, the basic material e procedure rules and arriving at normative way of acting and being. Finally, the research has attempted to define the features of this way of looking at ancient greek law experience as constitutive law, by analyzing a particular way of read philosophy of law as constitutive thinking, the outlinings of this law and the epistemological vector and its bounds as well.

This paper explores the Hellenistic Ideal of the good or virtous life by looking at historical backround, the philosophical writings of Plato and Aristotle, and the literary works of Euripides.

This study situates Ptolemy’s philosophy within the second-century milieu of Middle Platonism and the nascent Aristotelian commentary tradition. It focuses on Ptolemy’s adaptation and application of Aristotle’s tripartite division of theoretical philosophy into the physical, mathematical, and theological. In Almagest 1.1, Ptolemy defines these three sciences, describes their relations and objects of study, and addresses their epistemic success. According to Ptolemy, physics and theology are conjectural, and mathematics alone yields knowledge. This claim is unprecedented in the history of ancient Greek philosophy. Ptolemy substantiates this claim by constructing and employing a scientific method consistent with it. In Almagest 1.1, after defining the theoretical sciences, Ptolemy adds that, while theology and physics are conjectural, mathematics can make a good guess at the nature of theological objects and contribute significantly to the study of physics. He puts this claim into practice in the remainder of his corpus by applying mathematics to theology and physics in order to produce results in these fields. After the introductory chapter, I present Ptolemy’s philosophy and practice of the three theoretical sciences. In Chapter 2, I examine how and why Ptolemy defines the sciences in Almagest 1.1. In Chapter 3, I further analyze how Ptolemy defines mathematical objects, how he describes the relationships between the tools and branches of mathematics, and whether he demonstrates in the Harmonics and Almagest that he believed mathematics yields sure and incontrovertible knowledge, as he claims in Almagest 1.1. In Chapter 4, I present Ptolemy’s natural philosophy. While in Chapter 2 I discuss his element theory, in Chapter 4 I focus on his physics of composite bodies: astrology, psychology, and cosmology as conveyed in the Tetrabiblos, On the Kritêrion, Harmonics, and Planetary Hypotheses. I do not devote a chapter to theology, as Ptolemy refers to this science only once in his corpus. Therefore, I limit my analysis of his definition and practice of theology to Chapter 2. In the concluding chapter, I discuss Ptolemy’s ethical motivation for studying mathematics. What emerges from this dissertation is a portrait of Ptolemy’s philosophy of science and the scientific method he employs consistently in his texts.

This study situates Ptolemy’s philosophy within the second-century milieu of Middle Platonism and the nascent Aristotelian commentary tradition. It focuses on Ptolemy’s adaptation and application of Aristotle’s tripartite division of theoretical philosophy into the physical, mathematical, and theological. In Almagest 1.1, Ptolemy defines these three sciences, describes their relations and objects of study, and addresses their epistemic success. According to Ptolemy, physics and theology are conjectural, and mathematics alone yields knowledge. This claim is unprecedented in the history of ancient Greek philosophy. Ptolemy substantiates this claim by constructing and employing a scientific method consistent with it. In Almagest 1.1, after defining the theoretical sciences, Ptolemy adds that, while theology and physics are conjectural, mathematics can make a good guess at the nature of theological objects and contribute significantly to the study of physics. He puts this claim into practice in the remainder of his corpus by applying mathematics to theology and physics in order to produce results in these fields. After the introductory chapter, I present Ptolemy’s philosophy and practice of the three theoretical sciences. In Chapter 2, I examine how and why Ptolemy defines the sciences in Almagest 1.1. In Chapter 3, I further analyze how Ptolemy defines mathematical objects, how he describes the relationships between the tools and branches of mathematics, and whether he demonstrates in the Harmonics and Almagest that he believed mathematics yields sure and incontrovertible knowledge, as he claims in Almagest 1.1. In Chapter 4, I present Ptolemy’s natural philosophy. While in Chapter 2 I discuss his element theory, in Chapter 4 I focus on his physics of composite bodies: astrology, psychology, and cosmology as conveyed in the Tetrabiblos, On the Kritêrion, Harmonics, and Planetary Hypotheses. I do not devote a chapter to theology, as Ptolemy refers to this science only once in his corpus. Therefore, I limit my analysis of his definition and practice of theology to Chapter 2. In the concluding chapter, I discuss Ptolemy’s ethical motivation for studying mathematics. What emerges from this dissertation is a portrait of Ptolemy’s philosophy of science and the scientific method he employs consistently in his texts.

According to Epicurus, philosophy’s sole task is to ensure the well-being of the soul. Human souls are often riddled with diseases; the most serious are the fear of the gods and the fear of death. Thus, the Epicureans offered several arguments designed to demonstrate that, for instance, “death is nothing to us,” and should therefore not be feared. Since their creation there has been much discussion, both in antiquity and by contemporary philosophers, about these arguments. In this thesis, I argue that Epicurean philosophical arguments are patient-relative; they necessarily adapt themselves so as to be therapeutically effective for their intended audience. The end result is that when we evaluate Epicurean philosophical arguments, we must do so in light of the audience for whom they were intended.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1994. / "Stellingen" laid in. Includes bibliographical references (p. [282]-290).

This thesis wants to say that Socrates was a teacher of his fellows. He engaged with them through dialogue because he cared for their wellbeing, or as he might have put it: for the state of their souls. He was an intellectual and he had an intellectualist view of people and reality. He felt that right-mindedness was reasonable; and thus he believed that learning and developing understanding brought people closer to being virtuous; to goodness; and so to mental health. Socrates was a philosopher, and he considered this to be the most prudent and exalted approach to life. He taught his fellows how to be philosophers, and he urged them as best he could to take up the philosophical stance. His form of care for others was ‘intellectualist’. He cared ‘for the souls of others’ and for his own with intellectual involvement because he believed that this was the most appropriate way. He had a view of the human soul that produced intellectualist views of what wellbeing is and how it is achieved. He himself was a humble and able thinker, and was fully devoted to being virtuous and to helping his fellows to do the same. This thesis addresses the question of what Socrates did in the agora (his aims) and how he went about doing it (his methodology). Our answer might seem obvious. One might wonder what is new about saying that Socrates was a philosopher, and that he cared for the souls of his fellows and that he urged them to become virtuous. Perhaps nothing of this is new. Nevertheless, we find that making this ‘simple’ statement about Socrates is not that simple at all. We find that in Socratic scholarship there exist a plethora of contrasting voices that make it rather difficult to formulate even such a basic description of what Socrates did. We do not wish to create a novel and different reading of Socrates. We do not think that this is even possible after civilization has been interpreting Socrates for millennia. We do not see innovation for its own sake as desirable. We prefer clear understanding to the eager ‘originality’. Therefore rather, our aim with this work is to defend and clarify a very basic picture of Socrates as an educator. We see this work as clearing away clutter so as to begin our life-long study of Socratic thought and action: by laying a foundation with which we can read Socratic works and discern their meaning.

x, 216 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / This dissertation engages three facets of Greek philosophy: (1) the phenomenon of tyche (chance, fortune, happening, or luck) in Aristotle's Physics, Nicomachean Ethics , and Poetics ; (2) how tyche informs Socrates' own philosophical practice in the Platonic dialogues; and (3) how engaging tyche in these Greek texts challenges established interpretations of Greek thought in contemporary scholarship and discussion. I argue that the complex status of tych e in Aristotle's texts, when combined with its appearance in the Platonic dialogues and the framework of Greek myth and poetry ( poiesis ), underscores the seriousness with which the Greeks consider the role of chance in human life. I claim that Aristotle's and Plato's texts offer important counterpoints to subsequent Western philosophers who deny the importance and existence of chance in human affairs and in the universe, dichotomously privileging reason over fortune (Boethius), necessity over chance (Spinoza), certainty over contingency (Descartes), and character over luck (Kant). My investigation of tyche unfolds in relation to a host of important Greek words and ideas that are engaged and transformed in Western philosophical discourse: anank e (necessity), aitia (cause, or explanation), automaton, logos (speech), poietic possibility, and philosophy. First, a close reading of tyche in the Physics shows that its emergence in Book II challenges the "four causes" as they are traditionally understood to be the foundation of the cosmos for Aristotle. Attentiveness to the language of strangeness (that which is atopos ) and wonderment ( t o thauma ) that couches Aristotle's consideration of tyche unveils a dialogical character in Aristotle's text. I also show how tyche hinges together the Physics and the Nicomachean Ethics . Second, I argue that tyche illuminates the possibility of human good through an inquiry into human nature in the Ethics , exploring the tension that tych e is, paradoxically, a necessity as it is grounded in nature and yet relates to human beings in "being good" ( EN 1179a20), ultimately returning to a deeper understanding of the relation between physis and tyche . Third, I argue that the Poetics also sustains an engagement with tyche insofar as poi esis speaks to human possibility, turning to Heidegger and Kristeva to see how this is so. / Adviser: Peter Warnek

A presente tese inicia-se por uma encruzilhada e um segredo: na encruzilhada está a psicologia, entre os apelos instrumentais, antropológicos e neurocientíficos; já o segredo refere-se à quase desconhecida leitura de Kierkegaard por Foucault. Os dois filósofos se inscrevem na esteira da experimentação filosófica, caminho oposto ao da metafísica. Experimentação, aqui, não diz respeito a qualquer empirismo; inspira-se nos exercícios espirituais da Antiguidade grega e romana, e nas práticas da ironia, do cuidado de si e da parresía filosófica. As aproximações possíveis entre o pensamento de Kierkegaard e o de Foucault por esse viés da filosofia antiga, visam a contribuir para uma compreensão da psicologia e de suas práticas que permita o enfrentamento dos dilemas acima referidos, ou seja, os instrumentais, antropológicos e neurocientíficos. O percurso do trabalho tem como ponto de partida as suspeitas direcionadas à psicologia, desde o questionamento colocado por Canguilhem há mais de cinqüenta anos acerca das intenções pouco claras da disciplina, passando pelas críticas aos processos de subjetivação psicologizantes, até chegar ao grave enquadramento contemporâneo que busca convencer os sujeitos de que são, em última análise, nada mais do que cérebros. Os processos de subjetivação engendrados pelas práticas psi se vêem, pois, colocados hoje frente a impasses de difícil solução. Tantas são as suspeitas e temores quanto aos efeitos psi, que os próprios profissionais da área têm, em muitos casos, assumido a posição de que a psicologia se tornou inviável e deve desaparecer. As referências objetivantes ou antropológicas, quando priorizadas pela psicologia, de fato não deixam saídas, tornando urgente o encontro com outros referenciais que possibilitem respirar novos ares. O pensamento de Kierkegaard e o de Foucault surgem como intercessores em face desse horizonte sombrio. Os dois filósofos se dedicaram a tornar o homem atento a si e ao mundo, priorizando saídas singulares e criativas em lugar da reprodução dos modos de ser hegemônicos que ameaçam igualar tudo e todos. Desnaturalizadores do presente e avessos às grandes especulações teóricas sobre a vida, escreveram obras que é preciso experienciar, mais do que simplesmente ler, a fim de captar-lhes a atmosfera e com elas operar. A partir dessa atitude, a psicologia experimental ou interpretativa pode dar lugar a uma psicologia experimentante, que acompanha o cotidiano ao invés de se colocar como uma curiosidade sem paixão. Tal psicologia segue de maneira interessada os movimentos da existência e a apropriação pessoal da verdade, que deixa de ser transcendente, metafísica ou sonhada, e aparece encarnada nas lutas, receios, enganos, ações e tensões do dia-a-dia dos sujeitos de carne, osso e espírito. É na tensão constituinte-constituído que o sujeito se forja, seja ele lançado por Deus, como pensa Kierkegaard, seja, como propõe Foucault, mergulhado nos esquemas e objetivações que toma como naturais: a tarefa do sujeito é tornar-se si mesmo, participando de forma mais livre da própria constituição, exercendo de maneira refletida e ética a liberdade e transparecendo a si mesmo, ao invés de tomar como suas as determinações que lhe são oferecidas. A presente tese visa, portanto, a estabelecer o diálogo entre Foucault e Kierkegaard, pelo viés da filosofia antiga, buscando inspiração para promover, no tempo presente, processos de subjetivação outros que os modos desesperados de ser, e práticas psicológicas mais experimentantes e menos disciplinadoras. / This dissertation begins at a crossroads and a secret: at the crossroads there is Psychology, among its instrumental, anthropological and neuroscientific appeals; the secret refers to the almost unknown reading of Kierkegaard by Foucault. Both philosophers are inserted in the wake of philosophical experimentation, the opposite path to metaphysics. Experimentation, here, is not related to empirism; it is inspired by the spiritual exercises of Greek and Roman Ancient History, and in the practice of irony, self-care and philosophical parresía. The possible approximations between the thoughts of Kierkegaard and Foucault through this approach of Ancient Philosophy aim at contributing to an understanding of Psychology and its practices that allow the facing of the above-mentioned dilemmas, that is, the instrumental, anthropological and neuroscientific ones. The course of this work has its starting point at the suspicions directed at Psychology, from the questioning posed by Canguilhem over fifty years ago about the unclear intentions of the subject, through the critiques to the processes of psychological subjectivizing, up to the serious contemporary framing that seeks to convince human beings that they are, ultimately, no more than brains. The subjectivizing processes carried out by the psi practices are, then, today, faced with difficult predicaments. There are so many suspicions and fears about the psi effects that the area professionals themselves have, in many cases, assumed that psychology has become not viable and must disappear. The objecting or anthropological references, when prioritized by Psychology, actually leave no way out, urging the finding of new referentials that make it possible to breathe new air. Kierkegaards and Foucaults thoughts arise as interceders in the face of this somber horizon. Both philosophers are devoted to taking man as attentive to himself and the world, prioritizing singular and creative exits instead of reproducing the hegemonic ways of being that threaten to equal everything and everyone. Unnaturalizing the present and contrary to great theoretical speculations about life, both have written works that must be experienced, more than simply read, so as to capture their atmosphere and operate it. From this attitude, Experimental or Interpretive Psychology can give way to an Experiencing Psychology, which follows everyday life instead of presenting itself as passionless curiosity. This Psychology follows interestingly the movements of existence and personal appropriation of the truth, which stops being transcendent, metaphysical or dreamed, and appears layered in struggles, fears, mistakes, actions and tensions of the everyday life of subjects made of flesh, bone and spirit. It is in this constituting-constituted tension that the subject is forged, either cast by God, as Kierkegaard thinks, or, as Foucault proposes, sunk in the schemes and objectivations he takes for natural: the subjects task is to take himself, participating in a freer way of his own constitution, exercising freedom in an ethical and thoughtful manner and manifesting himself, instead of taking as his own the determinations which he is offered. This dissertation aims, therefore, at establishing the dialogue between Foucault and Kierkegaard, through the approach of Ancient Philosophy, seeking inspiration to promote, in the present time, processes of subjectivation other than the desperate ways of being, and psychological practices which are more experimenting and less disciplining.