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AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA¡¦S ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL CAPABILITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN PACIFICJ. Sampson, Gary 08 September 2011 (has links)
The post-Cold War world has created a number of important new challenges to the United States¡¦ power projection capabilities. The worldwide network of bases and stations that enabled the U.S. to contain the Soviet Union have, in many cases, been made into liabilities. U.S. dependence on fixed, vulnerable ports and airfields for the buildup of combat power, as seen in the 1990-91 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War, have shown potential foes like China and Iran that it doesn¡¦t pay to allow penalty-free access and freedom of action in maritime, air, and space commons. In the Western Pacific, China has pursued an anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, developing capabilities designed to deny U.S. freedom of movement in the region.
This study examines U.S. perceptions of China¡¦s growing A2/AD capabilities and their implications for U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific through the analysis of authoritative official and unofficial U.S. documents and studies. This work establishes a comprehensive, up-to-date picture of Chinese A2/AD capabilities through American eyes, updating previous comprehensive works in key areas such as the status of China¡¦s anti-ship ballistic missile, conventional ballistic and cruise missile capabilities and their implications for key U.S. facilities in the region, and new technology and platforms like China¡¦s first aircraft carrier and stealth aircraft.
The thesis concludes that the U.S. has been slow in reacting to Chinese A2/AD developments and that it is unlikely that continued Chinese military modernization (including the refinement and development of additional A2/AD capabilities) will end in the near future. For the U.S., this means that development and implementation of a truly joint concept for counter-A2/AD operations, as well as the right mix of military capabilities to carry out such operations, cannot be delayed any longer.
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Tröskelförsvar : En jämförelse mellan svenska och finska förmågorÅkermark, Anders January 2014 (has links)
Uppsatsen syftar till att jämföra svenska och finska förmågor rörande ett tröskelförsvar. Tröskelförsvaret bygger på strategin om anti-access/area denial, översatt till tillträdesförsvar och kontrollbestridande försvar. Tillträdesförsvaret syftar till att hindra en överlägsen motståndare att få tillträde till ett operationsområde och kontrollbestridande försvar syftar till att förneka motståndaren kontroll över operationsområdet i händelse av en väpnad konflikt. Denna strategi diskuteras flitigt i den internationella debatten men då främst hur stormakter som USA med allierade bäst skall bemöta de förmågor som svagare nationer bygger upp, inte hur det kan byggas upp. Detta tröskelförsvar har i uppsatsen tillämpats på Östersjön i vilket svenska och finska förmågor analyserats mot de grundläggande förmågorna verkan, rörlighet och skydd. Jämförelsen visar att Sverige har en tyngdpunkt i tillträdesförsvaret baserat på förmågan att möta en motståndare tidigt med sin offensiva undervattensförmåga, smyganpassade korvetter och flygburen sjömålsrobot. De brister som finns i Sverige utgörs främst av avsaknad av långräckviddig markattackförmåga samt förmågor i det kontrollbestridande försvaret. Finland har å andra sidan sin tyngdpunkt i det kontrollbestri-dande försvaret då de alltjämt har förmåga till markbaserad långräckviddig sjömålsbekäm-pande förmåga samt ett defensivt undervattensvapen i form av sjöminförmåga. Detta är för-mågor som Sverige avvecklat sedan 2000-talets inledning. Finlands brister är i tillträdesför-svaret där den offensiva undervattensförmågan saknas helt samt det begränsade antal platt-formar som kan verka framskjutet mot sjömål. Uppsatsen visar också att indelningen av till-trädesförsvar och kontrollbestridande försvar är en bra modell för att analysera nationers försvarsförmågor.
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中共「反介入與區域拒止」軍事戰略之研究 / Studies on the PRC’s“ Anti-Access and Area-Denial” Strategy慎炳倫, Shen, Pin Luen Unknown Date (has links)
中共一直沒有放棄以武力作為解決「臺灣問題」的選項,「統一臺灣」是中共建軍備戰主要目標之一,而國軍自然是共軍的主要假想敵。但是在1996年美國派遣兩支航母戰鬥群干預臺海軍事危機後,使中共體認美軍才是解決「臺灣問題」的最強大對手,開始深入思考如何阻止擁有高科技優勢的美軍介入臺海軍事衝突。防止美軍在中國大陸周邊地區進行作戰行動,是目前中共軍事現代化的主要發展方向,美國官學界將其稱為「反介入與區域拒止」軍事戰略,一時之間已成為研究中共軍事發展者之主要觀察指標。
中共「反介入與區域拒止」軍事戰略的主要著眼,在於建構能防止美國運用軍力涉入中國大陸周邊事務的能力,中共相信即使強大如美軍也不可能擁有全方位的優勢,其「反介入與區域拒止」軍事戰略主要依據地理環境、地緣戰略、美軍作戰特性及弱點等要素,並憑藉共軍數量與質量俱增的現代化武器,希望在西太平洋地區可能的軍事衝突中壓制美軍的作戰行動,或迫使美軍由較遠的基地發起軍事行動,並且阻止美軍後續的兵力增援,這可能使美軍在西太平洋作戰中遭到中共擊敗,或是迫使美國付出其不願意承擔的重大代價,此將導致中共可以達成其軍事和政治目標,同時也阻止美國全部或部分的軍事和政治目標。
中共軍力在「反介入與區域拒止」軍事戰略的帶動下快速成長,使美軍在西太平洋地區面臨重大挑戰和風險,並使美國區域盟邦有遭受侵略或被迫接受強制手段之虞,美軍為因應中共的挑戰,已確立「空海一體戰」的新型作戰概念,並著手發展相關能力。「空海一體戰」係以美軍現有軍力優勢為基礎,再經由西太平洋軍力部署的重組、海空作戰力量的整合、新型武器裝備的研發,並且加強與盟邦的軍事合作,希望建構一個多層次立體作戰體系,俾遏制中共的軍事擴張。在中、美兩強「反介入與區域拒止」和「空海一體戰」軍事戰略的競逐下,臺灣的自處之道和所應扮演的角色,亦為吾人應予深思的課題。 / The People’s Republic of China has never given up the use of military force as an option to solve the “Taiwan issue”, and the “unification with Taiwan” has also been one of the PLA’s objectives in its military buildup, which naturally makes the ROC military as the PLA’s hypothetical enemy. However, after the US sending two of its aircraft carrier battle groups to intervene a military crisis across the Taiwan Strait in 1996, the PRC started to realize that US military is its strongest opponent in solving the Taiwan issue and began to think how to deny the high-tech US military force from stepping into a military confrontation across the Taiwan strait. The prevention of US military operation in surrounding areas of China has been leading the modernization of China’s military, and officials and academia in the US have been calling this phenomenon “anti-access and area-denial” strategy which all of a sudden becomes an observation index when studying the PRC’s military development.
The main focus of China’s “anti-access and area-denial” strategy is to develop the capability of preventing the US military from intervening affairs taking place in surrounding areas of China. China believes that no matter how powerful the US military is, it is unable to gain a comprehensive advantage in this region. By the PLA’s increasing modernized weapons, the anti-access and area-denial strategy, based on the geographic environment, geostrategy, and characteristics and weakness of the US military, aims to suppress US military activities in possible military conflicts in the western Pacific region, or to compel the US military to launch its force from bases further away and to stop its reinforcement. The success of this strategy will make the US military be defeated by the PLA or force the US to pay a price that it is unwilling to afford, and then China is able to achieve its military and political objectives and at the same time stops the US, entirely or partially, from achieving its military and political objectives.
The anti-access and area-denial strategy has led to a rapid military development in China, which poses a great challenge and risk to the US military in the western Pacific region and makes allies of the US in this region in the fear of being invaded or coerced. In responding to China’s challenges, the US military has developed a new operational concept -- “AirSea Battle” and begins the development relating to this new concept. The “AirSea Battle” concept, building on current US military supremacy and the integration of air-sea combat powers as well as the reorganization of US force in the western Pacific region and the development of new weapons, looks to enhance the military cooperation between the US and its allies to establish a multilevel operation system which is able to contain Chinese military expansion. Amid the competition between China’s “anti-access and area-denial” strategy and US “AirSea Battle” concept, Taiwan’s responses and the role that Taiwan should play is a subject that we must deliberate thoroughly.
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