The aim ofthis study was to examine how economic growth affects the level of democracy inauthoritarian states. Some of these states have experienced high economicgrowth. However, one can discuss how it affects the country’s democratization-process.For that reason this study was needed to contribute to a clarification of howeconomic growth can affect authoritarian rule and democratization. This wasdone through an examination of the development in China. Hence, this study aimsto contribute to the research field of democracy and to suggest how to manageand support democracy in authoritarian growth-states that deny their denizensdemocratic rights. The study was conducted through a comparison of the expecteddevelopment that the modernization theory stipulates with the actualdevelopment of the Chinese society. The study has examined the impact of twofactors of modernization, namely education and media.  The analysis of the empirical material showsthat the expected development, suggested by the modernization theory, in largeparts corresponds to the development in China. However, based on thedevelopment in China, it seems that economic growth suggest two implications inauthoritarian states; firstly it means a legitimization of the currentpolitical leadership and secondly it means the growth of a middle class throughimproved socioeconomic conditions. This suggest that economic growth bothsupport and undermines the level of democracy. In the case of China this suggests that a popularization of society has begun. However, the democratizationin China is still inconclusive and there are no signs of change in thepolitical leadership. The dualities of the conclusions underline the importanceof further research on the subject of economic growth and its implications fordemocracy and authoritarian states.

In the theory part of this thesis will examine the connection between politics and sport, including the politicization of major sport events and the particular role of non-democratic states as host nations. In the empirical part, three case studies (Summer Olympics Beijing 2008, Winter Olympics Sochi 2014, and FIFA World Cup Qatar 2018) will be analyzed in the light of how they have influenced (or have the potential to influence) reforms, the adoption of democratic structures, and the human rights situation.

My dissertation offers insight into the political epistemology of the Chinese Communist Party and state on the basis of their activities during the post-2008 Wenchuan earthquake reconstruction. By “political epistemology,” I mean how the Party thinks about the nature of politics, including but not limited to the role of the state in the economy. An important facet of this approach is taking seriously the CCP’s distinctive manner of thinking, writing, and talking about politics that is too often dismissed as empty jargon that means little in post-Mao China. I show how a Maoist conception of politics remains at the bedrock of how the CCP understands its own political identity and actions. Certainly, many of the salient features of Maoism have been discarded, such as the emphasis on class struggle, continuous revolution, and the role of the masses in political movements. Despite these trends toward de-politicization and technocracy, the Party’s confidence in the rationality of its planning apparatus and in its ability to mobilize politically to achieve the ends of market construction and biopolitical social transformation constitutes what I call Maoist neo-developmentalism. Each of my empirical case chapters examines a localized combination of post-disaster reconstruction with a national strategy for long-term, “great leap” development. Thus, each chapter traces how the Party’s plans to capitalize the countryside - by way of urbanization, tourism, and ecology – have become stuck in transitional processes. The spectacular market transitions and transformations envisioned by Party leaders became cycles of state investment in local economies that only function by virtue of continued state involvement. The Party’s massive expenditures of maintaining the appearance of success, however, generated local resentment at perceived waste, indifference, and corruption. Each case chapter shows evidence not so much of social resistance to the state (although of course that happened, too) but an intimate negotiation between state and society of high expectations, broken promises, and frustrations. I argue that these “perforations” deep within the tissue of the state-society relationship only make sense when viewed from the context of a Maoist social contact in which the Party’s legitimacy depends on its perceived ability to serve the people. / text

The purpose of this essay is to study what conditions Afghanistan and Iraq have in order to create democracy in their countries. The study is interesting in a political science perspective because it engages many scientists how democracy can be created in authoritarian states. The overall questions my study is based on are: - What are the conditions for Afghanistan and Iraq to develop democracy based on Dankwart Rustow's four democratization phases? and which of these countries Afghanistan or Iraq has bigger chance to develop democracy in its country? My approach to answering my questions has been to study Dankwart Rustow’s theory based on that the creation of democracy can be achieved by four different democracy phases: unit phase, dissolution phase, transition phase and consolidation phase. The conclusion of my study shows that Afghanistan and Iraq have the same conditions for democracy, but Iraq has come further in its democratization and has more opportunities to develop democracy in its country compared to Afghanistan. This is because Iraq has not been involved in any long term war and that Afghanistan is still in civil war with the Taliban, which prevents democratic development in their country. / Syftet med denna uppsats är att studera vilka förutsättningar Afghanistan och Irak har för att utveckla demokrati i sina länder. Studien är intressant ur ett statsvetenskapligt perspektiv eftersom det engagerar många forskare hur demokrati kan skapas i auktoritära stater. De övergripande frågeställningarna som min studie är baserad på är: -Hur ser förutsättningarna ut för Afghanistan och Irak att utveckla demokrati utifrån Dankwart Rustows fyra demokratiserings faser? och vilka av dessa länder Afghanistan eller Irak har störst möjlighet att utveckla demokrati i sitt land? Mitt tillvägagångssätt för att besvara mina frågor har varit att studera Dankwart Rustows teori, som bygger på att demokrati kan skapas utifrån att fyra olika demokratifaser uppnås: enhetsfas, upplösningsfas, övergångsfas och konsolideringsfas. Uppsatsens slutsats visar på att Afghanistan och Irak har liknande förutsättningar att skapa demokrati men att Irak har kommit längre i sin demokratisering och har större förutsättningar att kunna utveckla demokrati än Afghanistan. Det beror på att Irak inte har varit inblandat i några långvariga krig och att Afghanistan fortfarande är i inbördeskrig med talibanerna, vilket förhindrar en demokratisk utveckling i deras land.

Thesis (MA) -- Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: For multinational oil corporations (MNOCs), increasing worldwide demand for energy combined with greater competition in the international petroleum market necessitate continuous search for new areas rich in hydrocarbons – and the greatest oil reserves have in many instances been located in authoritarian states with challenging investment environments that often imply great uncertainty with regard to return of investment (ROI). In such cases, proper political risk analysis is an invaluable decision-making tool in determining whether the risk of a negative ROI is too large to make an investment. The Libyan market appeared highly promising for MNOCs from the mid- 2000s, and oil companies decided to return to Libya despite a large degree of uncertainty around regulatory, contractual and political stability issues. Once the Arab uprising surfaced in 2011, eventually turning into a brutal civil war between the Quadhafi regime and the opposition to his rule, the levels of political risk in the Libyan market increased dramatically. A model of political risk analysis can only be as good its components, and the start of 2011 once again manifested the importance of proper political risk analyses in order to minimise potential losses resulting from unexpected events. Thus, in the context of the Arab Spring revolution, the main purpose of this research is to assess the forecasting ability of key political risk factors and indicators. The central question asked is whether political risk analysis as a discipline can be successfully applied as a tool to forecast a political situation within authoritarian states. Specifically, and by analysing the case of Libya, the aim of this study is to determine whether the political events of 2011 and the concurrent extremely high levels of political risk could have been anticipated by competent political risk analysis. This study builds on the 1999 work of Professor Albert Venter and his vindication of key political risk indicators for authoritarian states. Additionally, the study seeks to contribute to existing research by adapting the indicators to an industry-specific political risk context, namely the petroleum sector. The research study concludes that a forecast for Libya, conducted with information available in 2009, would have given the market a medium high level of political risk, with several points of great concern for MNOCs. The research study argues that competent political risk analysis, as far as it is possible to predict such an event as the Libyan uprising, identified several signs of an imminent revolution. The analysis could not forecast when, or even if it would happen, but the fact that several indicators pointed in the direction of increasing levels of political risk signifies that it could have been too early for MNOCs to return to the country in the mid-2000s. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die toenemende wêreldwye energiebehoeftes gepaardgaande met groter mededinging in brandstofmarkte, dwing die Multi-nasionale Olie Korporasies (MNOKs) om deurlopend te soek na nuwe gebiede ryk aan vloeibare koolstowwe (hydrocarbons) en die grootste olie reserwes word in baie gevalle aangetref in state met outoritêre regerings vorme waar die beleggings omgewing van so ’n aard is dat ’n kapitaal-opbrengs (KO) baie keer erg onseker is. In sulke gevalle is dit noodsaaklik dat daar ’n behoorlike analiese van politieke risiko moet wees sodat bepaal kan word of die kans van ’n negatiewe KO te groot is om so ’n belegging te maak. In die beginjare van die 2000s het die Libiese market veel belofte vir die MNOKs ingehou en het hulle besluit om na Libië terug te keer ten spyte van die feit dat daar groot onsekerhede bestaan het ten opsigte van reguleering, kontrakte en politieke stabiliteit. Die vlakke van politieke risiko het in 2011 dramaties verhoog met die Arabiese opstande, wat uiteindelik in ’n burgeroorlog tussen die Quadhafi regime en sy teenstanders, ontaard het. ’n Model van politieke risiko analise is natuurlik net so goed soos sy verskillende dele en aan die begin van 2011 het dit weereens aan die lig gekom dat behoorlike politieke risiko analise baie belangrik is om te verseker dat onverwagte gebeure die kleins moontlike invloed op winste sal hê. Dus, met die ‘Arabiese Lente revolusie’ as agtergrond, is die hoofdoel van hierdie navorsing om te bepaal tot watter mate belangrike politieke risiko faktore en indikators gebruik kan word om voorspellings te waag. Die vraag word gevra of politieke risiko analise, as disipline, suksesvol toegepas kan word om die politieke toestande in outoritêre state, te voorspel. Deur spesifiek die geval Libië te analiseer, is die doel van hierdie studie om te bepaal of die politieke gebeure van 2011 en die ernstige verhoogde vlakke van politieke risiko redelikerwys voorspel sou kan wees as daar bevoegde politieke risiko analise vooraf was. Hierdie studie gebruik as basis die 1999 werk van Prof. Albert Venter waarin hy regverdiging toon van die politieke risiko indikators vir outoritêre state. Daarby beoog die studie om by te dra tot bestaande navorsing deur die indikators aan te pas vir toepassing in ’n ondernemings-spesifieke politieke risiko konteks, naamlik die brandstof sektor. Die navorsing maak die gevolgtrekking wat Libië betref, met die inligting wat in 2009 beskikbaar was, dat ’n voorspelling van ñ medium hoog vlak van politieke risiko vir die market gemaak kon wees met sekere punte van groot kommer vir die MNOKs. Die navorsingstudie maak die punt dat bevoegde politieke risiko analise, sover dit moontlik is om ’n onverwagte gebeurtenis soos die Libiese opstande te voorspel, verskeie tekens van ’n dreigende revolusie geïdentifiseer het. Die analise kon nie voorspel wanneer of selfs indien dit sou gebeur nie, maar die feit dat verskeie indikators getoon het dat daar verhoogde vlakke van politieke risiko was, het dit aangedui het dat die middle 2000s te vroeg was vir die MNOKs om na die land terug te keer.

No description available.