This thesis explores the delegitimation concept in an electoral authoritarian context by studying how religious institutions seek to delegitimise the autocratic tendencies of the government. The thesis conducts a case study of the main religious institutions in Zambia, where the response to the authoritarian practices by the government is analysed and reviewed through a qualitative textual analysis. Newspaper articles and written statements by the churches are the central material for the study. The results of the analysis show that during the period of 2016-2020, the main religious institutions have been highly critical of the actions by the government and openly criticised them through public progressive statements as well as rejected to join activities that were hosted or organised by the government. However, the results also show that the response has been divided among the otherwise unified religious actors, where some churches have been less bold in their criticism and rejection of the government. While still regarded as a strong response to authoritarian practices, this split in response does denote that the main religious institutions’ efforts to delegitimise the government is in some sense weakened.

Over the past decade, a third wave of autocratisation has stormed the world, hitting democracies and autocracies alike. The ongoing democratic backsliding is attributed to a range of factors. From “executive aggrandisement” and strategic manipulation of elections to "autocratic lawfare”. Such autocratic tendencies are contributing to autocratisation in dominant party regimes in Africa. If most dominant party systems are increasingly autocratising in Africa, then there is a problem with the dominant party structure that warrants academic inquiry. However, the literature on one-party dominance and democratic consolidation in Africa are a bit old, hence do not address the current debates on democratic backsliding in the continent. Botswana and Tanzania are interesting cases of autocratising dominant party systems because they have witnessed rapid erosion of democratic qualities over the decade. But what effects do these patterns of democratic backsliding have on the quality of democracy in dominant party systems in Africa? Employing a comparative research design (MSSD) and using historical institutionalism and the substantive democratic theory as well as relying on secondary data in Botswana and Tanzania (Mainly Afrobarometer surveys, V-Dem Index, CPI Index, Ibrahim Index of African Governance, and Freedom Index), this study explores this question within the framework of peace and development research. It analysed four variables: management of social tensions facing the regime, the scope of presidential power, governance performance, and the nature of the electoral competition. Findings suggest that a dominant party structure in Botswana and Tanzania creates conditions that erode the quality of democracy, hence democratic backsliding. Therefore, the thesis argues that autocratisation in Botswana and Tanzania suggests reproduction of one-party dominance at the expense of consolidation of substantive democracy. This way, a dominant party structure in Africa appears to be a peace and development research problem because it creates strong incentives for dominant parties to autocratise rather than democratise when challenged by a strong political opposition.

Die Zeitenwende, die der deutsche Kanzler ausrief, bedeutet weit mehr als einen abrupten Politikwechsel: Zum einen haben eingespielte Wahrnehmungs- und Bewältigungsroutinen politischer Konfliktlagen ihre Wirksamkeit verloren. Zum anderen wird demokratische Führungsfähigkeit, ein gleichermaßen entschiedenes wie legitimierbares Krisenhandeln unter den Bedingungen von Ungewissheit, in dramatischer Zuspitzung herausgefordert. Das setzt Demokratien unter Druck, die Gleichzeitigkeit von Krieg und Krisenbewältigung bringt sie an die Grenzen ihrer Belastung. Auch befindet sich die Demokratie seit geraumer Zeit in einem fundamentalen Transformationsprozess. Autokratische Umbrüche und (rechts‑)populistische Regierungen auf der einen, Volatilität demokratischer Öffentlichkeit und Integrationsverlust intermediärer Assoziationen auf der anderen Seite lassen die Frage aufkommen, ob die liberal-repräsentative Demokratie, wie sie sich nach 1945 herausgebildet und konsolidiert hat, zu ihrem Ende gekommen ist. So ist nicht nur die Zeitenwende eine Herausforderung für die Demokratie, auch die Demokratie befindet sich in der Zeitenwende. / The watershed moment proclaimed by the German chancellor means much more than an abrupt change in policies: On the one hand, well-established routines for perceiving and managing political conflicts have lost their validity. On the other hand, the ability to lead democracies, to act decisively and legitimately in crises under conditions of uncertainty, is being challenged to a dramatic degree. This puts democracies under pressure; the simultaneity of war and crisis management brings them to the limits of their capacity. Democracy has also been undergoing a fundamental transformation for some time. Autocratic upheavals and (right-wing) populist governments on the one hand, and the volatility of the democratic public sphere and the loss of integration of intermediary associations on the other raise the question of whether liberal-representative democracy, as it emerged and consolidated after 1945, has come to its end. Thus, not only is the turn of the times a challenge for democracy, democracy is also in the turn of the times.