Thesis (PH. D)--University of Chicago, 1913. / "Private edition, distributed by the University of Chicago libraries, Chicago, Ill., 1913." Includes bibliographical references.

Inaug.-Diss.--Berlin. / Vita.

Inaug.-Diss.--Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat, Berlin. / Lebenslauf.

Inaug.-Diss.--Bern. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

In The Battle of Maldon, the valor of the English who fight is never in question. The infamy of the cowards who flee is evident. The way the poet views the Vikings, however, is slightly less obvious. The poet treats all characters who act within the contract of battle with a sort of biased equanimity—of course, the English are portrayed as more heroic and sympathetic, but the Vikings are referred to in a practical manner as seafarers or warriors. It is my contention that the Maldon poet treats the Vikings as natural parts of the battlefield, as if they had their own maxim pairing and were acting according to expectation. By defining how maxims function in the Old English corpus, illustrating the prevalence of Viking violence leading up to the battle, and presenting literary evidence of a Viking maxim in Maldon and The Battle of Brunanburh, I will define what I believe to be the integral parts of the "Viking maxim" and clarify how its presence in The Battle of Maldon informs the poem overall. / Master of Arts

The history of scientific intelligence – its birth, its importance during the Second World War, and its unique wartime qualities – has relied almost entirely on the memories of its pioneer, R. V. Jones. This thesis constitutes a critique of this history; through scrutiny of Jones’s post-war literature (especially his war memoirs entitled Most Secret War), his archival papers and those of his colleagues and contemporaries, and other mediums he used to promote his account of scientific intelligence. This thesis examines chronologically all of the key events Jones became famous for – the Battle of the Beams, the Bruneval Raid, the Radio War, the Battle of the V-Weapons – and compares Jones’s account of these (and many other) events with contemporary documentation. This thesis provides a rich understanding of the internal machinations within the British wartime air scientific intelligence organisation defined as ADI (Science), and their relationships with the many other political, military and intelligence sections that pursued similar and often closely-linked quests. This thesis importantly connects science and technology with the collection and collation of intelligence, is an analysis of wartime intelligence of a scientific and technical nature, and argues that scientific intelligence was much more than one man’s accomplishments, involved many more individuals and organisations than is perceived, and is much more important to twentieth century history than has been permitted.

Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

<p>Syftet med uppsatsen har varit att undersöka vilka skillnader som finns i analysen av CBRN-skyddsförmågan i BG08 och BG11. För att kunna genomföra undersökningen har det varit nödvändigt att beskriva hur EU Battle Group konceptet har tillkommit samt vad konceptet innebär. Följande frågeställningar har legat till grund för studien: Vilka förändringar har gjorts i analysen av CBRN-funktionen i BG08 och BG11? Om det finns några förändringar, hur förklarar man och förstår dessa förändringar? Utifrån de rådande politiska ingångsvärdena för de två styrkorna har viss diskrepans, dock liten, identifierats. Den största skillnaden ligger i vilken nation som skall bidra med förmågan. Den här skillnaden påverkar dock inte nämnvärt de framtagna CBRN-skyddskoncepten. Däremot har det under undersökningens gång framkommit att det hos en del befattningshavare inom Försvarsmakten funnits en önskan om att vidareutveckla CBRN-skyddskonceptet på ett antal punkter till BG11. Då arbetet med BG08 tog form fanns det stöd i HKV att tillgå på strategisk/operativ nivå, vilket saknades under arbetet med BG11. Utifrån den genomförda undersökningen i denna studie framstår detta stöd som relevant för att kunna utveckla det här konceptet på ett adekvat sätt. Författaren har under arbetes gång konstaterat att det torde bli en förändring i den reella förmågan som levererades av Finland till BG08 mot den reella förmåga Norge kommer att besitta i BG11. Det här har inte diskuterats under framtagandet av de två koncepten utan argumentationen har endast baserats på de politiska ingångsvärdena samt hotbilden för EU Battle Group.</p> / <p>The purpose of this paper has been to examine the differences in the analysis of CBRN protection capability of the BG08 and BG11. A secondary purpose to carry out this analysis was to describe the EU Battle Group concept, its development and meaning. The following issues formed the basis for the paper: What changes have been made in the analysis of CBRN branch in BG08 and BG11? If there are any changes, how do we explain and understand these changes? Given the current political input values for the two forces only minor discrepancies could be identified. The main difference is due to the nation responsible for CBRN capacity. This difference, however, does not seriously affect the developed CBRN protection-concepts. However, during the investigation it has emerged that some executives within the Armed Forces desire to develop some points of the CBRN protection-concept in reference to the BG11. When BG08 formed itself there was available support in HKV in strategic/operational level, which was missing in the workflow to BG11. Based on the findings of this paper this support seems relevant to develop the concept adequately. In the course of working on the paper the author has discovered a most likely change in the real capability delivered by Finland to the BG08, and the real ability that Norway will possess in BG11. The development process of the two concepts has not included an analysis of the ultimate ability. Instead is has been based on the input values and political threat for the EU Battle Group.</p>

Syftet med uppsatsen har varit att undersöka vilka skillnader som finns i analysen av CBRN-skyddsförmågan i BG08 och BG11. För att kunna genomföra undersökningen har det varit nödvändigt att beskriva hur EU Battle Group konceptet har tillkommit samt vad konceptet innebär. Följande frågeställningar har legat till grund för studien: Vilka förändringar har gjorts i analysen av CBRN-funktionen i BG08 och BG11? Om det finns några förändringar, hur förklarar man och förstår dessa förändringar? Utifrån de rådande politiska ingångsvärdena för de två styrkorna har viss diskrepans, dock liten, identifierats. Den största skillnaden ligger i vilken nation som skall bidra med förmågan. Den här skillnaden påverkar dock inte nämnvärt de framtagna CBRN-skyddskoncepten. Däremot har det under undersökningens gång framkommit att det hos en del befattningshavare inom Försvarsmakten funnits en önskan om att vidareutveckla CBRN-skyddskonceptet på ett antal punkter till BG11. Då arbetet med BG08 tog form fanns det stöd i HKV att tillgå på strategisk/operativ nivå, vilket saknades under arbetet med BG11. Utifrån den genomförda undersökningen i denna studie framstår detta stöd som relevant för att kunna utveckla det här konceptet på ett adekvat sätt. Författaren har under arbetes gång konstaterat att det torde bli en förändring i den reella förmågan som levererades av Finland till BG08 mot den reella förmåga Norge kommer att besitta i BG11. Det här har inte diskuterats under framtagandet av de två koncepten utan argumentationen har endast baserats på de politiska ingångsvärdena samt hotbilden för EU Battle Group. / The purpose of this paper has been to examine the differences in the analysis of CBRN protection capability of the BG08 and BG11. A secondary purpose to carry out this analysis was to describe the EU Battle Group concept, its development and meaning. The following issues formed the basis for the paper: What changes have been made in the analysis of CBRN branch in BG08 and BG11? If there are any changes, how do we explain and understand these changes? Given the current political input values for the two forces only minor discrepancies could be identified. The main difference is due to the nation responsible for CBRN capacity. This difference, however, does not seriously affect the developed CBRN protection-concepts. However, during the investigation it has emerged that some executives within the Armed Forces desire to develop some points of the CBRN protection-concept in reference to the BG11. When BG08 formed itself there was available support in HKV in strategic/operational level, which was missing in the workflow to BG11. Based on the findings of this paper this support seems relevant to develop the concept adequately. In the course of working on the paper the author has discovered a most likely change in the real capability delivered by Finland to the BG08, and the real ability that Norway will possess in BG11. The development process of the two concepts has not included an analysis of the ultimate ability. Instead is has been based on the input values and political threat for the EU Battle Group.