Results from 10 empirical studies and 1 review article are described and can be summarized as follows: Only moral emotions represent an evaluation of person's behavior, whereas non-moral emotion provide information about outcomes. Positive moral emotions (e.g. pride, respect) signal that a person's (self or other) behavior was right, whereas negative moral emotions (e.g., guilt, indignation) signal that a person's behavior was wrong. These evaluations and signals are elicited by judgments of ought, goal attainment and effort (see Heider, 1958). Some moral emotions (e.g., shame or admiration) are also elicited by judgments on a person's ability. A person's responsibility (Weiner, 1995, 2006) and the perceived morality of a person's behavior (i.e., with regard to rightness and wrongness) represent further cognitive antecedents of moral emotions. Some moral emotions (e.g., regret, sympathy) are also influenced by a person's empathy (see Paulus, 2009) towards others. There are specific moral emotions that are closely connected to help-giving (e.g., sympathy), whereas other moral emotions are more closely related to reward (e.g., admiration) or punishment (e.g., anger). With regard to the cognitive effort underlying emotions, moral emotions require more cognitive effort (i.e., longer reaction times) than non-moral emotions.

Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team treatments exhibit a less frequent use of anti-social punishment and lower levels of social as well as anti-social punishment. Extreme preferences for punishment are eliminated by the majority decision rule. Overall, team decisions are closer to the social optimum and teams yield higher net payoffs when compared to individuals.

Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team treatments exhibit a less frequent use of anti-social punishment and lower levels of social as well as anti-social punishment. Extreme preferences for punishment are eliminated by the majority decision rule. Overall, team decisions are closer to the social optimum and teams yield higher net payoffs when compared to individuals.

Results from 10 empirical studies and 1 review article are described and can be summarized as follows: Only moral emotions represent an evaluation of person's behavior, whereas non-moral emotion provide information about outcomes. Positive moral emotions (e.g. pride, respect) signal that a person's (self or other) behavior was right, whereas negative moral emotions (e.g., guilt, indignation) signal that a person's behavior was wrong. These evaluations and signals are elicited by judgments of ought, goal attainment and effort (see Heider, 1958). Some moral emotions (e.g., shame or admiration) are also elicited by judgments on a person's ability. A person's responsibility (Weiner, 1995, 2006) and the perceived morality of a person's behavior (i.e., with regard to rightness and wrongness) represent further cognitive antecedents of moral emotions. Some moral emotions (e.g., regret, sympathy) are also influenced by a person's empathy (see Paulus, 2009) towards others. There are specific moral emotions that are closely connected to help-giving (e.g., sympathy), whereas other moral emotions are more closely related to reward (e.g., admiration) or punishment (e.g., anger). With regard to the cognitive effort underlying emotions, moral emotions require more cognitive effort (i.e., longer reaction times) than non-moral emotions.:Danksagung Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Einleitung 1 2 An Introduction to Moral Emotions: Summary of Published Articles 3 2.1 A First Empirical Analysis of Moral Emotions 3 2.1.1 Towards a Classification of Moral Emotions 4 2.1.2 Cognitive Antecedents of Moral Emotions 5 2.1.3 Empirical Data 7 2.1.3.1 Positive Moral Observer Emotions 7 2.1.3.2 Negative Moral Observer Emotions 8 2.1.3.3 Positive Moral Actor Emotions 9 2.1.3.4 Negative Moral Actor Emotions 9 2.1.4 Cluster Analyses of Moral Emotions 10 2.1.5 Conclusions 12 2. 2 Integrating Moral Emotions in the Context of Attributional Theories 13 2.2.1 Metaphorical Backgrounds of Moral Emotions 13 2.2.2 Moral Emotions as ‘Stop vs. Go - Signals\' 15 2.3 Open Questions 16 2.3.1 Distinguishing Moral from Non-Moral Emotions 16 2.3.2 Controllability 16 2.3.3 Ability as a Further Antecedent Condition Eliciting Moral Emotions 16 2.3.4 Behavioral Consequences of Moral Emotions 17 2.3.5 Personality 17 2.3.6 Cognitive Effort 18 3 On Distinguishing Moral from Non-Moral Emotions. 19 3.1. Abstract 19 3.2 Introduction and Theoretical Background 20 3.2.1 Identifying Moral Emotions: Cognitive Antecedents 21 3.2.1.1 Agency 21 3.2.1.2 Moral Standards 22 3.2.1.3 Effort 23 3.2.2 Moral vs. Non-Moral Emotions 24 3.2.2.1 Non-Moral Emotions 25 3.2.2.2 Emotions with Both Moral and Non-Moral Qualities 25 3.2.2.3 Discordant Emotions 26 3.2.4 Aims and Expectations 27 3.3 Study 1 28 3.3.1 Method 28 3.3.1.1 Participants 28 3.3.1.2 Experimental Design 29 3.3.1.3 Materials and Procedure 29 3.3.1.4 Data Analysis 30 3.3.2 Results 31 3.3.2.1 Positive Moral Observer Emotions 31 3.3.2.2 Positive Non-Moral Observer Emotions 32 3.3.2.3 Negative Moral Observer Emotions 35 3.3.2.4 Negative Non-Moral Observer Emotions 36 3.3.3 Discussion of Study 1 37 3.4 Study 2 41 3.4.1 Method 41 3.4.1.1 Participants 41 3.4.1.2 Experimental Design 42 3.4.1.3 Materials and Procedure 42 3.4.1.4 Data Analysis 42 3.4.2 Results 43 3.4.2.1 Positive Moral Actor Emotions 43 3.4.2.2 Positive Non-Moral Actor Emotions 43 3.4.2.3 Negative Moral Actor Emotions 44 3.4.2.4 Negative Non-Moral Actor Emotions 48 3.4.3 Discussion of Study 2 48 3.5 General Discussion 51 3.5.1 The Signal-Function of Moral Emotions 54 3.5.2 Limitations and Implications for Future Research 55 4 The Who and Whom of Help-Giving: An Attributional Model Integrating the Help-Giver and the Help-Recipient. 58 4.1. Abstract 58 4.2 Introduction and Theoretical Background 59 4.2.1 Responsibility, Moral Observer Emotions and Help-Giving 62 4.2.2 Responsibility, Moral Actor Emotions and Help-Giving 63 4.2.3 Responsibility and Deservingness …………………………………………...... 65 4.2.4 Personal Characteristics of the Help-Giver 65 4.2.5 Aims and Expectations 66 4.3 Method 67 4.3.1 Participants 67 4.3.2 Experimental Design 67 4.3.3 Materials and Procedure 68 4.3.4 Data Analysis 70 4.4 Results 71 4.4.1 Manipulation Checks 71 4.4.2 From Thinking to Feeling 72 4.4.3 From Thinking to Acting 72 4.4.4 From Feeling to Acting 73 4.4.5 Moral Emotions as Mediators between Thinking and Acting 74 4.4.5.1 Moral Actor Emotions 74 4.4.5.2 Moral Observer Emotions 76 4.4.6 Empathy and Help-Giving 77 4.4.7 A Comprehensive Model 78 4.5 Discussion 83 4.5.1 Responsibility and Feelings of the Moral Actor 83 4.5.2 Moral Actor Emotions and Help-Giving 83 4.5.3 Responsibility and Help-Giving 84 4.5.4 Responsibility of the Person in Need and Moral Observer Emotions 85 4.5.5 Moral Observer Emotions and Help-Giving 85 4.5.6 Moral Emotions as Mediators between Cognitions and Help-Giving 85 4.5.7 Stable Characteristics of the Moral Actor 87 4.5.8 A Comprehensive Model of Help-Giving 87 4.5.9 Recommendations for Future Research 89 5 Moral Emotions: Cognitive Basis and Behavioral Consequences. 91 5.1 Abstract 91 5.2 Introduction and Theoretical Background 92 5.2.1 Cognitive Antecedents of Moral Emotions 94 5.2.2 Behavioral Consequences of Moral Emotions 97 5.2.3 Combining Cognitive Antecedents and Behavioral Consequences 98 5.2.4 Aims and Expectations 100 5.3 Study 1 100 5.3.1 Method 101 5.3.1.1 Participants 101 5.3.1.2 Experimental Design 102 5.3.1.3 Materials and Procedure 102 5.3.1.4 Data Analysis 103 5.3.2 Results 103 5.3.2.1 Manipulation Checks 103 5.3.2.2 Eliciting Moral Cognitions and Moral Actor Emotions 104 5.3.2.3 Predicting Moral Actor Emotions from Cognitions: Attained Goals 109 5.3.2.4 Predicting Moral Actor Emotions from Cognitions: Non-Attained Goals 111 5.3.2.5 Predicting Moral Actor Emotions from Cognitions: Mediation Analyses. 113 5.3.3 Discussion of Study 1 116 5.3.3.1 Cognitive Antecedents as Elicitors of Moral Cognitions and Moral Actor Emotions 116 5.3.3.2 Moral Cognitions Eliciting Moral Actor Emotions. 119 5.4 Study 2 121 5.4.1. Method 123 5.4.1.1 Participants 123 5.4.1.2 Experimental Design 123 5.4.1.3 Materials and Procedure 124 5.4.1.4 Data Analysis 125 5.4.2 Results 125 5.4.2.1 Manipulation Checks 125 5.4.2.2 Eliciting Moral Cognitions, Moral Observer Emotions and Sanctioning Behavior 126 5.4.2.3 Predicting Moral Observer Emotions from Cognitions: Attained Goals 132 5.4.2.4 Predicting Moral Observer Emotions from Cognitions: Non-Attained Goals 134 5.4.2.5 Predicting Moral Observer Emotions from Cognitions: Mediation Analyses 135 5.4.2.6 Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Cognitions: Attained Goals 138 5.4.2.7 Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Cognitions Non-Attained Goals 139 5.4.2.8. Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Moral Observer Emotions: Attained Goals 139 5.4.2.9 Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Moral Observer Emotions: Non-Attained Goals 140 5.4.2.10 Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Cognitions and Moral Observer Emotions: Mediation Analyses 141 5.4.2.11 Predicting Sanctioning Behavior from Cognitions and Emotions: a Comprehensive Cognition  Emotion  Action Model 144 5.4.3 Discussion of Study 2 146 5.4.3.1 Cognitive Antecedents as Elicitors of Moral Cognitions, Moral Observer Emotions, Reward and Punishment 146 5.4.3.2. Moral Cognitions Eliciting Moral Observer Emotions 150 5.4.3.3 Relationships between Moral Cognitions, Moral Observer Emotions, Reward and Punishment 151 5.5 General Discussion 155 5.5.1 Moral Cognitions 155 5.5.2 Moral Emotions 155 5.5.3 Sanctioning Behavior 157 5.5.4 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research. 159 6 Moral vs. Non-moral Emotions: Further Differentiation Based on Cognitive Effort 160 6.1 Abstract 160 6.2 Introduction and Theoretical Background 161 6.2.1 The Cognitive Effort Underlying Moral vs. Non-Moral Emotions 162 6.2.2 Cognitive Effort and Balance Theory 163 6.2.3 Aims and Expectations 166 6. 3 Method 168 6.3.1 Participants 168 6.3.2 Experimental Design 168 6.3.3 Materials and Procedure 169 6.3.4 Data Analysis 170 6.4 Results 171 6.4.1 Frequency of Choice 171 6.4.1.1 Moral Cognitions 171 6.4.1.2 Positive Emotions 172 6.4.1.3 Negative Emotions 174 6.4.2 Reaction Times 175 6.4.2.1 Moral Cognitions 174 6.4.2.2 Moral and Non-Moral Emotions 176 6.5 Discussion 180 6.5.1 Shortcomings and Issues for Future Research 183 7 Summary and Future Prospects 185 7.1 A Classification of Moral and Non-Moral Emotions 185 7. 2 Moral Emotions and Subsequent Behaviors 189 7.3. Moral Emotions and Personality 190 7.4 Cognitive Effort and Moral Emotions 192 7.5 An Empirically Based Definition of Moral Emotions 194 8 Zusammenfassung und Ausblick 195 8.1 Eine Klassifikation moralischer und nicht-moralischer Emotionen 195 8.2. Moralische Emotionen und nachfolgende Verhaltensweisen 200 8.3. Moralische Emotionen und Persönlichkeit 202 8.4 Kognitive Beanspruchung und moralische Emotionen 203 8.5 Eine empirisch fundierte Klassifikation moralischer Emotionen 205   Appendix A 207 Appendix B 208 Appendix C 209 Appendix D 210 Literaturverzeichnis 211 Tabellenverzeichnis 239 Abbildungsverzeichnis 240 Erklärung zur Selbstständigkeit LEBENSLAUF

Challenges addressed in global politics, such as climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases, concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are primarily made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to the decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public goods game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that, in the absence of a punishment option, teams deciding by the unanimity rule contribute slightly more than individuals. With the punishment option, unanimity teams choose significantly lower levels of punishment and exhibit anti-social punishment less frequently than individuals. A possible explanation is the elimination of extreme preferences for punishment through the coordination process in teams.

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