This thesis includes three self-contained projects: In the first project Bidding strategies and their impact on the auctioneer's revenue in combinatorial auctions, focusing on combinatorial auctions, we propose a simple and efficient model for evaluating the value of any bundle given limited information, design bidding strategies that efficiently select desirable bundles, and evaluate the performance of different bundling strategies under various market settings. In the second project Retailer shelf-space management with promotion effects, promotional investment effects are integrated with retail store assortment decisions and shelf space allocation. An optimization model for the category shelf-space allocation incorporating promotion effects is presented. Based on the proposed model, a category shelf space allocation framework with trade allowances is presented where a multi-player Retailer Stackelberg game is introduced to model the interactions between retailer and manufacturers. In the third project Supply-chain oriented robust parameter design, we introduce the game theoretical method, commonly used in supply-chain analysis to solve potential conflicts between manufacturers at various stages. These manufacturing chain partners collaboratively decide parameter design settings of the controllable factors to make the product less sensitive to process variations.

In this study a time based bidding framework is developed which is used for dispatching jobs to manufacturing resources in a virtual shop-floor environment. Agent-based shop-floor control approach is implemented with machine and part agents. The Contract-net communication protocol is utilized as the negotiation scheme between these agents. Single step product reservation (SSPR) technique is adopted throughout the study. Primary objective is determined as meeting the due dates and if the lateness is inevitable, avoiding the parts of high priority from being late. A balanced machine utilization rate is set as the secondary objective. During bid construction step, the SSPR technique is augmented with W(SPT+CR) sequencing rule in order to obtain weighted tardiness results. Bids containing Earliest Finishing Time (EFT) and machine loading values of the corresponding machine are evaluated with considering the priority of the part. An elimination algorithm which discards the highly deviated bids having obvious differences is implemented at the initial stage of the bid evaluation step. A basic algorithm to control the maximum tardiness value is applied, as well. A simulation test bed is developed in order to implement the time concept into the presented bidding framework. The test bed is mainly based on the Computer Integrated Manufacturing Laboratory (CIMLAB) located in Middle East Technical University, Department of Mechanical Engineering. The developed bidding algorithm is tested under several cases. Results revealed that the proposed bidding framework was quite successful in meeting the objectives. The study is concluded with some specific future work, outlined in the light of the results obtained.

In this thesis, three methods are presented to model the decision process of whether or not to bid for a tender in offshore petroleum platform fabrication. A sample data and the assessment based on this data are gathered from an offshore petroleum platform fabrication company and this information is analyzed to understand the significant parameters in the industry. The alternative methods, &ldquo / Regression Analysis&rdquo / , &ldquo / Neural Network Method&rdquo / and &ldquo / Fuzzy Neural Network Method&rdquo / , are used for modeling of the bidding decision process. The regression analysis examines the data statistically where the neural network method and fuzzy neural network method are based on artificial intelligence. The models are developed using the bidding data compiled from the offshore petroleum platform fabrication projects. In order to compare the prediction performance of these methods &ldquo / Cross Validation Method&rdquo / is utilized. The models developed in this study are compared with the bidding decision method used by the company. The results of the analyses show that regression analysis and neural network method manage to have a prediction performance of 80% and fuzzy neural network has a prediction performance of 77,5% whereas the method used by the company has a prediction performance of 47,5%. The results reveal that the suggested models achieve significant improvement over the existing method for making the correct bidding decision.

Amidst mounting federal debt, slowing the growth of health care spending is one of the nation’s top domestic priorities. This dissertation evaluates three current policy ideas: (1) global payment within an accountable care contracting model, (2) physician fee cuts, and (3) expanding the role of competitive bidding in Medicare. Chapter one studies the effect of global payment and pay-for-performance on health care spending and quality in accountable care organizations. I evaluate the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Alternative Quality Contract (AQC), which was implemented in 2009 with seven provider organizations comprising 380,000 enrollees. Using claims and quality data in a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design, I find that the AQC was associated with a 1.9 percent reduction in medical spending and modest improvements in quality of chronic care management and pediatric care in year one. Chapter two studies Medicare’s elimination of payments for consultations in the 2010 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. This targeted fee cut (largely to specialists) was accompanied by a fee increase for office visits (billed more often by primary care physicians). Using claims data for 2.2 million Medicare beneficiaries, I test for discontinuities in spending, volume, and coding of outpatient physician encounters with an interrupted time series design. I find that spending on physician encounters increased 6 percent after the policy, largely due to a coding effect and higher office visit fees. Slightly more than half of the increase was accounted for by primary care physician visits, with the rest by specialist visits. Chapter three examines competitive bidding, which is at the center of several proposals to reform Medicare into a premium support program. In competitive bidding, private plans submit prices (bids) they are willing to accept to insure a Medicare beneficiary. In perfect competition, plans bid costs and thus bids are insensitive to the benchmark. Under imperfect competition, bids may move with the benchmark. I study the effect of benchmark changes on plan bids using Medicare Advantage data in a longitudinal market-level model. I find that a $1 increase in the benchmark leads to about a $0.50 increase in bids among Medicare managed care plans.

<p>Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has been a topic of discussion since the dawn of democracy in April 1994. Due to the entrenched inequalities of the past, economic empowerment is very important for the economic growth of the majority of South Africa&rsquo / s citizens. However, significant economic enrichment of black people has not been made, despite, economic success, legislation, state policies and programme interventions. This economic growth is to be realised through the use of preferential procurement as a policy tool for BEE. Whilst sufficient legislation has been enacted to regulate preferential procurement, to favour black people, much still seems to be lacking in the enforcement of the laws in public procurement. Central to the challenges of preferential procurement is the disharmony between the Framework legislation governing preferential procurement and BEE. This discord has seen two visions being followed for preferential procurement / the Procurement Act refers to the beneficiaries of BEE as historically disadvantaged individuals (HDI / s) and the goals for BEE are measured through specific goals which promotes narrow empowerment / the BBBEE Act on the other hand defines black people as the recipients of BEE and through the BEE Codes broad-based empowerment is promoted through seven core elements. This congruency has not served the promotion of preferential procurement, it has created a hindrance that frustrates economic growth for those it is intended. The other quandary that undermines the success of preferential procurement is willful practices engaged by both tenderers and public officials / skills deficiency in the adjudication of tenders and self-interest. The success of BEE through preferential procurement is dependent on a coherently legislated procurement environment fortified by perceptive public officials. The objective of this thesis is to analyse the impact of these challenges on the success of preferential procurement. The study will highlight the main practices that defeat the use of preferential procurement. This will include an analysis of the various legislation and the amendments thereto. In addition the enquiry will examine the proficiency of public officials in the adjudication of public tendering. Recommendations for a successful preferential public procurement environment will be made. The proposed thesis will utilise, inter alia, relevant legislation, case law, theses, journals, books and policy documents.</p>

If a correlation exists between cost and project delivery system then this is crucial knowledge for any group organizing a new construction project. It has been observed anecdotally that the construction cost per student of public elementary schools has been observed to continue to increase in the state of Texas, even with the recent downturn in the economy. The recent economic depression in the USA has seen construction material costs stagnate and construction costs dropping. This is a direct result of the competitive nature of a market that has a lack of business. The issue of a rising cost at the time of a falling market is of more than a passing research interest to school superintendents and the people of Texas. This study investigated the relationship between cost and project delivery systems. A survey was sent to all school superintendents in Texas requesting recent data on elementary school enrollment, project delivery type and construction costs. One hundred and thirty six responses were received from one thousand and seventy six Texas school districts. A comparative means test was used to determine if a relationship exists between construction cost per student and project delivery system for public elementary schools in Texas. The research shows that Texas school districts are primarily using two types of project delivery systems for their new school construction, Construction Management at Risk and Competitive Sealed Proposals. After comparing the average construction cost per student for these two project delivery systems, the statistical analysis showed that Competitive Sealed Proposals cost approximately four thousand dollar less per student than Construction Management at Risk. The clear question is then as to why are districts using Construction Management at Risk when the comparative benefits of the contract type are not worth this amount of money per student.

Recently, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) indicated lack of competition and single-bid contracts in asphalt paving as a major issue facing state transportation departments. Single-bid contracts indicate a lack of competition which increases costs to state and local governments. During the period from 2005-2007 in Kentucky, 42 percent of all bids were awarded with only one firm bidding on the project. Of the asphalt paving jobs, 63 percent of those jobs were awarded to a single bidder. The analysis of this dissertation focuses on detecting tacit collusion in asphalt paving jobs in Kentucky. A focal point enables firms to coordinate bids and engage in a tit-for-tat strategy where they refuse to bid in each other’s counties. In this case the focal point is the county boundaries. Two factors contribute to the ability of firms to use county boundaries to coordinate bids. The first factor is that the political county boundaries form relatively small counties which allow a firm’s service area to cover multiple counties. The firms are able to claim counties and service the projects in those counties. The second factor is that a majority of asphalt projects which the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet puts up for bidding are exclusive to a specific county. This allows firms to know whether a project falls in a county within their bidding territory. Each county and firm in each of the 12 Kentucky Transportation Cabinet geographic districts was analyzed to see if there was evidence of bid coordination. The result is that in 94 out of 120 counties there was evidence of bid coordination or tacit collusion with increases in bid levels. There is evidence that 25 of the 31 Kentucky asphalt paving firms refuse to bid against their rivals in their rival’s territories. This refusal by firms to bid against each other resulted in single-bid contracts that were $70,595,466.09 above the competitive level.

Many studies have been performed on the short- and long-run abnormal returns to acquirers in acquisition attempts, but the topic of bidding wars is relatively unexplored. This piece performs an in-depth analysis of daily returns to both the public winners and losers in bidding war situations. It provides a counterargument to earlier findings that found that winners in bidding wars performed poorly compared to losers. I also fill in the gap in the analysis of short-term returns to paired winners and losers during and surrounding the bidding war. I find that winners perform significantly better than losers during certain critical periods in the bidding war, and this appears to signal the increased likelihood of the winner’s success. However, in the short-term, the market consistently misjudges the direction of the long-run benefits of the acquisition to the winner.

In the global construction market, most construction companies are willing to undertake international projects in order to maximise their profitability by taking advantage of attractive emerging markets and minimise dependence on unfavorable domestic market conditions. In order to be awarded a contract in highly competitive global construction market, companies should excel in choosing the most attractive markets and prepare winning bids for the selected construction projects in those markets. While preparing bids, the major concern of companies is to offer an optimum price that will enable them to earn enough profits and win the contract at the same time, where profit making ability is strongly correlated with proper estimation of a risk premium that is added onto the estimated cost of the project. Due to the nature of construction works, there are lots of uncertainties associated with the project, market and country conditions. Therefore, how the profitability of the project changes with occurrence of various risk events, in other words, the sensitivity of project costs to risk events, should be estimated by bidders realistically. In this study, fuzzy set theory is used to estimate cost overrun risk in international projects at the bidding stage. The objective is to propose a methodology which can be used by bidders to quantify cost overrun risk so that a realistic risk premium may be determined. A fuzzy risk rating approach is proposed to quantify cost overrun risk rating, which takes into account of risks characterised in international construction projects. For this purpose, risk sources have been identified and a risk model is put forward by using influence diagramming method. Based on this risk model, a fuzzy risk rating algorithm has been defined and software has been developed to conduct fuzzy risk rating calculations easily. After a decision-maker inserts the necessary inputs related with project and country risk factors, the output of the software is a rating that takes into account of all factors that may affect cost overrun risk in international construction projects. The reliability of the algorithm and developed software have been tested by an application on a real construction project. The proposed methodology and decision support tool have been proved to be reliable for the estimation of cost overrun risk while giving bidding decisions in international markets.

As constantes denúncias de superfaturamento nas compras do governo, o excesso de burocratização nos procedimentos licitatórios, entre outras motivações, fazem com que a qualidade do gasto público seja cada vez mais discutida e questionada. Pesquisas acadêmicas analisam os princípios da eficiência, da eficácia, da efetividade e da economicidade na gestão pública e mostram que o processo de compra pública é ineficiente. E é neste contexto, que esta dissertação teve como objetivo avaliar o cumprimento do princípio da economicidade nas licitações ocorridas em 2012 na Marinha do Brasil, para a realização de suas despesas de custeio. Para isto, foi realizada uma pesquisa do tipo descritiva e com a utilização do método quanti-qualitativo. O universo da pesquisa é constituído de todas as 2.192 Ordens de Compras emitidas pelo Centro de Obtenção da Marinha no Rio de Janeiro (COMRJ), no exercício de 2012 e de todas as empresas cadastradas no Sistema Integrado de Administração de Serviços Gerais (SIASG) que tenha participado de algum processo licitatório nos anos de 2011, 2012 ou 2013. Os resultados obtidos evidenciaram que a Marinha do Brasil conseguiu, nas suas aquisições de 2012, selecionar a proposta mais vantajosa, cumprindo assim o princípio constitucional da economicidade. Os resultados também sugerem que, mesmo a Marinha do Brasil tendo conseguido ser econômica nas suas aquisições, os fatores de custos apresentados na pesquisa, se melhor estudado e trabalhado, podem possibilitar uma redução ainda maior nos preços dos produtos adquiridos. / The constant complaints of overpricing in government purchases, the excessive bureaucracy in procurement procedures, among other reasons, make the quality of public costing increasingly discussed and questioned. Academic researches analyzing the principles of the efficiency, efficacy, effectiveness and economicity in public administration show that the process of public procurement is inefficient. It was in this scenario that this dissertation aimed to evaluate the compliance with the principle of economicity in procurements conducted in 2012 in Brazilian Navy to the achievement of its operating expenses. For this, a descriptive research and the use of quantitative and qualitative methods were performed. The research consists of all 2,192 orders issued by Obtention Center of Brazilian Navy in Rio de Janeiro (COMRJ) in 2012 and all companies registered in the Integrated System of the General Services Administration (SIASG) that has engaged in any procurement process in the years 2011, 2012 or 2013. The results showed that the Brazilian Navy succeeded in its 2012 acquisitions, selecting the highest bidder, thus fulfilling the constitutional principle of economicity. The results also suggest that even having been economic in its purchases, the cost factors presented in the survey, if best studied and worked, may allow a further reduction in the prices of acquired goods for the Brazilian Navy.