The concept of ecological compensation (EC) assumes that ecological values are substitutable across spatial units. EC is increasingly recognised in Sweden as a novel policy instrument for land-use planning, however, it suffers from inconsistency in application and outcome. For example, there are no legal provisions to require EC for urban development or new roads and railways. This study shows that there are many context dependent variables affecting the performance of EC in Sweden, which can partly be explained by authorities’ lacking experience in administrating these questions, and by the absence of a standardised structure for handling the full EC process. These shortcomings together with an inadequate legislation may cause EC to result in “license-to-trash” and fails to guarantee no net loss of ecological values. The performance of EC in Sweden was assessed through two case studies: the Sigtuna trading estate and the Aitik mine expansions. Implementation procedures and compensation designs were investigated by analysis of written documents and semi-structured interviews. The data was structured in an analytical framework, displaying similarities and context dependent disparities. The results suggest that, for the Aitik-case, licence-to-trash is a risk if compensation schemes are reviewed by the regulatory authorities during the processing of the application. The Sigtuna case suggests, opposed to earlier findings, that the Plan and Building Act can be utilised for EC if the compensation measures are regulated in a development agreement between the municipality and the landowner/developer. Both cases suggest that additionality can be met by appropriate institutional design, whereas no net loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services hardly can be achieved within the existing Swedish legal framework. To improve the performance of EC, structures for handling the process from quantification of social and ecological values, to monitoring of compensation outcomes must be implemented in all development projects affecting nature.

Biodiversity loss is an important issue for New Zealand: for the domestic environment, economy and society, but also for New Zealand as a member of the international community. Biodiversity offset banking is making an important contribution to addressing such issues in a number of countries around the world. Developing the ability to participate and take advantage of possible benefits requires comprehensively understanding both the fundamental principles and varying concepts, and supports the analysis necessary for New Zealand to progress towards offset banking. New Zealand can learn much from observing and investigating overseas models and use them as valuable templates. California and New South Wales provide examples of potential policies and frameworks (both economic and social) to establish and operate successful offset banking systems. Discussions of offset banking, both in theory and practice, frequently concern the potential failings of the system. These issues can be conceptualised as various forms of risk. Considering offset banking as sustainable development, this thesis addresses such risks to reflect the tripartite biological, financial and social framework of sustainable development. Biologically, risk is in the potential biodiversity outcomes are inadequate, unexpected or undesirable. Scientific uncertainty underlies this, both inherently and from the limits of current scientific disciplines. Through expanding scientific knowledge and experience, measures for reducing or accommodating the risk of uncertainty are emerging. Financial risk represents concerns that individual banks may lack the monetary support to achieve the specific biodiversity conservation required for the site. Also the system of interacting banks, bankers and traders may fail to produce financial outcomes that support effective and efficient biodiversity conservation over the breath of the scheme. Social risk lies in the potential that societies’ individuals conduct themselves in ways that conflict with achieving biodiversity conservation through malfeasance or negligence. Additionally, there is social risk that an offset banking system fails to respond appropriately to broader society and human, such as equity and intergenerational justice. Here, deliberating these risks is primary to appreciating how design elements and emergent properties minimize risks. Given comprehensive understanding, components of a system can be designed and allow informed policy, regulations and rules to offer successful risk mitigation. For this reason policy, rules and regulations observed within California and New South Wales helps to discuss this and establish guidance for New Zealand offset banking design to draw upon. Californian systems are achieving promising conservation and continued growth; New South Wales’ Biobanking scheme is robustly designed and in its early stages. Each contrasts in design and carries varying criticisms. California has been observed as potentially shortcoming biologically, whereas New South Wales Biobanking has been questioned based on the strength and character of its economic underpinnings. In addition to these considerations, New Zealand has significant societal perspectives to incorporate given current popular, socio-democratic conservation modus operandi. Identifying the three forms of risk present highlights the importance of allocating appropriate consideration and expertise to the biological, economic and social components of offset banking. Successful sustainable development, biodiversity conservation and risk mitigation may be achieved through designing mechanisms, regulations and governing policy for offset banking. New Zealand may therefore expand the success and application of current offsetting by taking guidance from examples and analysis presented here.

Malgré ce que l’on a pu croire, le régime commun pourrait présenter un grand intérêt pour le droit international de l’environnement sous réserve de la prise en compte de certaines considérations environnementales. Il s’agit d’une part, du déclenchement de la responsabilité et, d’autre part, de la réparation. Si, en raison de certaines insuffisances normatives environnementales, l’engagement de la responsabilité pourrait soulever des difficultés, le fondement du régime commun, à savoir le fait illicite, facilite la prévention des dommages environnementaux. Quant à l’invocation de la responsabilité, une évolution concernant les droits des États agissant pour un intérêt collectif pourrait empêcher que de nombreux espaces et espèces échappent à la sphère de la responsabilité des États. Concernant les modalités de la réparation, l’importance d’une réparation en nature ou par équivalent en nature impose une adaptation à l’appréciation ou à la mise en œuvre de la restitution et de l’indemnisation. En revanche, la présente thèse propose une nouvelle forme de satisfaction : la compensation écologique. / Despite some authors’ scepticism, the international environmental law can find certain solutions in the law of state responsibility. However, the success of finding such solutions depends on the introduction of a number of environmental considerations to as conditions of state responsibility, its invocation and reparation. Regarding the first, although the state responsibility, which is based on breach of obligations, may lack normative environmental aspect, its preventive role vis-a-vis the environmental harm should not be underestimated. As to the invocation, the positive law has to acknowledge the right of an injured state acting for the collective interest in order to include spaces and species beyond the state’s sovereignty to the law of state responsibility. Regarding the forms of reparation, restitution and compensation must be adapted taking into consideration the importance of environmental restoration towards baseline conditions. However, satisfaction needs to transform into a multiform and flexible form of reparation. For this purpose the present study suggests the biodiversity offset mechanism as a form of satisfaction.

Titre : La compensation écologique : du principe de non perte nette de biodiversité à son opérationnalisation – analyse de l’action collectiveMots clés : Compensation écologique, action collective, effets spatio-temporels, Non perte nette de biodiversité.Résumé : En France la compensation écologique des impacts résiduels sur la biodiversité a pour objectif l'atteinte de la non perte nette de biodiversité. Un cadre normatif énonçant une dizaine de principes permet théoriquement d'atteindre cet objectif.Nous étudions donc la mise en œuvre de la compensation écologique à travers trois projets de LGV. Nous analysons le jeu d'acteur autour de cette mise en œuvre grâce aux théories de l'action collective, et notamment grâce au cadre analytique de la Traduction proposé par M. Callon. Cette première analyse nous permet de comprendre en quoi la compensation est un objet socio-technique. Nous mettons en évidence que de nombreux acteurs aux intérêts divergents se mobilisent pour mettre en place la compensation écologique. Nous montrons qu’il y a une tension entre la mobilisation des acteurs et les exigences écologiques, ces deux aspects ne sont pas toujours compatibles. La durée des cahiers de charges et la rétribution des propriétaires fonciers, chargés de la mise en œuvre de la compensation écologique est déterminante à la fois pour la mobilisation des humains et des nons humains (biodiversité). Nous nous interrogeons ensuite sur les effets spatiaux temporels de l’action collective et de sa capacité à tendre vers une non perte nette de biodiversité. Nous montrons que les mesures n’ont pas pu être effectives avant le démarrage des impacts. La gestion du foncier en France semble pour le moment difficilement compatible avec une mise en œuvre de la compensation non anticipée très en amont. Nous montrons que la majorité des sites de mesures de compensation sont de petites tailles, bien que des espaces de grandes tailles semblent davantage vertueux d’un point de vue écologique. Enfin nous montrons que la pérennité des mesures de compensations peut être appréhendée à différents niveaux suivant (i) le type de maîtrise foncière (acquisition, conventionnement); (ii) les contrats de mesures de compensation (durée, contenu de ces derniers – les sanctions en cas de manquement aux obligations influent sur le maintien des mesures) ; (iii) la gestion du renouvellement de ces contrats; (iv) la vocation des propriétaires des sites (une entreprises publique ou privée de construction n’a pas comme rôle au départ de conserver la biodiversité, tandis qu’une association naturaliste en a la vocation) ; (v) la pérennité des structures et les assurances quant au devenir des sites de mesures de compensation en cas de faillite; (vi) le suivi et le contrôle l’application de la compensation. / In France, the objective of ecological compensation for residual impacts on biodiversity is to achieve no net loss of biodiversity. A normative framework setting out about ten principles theoretically makes it possible to achieve this objective.We are therefore studying the implementation of biodiversity offset through three High Speed Railway projects. We analyze the actor's game around this implementation through the theories of collective action, and in particular the analytical framework of Translation proposed by M. Callon. This first analysis allows us to understand how biodiversity offset is a socio-technical object. We highlight that many actors with diverging stakes are mobilizing to implement ecological compensation. We show that there is a tension between the mobilization of actors and ecological requirements, these two aspects are not always compatible. The duration of the environmental services specifications and the associated retribution of landowners, who set-up biodiversity offset specification, is decisive for both human and non-human (biodiversity) mobilization. We then question the temporal spatial effects of collective action and its ability to achieve a net loss of biodiversity. We show that the measures could not be effective before the impacts began. Land management in France seems for the moment to be difficult to reconcile with the implementation of unanticipated biodiversity offset at a very early stage. We show that the majority of biodiversity offset sites are small in size, although larger areas seem more virtuous for biodiversity. Finally, we show that the sustainability of biodiversity offset measures can be assessed at different levels depending on (i) the type of land control (acquisition, agreement); (ii) biodiversity offset contracts (duration, content of the latter - sanctions in the event of failure to comply with obligations influence the maintenance of the measures); (iii) the management of the renewal of these contracts; (iv) the vocation of the owners of the sites (a public or private construction company does not initially have the role of conserving biodiversity, whereas an environmental NGO has the vocation); (v) the sustainability of the structures and assurances as to the future of the biodiversity offset measures sites in the event of bankruptcy; (vi) the monitoring and control of the implementation.

La compensation écologique, envisagée dans le respect de la séquence éviter-réduire-compenser les impacts, cherche à apporter des réponses à la crise actuelle d’érosion de la biodiversité. L’objectif de la thèse est de comprendre quels sont les enjeux organisationnels et institutionnels de la mise en œuvre du principe de compensation écologique pour les impacts sur les écosystèmes aquatiques marins et continentaux en Europe et aux Etats-Unis. La thèse mobilise le cadre théorique de l’économie néo-institutionnelle. Les organisations de type hiérarchique (compensation au cas par cas) ont pour principales limites d’avoir une efficacité écologique discutable et de ne pas permettre le suivi et le contrôle des mesures compensatoires ce qui conduit souvent à ce que la compensation ne soit pas ou peu mise en œuvre. Aux Etats-Unis, les banques de compensation consistent en une réponse anticipée et mutualisée aux dommages à l’environnement. Il s’agit d’une forme organisationnelle alternative hybride fortement régulée à mi-chemin entre la hiérarchie et le marché. Cependant, les acteurs ont des stratégies collectives et individuelles qui engendrent des négociations ayant des conséquences sur les enjeux de développement économique et de maintien des objectifs de conservation de la biodiversité. Le système des banques de compensation crée un double phénomène de redistribution des coûts de transaction et de diminution de ceux-ci mais il semble que l’évolution de l’ensemble du cadre d’application de la compensation écologique américain permet aujourd’hui une complémentarité institutionnelle entre ces deux formes organisationnelles plutôt qu’une disparition des formes hiérarchiques. / Biodiversity offset, as the last step of the mitigation hierarchy (avoid/reduce/offset), aims to address the current biodiversity loss crisis. The main goal of this PhD, which relies on the new institutional economics approach as a theoretical framework, is to understand the organizational and institutional issues of implementing biodiversity offsets policies for impacts on continental and offshore wetlands in Europe and the United-States. Hierarchical organizations (i.e. permittee responsible mitigation) often lead to little to no implementation of biodiversity offsets because the ecological effectiveness of case-by-case compensatory measures is unproven and the monitoring and control of numerous measures are difficult. In the United-States, the mitigation banking system aims to compensate for multiple small impacts on wetlands by carrying out restoration projects on fewer but larger wetland areas in order to reach the goal of no net loss of biodiversity. This hybrid organizational form is highly regulated and therefore stands halfway between hierarchical and market organizations. However, actors have individual and collective strategies that generate negotiations with consequences on economic development and biodiversity conservation stakes. The mitigation banking system leads to a decrease of transaction costs and a change of the actors bearing them. It seems that the evolution of the whole framework of biodiversity offsets policy implementation in the United-States leans toward an institutional complementarity between these two organizational forms rather than a disappearance of hierarchical organizations.