The EU integration process has led to severe changes in policy-making. On the one hand, authority shifted from the national level to the EU. On the other hand, national level executives have gained power relative to the national legislatures. However, since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, scholars argue for a comeback of national legislatures. In Germany, parliamentary standing committees have gained considerable power throughout these developments. Nonetheless, their traditional role as policy shaper is contested among scholars. Thus, clarification of their role is needed. While, previous analysis has mainly focused on the Bundestag as a unitary actor. This thesis investigates the role of two standing committees of the Bundestag – Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung and Ausschuss für Gesundheit – in the EU policy-making process across two different competence areas emerging due to the Lisbon Treaty. To answer the research questions, semi-structured interviews with committee members have been conducted. The results of the study show a diverging picture. The members of the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung are considerably constrained in their ability to act as a policy shaper. The members of the Ausschuss für Gesundheit can secure their policy-shaping powers to a great extent. The former committee lacks these qualities concerning the shift of an increasing amount of policy authority in agriculture to the EU, the restricted use and abilities of the Early Warning Mechanism and the constrained ability to influence the minister’s position in the Council. The members of the latter are more successful in securing policy authority in public health at the national level by making use of the EWM. Nonetheless, the restricted ability to influence the minister’s position in the Council is present, too. We can conclude that the Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung has inherited the role of a scrutiniser and executer meanwhile the Ausschuss für Gesundheit can be described as policy shaper.

Zugl.: Berlin, Univ., Diss., 2006

Discourse pervades all areas of human activity. Beyond the use of verbal communication, discourse also extends to non-verbal elements such as body language, facial expressions, intonation and laughter. Despite the wide range of studies that examine the structures and nature of political discourse, very few have looked at the ways in which politicians use non-verbal elements and, in particular, laughter as part of their discourse strategies. This study looks at the use of laughter in the German Bundestag by analysing 16,000 observations of laughter taken from the transcripts of 847 plenary sessions spanning four electoral terms. The study finds that laughter can be used by politicians as a non-verbal means of expressing opinion and making a statement without breaking the stringent rules of conduct. The use of laughter in parliament can provide information on party alliances, both current and traditional, as well as the general ‘mood’ of the electoral period. Due to the changing nature of political debates and the increasing rejection of ‘traditional’ means of doing politics, fascinating changes are taking place in the political landscape.:1 Introduction 2 Discourse analysis 2.1 Political discourse analysis 2.2 Parliamentary debates 2.2.1 According to Klein 2.2.2 Parliamentary discourse as monologue, dialogue or trialogue? 2.2.3 Interjections as parliamentary discourse 2.3 Non-verbal communication 3 Humour 3.1 Humour in politics 3.2 The study of humour in politics 4 Background 4.1 The German Bundestag 4.2 Stenographic reports 4.2.1 Written or spoken language? 4.2.2 The difference between Lachen and Heiterkeit 4.3 Electoral term specifics 5 Data 5.1 Hypotheses 5.2 Description of the analysis 6 Results 7 Discussion 7.1 Reflections 7.2 Outlook 8 Conclusion References

Univ., Diss. u.d.T.: Die Längsschnittanalyse von Wahlkämpfen--Mannheim, 1999, Veränderungen von Wahlkampfstrategien und -führung der Parteien. / Literaturverz. S. 409 - 441.

Univ., Diss.--Bielefeld, 2003.

Zugl.: Frankfurt (Oder), Universiẗat, Diss., 2004.

This thesis presents a new approach to the long-standing question of how electoral rules influence the behaviour of legislators. It begins with the argument that fresh empirical advances can be made by moving beyond the pervasive but rigid assumption that all legislators want to be re-elected and, by extension, that every incumbent values this goal to the same degree. Rather, I propose that individual Members of Parliament (MPs) vary in the extent to which they personally desire or depend upon re-election. Following the principles of a difference-in-differences design, this observation allows me to devise a theoretical framework capable of testing whether MPs' vote-seeking behaviour differs within parliaments in a way that varies predictably across countries. Specifically, I propose that in electoral systems where party-centric behaviour increases re-election chances, MPs particularly invested in the goal of re-election should cater to the party to an even greater extent than their colleagues. Conversely, in systems where a personal vote can generate electoral gains, MPs most ambitious for re-election should engage in this type of vote-winning strategy to the greatest extent. I test this prediction across the UK House of Commons and the German Bundestag, and within Germany's mixed-member system. Newly-collected biographical data on over 1700 MPs is used to conduct the first systematic MP-level operationalisation of re-election ambition based on legislators' career backgrounds. Career politicians are thereby identified as those most ambitious for re-election. Using voting behaviour from 1.8 million vote choices in legislative roll-calls as a proxy for the degree to which an MP caters to the party or to his or her personal reputation, the quantitative multilevel analysis reveals strong evidence for the proposed behavioural pattern. The contribution made by this study is two-fold. First, it uncovers the interaction between electoral rules and individual re-election ambition as a new explanation for MP-level variation in legislative behaviour. Second, its research design overcomes shortcomings in previous empirical tests for the existing theory on how electoral rules impact MP behaviour (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995), producing more robust evidence in support of this influential framework.

In this research, I analyze the effects of candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules on elite recruitment into the national legislatures of Germany and the United States. This dissertation is both theory-driven and constitutes exploratory research, too. While the effects of electoral rules are frequently studied in political science, the emphasis is thereby on electoral rules that are set post-election. My focus, in contrast, is on electoral rules that have an effect prior to the election. Furthermore, my dissertation is comparative by design. The research question is twofold. Do electoral rules have an effect on elite recruitment, and does it matter? To answer these question, I create a large-N original data set, in which I code the behavior and recruitment paths and patterns of members of the American House of Representatives and the German Bundestag. Furthermore, I include interviews with members of the said two national legislatures. Both the statistical analyses and the interviews provide affirmative evidence for my working hypothesis that differences in electoral rules lead to a different type of elite recruitment. To that end, I use the active-politician concept, through which I dichotomously distinguish the economic behavior of politicians. Thanks to the exploratory nature of my research, I also discover the phenomenon of differential valence of local and state political office for entrance into national office in comparative perspective. By statistically identifying this hitherto unknown paradox, as well as evidencing the effects of electoral rules, I show that besides ideology and culture, institutional rules are key in shaping the ruling elite. The way institutional rules are set up, in particular electoral rules, does not only affect how the electorate will vote and how seats will be distributed, but it will also affect what type of people will end up in elected office.

Le domande retoriche (DR) sono parte integrante delle sedute plenarie nel Bundestag e vengono qui analizzate dal punto di vista prosodico. Il corpus comprende 40 DR in senso stretto e 60 domande topic-setting (DTS). L’analisi prosodica è stata svolta con il software PRAAT e si concentra principalmente sugli accenti nucleari, sui toni di confine e sui contorni nucleari. A seguito di un’analisi percettiva preliminare, la successiva analisi acustica si è concentrata sulla misurazione e l’osservazione delle variazioni di F0 e intensità in relazione ai contorni nucleari e prenucleari. I risultati mostrano che le DR sono realizzate in modo quasi esclusivo con contorni discendenti e si è osservata anche la presenza di numerosi toni nucleari con downstep. Un altro elemento caratteristico è la presenza di due o più accenti enfatici in posizione prenucleare che rompono la regolarità dello schema intonativo del tedesco. Sono stati inoltre osservati accenti sul pronome interrogativo, picchi di F0 sui deittici e realizzazioni contrastive (o verum focus) e tutti sono stati associati a una funzione di persuasione e mantenimento dell’attenzione. Nelle DTS sono stati osservati in gran parte gli stessi schemi. A differenza delle DR, tuttavia, circa un quarto delle DTS presenta un contorno ascendente o ascendente-progrediente. Tale contorno contribuisce a marcare le domande come espediente narrativo e come parte di un più ampio contesto prosodico. / Rhetorical questions (RQs) are an integral part of the plenary sessions of the Bundestag and are here analysed in their prosodic realisations. The corpus comprises 40 RQs and 60 topic-setting questions (TSQs). The prosodic analysis has been carried out using the software PRAAT and focuses on nuclear accents, boundary tones and nuclear contours. After a preliminary perceptive analysis, the following acoustic analysis was aimed at measuring and observing the variations of F0 and intensity in relation to nuclear and pre-nuclear contours. The results show that RQs are almost exclusively produced with a falling contour and a widespread use of downstepped nuclear tones was also observed. Another key feature was the occurrence of two or more emphatic accents in prenuclear position which break the regular pattern of German intonation. Other prosodic patterns such as accents on the wh-word, F0 peaks on deictics and the use of contrastive realisations – or verum focus – were observed and their function associated to persuasion and maintaining attention. TSQs largely presented the same patterns, but differently from RQs, one-fourth of TSQs presented a rising or rising-progredient contour. This contour contributes to marking the question as a narrative device and as part of a broader prosodic context.

Ce travail traite l'évolution de l'institution parlementaire en France et en Allemagne. Il part d'un topo de la recherche sur le parlementarisme : l'idée du déclin de la représentation nationale, une thèse qui a été formulée par de nombreux auteurs parallèlement aux phases de modernisation de l'institution et dont la dernière version s'inspire des processus d'européisation et de mondialisation. La thèse étudie les efforts de l'Assemblée nationale et du Bundestag dans les années 1990 pour s'adapter à ces nouvelles situations, identifie les variables responsables de l'adaptation et observe le changement dans les fonctions de contrôle, de législation, de représentation et de légitimation dans la politique transnationale. Après une analyse du contexte constitutionnel des deux parlements, trois arènes du travail parlementaire font l'objet d'une étude comparative approfondie : les structures de spécialisation (commissions), les structures publiques (plenum) et les structures de réseaux ("la politique étrangère parlementaire"). Les résultats montrent que la fonction législative diminue selon l'interdépendance croissante des systèmes politiques. Si cette fonction perd graduellement en importance, les parlements ont su partiellement compenser cette évolution par un renforcement de leur fonction de contrôle et de leur fonction symbolique.