In moving beyond the dichotomy between representative and participatory models of democracy, contemporary democratic theory has drawn out the crucial role of deliberation in the effective operation of democratic institutions. However, while various theorists show that deliberation is applied to democratic effect in an assortment of arrangements (such as interpersonal relationships, new social movements and international negotiations), there appears to be a hesitation in theorising the means to improve the deliberative functioning of currently existing representative institutions. This thesis argues that despite the many limitations of representative democracy, and of the mass media which act as its key deliberative forum, currently existing models of representative democracy still offer formal and practical opportunities for collective deliberation in rhetorical exchanges among citizens, particularly, but by no means exclusively, in the course of the election campaign. Consideration of recent democratic theory suggests that the quantity and quality of democratic deliberation in a range of particular situations may be assessed against a set of criteria: access, transparency, feedback and coordination. For citizens to make use of the deliberative opportunities raised by the election campaign requires, it is argued, the creation of a contemporary rhetoric. This thesis addresses that process by reviewing the roots of rhetorical practice and theory in tribal and bardic methods used to produce social cohesion, in the activities of the Sophists in Greek, and particularly Athenian, direct democracy and in the practical reason of Aristotle's seminal text. This thesis then proceeds to consider the rhetorical techniques, employed in two recent election campaigns, which overcame the preconceptions of academic and media commentators to produce "upset" results by successfully engaging, it is argued, the citizen-audience in a meta-narrative of rhetorical exchange. From consideration of these three case studies, an account of a rhetoric emerges as a technical and instrumental discipline. While a contemporary version of political rhetoric may be derived from campaign practices in the electoral context, that rhetoric is also capable of utilising the mass media for much broader deliberative purposes and the potential for marginal and critical political forces to apply these activities more widely is explored. Central to the development of new, deliberative accounts of rhetoric is a return to Aristotle to appreciate the ethical import of rhetoric. A contemporary approach to rhetoric, arising from an emerging account of citizenship as participatory, deliberative, global and "media-active" is considered.

In moving beyond the dichotomy between representative and participatory models of democracy, contemporary democratic theory has drawn out the crucial role of deliberation in the effective operation of democratic institutions. However, while various theorists show that deliberation is applied to democratic effect in an assortment of arrangements (such as interpersonal relationships, new social movements and international negotiations), there appears to be a hesitation in theorising the means to improve the deliberative functioning of currently existing representative institutions. This thesis argues that despite the many limitations of representative democracy, and of the mass media which act as its key deliberative forum, currently existing models of representative democracy still offer formal and practical opportunities for collective deliberation in rhetorical exchanges among citizens, particularly, but by no means exclusively, in the course of the election campaign. Consideration of recent democratic theory suggests that the quantity and quality of democratic deliberation in a range of particular situations may be assessed against a set of criteria: access, transparency, feedback and coordination. For citizens to make use of the deliberative opportunities raised by the election campaign requires, it is argued, the creation of a contemporary rhetoric. This thesis addresses that process by reviewing the roots of rhetorical practice and theory in tribal and bardic methods used to produce social cohesion, in the activities of the Sophists in Greek, and particularly Athenian, direct democracy and in the practical reason of Aristotle's seminal text. This thesis then proceeds to consider the rhetorical techniques, employed in two recent election campaigns, which overcame the preconceptions of academic and media commentators to produce "upset" results by successfully engaging, it is argued, the citizen-audience in a meta-narrative of rhetorical exchange. From consideration of these three case studies, an account of a rhetoric emerges as a technical and instrumental discipline. While a contemporary version of political rhetoric may be derived from campaign practices in the electoral context, that rhetoric is also capable of utilising the mass media for much broader deliberative purposes and the potential for marginal and critical political forces to apply these activities more widely is explored. Central to the development of new, deliberative accounts of rhetoric is a return to Aristotle to appreciate the ethical import of rhetoric. A contemporary approach to rhetoric, arising from an emerging account of citizenship as participatory, deliberative, global and "media-active" is considered.

Estudiamos los mecanismos a partir de los cuales los miembros de una sociedad deciden sobre cuestiones colectivas. Cada agente tiene preferencias distintas, pero la sociedad ha de tomar una única decisión colectiva. ¿Qué características necesita cumplir un perfil de preferencias para que exista un ganador por mayoría? ¿Qué reglas de decisión serían útiles para decidir sobre la localización de un mal público como lo es una cárcel o una planta nuclear? ¿Para qué sirven las campañas políticas en las que los candidatos no se limitan a mostrar sus propuestas a los votantes, sino también las de sus rivales? El objetivo de este trabajo es estudiar la agregación de preferencias individuales en estos casos. En particular, se identifican las condiciones bajo las cuales existe una alternativa ganadora de Condorcet débil, se describen las reglas fuertemente no manipulables por grupos y unánimes para escoger el nivel de un mal público, y por último, se propone un modelo que explique la existencia de campañas de contraste en la competencia electoral. Capítulo 1: Suponemos que cada agente tiene preferencias sobre un conjunto finito de alternativas. Estas preferencias pueden ser débiles, es decir, existe la posibilidad de que el agente sea indiferente entre varias alternativas. Un procedimiento atractivo para decidir sobre qué alternativa es la mejor socialmente, es comparándolas por pares. Aquella alternativa que gana por mayoría o empata con todas las demás se la denomina ganadora de Condorcet débil. No siempre existen alternativas con esta propiedad. Obtenemos las condiciones necesarias y suficientes que debe cumplir el perfil de preferencias individuales para que exista al menos una alternativa ganadora de Condorcet débil. Capítulo 2: Es razonable suponer que al considerar la localización de un mal público los agentes vean aumentar su bienestar a medida que la localización escogida sea más lejana a la que consideran peor. Sin embargo, puede existir una localización a partir de la cual las externalidades negativas de este mal ya no sean percibidas por los agentes. Por ello, extendemos las preferencias single-dipped (cuando el agente considera que hay una localización peor y a medida que la localización se aleja, su bienestar aumenta) permitiendo que a partir de una localización el agente sea indiferente a todas las localizaciones más lejanas, alcanzando su máximo nivel de bienestar por no recibir los efectos negativos del mal público. Bajo este supuesto, caracterizamos las reglas de decisión fuertemente no manipulables por grupos y unánimes. Capítulo 3: Consideramos las decisiones estratégicas de candidatos a ejercer un cargo público. Cada candidato tiene decidido qué política implementar en el caso de ganar, y los votantes saben cuál es su propia política idónea, pero desconocen la de los candidatos. Pretendemos incorporar explícitamente en el análisis el hecho de que los candidatos en campaña no sólo hacen promesas sobre sus políticas a implementar en un futuro, sino que también se pronuncian sobre las políticas que realizará su contrincante, en el caso de que este gane. En un contexto dinámico, analizamos las consecuencias de que existan las campañas de contraste, donde los candidatos no se limitan a hacer promesas sobre sus propias políticas. Si las propias promesas y los pronunciamientos sobre el rival se alejan de la política implementada por el ganador, la reputación del candidato que hace la campaña disminuye, y en el periodo siguiente puede perder tanta credibilidad, que no tenga oportunidad de ganar. Creando una disyuntiva de ganar en el presente y conservar la suficiente credibilidad para el futuro, podemos conseguir que en equilibrio los candidatos revelen su propia. / We study mechanisms by which the members of a society choose a social alternative. Each agent has his own preferences, but still the society has to select a unique alternative. Which characteristics ought to have a preference profile in order to admit the existence of a majority winner? Which rules are appropriate to decide over the location of a public bad such as a dumpsite, a jail, or a nuclear plant? What are the purposes of political campaigns where candidates do not limit themselves to make promises to voters about their own policies, but also about those of their rivals? The aim of this work is to study the aggregation of individual preferences in such cases. In particular, we identify conditions under which there exists a weak Condorcet winner, we characterize the class of strong group strategy-proof and unanimous rules to locate a public bad, and finally, we propose a model to explain the existence of contrast campaigns in political competition. Chapter 1: Suppose that each agent has preferences on a finite set of alternatives. Those preferences may be weak, that is, the agent might be indifferent among several alternatives. A meaningful procedure to determine the socially best alternative is to compare alternatives by pairs using majority voting. An alternative is a Weak Condorcet Winner if it beats by majority to any other available alternative. However, it may be the case that no such alternative exists. We identify sufficient and necessary conditions on preference profiles under which a Weak Condorcet Winner exists. Chapter 2: It is reasonable to assume that when considering the localization of a public bad agents feel that their welfare improves as the chosen location of the public bad moves away from their worse locations. However, there may be a location from which the negative externalities of the public bad are no longer perceived by the agents. Therefore, we extend the single-dipped preferences (when the agent believes there is a worse location and as the location moves away, his welfare increases) by allowing for the existence of a location from which the agent is indifferent with all locations located farther away, reaching his maximum level of welfare because he does not receive the negative effects of the public bad. Under this preference restriction, we characterize the set of strong group strategy-proof and unanimous rules. Chapter 3: We consider the strategic decisions of candidates running for public office. Each candidate has decided what policy to implement in case of winning, and voters know their own ideal policy, but do not know the ones the candidates will implement after winning. We aim to explicitly incorporate into the analysis the fact that candidates make promises not only about the policies they will implement in the future, but also speak out about the policies that his opponent will undertake, in the event of winning. In a dynamic context, we analyze the consequences of the existence of contrasting campaigns, where candidates are not limited to making promises about their own policies. If one’s promises and pronouncements on the opponent are very different from the policy implemented by the winner, the candidate’s reputation decreases, and in the next period can lose so much credibility, that he has no chance of winning. By building a trade-off between winning today and preserving enough credibility for the future, we can obtain equilibria in which the candidates reveal their own policy.

During campaigns, voters often learn that their party's candidate advocates policy positions that conflict with their own attitudes. These cross-pressured voters can either adjust their policy positions to be consonant with their party's candidate or voting for others. I use monthly NES Panel Data from 2008-2009 to examine how voters' beliefs change about a specific policy: the redistribution of wealth through progressive taxation during a presidential campaign. I test this by creating a Random Effects Ordered Probit Panel regression model of ten monthly waves of survey data before the 2008 presidential election. The study shows that over the campaign, voters' policy positions evolve on redistributive taxation policy; voters adjust their prior policy cognitive dissonance to be in agreement with their candidate. The results indicate that in the 2008 Presidential election, the electorate more often moved their policy beliefs to be in agreement with their candidate, rather than switch votes.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-139). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-139). Also available on the Internet.

This thesis aims to increase understanding of what motivates consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing of co-creative advertising campaigns on social media platforms. Consumer use of the Internet has increased immensely, and affects organisations due to the growth of consumer-to-consumer interactions, such as word-of-mouth. Word-of-mouth is a powerful form of advertising because of consumer trust in their social media networks, therefore, it is crucial for organisations to increase C2C sharing as a form of advertising, and in particular, co-creative advertising campaigns. To achieve this aim, this study used a grounded theory approach, to gather a comprehensive amount of data to discover theoretical propositions about the phenomenon. A total of ten unstructured depth interviews were conducted before theoretical saturation was reached. The results of the study found that consumer motivations to share co-creations online were pride, and to connect with others, conceptualised by social media self-presentation, and a consciousness of others. Whilst consumer motivations to participate in co-creative advertising campaigns were escapism and self-interest. The primary implication of these findings is understanding how organisations can influence consumer motivations to share co-creations online, hence, organisations advertising, by increasing personal connections that consumers can use to connect with others in consumer-to-consumer platforms online.

This thesis involves development, execution and analyzing of the first of a two-part longitudinal study for use in researching and evaluating the 1980 advertising campaign sponsored by the Indiana Dental Association.The data for this analysis was derived from responses to a 501-person random telephone survey in eight Indiana cities. The results were used to determine the accuracy of the advertising campaign target audience as well as provide a basis for advertisement recognition in the post-test.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Nevada, Reno, 2005. / "August, 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-88). Library also has microfilm. Ann Arbor, Mich. : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [2005]. 1 microfilm reel ; 35 mm. Online version available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 73-78).