In this dissertation, we study the interplay between a firm’s operations strategy, with regard to its capacity management, and its marketing decision of product differentiation. For this, we study a market comprising heterogeneous customers who differ in their preferences for time and price. Time sensitive customers are willing to pay a price premium for a shorter delivery time, while price sensitive customers are willing to accept a longer delivery time in return for a lower price. Firms exploit this heterogeneity in customers’ preferences, and offer a menu of products/services that differ only in their guaranteed delivery times and prices. From demand perspective, when customers are allowed to self-select according to their preferences, different products act as substitutes, affecting each other’s demand. Customized product for each segment, on the other hand, results in independent demand for each product. On the supply side, a firm may either share the same processing capacity to serve the two market segments, or may dicate capacity for each segment. Our objective is to understand the interaction between product substitution and the firm’s operations strategy (dedicated versus shared capacity), and how they shape the optimal product differentiation strategy. To address the above issue, we first study this problem for a single monopolist firm, which offers two versions of the same basic product: (i) regular product at a lower price but with a longer delivery time, and (ii) express product at a higher price but with a shorter delivery time. Demand for each product arrives according to a Poisson process with a rate that depends both on its price and delivery time. In addition, if the products are substitutable, each product’s demand is also influenced by the price and delivery time of the other product. Demands within each category are served on a first-come-first-serve basis. However, customers for express product are always given priority over the other category when they are served using shared resources. There is a standard delivery time for the regular product, and the firm’s objective is to appropriately price the two products and select the express delivery time so as to maximize its profit rate. The firm simultaneously needs to decide its installed processing capacity so as to meet its promised delivery times with a high degree of reliability. While the problem in a dedicated capacity setting is solved analytically, the same becomes very challenging in a shared capacity setting, especially in the absence of an analytical characterization of the delivery time distribution of regular customers in a priority queue. We develop a solution algorithm, using matrix geometric method in a cutting plane framework, to solve the problem numerically in a shared capacity setting. Our study shows that in a highly capacitated system, if the firm decides to move from a dedicated to a shared capacity setting, it will need to offer more differentiated products, whether the products are substitutable or not. In contrast, when customers are allowed to self-select, such that independent products become substitutable, a more homogeneous pricing scheme results. However, the effect of substitution on optimal delivery time differentiation depends on the firm’s capacity strategy and cost, as well as market characteristics. The optimal response to any change in capacity cost also depends on the firm’s operations strategy. In a dedicated capacity scenario, the optimal response to an increase in capacity cost is always to offer more homogeneous prices and delivery times. In a shared capacity setting, it is again optimal to quote more homogeneous delivery times, but increase or decrease the price differentiation depending on whether the status-quo capacity cost is high or low, respectively. We demonstrate that the above results are corroborated by real-life practices, and provide a number of managerial implications in terms of dealing with issues like volatile fuel prices. We further extend our study to a competitive setting with two firms, each of which may either share its processing capacities for the two products, or may dedicate capacity for each product. The demand faced by each firm for a given product now also depends on the price and delivery time quoted for the same product by the other firm. We observe that the qualitative results of a monopolistic setting also extend to a competitive setting. Specifically, in a highly capacitated system, the equilibrium prices and delivery times are such that they result in more differentiated products when both the firms use shared capacities as compared to the scenario when both the firms use dedicated capacities. When the competing firms are asymmetric, they exploit their distinctive characteristics to differentiate their products. Further, the effects of these asymmetries also depend on the capacity strategy used by the competing firms. Our numerical results suggest that the firm with expensive capacity always offers more homogeneous delivery times. However, its decision on how to differentiate its prices depends on the capacity setting of the two firms as well as the actual level of their capacity costs. On the other hand, the firm with a larger market base always offers more differentiated prices as well as delivery times, irrespective of the capacity setting of the competing firms.

In this dissertation, we study the interplay between a firm’s operations strategy, with regard to its capacity management, and its marketing decision of product differentiation. For this, we study a market comprising heterogeneous customers who differ in their preferences for time and price. Time sensitive customers are willing to pay a price premium for a shorter delivery time, while price sensitive customers are willing to accept a longer delivery time in return for a lower price. Firms exploit this heterogeneity in customers’ preferences, and offer a menu of products/services that differ only in their guaranteed delivery times and prices. From demand perspective, when customers are allowed to self-select according to their preferences, different products act as substitutes, affecting each other’s demand. Customized product for each segment, on the other hand, results in independent demand for each product. On the supply side, a firm may either share the same processing capacity to serve the two market segments, or may dicate capacity for each segment. Our objective is to understand the interaction between product substitution and the firm’s operations strategy (dedicated versus shared capacity), and how they shape the optimal product differentiation strategy. To address the above issue, we first study this problem for a single monopolist firm, which offers two versions of the same basic product: (i) regular product at a lower price but with a longer delivery time, and (ii) express product at a higher price but with a shorter delivery time. Demand for each product arrives according to a Poisson process with a rate that depends both on its price and delivery time. In addition, if the products are substitutable, each product’s demand is also influenced by the price and delivery time of the other product. Demands within each category are served on a first-come-first-serve basis. However, customers for express product are always given priority over the other category when they are served using shared resources. There is a standard delivery time for the regular product, and the firm’s objective is to appropriately price the two products and select the express delivery time so as to maximize its profit rate. The firm simultaneously needs to decide its installed processing capacity so as to meet its promised delivery times with a high degree of reliability. While the problem in a dedicated capacity setting is solved analytically, the same becomes very challenging in a shared capacity setting, especially in the absence of an analytical characterization of the delivery time distribution of regular customers in a priority queue. We develop a solution algorithm, using matrix geometric method in a cutting plane framework, to solve the problem numerically in a shared capacity setting. Our study shows that in a highly capacitated system, if the firm decides to move from a dedicated to a shared capacity setting, it will need to offer more differentiated products, whether the products are substitutable or not. In contrast, when customers are allowed to self-select, such that independent products become substitutable, a more homogeneous pricing scheme results. However, the effect of substitution on optimal delivery time differentiation depends on the firm’s capacity strategy and cost, as well as market characteristics. The optimal response to any change in capacity cost also depends on the firm’s operations strategy. In a dedicated capacity scenario, the optimal response to an increase in capacity cost is always to offer more homogeneous prices and delivery times. In a shared capacity setting, it is again optimal to quote more homogeneous delivery times, but increase or decrease the price differentiation depending on whether the status-quo capacity cost is high or low, respectively. We demonstrate that the above results are corroborated by real-life practices, and provide a number of managerial implications in terms of dealing with issues like volatile fuel prices. We further extend our study to a competitive setting with two firms, each of which may either share its processing capacities for the two products, or may dedicate capacity for each product. The demand faced by each firm for a given product now also depends on the price and delivery time quoted for the same product by the other firm. We observe that the qualitative results of a monopolistic setting also extend to a competitive setting. Specifically, in a highly capacitated system, the equilibrium prices and delivery times are such that they result in more differentiated products when both the firms use shared capacities as compared to the scenario when both the firms use dedicated capacities. When the competing firms are asymmetric, they exploit their distinctive characteristics to differentiate their products. Further, the effects of these asymmetries also depend on the capacity strategy used by the competing firms. Our numerical results suggest that the firm with expensive capacity always offers more homogeneous delivery times. However, its decision on how to differentiate its prices depends on the capacity setting of the two firms as well as the actual level of their capacity costs. On the other hand, the firm with a larger market base always offers more differentiated prices as well as delivery times, irrespective of the capacity setting of the competing firms.

In this paper we examine an Australian project in which we seek to develop leadership capacity in staff and students throughout the country, such that they may contribute to and lead others to contribute to the development and sharing of learning support resources for mathematics and statistics across disciplines and universities. One of the tangible outputs is a set of video based learning support resources that can be embedded in subjects across disciplines and shared across institutions. However the guiding aim is to develop leadership capacity, in its simplest form leading others to lead others to contribute to the project. Leadership may also be developed and exercised across different aspects of the project whether it be mapping needs, drawing together disciplines groups, finding ways to recognise and reward those engaged in the process, developing resources and the associated skills, ensuring copyright adherence, creating learning designs for optimal use of resources, evaluating the impact on student outcomes, peer review and the dissemination of findings.

In dieser Arbeit wird eine wettbewerbspolitische Beurteilung der Zusammenarbeit von Wettbewerbern in Form von Querlieferungen vorgenommen und der Einfluß von Information, Produktion und Kapazität auf Marktstruktur und Wettbewerb analysiert. In drei spieltheoretischen Modellen werden die Unternehmensstrategien und die wettbewerblichen Effekte von Informationsaustausch und Produktionsaustausch untersucht. Sie wurden motiviert und werden angewandt auf eine Entscheidung zum Europäischen Flachglasmarkt, um die restriktive Wettbewerbspolitik der Europäischen Kommission zu beurteilen. Die Modelle untersuchen die Auswirkungen von Querlieferungen und Austauschvereinbarungen auf Informationsaustausch, Kapazitätsentscheidungen und Produktionsentscheidungen. Dabei wird die Wohlfahrt mit und ohne Querlieferungen verglichen. In einem Modell mit horizontalen Querlieferungen werden erstens Signalling via Querlieferungen und zweitens die Auswirkungen auf Produktvielfalt und Kapazitätsentscheidungen analysiert. In einem Modell mit Austauschvereinbarungen wird die Kooperation zwischen unterschiedlich effizienten Wettbewerbern untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Technologie und Marktcharakteristika festlegen, ob Querlieferungen zwischen Wettbewerbern die Wohlfahrt erhöht oder reduziert. Der Markt ist in der Lage, Mechanismen wie z.B. Signalling via Querlieferungen zu entwickeln, um Ineffizienzen zu mildern. Die Wettbewerbspolitik sollte aufmerksam bleiben, aber eine rule-of-reason zulassen. / In this study we analyze the competitive effects of cooperation between competitors in the form of subcontracting and the influence of information, production and capacity on market structure and competition. Three game-theoretic models are developed to evaluate firms's strategies and the competitive effects of information sharing and production sharing. They are motivated by and applied to a case study of the flat glass market in order to evaluate the restrictive policy of the European Commission. The models analyze the effects of subcontracting and exchange agreements on information sharing, capacity decisions and production decisions. Welfare effects with and without subcontracting are then being compared. In a horizontal subcontracting model first signalling via subcontracting and secondly the effects on product variety and capacity decisions are being analyzed. In an exchange agreement model cooperation between competitors with different efficiency levels is being studied. The results show that technology and market characteristics determine whether subcontracting between competitors increases or decreases welfare. The market is able to develop mechanisms such as signalling via subcontracting to overcome inefficiencies but competition policy should stay attentive while allowing for a rule-of-reason.