This dissertation consists of three essays on reputation and repeated games. Reputation models typically assume players have full memory of past events, yet in many applications this assumption does not hold. In the first chapter, I explore two different relaxations of the assumption that history is perfectly observed in the context of Ely and Välimäki's (2003) mechanic game, where reputation (with full history observation) is clearly bad for all players. First I consider "limited history," where short-run players see only the most recent T periods. For large T, the full history equilibrium behavior always holds due to an "echo" effect (for high discount factors); for small T, the repeated static equilibrium exists. Second I consider "fading history," where short-run players randomly sample past periods with probabilities that "fade" toward zero for older periods. When fading is faster than a fairly lax threshold, the long-run player always acts myopically, a result that holds more generally for reputation games where the long-run player has a strictly dominant stage game action. This finding suggests that reputational incentives may be too weak to affect long-run player behavior in some realistic word-of-mouth environments. The second chapter develops general theoretical tools to study incomplete information games where players observe only finitely many recent periods. I derive a recursive characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs, which allows analysis of both stationary and (previously unexplored) non-stationary equilibria. I also introduce "quasi-Markov perfection," an equilibrium refinement which is a necessary condition of any equilibrium that is "non-fragile" (purifiable), i.e., robust to small, additively separable and independent perturbations of payoffs. These tools are applied to two examples. The first is a product choice game with 1-period memory of the firm's actions, obtaining a complete characterization of the exact minimum and maximum purifiable equilibrium payoffs for almost all discount factors and prior beliefs on an "honest" Stackelberg commitment type, which shows that non-stationary equilibria expand the equilibrium set. The second is the same game with long memory: in all stationary and purifiable equilibria, the long-run player obtains exactly the Stackelberg payoff so long as the memory is longer than a threshold dependent on the prior. These results show that the presence of the honest type (even for arbitrarily small prior beliefs) qualitatively changes the equilibrium set for any fixed discount factor above a threshold independent of the prior, thereby not requiring extreme patience. The third chapter studies the question of why drug trafficking organizations inflict violence on each other, and why conflict breaks out under some government crackdowns and not others, in a repeated games context. Violence between Mexican drug cartels soared following the government's anti-cartel offensive starting in 2006, but not under previous crackdowns. I construct a theoretical explanation for these observations and previous empirical research. I develop a duopoly model where the firms have the capacity to make costly attacks on each other. The firms use the threat of violence to incentivize inter-cartel cooperation, and under imperfect monitoring, violence occurs on the equilibrium path of a high payoff equilibrium. When a "corrupt" government uses the threat of law enforcement as a punishment for uncooperative behavior, violence is not needed as frequently to achieve high payoffs. When government cracks down indiscriminately, the firms may return to frequent violence as a way of ensuring cooperation and high payoffs, even if the crackdown makes drug trafficking otherwise less profitable. / text

Karteliai yra slapti konkurentų susitarimai, kuriais koordinuojamos ar nustatomos kainos, ribojama pasiūla, gamybos apimtys, dalinamasi rinkomis ar vartotojais, sumažinama prekių kokybė ar jų pasirinkimas, todėl yra pripažįstami vienais iš rimčiausių konkurencijos pažeidimų. Susitarimai dėl kartelių yra slapti, gerai koordinuoti, o jų dalyviai, vengdami griežtos atsakomybės ir prisidengdami slapyvardžiais, susitikimus organizuoja užsienio kurortuose. Vis dažniau sudaromi tarptautiniai karteliai, kuriais nustatomos kainos, ribojama pasiūla pasauliniu mastu. Tai apsunkina kartelių atskleidimą bei konkurencinės teisės įgyvendinimą, todėl reikalingas specialus mechanizmas, ardantis ir užkertantis kelią kartelių egzistavimui. 1978 m. pirmąkart atleidimo nuo bausmių programą pritaikė JAV Konkurencijos skyrius. 1996 m. Komisija paskelbė pranešimą, kuris numatė, jog kartelio dalyviui, kuris bendradarbiaus kartelio tyrimo metu, gali būti nepaskirta arba sumažinta bauda. Nuo 2006 m. gruodžio mėn. 8 d. taikoma jau trečioji atleidimo nuo baudų ir baudų sumažinimo kartelių bylose programa. Šis magistro darbas analizuoja atleidimo nuo bausmių programų įgyvendinimo efektyvumo prielaidas: griežtos atsakomybės, kartelių kriminalizavimo, kartelių demaskavimo rizikos, programų sąlygų aiškumo bei lankstumo, harmonizavimo įtaka. Taip pat atskleidžiama viešo ir privataus konkurencijos teisės įgyvendinimo reikšmė sėkmingam atleidimo nuo bausmių programų taikymui. JAV ir EB bendradarbiavimo aspektai... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Cartels are agreements or concerted practices between two or more competitors aimed at coordinating their competitive behaviour on the market or influencing the relevant parameters of competition through practices such as the fixing of purchase or selling prices or other trading conditions, the allocation of production or sales quotas, the sharing of markets including bid – rigging, restrictions of imports or exports or anti-competitive actions against other competitors. Such practices are among the most serious violations of Article 81 EC. The amount of international cartels is constantly growing. The members of cartels create sophisticated schemes, hold meetings in hotels and use pre-paid phone – cards. All these facts makes the investigation of cartel complicated. Therefore, there is a trong need to have a special programme able to combat illegal agreements. The original version of the U.S. Corporate Leniency programme traces back to 1978. In 1996 Commission announced Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases. Since the 8 th of December 2006 the new Notice replaced the 2002 Leniency Notice in which no undertaking has contacted the Commission in order to take advantage of the favourable treatment set out in the previous Notice. These master thesis analyses the key features that determine the effective enforcement of leniency programme: the importance of strict sanctions, criminal penalties for cartels, clarity and flexibility, harmonisation of... [to full text]

Il nous appartiendra au fin de ce mémoire, d'observer comment les autorités de la concurrence communautaires, américaines et canadiennes assurent la régulation des pratiques anticoncurrentielles prenant leur source ou produisant leur effets au sein de leur marché. Il conviendra donc à cet égard de se pencher sur les spécificités de chacun de ces régimes juridiques, afin d'étudier les similitudes et différences existantes quant à la définition de la notion de marché du marché pertinent, la qualification juridique des différentes infractions (ententes ou cartels - abus de position dominantes ou monopolisation concentration d'entreprise ou fusionnement ou même mergers) ainsi que la procédure permettant à ces différentes autorités d'autoriser, d'amender ou d'interdire ces différentes pratiques. Il conviendra par la suite de démontrer comment et sur quel fondement chacun de ces systèmes peuvent avoir une interaction entre eux en élargissant notamment leur champ de compétence respectif par le recours à une application extraterritoriale de leurs lois antitrust. Ce mémoire aura également pour objectif de se pencher sur les tentatives des différents législations étudiées pour arriver à une harmonisation de leurs normes et pour favoriser une plus ample coopération internationale. Pour conclure il conviendra de faire le point sur les travaux visant à la mise en place d'un droit antitrust international qui pourrait selon les cas reposer soit sur un traité international, soit un code multilatérale ayant trait aux pratiques restrictives à la concurrence. / The purpose of this memoir is to observe how the antitrust authorities of the European Union, the United States of America and the Canada are controlling and enforcing cartels, monopolizations or attempts of monopolizations and mergers and acquisitions which have sometimes the effect of restricting the competition in a specifie market. In order to do so, the differences and similarities between this three different antitrust legislation will be highlight especially those concerning the definition of the relevant market, the qualification and the nature of aIl this practices and the process by which, each authority permit, amend or fordid the supposed infringement. In a second time this memoir will have to demonstrate the basis of the extraterritorial application of their nationallegislation by national antitrust authorities, on foreign market or foreign company. Finally the last goal of this memoir is to take stock on evolution of an international antitrust legislation inspired by a treaty or a multilateral guide, which be bounding for each actor of the economic process. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit des affaires"

For over a century the international community has widely accepted a policy of universal drug prohibition. However, an increasing number of countries have been willing to experiment with progressive drug policies as the shortcomings of strict prohibition become more clear. This thesis is a study of the structures of drug laws in four countries – the Netherlands, Portugal, the United States, and Mexico – and their economic, public health, and human rights outcomes. The policies range in restrictiveness from the decriminalization of all drugs in Portugal to complete criminalization in Mexico. This thesis focuses on cannabis and heroin, two drugs which differ markedly in their risk for addiction and acute harm. A wide range of sources in the drug policy literature was analyzed. Evidence suggests that progressive policies in Portugal and the Netherlands have not significantly increased drug use and have led to numerous favorable public health outcomes. States in America that have legalized marijuana face many legal and economic challenges, and they should be observed closely as their policies develop further. Strict supply-control enforcement in Mexico has, on the other hand, led to an extreme upsurge in violent crime. These results suggest that in the future policymakers should drastically reallocate resources from ineffective supply-side strategies and pursue proven policies centered on public health and the protection of human rights.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed July 6, 2007). Includes bibliographical references (p. 333-362). Also issued in paper format.

This research aims to dispel the myth that export cartels should be prohibited because they restrain competition and, thus, holds back economic development. It also proposes the conditions under which export cartels promote economic development. In contrast to the myth, this research argues that, when it comes to economic development, competition is not always desirable and, therefore, that export cartels should be formed under certain conditions. In other words, the doctrine that maximum competition is optimal competition is not applicable when the objective is economic development. Moreover, as export cartels from developing countries do not possess market power in the global market, if they facilitate their firms, which are mainly SMEs, to be able to export, competition in the global market is increased, rather than decreased. We then propose the concept of competition relocation, which argues that cartelisation does not eliminate competition but relocate competition from the activity being cartelised into other activities. The concept rejects the conventional interpretation of competition as a unidimensional action, in which cartels always decrease competition. On the contrary, competition is multidimensional, i.e., firms compete across different activities. Therefore, cartelisation may not eliminate or decrease competition but simply relocates it across different activities and the overall degree of competition might even increase. Export cartels is simply a tool to relocate competition. Based on the concept of competition relocation, we argue further that, in order to promote economic development, we must make sure that whenever cartelisation promotes the long-term productive capabilities more than competition does, cartelisation should be promoted. To derive the conditions under which export cartels should be promoted, we used both history and game theory. We study the historical lessons of now-developed countries, including Germany, the US, and Japan and draw a game-theoretical model to derive the conditions under which export cartels promote economic development. In terms of game theory, we propose that the situation in which export cartels should be promoted resembles the stag-hunt game, where both cartelisation and competition are Nash equilibria. Even though it is more productive to hunt a stag together, each hunter has an incentive to deviate and catch a hare. The model shows that, whenever the benefit of sharing resources between firms is sufficiently large (in comparison with other parameters), export cartels are more productive than competition. Therefore, most export cartels have been promoted among SMEs. Moreover, it also shows that, even though each firm may be able to export (due to abundant exclusive resources), the environment, which supports the use of resources across firms, could still make export cartels more productive.

This paper analyses how IndecopI has prosecuted and sanctionedcartels within the country, taking into account whether economic agents have internalized the extent and impact of the ban of cartels and the type of reaction deployed by the authority over time. / En este trabajo se analiza cómo ha perseguido y sancionado el Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual (IndecopI) las prácticas colusorias  de  competidores que han tenido lugar en el interior del país, considerando si los agentes económicos de esas zonas han internalizado el alcance y las consecuencias de la prohibición de tales prácticas, así como el tipo de respuesta que ha tenido la autoridad a lo largo del tiempo.

O Direito Antitruste experimenta hoje uma verdadeira era dourada na qual a cooperação internacional entre os órgãos de defesa da concorrência e a aplicação de suas leis alcançaram níveis jamais vistos. Como efeito colateral do fenômeno globalização, o qual marcou as últimas décadas pela expansão da economia de mercado, veio a internacionalização dos acordos entre concorrentes com vistas a limitar a concorrência. Os chamados cartéis, antes nacionais, passam a ter a dimensão dessa nova dinâmica da economia, a mundial. E os danos ao mercado, antes limitados a um território, passam a poder atingir dezenas de jurisdições. A partir desse introito, o objetivo dessa dissertação é oferecer ao leitor um quadro compreensivo da evolução da atuação das autoridades antitruste brasileiras na cooperação internacional de combate aos cartéis transnacionais, em termos normativos e na utilização na prática, considerando, sobretudo, o contexto do recente recrudescimento do instrumental persecutório das autoridades brasileiras de defesa da concorrência no combate às práticas anticompetitivas. Por meio de uma análise comparativa entre os acordos internacionais de cooperação mais sofisticados e os instrumentos cooperacionais existentes no Brasil à luz da sua florescente experiência, a dissertação procura identificar os elementos necessários para o aprofundamento da técnica cooperativa brasileira de combate aos cartéis transnacionais. Ou seja, intenta trazer elementos para a reflexão dos mecanismos cooperativos brasileiros para um combate mais efetivo à mais danosa infração à livre concorrência. Para tal análise comparativa, o centenário direito antitruste estadunidense é paradigma de direito estrangeiro, em especial porque alia a longa experiência jurídica nessa matéria a mecanismos bastante inovadores em relação ao sistema jurídico nacional. O presente trabalho tem também por escopo tratar dos principais temas que permeiam a discussão da cooperação internacional entre as agências de defesa da concorrência, passando pelo estudo dos conceitos de cooperação jurídica internacional; princípios do direito internacional público que regem a competência internacional dos Estados, incluindo a delimitação do escopo da cooperação em sede da aplicação extraterritorial do direito antitruste, noções de direito concorrencial, os instrumentos e mecanismos de cooperação internacional existentes, as melhores práticas, entre outros. Os desdobramentos das questões analisadas nesta reflexão se expressam em problemas jurídicos tanto de caráter geral quanto de ordem específica. De forma geral, impõe-se uma avaliação recapitulativa e analítica da natureza jurídica dos acordos de cooperação assinados pelo Brasil, de suas características e de sua utilização. Também se pretende avaliar o tratamento normativo dado aos cartéis e à questão da incidência extraterritorial da legislação antitruste brasileira e da legislação comparada, bem como do entendimento da jurisprudência (especialmente do CADE) sobre os principais temas que permeiam a pesquisa. No âmbito dos objetivos específicos, é necessário responder às seguintes perguntas: como a cooperação entre as agências de defesa da concorrência pode efetivamente auxiliar na aplicação de suas leis?; quais os limites e obstáculos dessa cooperação?; quais os tipos de cooperação disponíveis e quais deles fariam sentido para o Brasil na persecução de cartéis internacionais?; como o Brasil pode aperfeiçoar seu modelo jurídico-institucional de cooperação? / The Antitrust Law faces today a true golden age in which international cooperation among antitrust authorities and its enforcement have reached levels never seen before. As a side effect of the \"globalization\", the phenomenon that marked the past few decades by the world expansion of the economy, it came along the internationalization of agreements among competitors to restrain competition. Prior to that, the so-called cartels had then a national dimension, but along with the globalization, they now operate at a worldwide scale in this new dynamic of the world economy. And, the damages to the market, which was before limited to a single territory, now, reach dozens of jurisdictions. With that preamble into consideration, the goal of the present dissertation is offering the reader a comprehensive picture of the evolution of the Brazilian antitrust authorities on international cooperation in the fight of transnational cartels, both, in normative terms and in practice. That picture is especially important in light of the context of the recently enhanced Brazilian authorities instrumental competition in combating anti-competitive practices. Through a comparative assessment between the more sophisticated cooperation international agreements and the Brazilian cooperational instruments, the dissertation attempts to identify the essentials for the improvement of the Brazilian cooperative techniques in combating transnational cartels. That is, it brings elements to the reflection of the Brazilian cooperative mechanisms for a more effective combat of such damaging infringement to free competition. For the elaboration of said comparative assessment, the centennial USA antitrust law is the foreign law paradigm chosen, in particular because it combines the long legal experience in the matter and fairly innovative mechanisms in relation to the Brazilian legal system. The present work also deals with the most relevant themes that permeate the discussion of international cooperation among antitrust agencies, such as, the study of concepts of international legal cooperation; the public international law principles which govern the international jurisdiction of the States, including the extraterritorial application of antitrust law, relevant notions of competition law, international instruments and existing mechanisms for cooperation, best practices, among others. The unfolding of these relevant matters which are examined in the herewith reflection are expressed in legal problems of both general and specific orders. Generally, the work presents a summary and an analytical assessment of the legal nature of the cooperation agreements signed by Brazil, its characteristics, and its use. The work also aims at evaluating the regulatory treatment given to cartels and at addressing the question of the extraterritorial application of the Brazilian antitrust legislation and of comparative law, as well as at understanding the national case law (especially of CADE) on the main matters. With the specific objectives in mind, the present work deems necessary to respond to the following questions: How cooperation among the antitrust agencies can effectively enforce competition laws? What are the limits and obstacles of this cooperation? What types of cooperation are available and which ones make sense for Brazil in the prosecution of international cartels? How can Brazil enhance its legal and institutional model of cooperation?

This paper discusses the socio-economic structural causes that favored the creation of drug cartels in Colombia. This paper argues that structural causes are often neglected from research on cartels and drug trafficking and the aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of how new policies can be achieved that are based on the comprehension of the deep socio-economic conditions which are a part of the very structures of Colombia and their relation to the cartels. This is done with a focus on the state and the social classes, and their development throughout the Colombian history since independence. The cartels are analyzed as criminal insurgencies in order to achieve a conceptual understanding of them. This paper concludes that the incomplete Colombian state formation, together with a great amount of marginalization of the lower social classes have been decisive factors in the creation of the criminal insurgencies and consequently, that we need to rethink the current policies on the war on drugs, since the policies in place have been rather unsuccessful in blocking the development of powerful cartels, not only in Colombia but Latin America in general.

In this dissertation, I investigate how different aspects of the procurement process and evaluation affect bidding behavior. In essay 1, we attempt to map public procurements in Sweden by gathering a representative sample of procurements. We find that framework agreements and multiple-contract procurements represent a very large share of total government spending. The total value procured by government authorities, municipalities and counties accounts to 215 BSEK yearly, which we believe is an underestimate due to data issues. Essay 2 suggests a simple method for of estimating bidding costs in public procurement, and are empirically estimated to be approximately 2 percent of the procurement value using a comprehensive dataset and approximately 0.5 percent for a more homogeneous road re-pavement dataset. Our method provides reasonable estimates with, compared to other methods, relatively low data requirements. Essay 3 investigates the effect of quality evaluation on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Contrary to common belief, SMEs’ participation does not increase when evaluating quality, and their probability to win procurements decreases compared with that of large firms. In essay 4, the bidders’ decision to apply for a procurement review “appeal” is investigated. Contrary to procurers’ beliefs, evaluating quality is found not to have any statistically significant effect on the probability of appeals. Instead, I empirically confirm theoretical prediction of the 1st runner-up’s decision to claim the evaluation to be redone, as well as free-riding in appealing. In essay 5, we test whether spatial econometrics can be used to test for collusion in procurement data. We apply this method on a known cartel and test during and after the period the cartel was active. Our estimates support the proposition that spatial econometrics can be used to test for collusive behavior.