Thesis (Ph.D) - University of Queensland, 2003. / Includes bibliography.

Diss.--Universität Stuttgart, 1990. / Contient de nombreuses citations, traduites en allemand. Bibliogr. p. 251-262.

The continuing diplomatic impasse between the United States and Iran dates back to the turbulent events of the late 1970s. Blame for the 'loss' of Iran, which had been one of the 'twin pillars' of US strategy in the Persian Gulf, has inevitably fallen on the White House incumbent at the time, President Jimmy Carter. This thesis offers a reassessment of Carter's decision making and his responses to the fall of the Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the US embassy hostage taking. It demonstrates that the breakdown of US-Iranian relations was not simply a one-president phenomenon and, more significantly, Carter's handling of Iran was not as dire as it is often portrayed. The research is based on a thorough examination of the available archive material, including newly released documents, as well as recent interviews with the major protagonists. When Carter took office in 1977 he inherited a badly creaking Iranian pillar that was soon to collapse altogether. The flawed policies of his predecessors placed strict limitations on his administration and unwittingly created a ticking time bomb in the form of the Shah. Despite these restrictions, Carter battled to reconcile the strategic necessities of Cold War containment with his moral principles in areas such as human rights and arms sales. In an administration seemingly dominated by the disagreements amongst his top two advisors, Carter remained the key decision maker at all times. He recognised the practical limits of American power and assumed sensible positions in response to an ever changing and uncontrollable crisis. Aside from its contemporary significance, Iran is therefore critical to Carter's disputed legacy and how he rates as a foreign policy president.

Submitted by Maria Dulce (mdulce@ndc.uff.br) on 2014-02-19T20:52:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Pinheiro, Pedro-Disser-2013.pdf: 1494000 bytes, checksum: 4ace873d951330464bcf5d136a1d6a74 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-02-19T20:52:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pinheiro, Pedro-Disser-2013.pdf: 1494000 bytes, checksum: 4ace873d951330464bcf5d136a1d6a74 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Este trabalho procura dar conta da ascensão de Jimmy Carter dentro do Partido Democrata, no caminho percorrido por ele até chegar à presidência dos EUA. Não se trata, contudo, de uma biografia; o trabalho procura inserir a trajetória pessoal de Carter no contexto maior das transformações políticas, sociais e econômicas pelas quais passavam os EUA na década de 70. Para tanto, concebemos uma tríade de atores sociais, composta por militantes profissionais do partido, integrantes de movimentos sociais e funcionários tecnocratas da área econômica. Nosso objetivo é observar pontos de interação e atritos entre esses agentes, dentro e fora do governo, de modo a compreender a formação de uma cultura política específica do Partido Democrata, cuja origem está no seu processo de nacionalização e unificação. Procuramos ainda relacionar a crise de governabilidade enfrentada por Carter durante seu mandato com as estratégias legislativas do governo, as condicionantes econômicas e políticas do período, e a percepção do governo e da liderança pessoal de Carter por parte da opinião pública. / This study is an attempt to understand the rise pf Jimmy Carter inside the Democratic Party, on his way to the presidency of the United States. It isn’t a biography, however, this work tries to frame Carter’s personal path inside the larger context of the political, social and economic changes of United States during the 70’s. For this purpose, we conceived a triad of social actors, composed by professional politicians of the party, members of social movements and technocrats of the economic area. Our goal is to observe points of interaction and conflicts among these agents, inside and outside the government, in order to understand the building of a political culture that is specific of the Democratic Party, whose origin is related to its process of nationalization and unification. We try also to relate the crisis of governability faced by Carter during his term with the legislative strategies of the administration, the economic and political constraints of the period, and the perception of the government and of Carter’s personal leadership by the public opinion.

No description available.

Strategic upheavals, such as the emergence or disappearance of geopolitical threats or radical technological changes, generate profound uncertainty and intense debate about a state’s future strategy. How do decisionmakers reexamine and revise strategy amidst these upheavals? Existing theories of strategic change recognize the significance of upheavals, but raise questions about the mechanisms by which decisionmakers embrace or discard new ideas about strategy. contend that understanding strategic change requires attention to narratives––stories about the past and present of international politics that suggest legitimate pathways for future action. I develop a theory of narrative emergence, positing that after upheavals, national security elites compete to mobilize support for their vision of future policy. They use public and private debates to legitimate their positions and build domestic coalitions. I identify four rhetorical strategies––persuasion, rhetorical coercion, co-optation, and transgression––that have different effects in mobilizing or demobilizing coalitions. If one coalition builds cross-cutting support, this can entrench their rhetoric in public discourse over time as part of a dominant narrative that shapes subsequent strategy debates through constraining and enabling effects. I evaluate this theory in the context of two cases of strategic upheaval in the United States, focusing on the puzzles of U.S. nuclear strategy: the arrival of the atomic age and the achievement of strategic parity between the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. In the first case, I use qualitative and text analysis to track the rise of a dominant narrative about nuclear weapons during the early Cold War. In this contradictory narrative which I label “Waging Deterrence,” the bomb was both an unusable, revolutionary deterrent and an essential tool for fighting and winning the next war. I draw on archival sources to trace the emergence of this narrative during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, showing this narrative was not predetermined, but contingent on domestic debates as speakers––Presidents, civilian advisors, military elites, and others––used rhetorical strategies in public and private to co-opt and silence opponents. This narrative constrained the possibilities for strategic revision during the later Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. In the second case, parity’s mutual vulnerability upended this narrative; narratives remained unsettled until the Carter administration, where domestic legitimation contests facilitated the return of Waging Deterrence to justify competitive nuclear postures that had a lasting impact on U.S. nuclear strategy. The project offers a novel mechanism to understand strategic change and highlights the discursive and domestic politics of nuclear strategy, showing that foundational U.S. deterrence concepts emerged in part from domestic legitimation contests that rendered other options illegitimate. It also offers insights into policy debates about the future of nuclear and grand strategy amidst contemporary upheavals, suggesting contested processes of narrative construction will be central to shaping future strategy.