Esta dissertação tem como objetivo analisar os processos político-legislativos que culminaram na criação e nas modificações do mecanismo de compensação de reserva legal, previsto no revogado Código Florestal Brasileiro (Lei Federal nº 4.771/1965) e na lei que o substituiu (Lei Federal nº 12.651/2012). A questão central que orienta esta pesquisa é a seguinte: por que, desde o seu surgimento, a compensação de reserva legal sofreu constantes modificações? As hipóteses para a pergunta formulada consideram que, no complexo jogo político de alteração do Código Florestal, prevaleceram as proposições de dois agrupamentos de atores: o agronegócio (e de outros interesses associados, como mineradoras e hidrelétricas) e a bancada ruralista do Congresso Nacional. Assim, focalizando na compensação de reserva legal, estabeleceu-se um recorte temporal de 1996 a 2012, onde se analisou os processos políticos das seguintes etapas: (i) a formação da agenda governamental em 1996, que culminou na alteração do Código Florestal por medida provisória; (ii) a criação da compensação em 1998; (iii) a modificação desse instrumento no anteprojeto de lei do Conselho Nacional de Meio Ambiente (CONAMA) (2000); e (iv) a alteração proposta pelo projeto de lei aprovado na Comissão Especial Temporária do Código Florestal (2010), instituída na Câmara dos Deputados, e sua aprovação pelo plenário daquela Casa (2011), cujo texto foi incorporado na nova lei florestal (2012). No exame dessas quatro fases, considerou-se que uma política pública é o resultado da multiplicidade de elementos e sua complexa interação. Assim, conforme as especificidades de cada etapa, o desenvolvimento do trabalho demandou a mobilização de componentes teóricos dos seguintes referenciais da ciência política: o neo institucionalismo, a hegemonia do Poder Executivo sobre o Legislativo, a articulação dos grupos de interesses econômicos, a teoria dos Múltiplos Fluxos (John W. Kingdon), o pluralismo (Robert A. Dahl) e a tipologia de Theodore Lowi. Assim, o trabalho identifica os atores chaves, especialmente aqueles relacionados ao agronegócio e à bancada ruralista, seus aspectos essenciais, suas interações, a correlação de forças, os embates, as tentativas de influenciar o jogo político em relevo. Na análise da Comissão Especial do Código Florestal (2010), o trabalho identifica os parlamentares ruralistas, os donos de terras, aqueles cujas campanhas eleitorais receberam financiamento do agronegócio/interesses associados, bem como outras características que permitam entender o peso daquela bancada suprapartidária e daquele setor econômico no abrandamento das regras alusivas à compensação de reserva legal. O trabalho colheu evidencias que corroboram as hipóteses levantadas, pois a bancada ruralista e o agronegócio/interessados associados atuaram em várias frentes, mobilizaram recursos políticos e, aproveitando-se do desenho institucional, contribuíram decisivamente para a criação e modificação da compensação de reserva legal ao longo dos anos. O estudo mostra ainda que outros fatores foram importantes nesse contexto, como a posição do governo e a formação das coalizões partidárias, especialmente no Congresso Nacional. / The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the political and legislative processes that culminated in the creation and modification of the compensation mechanism of legal forest reserve, provided for in the repealed Brazilian Forest Act (Federal Act No. 4.771/1965) and in the law that replaced it (Federal Act No. 12.651/2012). The central matter guiding this research is the following: why, since its appearance, the compensation of legal forest reserves has been suffering constant changes? The hypothesis regarding the question posed considers that in the complex political game of the Forest Act alteration, there have prevailed the propositions of two groups of actors: agribusiness (and other associated interests such as mining and hydropower companies) and the Brazilian Congressional Rural caucus members performance congressmen and senators. Thus, focusing on the compensation of the legal forest reserve, a time frame from 1996 until 2012 was established, where the political processes of the following stages were analyzed: (i) the formation of the government agenda in 1996, which culminated in the amendment of the Forest Act by provisional decree; (ii) the creation of compensation in 1998; (iii) modification of this instrument in the draft bill of the National Council of Environment (CONAMA) (2000); and (iv) the amendment proposed by the bill of law approved by the Temporary Special Commission of the Forest Act (2010), introduced in the House of Representatives, and its approval by the plenary of that House (2011), whose text was incorporated in the new forest code (2012). Examining these four stages, it was considered that a public policy is the result of multiple factors and their complex interaction. Thus, according to the specificities of each stage, the development work required the mobilization of theoretical components of the following references of political science: the new institutionalism, the hegemony of the Executive Branch over the Legislative Branch, the articulation of the economic interest group, the Multiple Stream Model (John W. Kingdon), pluralism (Robert A. Dahl) and Theodore Lowis typology. Thus, the work identifies the key actors, especially those related to agribusiness and to the rural caucus, their essential aspects, their interactions, the correlation of forces, the conflicts, and attempts to influence the political game at issue. In the analysis of the Special Committee of the Forest Act (2010), the work identifies the rural parliaments, landowners, those whose electoral campaigns received funding from associated agribusiness/interests, as well as other characteristics that allow the understanding of the weight of that bench and that economic sector in loosening the rules regarding the compensation of legal forest reserve. The work gathered evidences that corroborated the hypotheses because the caucus and agribusiness/interested members acted on several fronts, mobilized political resources, taking advantage of the institutional design, contributed decisively for the creation and modification of the legal forest reserve compensation along the years. The study further demonstrates that other factors were important in this context, as the government position and formation of party coalitions, especially in the National Congress.

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo analisar os processos político-legislativos que culminaram na criação e nas modificações do mecanismo de compensação de reserva legal, previsto no revogado Código Florestal Brasileiro (Lei Federal nº 4.771/1965) e na lei que o substituiu (Lei Federal nº 12.651/2012). A questão central que orienta esta pesquisa é a seguinte: por que, desde o seu surgimento, a compensação de reserva legal sofreu constantes modificações? As hipóteses para a pergunta formulada consideram que, no complexo jogo político de alteração do Código Florestal, prevaleceram as proposições de dois agrupamentos de atores: o agronegócio (e de outros interesses associados, como mineradoras e hidrelétricas) e a bancada ruralista do Congresso Nacional. Assim, focalizando na compensação de reserva legal, estabeleceu-se um recorte temporal de 1996 a 2012, onde se analisou os processos políticos das seguintes etapas: (i) a formação da agenda governamental em 1996, que culminou na alteração do Código Florestal por medida provisória; (ii) a criação da compensação em 1998; (iii) a modificação desse instrumento no anteprojeto de lei do Conselho Nacional de Meio Ambiente (CONAMA) (2000); e (iv) a alteração proposta pelo projeto de lei aprovado na Comissão Especial Temporária do Código Florestal (2010), instituída na Câmara dos Deputados, e sua aprovação pelo plenário daquela Casa (2011), cujo texto foi incorporado na nova lei florestal (2012). No exame dessas quatro fases, considerou-se que uma política pública é o resultado da multiplicidade de elementos e sua complexa interação. Assim, conforme as especificidades de cada etapa, o desenvolvimento do trabalho demandou a mobilização de componentes teóricos dos seguintes referenciais da ciência política: o neo institucionalismo, a hegemonia do Poder Executivo sobre o Legislativo, a articulação dos grupos de interesses econômicos, a teoria dos Múltiplos Fluxos (John W. Kingdon), o pluralismo (Robert A. Dahl) e a tipologia de Theodore Lowi. Assim, o trabalho identifica os atores chaves, especialmente aqueles relacionados ao agronegócio e à bancada ruralista, seus aspectos essenciais, suas interações, a correlação de forças, os embates, as tentativas de influenciar o jogo político em relevo. Na análise da Comissão Especial do Código Florestal (2010), o trabalho identifica os parlamentares ruralistas, os donos de terras, aqueles cujas campanhas eleitorais receberam financiamento do agronegócio/interesses associados, bem como outras características que permitam entender o peso daquela bancada suprapartidária e daquele setor econômico no abrandamento das regras alusivas à compensação de reserva legal. O trabalho colheu evidencias que corroboram as hipóteses levantadas, pois a bancada ruralista e o agronegócio/interessados associados atuaram em várias frentes, mobilizaram recursos políticos e, aproveitando-se do desenho institucional, contribuíram decisivamente para a criação e modificação da compensação de reserva legal ao longo dos anos. O estudo mostra ainda que outros fatores foram importantes nesse contexto, como a posição do governo e a formação das coalizões partidárias, especialmente no Congresso Nacional. / The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the political and legislative processes that culminated in the creation and modification of the compensation mechanism of legal forest reserve, provided for in the repealed Brazilian Forest Act (Federal Act No. 4.771/1965) and in the law that replaced it (Federal Act No. 12.651/2012). The central matter guiding this research is the following: why, since its appearance, the compensation of legal forest reserves has been suffering constant changes? The hypothesis regarding the question posed considers that in the complex political game of the Forest Act alteration, there have prevailed the propositions of two groups of actors: agribusiness (and other associated interests such as mining and hydropower companies) and the Brazilian Congressional Rural caucus members performance congressmen and senators. Thus, focusing on the compensation of the legal forest reserve, a time frame from 1996 until 2012 was established, where the political processes of the following stages were analyzed: (i) the formation of the government agenda in 1996, which culminated in the amendment of the Forest Act by provisional decree; (ii) the creation of compensation in 1998; (iii) modification of this instrument in the draft bill of the National Council of Environment (CONAMA) (2000); and (iv) the amendment proposed by the bill of law approved by the Temporary Special Commission of the Forest Act (2010), introduced in the House of Representatives, and its approval by the plenary of that House (2011), whose text was incorporated in the new forest code (2012). Examining these four stages, it was considered that a public policy is the result of multiple factors and their complex interaction. Thus, according to the specificities of each stage, the development work required the mobilization of theoretical components of the following references of political science: the new institutionalism, the hegemony of the Executive Branch over the Legislative Branch, the articulation of the economic interest group, the Multiple Stream Model (John W. Kingdon), pluralism (Robert A. Dahl) and Theodore Lowis typology. Thus, the work identifies the key actors, especially those related to agribusiness and to the rural caucus, their essential aspects, their interactions, the correlation of forces, the conflicts, and attempts to influence the political game at issue. In the analysis of the Special Committee of the Forest Act (2010), the work identifies the rural parliaments, landowners, those whose electoral campaigns received funding from associated agribusiness/interests, as well as other characteristics that allow the understanding of the weight of that bench and that economic sector in loosening the rules regarding the compensation of legal forest reserve. The work gathered evidences that corroborated the hypotheses because the caucus and agribusiness/interested members acted on several fronts, mobilized political resources, taking advantage of the institutional design, contributed decisively for the creation and modification of the legal forest reserve compensation along the years. The study further demonstrates that other factors were important in this context, as the government position and formation of party coalitions, especially in the National Congress.

This thesis aims to contribute to the current academic debate on contemporary polarization in the U.S. Congress. The paper provides a brief overview of the relevenat existing literature and schools of thought on the issue. As part of the thought direction which steers away from definining roots and causes of polarization among the general public but rather sees them as issues of the political elite, this thesis highlights the need to focus on individual Congressional Member Organizations (CMOs) in the House of Representatives and their connection to polarization. By applying an existing dataset accepted among political science scholars as the key tool for measuring polarization, the thesis seeks to affirm the presumed ideological differences among the individual CMOs (or caucuses). The main part of this thesis which adds value to further discussion is the case study of all roll call votes of the 114th House of Representatives examining voting cohesion of the studied caucuses. The aim of this study is to show to what extent the CMOs are in fact consistent voting blocs and how influential they can potentially be within the political elites in the House of Representatives and to what level they may be contributing to the contemporary polarization.

Following the historic election of Barack Obama, the largest overhaul of the nation's health care system since the Great Society, and with the country still reeling from the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, a group of disenchanted conservative Republicans and elected leaders wary of government policy gave rise to a new political movement - the Tea Party. Since taking the American political system by storm in 2010, considerable research has focused on the electoral consequences of the Tea Party. Using an original dataset and the American National Election Study, I study the Tea Party Caucus at the elite level by analyzing roll call votes, incumbency, and endorsements, and at the mass level through an examination of congressional districts and constituencies. Findings show that members of the Tea Party Caucus and their Republican House colleagues are largely homogeneous. Exceptions to this include economic final passage votes, legislation receiving presidential support, district lean, census region, and presidential vote in congressional districts. Furthermore, evidence is seen that economic factors in members' districts affected the election of freshmen representatives in 2010, and that district variables strongly influence legislative voting behavior. Finally, discontinuity is discovered between the Tea Party movement at the mass level and the Tea Party Caucus at the elite level.

This item contains the agenda, minutes, and attachments for the Faculty Senate meeting on this date. There may be additional materials from the meeting available at the Faculty Center.

Over the course of the last few years, a new movement has taken the American political system by storm, the Tea Party. The movement has not only captivated our media but also the minds of ordinary Americans and political elites. According to popular consensus and academic opinion, the Tea Party is comprised of a group of conservative-leaning Republicans who want a smaller government and a lesser tax burden. This is what we think of the Tea Party, but is it true? It is perceived that Tea Party members differ significantly from their Republican colleagues in the House of Representatives, but do they? Do they truly represent the Tea Party philosophy and agenda? By creating an original data set on the Republican members of the United States House of Representatives, and examining variables such as the political lean, economic and employment make-up of a member's district, their endorsements and incumbency, as well as high priority legislative votes from the 112th Congress, I will be able to investigate the characteristics and tendencies of Tea Party Caucus members. Once one looks at the 242 member House Republican Caucus and further examines the sixty members of the Tea Party Caucus, the data shows that Tea Party Caucus members largely originate from safe Republican districts and have served in previous congressional terms. Analysis shows that Tea Party Caucus members do vary significantly from their House Republican colleagues when examining their districts, but do not vary as considerably when examining their voting patterns.

This item contains the agenda, minutes, and attachments for the Faculty Senate meeting on this date. There may be additional materials from the meeting available at the Faculty Center.