The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the Russian Federation&rsquo / s military Policy in Central Asia in 1991-2001. My main concern in this point is to figure out what is Moscow&rsquo / s real intention behind establishing military ties with the Central Asian states and to what extent is Moscow successful in accomplishing this aim? Does the Russian Federation perceive direct threats to its security from Central Asia? My argument is that the Russian Federation does not perceive direct threats to its national security from the region rather she uses these threats to be the main actor in the region by using military means. Throughout the thesis first the shift in the Russian Federation&rsquo / s foreign policy course regarding the &lsquo / Near Abroad&rsquo / and its reflections on the basic security documents of the Russian Federation, second the threat perceptions of the Russian Federation in these regions, third reflections of this shift on Russia&rsquo / s bilateral military ties with these states and finally the role of the changing perception in the formation of regional collective security formations are to be analyzed.

Thesis (D. Phil.)--University of Ulster, 1985. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 556-591).

This dissertation explores what it means to be post-socialist for Ismaili Muslims living in the Ishkashim district of Tajik Badakhshan. It examines the legacies of the Soviet era in people’s everyday lives, questioning how people continue to see themselves as socialist notwithstanding the putative end of state socialism. Part of what it means to be socialist has to do with expectations of what the state should provide. Tajik Ishkashimis experienced the Soviet Union as an allocative centre that helped them greatly. The post-Soviet Tajik state is unable to provide for Tajik Ishkashimis in the way of the former Soviet Union. I suggest that Tajik Ishkashimis’ religious leader, the Aga Khan, and his development institutions have gone some way toward filling this gap, making the Imam appear to be the new paternalist centre. I propose that we think through Ishkashimis’ memories of their relations with the Soviet allocative centre through what I call an “economy of grace”. Drawing on Pitt-Rivers’ theorization of “grace” as a morally-driven gift of excess that the receiver is never expected to (be able to) return, I trace the ways in which this economy of grace continues to frame Ishkashimis’ post-Soviet engagement with the Imam and his institutions, if not with the Tajik state. I then explore the moral legacies of Soviet socialism by examining how Ishkashimis try to maintain values that they associate with socialism, most notably the privileging of social relations over the market. Where both the Tajik state and the Imam’s institutions fail to provide for Tajik Ishkashimis in the way of the former Soviet state, Ishkashimis turn to labour migration. I draw on Greenberg’s (2011) and Jansen’s (2011) definition of “normal” as the predictability of daily life to demonstrate that remittances enable those living at home to maintain the rhythms and trajectories of “normal” village life. One of the effects of migration, however, is that the absence of migrants has made villages in Ishkashim no longer feel like home. It is my contention that wedding videos actualize a transnational home by giving hope that migrants who had been present in Ishkashim for when the wedding was taped might one-day return.Many hope that the Imam will create jobs in Ishkashim that will bring home migrants because they see that his development projects in Afghanistan have had this effect. Tajik Ishkashimis want their state to enable such development work on their side too, but they also worry that the work of the Imam and his institutions will force them to negotiate the norms and values of what it means to be Ishkashimi with their cross-border Afghan kin. And so, they look to the Tajik state to firmly enforce the border and keep clear the division between Tajik and Afghan Ishkashim. Ultimately, notwithstanding the incapacity of the Imam and his institutions to provide for Tajik Ishkashimis in the way of the former Soviet state, the Imam continues to garner legitimacy because he is also a spiritual leader. As such, the Imam commands a moral order, motivating people to be good so that they can achieve spiritual enlightenment. I explain that for Tajik Ishkashimis, being good is not (yet) defined by orthopraxy. Instead, Ishkashimis strive to be good in their own ways within the context of the changing socio-economic circumstances. In many ways, even though Tajik Ishkashimis’ present socio-economic situation is ostensibly worse than during the Soviet era, they now have access to the Imam in a way they never had before. Tajik Ishkashimis hold out hope for a better future, one that looks very much like their Soviet past, only better. Better because it has the Imam in it and the spiritual component of his leadership gives him the potential to satisfy them in ways that the former Soviet state could never have.

What explains the dynamics of contentious collective political action in post-Soviet Central Asia? How do post-Soviet Central Asian citizens negotiate the tensions between partaking in and abstaining from elite-challenging collective protests? By analysing cross-national attitudes in two Central Asian states, this article (1) systematically analyses the variation in collective protests by testing rival macro-, meso-, and micro-level theories; (2) reintroduces a conceptual and empirical distinction between low-risk and high-risk collective protests; and (3) examines the conditions under which individuals participate in two distinct types of elite-challenging collective actions. Three conclusions are reached. First, the evidence suggests that nuanced consideration of multi-level theoretical perspectives is necessary to explain contingencies of elite-challenging actions. Second, economic grievances and resource mobilization emerge as leading factors driving both low-risk and high-risk protests. Third, Islamic religiosity and social networking robustly predict participation in high-risk collective action.

To what extent does Islam help explain the dynamics of a participatory civil society in the post-Soviet Muslim-majority Central Asia? More specifically, to what extent does the variation in Islam (personal religiosity) and political Islam (support for Islam’s role in politics) help predict the propensity to engage in elite-challenging collective political actions, rooted in self-assertive social capital? Grounded in emancipative social capital theory, this article embarks on an individual-level quantitative analysis to systematically examine the variation in self-assertive collective action in four Central Asian republics. This study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the empirical nexus between general religiosity (Islam), Islamism (Political Islam), and elite-challenging collective actions and offers new clues on the empirical interactions between resurgent Islam and collective political participation in the post-Communist Muslim world.

No description available.

This thesis will determine the influence of Turkey's domestic resources on Turkey's foreign relations with the five Turkic states in the Caspian Sea Region. The spheres analyzed in this study are the common ties, which are history, culture, religion and language, with the regional countries, pan-Turkism, Turkey's initial interactions as well as ongoing constructive policies in the region. Findings showed that both Turkey and the five Turkic republics were enthusiastic to carry their relations in every field to future cooperation following the break up of the Soviet Union. However the Turkic Republics' interest in Turkish development model gradually declined starting from the 1994s.The hypothesis that socio-cultural ties will ease establishing close foreign relations is applicable to all five republics. The Turkic states welcomed Turkey's educational and cultural policies with great willingness. In the field of business we find that Turkish economy follows a similar pattern in its relations with the Azerbaijani and Central Asian markets. Accordant policy goals of Turkey and the five republics led Turkey to establish close foreign relations with the regional countries. Turkey tried to give military aid to the Turkic republics of Central Asia in their struggle against terrorist groups which have the capacity to destabilize governments and to threaten international security. The hypothesis that the more Turkey has business interests in the Caspian Sea Region the more Turkey will have closer foreign relations with Turkic countries is mostly apparent in the case of Azerbaijan. In the area of energy politics Turkey has its strongest link with Azerbaijan. Besides being strong economic partners Turkey is Azerbaijan's biggest supporter in the region against Armenia.

The intent of this thesis is to explore why when compared to the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine and Georgia there is a measure of stability in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has made it a priority to slowly build a sense of its own nationalism after decades of Soviet control. In over 20 years of independence it has only known violence for an 18-month period. The Republic of Kazakhstan has gone from the leftovers from a dissolved empire to a stable regional power. Kazakhstan’s hegemony in Asia and peaceful ethnic-governmental relations has made it possible for Kazakhstan to have a multi-faceted foreign policy with Russia, China, and the United States and this paper will try to answer the question of how this has been possible.

No description available.

No description available.